Within the current transformation of both social and economic theory, the French régulation school (FRS) and German autopoietic social theory (ASS) hold two prominent positions, yet without much of an engagement if not even mutual neglect. This paper suggests an avenue for mutual engagement by emphasising similarities. In particular, it will use the common interest in the social nature of contingency and crises as a vantage point to suggest a common research agenda on risk, non-knowledge and governance regimes. This proposal suggests two amendments to the régulation school which are of central importance for social systems theorists and where the latter might provide useful stimulus. First, this paper proposes an incorporation of science and other knowledge-producing networks as an institutional form. Second, this paper argues for the introduction of the idea of ‘social differentiation’ to describe the changing interdependencies of the economy, politics, law and science due to a reconfiguration of the boundaries between national and international regimes.
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