Abstract
This article considers whether the leading perspectives of the theory of choice can provide the criminal law with a map to establishing when and where on the commission of a crime the agent should be held criminally culpable for a criminal attempt contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. In order to do so, this article will focus on examining the modern views of choice theory and their application in relation to the criminal attempter, namely, the last-act-attempter and non-last-act-attempter. As a result of such an inquiry it will be revealed that choice theory does not adequately correspond to reconciling the attribution of criminal culpability for both the last-act and non-last-act-attempter because theorists are eroding the theory of choice by supporting the reconcilement of criminal responsibility upon various views of subjectivism.
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