Providing Battlespace Information to Reduce Uncertainty: Will More Information Lead to Better Plans?

Abstract

One basic assumption behind network-centric warfare (NCW) is that increased supply of information will reduce battlespace uncertainty and increase decision quality. The purpose of this study was to test this assumption. Swedish army captains formed 16 brigade-level planning teams and performed in a realistic planning task. Eight teams planned with access to NCW-similar (abundant) information on the enemy situation, and 8 teams planned using the information supply of today. Results showed a significant reduction in perceived uncertainty for the NCW-condition teams but no substantial differences in plan quality, plan confidence, plan variability, or planning time between the two conditions. These results indicate that even though more information may result in less perceived uncertainty among future military decision makers, an increased information supply needs to be coupled with changes in doctrine and training to provide a maximum benefit to the military planner.

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