This chapter explores the history of accident investigation and shows how the quest for understanding the multitude of physical, environmental, and behavioral factors found in transportation accidents has profoundly influenced views of human behavior and performance. The chapter also explores how a multidisciplinary approach to accident investigation has been influenced by a human factors perspective on transportation safety. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what recent research at the National Transportation Safety Board suggests may be the future for accident investigation.
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