Freedom and environmental protection as a constitutional problem

Abstract

Most of the environmental protection measures taken by the state can be considered, first of all, as restrictions of individual freedom in the traditional sense of the word; that is, as interference with basic rights. It might be tempting to exclude ab initio activities harmful to the environment from the area of protection of freedom rights. This would lead, however, to a liquidation of the understanding of freedom granted by the German Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz). Efficient environmental protection can be achieved within the limits of the Grundgesetz by granting a comprehensive weighing of interests at the same time. In the Grundgesetz, the understanding of environmental protection is an anthropocentric one, which protects the environment in its function as the vital basis of man. This is the logical conclusion drawn from the function of the constitution as a human order. Individual rights of nature would not grant ‘better’ environmental protection, because all the parts of nature also serve, finally, to maintain the human basis of life. Principally, the constitution does not recognise subjective rights of environmental protection against the state. The state as an ‘environmental state’ does not exercise omnipotence in environmental law, but through the principle of cooperation both the state and the citizens are appointed to solve the existing tasks.