Russia inherited from the Soviet Union vast holdings of nuclear weapons and of the fissile materials necessary to build them. These nuclear assets have been in the possession of a Russia in the midst of an extraordinarily difficult and turbulent political, social, and economic transformation. Never before have such enormous inventories of nuclear weapons and fissile materials existed in such circumstances of political instability and uncertainty and economic distress. The economic struggles and financial crisis experienced by Russia since it emerged as an independent state in 1991 have placed enormous stress on its society. The Russian military and the Russian nuclear complex have not been exempt from these pressures. This reality has led to concerns that the Russian state is not in a position to provide adequately for the safety and security of its nuclear assets. If true, this would raise the risk that these assets could leak out of Russia and into the hands of those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons –the so called nuclear leakage problem.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50% of the economic activity in Russia occurs in the so called ‘shadow economy’ (seeThornhillJ.: ‘Russians grow rich in the shadows’, Financ. Times, 1998, 16 January; and J. Thornhill: ‘Russia's black market may be 50% of output’, Financ. Times, 1998, 16 January).
2.
See in particular the disturbing analysis by Alexei Arbatov, ‘Russian military reform: dilemmas, obstacles, and prospects’ (CSIA Discussion Paper 97–01, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, September 1997). An earlier analysis that identifies similar trends isLambethB.: ‘Russia's wounded military’, Foreign Aff., 1995, 74, March/April, 86–98. See also L. Rokhlin: ‘Castles in air for defenders of fatherland’, Pravda, 1998, 21 February, which suggests that most Russian servicemen and their families live far below the official poverty line.
3.
See, for example, LodgeR.: ‘Russian mafia gangs infiltrate army’,Times (Lond.), 1998, 11 March, which reported that 18 000 Russian officers were charged with criminal activity in 1997 and noted that the Russian Minister of Defence, General Igor Sergeyev, hadhimself claimed that criminal activity in the Russian military had reached ‘critical levels’.
On the suicide of the director of Chelyabinsk 70, and on the problem of economic collapse more generally, seeBunnM. and HoldrenJ.: ‘Managing military uranium and plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union’,Annu. Rev. Energy Environ., 1997, 475–477.
6.
For details, seeAllisonG., CoteO, FalkenrathR., and MillerS.: ‘Avoiding nuclear anarchy’, CSIA Studies in International Security, 31–36; 1996, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
7.
This is sometimes described as the ‘guards, guns, gates, and gulag’ approach to nuclear security. See, for example, p. 3 of the US Department of Energy's ‘MPC&A programme strategic plan’ (January 1998).
8.
DeutchJ.: ‘The threat of nuclear diversion’, in ‘Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Affairs, March1996, Washington, DC, 312.
9.
The inadequacies of Russian nuclear security have been enumerated in a number of sources, most authoritatively in the DOE's ‘MPC&A programme strategic plan’ (pp. 2–5). Earlier illustrative material can be found inVon HippelF.: ‘Fissile material security in the post-Cold War world’, Phys. Today, June1995, 26–31; and O. Bukharin and W. Potter: ‘Potatoes were guarded better’, Bull. Atom. Sci., May/June 1995, 46–50.
10.
The progress achieved up to January 1998 is concisely summarised in the DOE's ‘MPC&A programme strategic plan’, especially pp. 18–21.
11.
BunnM. and HoldrenJ.: ‘Managing military uranium and plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union’, Annu. Rev. Energy Environ., 1997, 421.
12.
See, for example, Von HippelF.: ‘Fissile material security in the post-Cold War world’, Phys. Today, June1995, 26.
13.
SeeAllisonG., CoteO, FalkenrathR., and MillerS.: ‘Avoiding nuclear anarchy’, CSIA Studies in International Security,106–108; 1996, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press; and M. Bunn and J. Holdren: ‘Managing military uranium and plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union’, Annu. Rev. Energy Environ., 1997, 422–423.
14.
See, for example, SchaperA.: ‘Nuclear smuggling in Europe: real dangers and enigmatic deceptions’, in ‘Illegal nuclear traffic: risks, safeguards, and countermeasures’, (ed. KouzminovV. and MartelliniM.), Unesco Science for Peace Series No. 4, 132–135; 1998, Unesco.
15.
See, for example, CochranT.: ‘Safeguarding nuclear weapon-usable materials in Russia’, in ‘Illegal nuclear traffic: risks, safeguards, and countermeasures’, (ed. KouzminovV. and MartelliniM.), Unesco Science for Peace Series No. 4, 102; 1998, Unesco.
16.
As reported in the DOE's ‘MPC&A programme strategic plan’ (p. 3).
17.
CochranThomas, for example, suggests that intelligence services may have been operating under more restrictive reporting guidelines since1994(see Ref. 15, p. 101).
18.
As reported in ‘Mubarak turns down a nuclear bomb offer’, Ha'aretz, 1998, 19 June.
19.
CockburnA. and CockburnL.: ‘One point safe’, 73–74; 1998, Boston, MA, Little, Brown.
20.
See, for example, HandelmanS.: ‘The Russian Mafiya’, Foreign Aff., 1994, 73, March/April, 83–96. An example of illicit activity in relation to gold and gems is provided by M. Franchetti: ‘Panic grips Kremlin in $180 million diamond scandal’, Sunday Times, 1998, 14 June.
21.
ArbatovA.: ‘Russian military reform: dilemmas, obstacles, and prospects’, CSIA Discussion Paper97–01, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, September1997.
22.
It is for this reason that many who have examined these issues conclude that a major initiative to support economic diversification of Russia's nuclear cities is imperative. See, for example, the proposal of the Russian–American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, ‘The nuclear weapons complexes: meeting the conversion challenge’ (September 1997).
23.
For a detailed examination of these issues, seeFalkenrathR. A., NewmanR, and ThayerB.: ‘America's Achilles heel: nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and covert delivery’;1998, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
24.
A recent examination of the nuclear terrorism threat is the Global Organized Crime Project's‘Wild atom: nuclear terrorism’ (1998, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
