One major problem with pilot-automation interaction on modern flight decks is a lack of mode awareness; that is, a lack of knowledge and understanding of the current and future status and behavior of the automation. A lack of mode awareness is not simply a pilot problem; rather, it is a symptom of a coordination breakdown between humans and machines. Recent changes in automation design can therefore be expected to have an impact on the nature of problems related to mode awareness. To examine how new automation properties might affect pilot-automation coordination, we performed a full-mission simulation study on one of the most advanced automated aircraft, the Airbus A-320. The results of this work indicate that mode errors and "automation surprises" still occur on these advanced aircraft. However, there appear to be more opportunities for delayed or missing interventions with undesirable system activities, possibly because of higher system autonomy and coupling.
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