Abstract
The paper is written in reply to Christopher Oleson's “Dignitas personae and the Question of Heterologous Embryo Transfer” in this issue. Oleson provides a very perceptive and comprehensive commentary on the key texts. This reply articulates my reasons for continued skepticism on whether Dignitas personae has settled the question on embryo rescue. The source of my skepticism concerns Oleson's key premise according to which heterologous embryo transfer for treating infertility and for rescue are the same moral acts. I argue that they are in fact different moral acts not merely in virtue of different intentions, but in virtue of their order. Embryo transfer is properly ordered to the end of rescue, but is inapposite for treating infertility—as this would replace the conjugal act. I conclude by offering several reductio ad absurdum arguments that argue in favor of embryo rescue.
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