Is the World Confronting China’s Influence Operations?

Introduction

Influence operations (IOs) are defined as “organized attempts to achieve a specific effect among a targeted audience” (Thomas et al., 2020). The target audience might include individual leaders, members of decision-making bodies, military organizations, specific population subgroups, or the public. Such operations often employ tactics such as sabotage, discredit operations, provocations, false flag operations, and manipulation—all aimed at weakening social and political cohesion. China has resorted to an integrated usage of its diplomatic, economic, and informational capabilities to conduct IOs that interfere with civic life overseas. IOs are more successfully carried out in constitutional democracies, as the civil liberties of such forms of government help IOs shield their agendas under the guise of popular expression. This environment significantly reduces the cost of IOs and rather provides an incentivized turf through existing civilian infrastructure of popular expression, for instance, social, electronic, and print media. Consequently, IOs become both cost-effective and difficult to detect. The advent of modern technologies has accelerated such operations to an unprecedented scale.

An illustrative case is that of the group No Cold War, which staged protests in the United States claiming that heightened Western rhetoric against China distracted attention from urgent global issues such as climate change and racial injustice. While such protests could be a genuine expression of public opinion, a New York Times investigation revealed that the group was lavishly funded by China and carries out Chinese IOs (Hvistendahl et al., 2023). In London, the same group’s protesters displayed placards reading “End China Bashing.” The investigation also linked these activities to American millionaire Neville Roy Singham, based in Shanghai, who has committed to promoting the Chinese Communist Party internationally. Therefore, when such protests demand reduced war rhetoric and provocations, they seem organic. Similar operations have been reported in India, where influence efforts have been more apparent. For instance, the Chinese embassy issued an advisory to Indian media outlets on how they should cover Taiwan-related news. India’s Ministry of External Affairs reaffirmed press freedom, stating that “there is a free media in India” (Singh & Cook, 2022). The following sections examine the components of Chinese IOs—actors, methods, and actions.

Actor and Method

The role of the United Front Work Department (UNFD) warrants its examination as a key instrument in the Chinese IOs abroad. China operationalized it in the aftermath of the communist revolution in 1949, aiming at tackling the internal and external enemies of the party. Mao Zedong, the founding leader of the People’s Republic of China, called the UNFD a “magic weapon,” and it has been named in several espionage cases from the United States to Australia (Ewe & Bicker, 2024). Xi’s ascent caused a seismic shift in Deng Xiaoping’s Tao Guang Yang Hui [keeping a low profile] to Fan Fa You Wei [striving for achievement] (Sorenson, 2015, p. 53). The department employs strategies such as narrative building, “co-opt and coerce” approach, and other methods discussed below.

Actions

Narrative Building

China leverages multiple forms of influence in its IOs. In Malaysia, where ethnic Chinese constitute about 25% of the population, Beijing has exploited ethnic and racial tensions to promote pro-China discourse. Through political parties, traders, and businesses within the Malay Chinese community, leaders were persuaded to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative (Freedom House, 2022). In the Philippines, China used disinformation and social media to insert anti-imperialist narratives into public discourse (Freedom House, 2022). The campaign succeeded in turning President Duterte against the United States, fostering a defeatist perception that a potential war would inevitably harm the Philippines. In Indonesia, China promoted the idea among Islamic organizations that the United States is anti-Islam, thereby undermining American credibility. This narrative has contributed to a surge in Indonesian students choosing Chinese Universities. Confucius institutes worldwide have become integral to China’s “strategic narratives,” often presented as cultural or public diplomacy (Hartig, 2015, p. 245).

Strategic narratives aim to project a “correct image” rather than the “real picture” (Hartig, 2015, p. 245). A report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) titled “China’s Pursuit of a New Media World Order” explores how China is incessantly making efforts towards the creation of a new media world order (RSF, 2019). The journalists in China do not exert counter-power to the state. However, in liberal constitutional democracies like India, the media acts like a countervailing power. This setup of liberal constitutional frameworks facilitates China’s act of subversion of information, thereby setting up its own narratives. In India, evidence suggests that Beijing has influenced segments of the media to avoid criticism and promote favorable coverage (Freedom House, 2022). Narratives, even when based on misinformation, can have lasting effects—a phenomenon known as the “continued influence effect” (Ecker et al., 2022, p. 13). For instance, Britain’s colonial narrative of “white man’s burden” and the United States’ narrative regarding Iraq’s alleged possession of nuclear weapons remain evidence of outcomes that can result from strategic narrative building.

As part of its IOs, China employs a two-pronged strategy of narrative building—direct and indirect. First, it leverages its own media infrastructure to misrepresent other nations, as it did in Indonesia in portraying the United States as anti-Islam by engaging in psychological warfare. Second, it conducts direct IOs by injecting bellicosity into public discourse through the media outlets, often by hiring security and strategic experts. The case of News Click, an Indian online news portal, is a prime example: the outlet allegedly ran discrediting campaigns against several policies of the Government of India and, in April 2018, received 9.59 crore rupees “by way of subscription of shares” (Hindustan Times, 2023).

