Abstract
An examination of the politico-strategic relationship between Great Britain and Australia during the Second World War demonstrates the extent to which wartime politics as conducted by Winston Churchill could be determined entirely by strategic logic. The basis for that logic was to be found in the plans and projections developed to control and manage the war against Japan. These plans, which rested on a strategic grammar composed partly of established working premises for gauging an enemy’s intentions and partly of more solidly based judgements about the range of military options open to the enemy, were of two kinds: until December 1941 they were speculative estimates of Japan’s likely course of action, while thereafter they became more robust calculations of her capabilities. Their influence shaped the wartime relationship between London and Canberra. It also explains the central paradox of the Anglo-Australian strategic relationship: that between January and June 1942, at the moment of greatest threat, Australia was least able to strike a military bargain with Great Britain on any terms which she could call her own.
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