In recent years, an argument has developed in social work research between supporters of the “heuristic paradigm” and the defenders of the traditional positivistic model. The authors believe that this is the wrong argument, and that supporters of the heuristic paradigm are really opposed to a kind of naive inductionism rather than science in general. The authors argue that the whole notion of paradigm shift obscures more than it clarifies and that the argument can be resolved by using an approach to science based on ideas advanced by Popper and Ravetz that avoids naive inductionism.
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