The Blame Game: ISKP and the Fog of Geopolitical Rivalries

Introduction

In recent times, the Islamic State Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its affiliate, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), have been making headlines due to a string of high-profile attacks, highlighting the persistent and evolving nature of transnational terrorism threats. In January 2024, the devastating Kerman attack in Iran resulted in approximately 91 fatalities. Again in March 2024, ISKP orchestrated a sophisticated operation at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, resulting in nearly 145 deaths and 551 injuries. In Afghanistan, ISKP continues its campaign against the Taliban and religious minorities, claiming responsibility for multiple lethal attacks, including the assassination of Khalil Haqqani, the Taliban’s Minister for Refugees, and an attack on a Sufi shrine in Baghlan province in December 2024 (KabulNow, 2025). In the recent UN Security Council briefing on threats to international peace and security by terrorist acts, the Secretary General’s 20th biannual report addressed the growing threat posed by ISIS to international peace and security. This discussion highlighted that “ISIS affiliates in Central Asia, most notably the ISKP, also pose a significant global threat. We remain concerned about ISKP’s capabilities to plot and conduct attacks, as well as sustain recruitment campaigns, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Shea, 2025). It further touched upon some of the other key factors, such as ISIS’s continued use of online propaganda to recruit individuals and inspire attacks, thus contributing to the growing threat of online radicalization.

The ISKP has expanded its operations beyond Afghanistan. According to Ms. Gherman, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “ISKP supporters have been involved in plotting attacks in Europe and actively recruiting individuals from Central Asian states” (United Nations, 2025). In July 2024, French authorities arrested an 18-year-old ISIS sympathizer suspected of planning a terror attack. Additionally, the terrorist attack in New Orleans on January 1, 2025, heightened concerns about ISIS’s expanding digital influence. The attacker claimed to have been inspired by ISIS, highlighting the increasing role of online radicalization in global security threats. These incidents demonstrate how ISIS and its affiliates, such as the ISKP, continue to exploit digital platforms to spread extremist ideology, recruit followers, and coordinate attacks, posing a persistent challenge to international security. The scale, precision, and geographical diversity of these attacks suggest that the operational reach and evolving objectives of ISKP extend beyond its core areas of operation. These attacks indicate the group’s evolving strategy and ability to target international locations with increasing precision.

Differing perspectives exist regarding the nature and impact of ISKP. One perspective prevalent in some Western circles posits that the ISKP is largely a fabricated entity or a marginal group, possibly orchestrated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. This view suggests that the ISKP narrative was constructed to deflect culpability from the Afghan Taliban for atrocities, particularly those committed against non-Pashtun communities in Afghanistan. Proponents of this perspective argue that this strategy aimed to safeguard the Taliban’s image during critical Doha talks with the United States concerning the withdrawal of United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (Bacon, 2024). Conversely, another perspective is that the ISKP is a genuine and autonomous entity, distinct from the Taliban and other regional jihadist groups. This view asserts that the ISKP possesses a tangible presence in Afghanistan, underpinned by an ideology and modus operandi that diverge from those of the Taliban. Furthermore, it contends that the ISKP’s strategic ambitions extend beyond Afghanistan’s borders, indicating a broader operational scope and distinct objectives.

The ISKP’s origins continue to be a contentious issue, intertwined with regional rivalries, strategic distrust, and geopolitical scapegoating. The discourse over ISKP’s existence, origins, and the geopolitical ramifications of its acts poses a critical inquiry: Is ISKP a tangible entity or a construct manufactured by regional and global powers? This commentary puts forward the argument that the ISKP constitutes a real security danger to the states and governments in the region and beyond. However, with their perceptions and reactions warped by conflicting geopolitical narratives, many nations exploit the presence of the ISKP to advance their geopolitical objectives, ascribing the group’s creation to competing forces instead of recognizing the real threat that it poses because of its ideological convictions, strategic outlook, and operational autonomy. For example, Iran and the Taliban assert Western complicity in the formation of ISKP, while Pakistan blames India for nurturing the organization (Bacon, 2024). This blame game hinders international cooperation in counterterrorism initiatives. The ISKP flourishes in this fractured setting, utilizing its ideological narrative and technological prowess to further its activities and reach. The article underscores the necessity of transcending geopolitical blame to acknowledge ISKP as a collective danger and to tackle it through collaborative, evidence-driven counterterrorism strategies.

