Abstract
This article aims to illuminate the fundamental problems of law and jurisprudence with reference to the fundamental tension between the immanence and imminence of language. The irreducible tension between the immanence and imminence of language constitutes the complex interface between language and itself, or between the two fundamental linguistic modes through which language becomes language. The article economically refers to this complex interface as the immimanence of language. The complex structure or structuration of this interface, it argues, goes to the heart of the relation between justice and law. In other words, it goes to the heart of the fundamental problem of jurisprudence. The paper explores this interface of immimanence that conditions both language and just law with reference to Wittgenstein on the one hand (immanence), and Derrida and Agamben on the other (imminence).
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