This article, and a related one in the next issue, investigates some myths surrounding the application of the right to life at the end of life. The present article focuses upon the myth that the right to life is an absolute right, always requiring the preservation of life. It identifies three distinct situations in which state authorities may be justified in declining to take intervening action in order to save a life. It argues that the right to life encompasses recognition of the impossibility and undesirability of preserving human life in all circumstances and that recognition of this fact will render the right more useful in a health-care context.
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See, for example, HarrisJ. The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics. London: Routledge, 1985; and Singer P. Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, for the drawing of a distinction between human beings and persons, only the latter of which qualify for rights
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The question of when the protection of the right to life begins is a complex and controversial one. It remains an unanswered question in international law, while different national systems have reached different answers. It is beyond the realms of this article to address it but the author's previous writing on this issue can be found inWicksE. The Right to Life and Conflicting Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, Chapter 1
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These guidelines were subsequently published as ‘Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ (2010). See http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html (last checked 26 October 2011)
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Transparency is one aspect of a broader approach developed by Daniels and Sabin in the context of funding for health care which has become extremely influential in recent years. Their approach, called ‘accountability for reasonableness’, is based upon an understanding that a lack of consensus on substantive solutions requires increased focus on procedural fairness. (DanielsN, SabinJ. Setting Limits Fairly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.) See also K Syrett, ‘Nice Work? Rationing, Review and the ‘Legitimacy Problem’ in the New NHS’ (2002) 10 Med.L.R. 1 and ‘NICE and Judicial Review: Enforcing ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’ through the Courts?’ (2008) 16 Med.L.R. 127