It is worth noting that China’s IOs frequently take the shape of “debt-trap diplomacy” in smaller South Asian and African countries, such as Sri Lanka and Kenya. Both countries are located at a crucial maritime crossroads; consequently, China has burdened them with burgeoning debt to expand its influence in the region. Similarly, in Latin America, China has emerged as the largest trading partner, and in May 2025, it announced a $9b credit line for the region (Roy, 2025). This growing economic dependence on China is being leveraged to isolate Taiwan. This was evident when the Central American Parliament expelled Taiwan from its position as a permanent observer and replaced it with China. Therefore, China has spread its operations across the globe with predetermined objectives.

Co-opting Local Leaders and Electoral Interference

This reflects a broader pattern among the PRC officials to co-opt representatives of ethnic minority groups or leaders of Chinese origin. A Canadian–Chinese lawmaker, Han Dong, testified about the foreign interference in his election. The Foreign Interference Commission was constituted to investigate possible electoral interference in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections (Foreign Interference Commission, 2024). According to a Canadian intelligence report, the Chinese consulate issued “veiled threats” to the Chinese students, linking them to visa concerns and the safety of their families in China (Onishi, 2024). In Canada, noncitizens over the age of 14 who reside in the same electoral district are entitled to vote in party elections. Similarly, in February 2024, Singapore invoked its Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act against Philip Chan Man Ping, a naturalized Singaporean. The law deals with foreign interference in domestic politics, targeting “hostile information campaigns and the use of local proxies” (Fang & Lau, 2024). Mr. Chan had been invited to attend China’s annual “Two Sessions” parliamentary meetings in the capacity of “overseas Chinese representative.”

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in its report on “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” also flagged the threat of Beijing’s malign IOs. The report revealed that China has used generative AI and fake TikTok accounts by a “PRC propaganda arm reportedly targeted candidates from both political parties during the midterm election cycle in 2022” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2024, p. 12). In this technique, widely known as “spamouflage,” the fake account holder masquerades as someone whom they are trying to help or discredit (Lindsay, 2024). The report rightly observed that Beijing has intensified its IOs to “mold the U.S. public discourse … on core sovereignty issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinxiang” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2024, p. 12). The UN General Assembly Resolution 44/147 (A/Res/44/147, 1989) explicitly states that any “extraneous activities … intended to sway the results” constitute electoral interference (A/Res/44/147, p. 226). Nevertheless, China is known for challenging the boundaries of international law within the existing global order.

Inducements and Coercion

The tactics of inducement and coercion constitute a psychological phenomenon aimed at eliciting specific behaviors. Schelling defines coercion as “the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that make someone yield or comply” (Schelling, 1970, p. 66). In the economic realm, China’s dual strategy of inducement and coercion is bluntly referred to as “debt-trap diplomacy.” Notably, China employs the same approach in conducting its IOs. The widespread Chinese diaspora provides Beijing with an edge to steer its “correct image” abroad or Xi Jinping’s preferred slogan for propaganda, Telling China’s Story Well, which he coined in 2013 (Xu & Gong, 2024, p. 1064). With an emphasis on external propaganda (Wai Xuan), China has been exerting control over its diaspora to exact strategic compliance from the Chinese students, researchers, and professionals overseas. One example is the operation of a secret Chinese police station in Manhattan’s Chinatown to track pro-democracy Chinese activists (U.S. Department of Justice, 2024). It has been reported that “at least 100 such stations have been reported worldwide across 53 countries … to threaten and monitor Chinese nationals abroad” (Ng, 2024).

Techno-authoritarianism and Digital Landscape

Within its territory, China has almost brought an Orwellian nightmare into existence. It is alarming that the country’s tech giants remain hand in glove with the political authorities, keeping their technological systems constantly hovering over users’ sensitive data. China has astutely developed its own technological ecosystem to create a distinct techno-sphere. In liberal democracies, oversight of such surveillance practices poses a serious challenge, as it risks violating human rights. This threat can be curbed by eliminating the presence of such service providers, as India did when it banned Huawei’s network services and several apps, including TikTok, to derail the Orwellian ambitions of the Chinese state. However, India and many other countries are still far from holding tech companies accountable to human rights standards.

Conclusion

China’s IOs pose an unprecedented challenge to the strategic autonomy of democracies worldwide. Such nations must remain vigilant and devise regulatory frameworks to curb these operations, while simultaneously fostering public awareness and strengthening the media and civic literacy. This will be a litmus test for security apparatuses of liberal democracies—assessing their ability to counter misinformation campaigns without compromising the democratic credentials. Targeted nations must develop analytical capabilities to decipher the Chinese IOs before resorting to law enforcement measures. Notably, it could be emulated by other nations to advance their interests, potentially eroding the norms of international law that govern diplomatic relations. Moreover, such practices could serve as a playbook for nations for strategic communication in which messages are transmitted opaquely, thereby undermining transparency within the international community. Therefore, it is essential for the affected nations to intensify discourse on the repercussions of these malign operations for democratic values and civic life.