Abstract
This article considers the use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or informers, by law enforcement agencies and examines whether sufficient ‘duty of care’ is being afforded them. It reflects on the implications of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which provide stringent controls and inspection processes for the management and use of informers by public authorities. The article examines those criminal cases of relevance, especially relating to the civil law of tort, to determine whether law enforcement agencies could have claims made against them for a lack of duty of care, or negligence. The use of a transparent risk management process is recommended, and the article provides examples of some areas of improvement considered necessary, including the use of an independent and objective inspections body.
The policeman does not care about the informant's reputation among his fellows, except as it effects the work of the policeman.
(J. H. Skolnick, 1966, Justice Without Trial. New York: Wiley, 132.)
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