The Real Schlieffen Plan

Abstract

In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to change in Germany’s war plans. Schlieffen’s 1905 memorandum took account of this strategic change and allowed Schlieffen at last to place at the heart of his war plan ideas he had been developing since the 1890s. Although modifications were made to meet changes in Germany’s strategic situation, this memorandum served as the basis for all German war plans before 1914. Thus, Schlieffen deserves to be remembered as the father of Germany’s war plan, with all its strengths and weaknesses, in 1914.