A key scope condition of most theory and research on exchange networks is that network members try to maximize profit. Thus members will try to use maximally one type of power: power concerning own interests. I specify a measure for power concerning own interests (POI) as a particular specification of a more general measure for social power. I calculate POI, conditional on fully competent actors, for two reciprocal exchange networks studied experimentally by Molm. Analysis shows that POI is related in complex ways to power over others' outcomes (Emerson's definition of power) and power over others' behavior (Homans's definition of power), thus implying that experimental networks with the scope condition of profit-maximizing actors may be ill suited to assess the latter two types of power. Comparison with empirical results shows that participants were far from competent in use of rewards, although fairly competent in their (lack of) use of punishment.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
BienenstockElisa JayneBonacichPhillip. 1992. “The Core as a Solution to Exclusionary Networks.”Social Networks14: 231–43.
2.
ColemanJames S.1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3.
CookKaren S.EmersonRichard M., 1978. “Power, Equity and Commitment in Exchange Networks.”American Sociological Review43: 712–39.
4.
CookKaren S.EmersonRichard M.GillmoreMary R.YamagishiToshio. 1983. “The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results.”American Journal of Sociology89: 275–305.
5.
DahlRobert A.1961. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press.
6.
EmersonRichard M.1972. “Exchange Theory, Part I: A Psychological Basis for Social Exchange” and “Exchange Theory, Part II: Exchange Relations and Network Structures.” Pp. 38–87 in Sociological Theories in Progress, vol. 2, edited by BergerJ.ZelditchM.Jr.AndersonB., Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
7.
FrenchJohn R. P.RavenBertram H., 1959. “The Bases of Social Power.” In Studies in Social Power, edited by CartwrightD., Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research.
8.
HeckathornDouglas. 1983. “Extensions of Power-Dependence Theory: The Concept of Resistance.”Social Forces61: 1248–59.
HomansGeorge C.1974. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
11.
LasswellHarold D.1958. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Meridian Books.
12.
LaudanLarry. 1990. Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
13.
MannMichael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
MarkovskyBarry. 1987. “Toward Multilevel Sociological Theories: Simulations of Actor and Network Effects.”Sociological Theory5: 101–17.
15.
MarkovskyBarrySkvoretzJohnWillerDavidLovagliaMichael J.ErgerJeffrey. 1993. “The Seeds of Weak Power: Extending Network Exchange Theory.”American Sociological Review58: 197–209.
16.
MeekerBarbara Foley. 1979. “Exchange Rules and Goal Structures.”Human Relations32: 523–44.
17.
MolmLinda D.1997. Coercive Power in Social Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
MolmLinda D.CookKaren S., 1995. “Social Exchange and Exchange Networks.” Pp. 209–35 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology, edited by CookK. S.FineG. A.HouseJ. S., Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
19.
ShubikMartin. 1982. Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20.
TaylorMichael. 1987. The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.1994. “Social Structure and the Actor: The Case of Power in Exchange Networks.”Social Psychology Quarterly57: 177–89.
22.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.1997. “Applying General Equilibrium Analysis and Game Theory to Exchange Networks.”Current Research in Social Psychology2: 13–23 <http://wwwuiowa.edu/∼grpproc>.
23.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.1999a. “Convex Preferences and Power Inequality in Exchange Networks: An Experimental Study.”Rationality and Society11: 367–90.
24.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.1999b. “Interest-Network Structures in Exchange Networks.”Sociological Perspectives42: 23–47.
25.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.2000a. “Power through Appointment.”Social Science Research29: 535–55.
26.
WhitmeyerJoseph M.2000b. “The Power You Need for a Cost You Can Afford: How to Use Individual and Collective Sanctions.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 12–16, Washington, DC.
27.
WillerDavidSkvoretzJohn. 1997. “Games and Structures.”Rationality and Society9: 5–35.
28.
YamaguchiKazuo. 1996. “Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational-Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization.”American Sociological Review61: 308–32.
