In this article we contrast static and dynamic theories of the effects of increasing the costs and benefits of cooperation in a repeated play prisoners' dilemma (PD). Using computer simulation as the methodology, we show that different decision heuristics respond differently to changes in the cost-benefit structure of a PD game, an effect not expected by static theories of cooperation. In addition, one of the heuristics, “win-stay, lose-change,” displays the pattern of cooperation predicted by static theories, but the underlying mechanisms are qualitatively differentfrom those assumed in the static theory. This demonstration raises questions about the external validity of the different types of social psychological theory.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Brendl, C. M., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Principles of judging valence: What makes events positive or negative. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 28, pp. 95-160). San Diego, CA: Academic.
2.
Burnstein, E., Crandall, C., & Kitayama, S. (1994). Some neo-Darwinian rules for altruism: Weighing cues for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the decision. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 773-789.
3.
Buskens, V., & Snijders, C. (1996). Individual heuristics and the dynamics of cooperation in large groups: Comment. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
4.
Coleman, A. (1995). Game theory and its applications. Oxford, England: Pergamon.
5.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology. 31, 169-193.
6.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178.
7.
Hornstein, H. A. (1972). Promotive tension: The basis of prosocial behavior from a Lewinian perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 191-218.
8.
Isen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, (Vol. 20, pp. 203-254). New York: Academic.
9.
Kalai, E., & Lehrer, E. (1993). Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica, 61, 1019-1045.
10.
Kelley, H. H., & Grzelak, J. (1972). Conflict between individual and common interest in an n-person relationship. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 190-197.
11.
Kelley, H. H., Thibaut, J. W., Radloff, R., & Mundy, D. (1962). The development of cooperation in the “minimal social situation”. Psychological Monographs, 76(Whole No. 19).
12.
Komorita, S. S. (1976). A model of the n-person dilemma-type game. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 357-373.
13.
Komorita, S. S., & Ellis, A. L. (1995). Reward structure and cooperation in the n-person prisoner's dilemma. In D. A. Schroeder (Ed.), Social dilemmas (pp. 15-30). Westport, CT: Praeger.
14.
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Madison, WI: Brown & Benchmark.
15.
Komorita, S. S., Sweeney, J., & Kravitz, D. A. (1980). Cooperative choice in the n-person dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 504-516.
16.
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 245-252.
17.
Krech, D., & Crutchfield, R. (1948). Theory and problems of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
18.
Liebrand, W. B. G., Messick, D. M., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1992). Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings. Oxford, England: Pergamon.
19.
Macy, M. W. (1991). Learning to cooperate: Stochastic and tacit collusion in social exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 97, 808-843.
20.
Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In L. Wheeler & P. Shaver (Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol.4, pp. 11-44). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
21.
Messick, D. M., & Liebrand, W. B. G. (1995). Individual heuristics and the dynamics of cooperation in large groups. Psychological Review, 102, 131-145.
22.
Messick, D, M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1-25.
23.
Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Clark, R. D. (1982). Responsive bystanders: The process of intervention. In V. J. Derlega & J. Grzelak (Eds.), Cooperation and helping behavior (pp. 279-304). New York: Academic.
24.
Pruitt, D. G. (1970). Motivational processes in the decomposed prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14, 227-238.
25.
Pruitt, D. G. (1967). Reward structure and cooperation: The decomposed prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 21-27.
26.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363-392.
27.
Rapoport, A. (1967). A note on the “index of cooperation” for prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 101-103.
28.
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995). Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164-212.
29.
Thibaut, J. W., & Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley.
30.
Tyler, T., & Hastie, R. (1991). The social consequences of cognitive illusions. In M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations (Vol. 3, pp. 69-98). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
31.
Vallacher, R. R., & Nowak, A. (1994). Dynamical systems in social psychology. San Diego, CA: Academic.
32.
Vallacher, R. R., & Nowak, A. (in press). The emergence of dynamical social psychology. Psychological Inquiry.