Competing Narratives of ISKP’s Origins: Examining the Interplay of Geopolitics, Blame, and Reality

The ISKP was officially proclaimed in January 2015, following pledges of loyalty from dissident elements of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP]), defectors from Afghan Taliban factions, and members of other terrorist organizations active in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region (Khan, 2019). The ISIS central leadership in Iraq and Syria accepted this pledge, recognizing ISKP as its affiliate in the Khorasan—a historical territory that included Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Iran. The ISKP’s initial objective was similar to that of the Islamic State’s worldwide strategy: to build a caliphate in Khorasan administered by their strict interpretation of Sharia law (Schulz, 2022). However, unlike ISIS in its heyday, which established territorial control in Iraq and Syria, ISKP has utilized more adaptive tactics. It has used guerrilla warfare, urban bombing-suicide operations, and transnational propaganda to portray itself as a constant security concern across South Asia. Nonetheless, the group’s operational independence and ties to significant state and non-state entities remain disputed, fueling competing narratives about its origins and goals.

It is in this context that one needs to understand the ideological schism between the ISKP and the Afghan Taliban. While both groups claim to uphold harsh Islamic rule, they differ significantly in their objectives and ideological foundations. The Afghan Taliban is focused on enforcing Sharia law within Afghanistan while maintaining its Pashtun identity and aligning with Afghan nationalist sentiments. The ISKP, however, rejects the whole idea of Afghan nationalism and instead advocates for a global caliphate based on rigid Salafist doctrine. In that sense, the ISKP continues to rail against the Afghan Taliban in the name of global Ummah (Baruah, 2023). It is also worth noting that the ISKP frequently criticizes the Afghan Taliban’s Deobandi religious ideology, dismissing it as a mere “jihadist movement.” It has also accused the Afghan Taliban of being a pliable force for Western interests, using the derogatory term “Mullah Bradley” to suggest cooperation with Washington (Kidwai, 2023). To counter the Taliban’s exclusive Deobandi influence, the ISKP portrays itself as a more inclusive Islamist group by appealing to non-Pashtun ethnic minorities and Afghan Salafis who feel marginalized in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. This growing division and ethnic resentment have heightened concerns about the potential for another civil war in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban’s and Iran’s Perspective: ISKP a US-created Proxy?

The Afghan Taliban and Iran are two of the most frequent sources of information on the beginnings of ISKP, both of which regard the organization as an American proxy (Bacon, 2024). According to this narrative, ISKP was established and backed by the United States in an effort to weaken the Taliban and destabilize Afghanistan and the surrounding area by extending the war. This accusation has become more intense after the Taliban’s comeback in 2021, when Afghan officials accused ISKP of serving as a vehicle for Western meddling. The Afghan Taliban’s views were further reinforced after the ISKP started attacking Taliban leaders since 2022.

Iran shares this opinion, believing that ISKP is a purposeful US plot to create division in the area and undermine Iran’s power. Tehran views the ISKP as a direct danger to its border areas, particularly its Shia communities, in addition to being an anti-Taliban force. Iran’s larger narrative of American imperialism and its involvement in West Asia (Middle East) is consistent with the assertion that the United States founded ISKP. However, there is little solid evidence to back up these assertions, and both independent observers and United States authorities have consistently refuted them, highlighting the ideological independence of ISKP and its animosity against both Western and regional entities (Star, 2024).

Such charges are advantageous to Iran and the Taliban because they allow them to assign responsibility for security lapses. Both players may avoid taking accountability for their failure to oppose ISKP by portraying it as a foreign puppet. This will also appeal to people in the region and at home who already have a negative opinion of US engagement in the region.

Pakistan’s View: ISKP an Indian Proxy?

Islamabad often claims that India is secretly helping the ISKP as part of a larger plan to destabilize Pakistan (Jazeera, 2020). This accusation has its roots in Pakistan’s tense history with India. Islamabad views New Delhi’s growing footprints in Afghanistan, ever since the withdrawal of US forces, as a clear threat to its national interests. In particular, Pakistan suspects that India is secretly backing the ISKP to create pressure on the Taliban government in Afghanistan and to drive a wedge between Pakistan and Afghanistan by causing unrest along the Durand Line, particularly in the tribal border areas.

Islamabad points to alleged Indian covert support to insurgent groups within Pakistan to justify its view that India is covertly supporting the ISKP (Khan, 2021). For instance, Islamabad has long claimed that India provides covert support to insurgent groups in Balochistan, like the Balochistan Liberation Army, in an effort to destabilize Pakistan (Najma, 2024). This narrative has big political ramifications because it makes the Indo–Pakistani relationship more tense and vitriolic.

