This article explores the regulation of cartel conduct in Australia focusing, in
particular, on the recent decision to criminalise so-called
‘hard-core’ cartels. It illuminates three interdependent
ambiguities in regulating such conduct: economic, moral and legal. The case
study is drawn on to highlight the challenges for the criminal law in attempting
to resolve such ambiguities or tensions as they arise in the regulation of
business behaviour generally.We argue that such challenges exist because the
ambiguities reflect broader shifts taking place on an ongoing basis in economic
policy, political ideology and social norms in Australian society.
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