Mobilizing the Base and Embarrassing the Opposition: Defense of Marriage Referenda and Cross-Cutting Electoral Cleavages

Abstract

Using the recent spate of so-called Defense of Marriage (DOMA) referenda as a point of analysis, the author argues that direct democracy presents the potential for intensifying the nature of interparty competition at the state level. Given a particular configuration of circumstances—namely where a salient electoral issue cross-cuts already existing party cleavages—ballot referenda can become tools by which political parties “poach” members of an opposing coalition. Using data at the county level, the author finds evidence that DOMA ballot referenda do not simply mobilize conservative Protestant voters; they also (potentially) reorient the partisan loyalties of two core Democratic constituencies: African Americans and Hispanics. However, as the electoral system is dynamic, the effectiveness of referenda as mechanisms of partisan competition changes with succeeding election cycles and may even lead to unintended effects. Notably, late-cycle DOMA elections (those occurring in 2005 and 2006) provide evidence both for increasingly effective mobilization within the gay and lesbian community and, more surprisingly, to increasing opposition to antigay marriage measures on the part of Mainline Protestant and Catholic voters. The author discusses the implications of these findings for our understanding of the gay marriage debate specifically and for the dynamics of the American party system more generally.