This article describes the state-of-the-art methods available for systems reliability assessment. The significant contributions made to those methods in common use for the analysis of industrial systems are identified. The article reviews the developments in engineering systems that are likely to occur over the next decade that will challenge the current capability in this field and the potential advances that may result. A discussion is also provided of novel uses that will become possible due to the advances made in the assessment techniques over this period.
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