Prolegomenon to a Theory of Punishment'

Abstract

The expression “Theory of Punishment” is rather obscure; typically conflating two different enterprises: first, a purely descriptive enterprise which seeks to define punishment, and, second, a normative enterprise which seeks to justify punishment. While some authors have asserted that these two enterprises are inescapably linked, others have tried to keep them distinct. I think that the latter approach is on the right track, but that its proponents have not remained faithful to the very separation that they recommend. Thus I discuss here the standard account of punishment found in the philosophical literature, together with what I suggest are its shortcomings. I then present my own account of punishment, which I think overcomes the shortcomings of the standard account. While solving some problems, my account could be seen as creating new problems of its own, but I endeavor to show that these allegedly new problems are, at best, not really problems at all, or, at worst, are not terribly worrisome.