Meta-analyses of research on consensus estimation have identified an asymmetry in the error patterns between majorities and minorities (Gross & Miller, 1997; Mullen & Hu, 1988). Members of the majority slightly underestimate the size of their own group, whereas members of the minority strongly overestimate the size of theirs. The present analysis shows that a single psychological assumption about projection is sufficient to explain this asymmetry. Most people, regardless of whether they are actually members of the majority or members of the minority, believe themselves to be in the majority. It is not necessary to attribute different psychological mechanisms, such as ego protection or cognitive availability, to majority and minority members. A simple quantitative model and empirical data illustrate this point.
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