The authors trace the dubious origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act through the legislative debate reported in the Congressional Record and contemporary commentary in the newspapers, particularly the New York Times. This examination shows that the evolution of effective market governance mechanisms is sometimes unpredictable, unintended, and fortuitous. Just as weak law and market governance mechanisms can result from the best of legislative intentions, so superior law and market governance mechanisms can result from the worst of legislative intentions. The authors discuss implications for marketers and marketing scholars, particularly how powerful and useful generally worded law can become in the hands of judges who are invited by the initial legislators to interpret the specific reach of the law.
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