India’s View: ISKP a Pakistani Creation?

On its part, India perceives the ISKP as an outcome of Pakistan’s enduring strategy of creating and endorsing terrorist organizations at home and in the immediate region (Pandya, 2021). The Indian narrative suggests that the ISKP is a part of Pakistan’s proxy warfare strategy of utilizing armed non-state actors to try and achieve strategic advantages in Afghanistan and to mitigate Indian influence in the area. Indian officials highlight Pakistan’s historical support for insurgent groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba as indicative of the notion that it is the Pakistani security establishment that gave birth to and nurtured the ISKP. India further posits that the ISKP’s limited presence and operations within Pakistan, in contrast to its major targeting of Taliban, Indian, and Iranian personnel and interests in Afghanistan, imply that the group is a Pakistani proxy and taking orders from Islamabad.

Russia’s Perspective: ISKP as a Western Tool Against Its Interests

Moscow often asserts that the ISKP is a tool of Western powers created to destabilize Eurasia, which is adjacent to Russia’s southern border. This narrative was reinforced after the 2024 Moscow Crocus Hall attack, which was claimed by the ISKP. Even though the ISKP claimed the attack, Russian leaders, including President Vladimir Putin, believed that the attack was planned with help from Ukraine and the West to punish and weaken Russia in the midst of the Ukraine war (Bacon, 2024).

Russia’s geopolitical objectives are probably served by this narrative of an elaborate conspiracy by Ukraine and the West. By saying that ISKP is a tool of the West, Moscow can promote the larger narrative that the West is hostile to Russia, which in turn can be used to justify its military operations in Ukraine and crackdown on domestic dissidents. Moscow’s narrative, however, makes the ISKP seem less independent than it actually is. It also overlooks the ISKP’s ideological and strategic objectives, which are definitely anti-West in orientation.

A Multi-state Blame Game: The Consequences

The conflicting accounts of the ISKP’s origins reflect a wider tendency on the part of regional and global powers to perceive the organization through the prism of their geopolitical rivalry. The narratives from Iran and the Afghan Taliban blame the United States, Pakistan’s narrative accuses India, and Russia sees a Western/Ukrainian conspiracy behind the ISKP’s operations. None of these narratives take into account the ISKP’s ideological and operational independence.

The blame game has not only fostered political conflicts but has also obstructed international collaboration attempts to mitigate the threats posed by the ISKP. When governments perceive their geopolitical enemies and rivals as instrumental in the formation and operation of the ISKP, they are often reluctant to exchange intelligence and collaborate in joint operations out of fear that such collaboration or joint operations may strengthen an adversary’s position. This undermines effective counterterrorism measures in the region, which require intelligence-sharing and military and non-military joint operations. The absence of a cohesive regional strategy to deal with the ISKP—similar to the previously established Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS—has resulted in substantial operational deficiencies. The ISKP has utilized these vulnerabilities to orchestrate and implement its global activities and expand its regional influence and reach.

Another fallout of this blame game has been the misdiagnosis of the ISKP’s genuine character. Framing the ISKP as a creation of foreign rivals and enemies has led to the underestimation of the group’s ideological, strategic, and operational intricacies. The ISKP is more than just a puppet for external powers. Its intellectual inspiration comes from the ISIS core, and its leadership and operators are mostly defectors from groups such as the Taliban and the TTP (Mines, 2021). The ISKP’s assaults have also targeted a diverse range of foes, including the Afghan Taliban, Iranian Shias, Western interests, and even Russia and China. Its hostility against state actors originates from its fundamental ideological belief that the present political dispensations must be overthrown to create an Islamic caliphate. This pan-Islamic identity of the ISKP allows it to transcend regional boundaries and rivalries, even as state actors try to co-opt the group in order to pursue their own geopolitical agendas. By misunderstanding and mischaracterizing the true nature of the ISKP, regional governments and major powers risk losing focus on the main issue: that they need to come together to combat an extremely lethal, adaptable, and ideologically driven organization that poses a major threat to all of them. The ISKP’s excellent ability to use advanced technology and its mastery of digital propaganda machinery, as demonstrated by ISKP websites like the Voice of Khorasan, has further enabled the group to expand its recruitment worldwide and inspire lone-wolf terror attacks across continents (Baruah, 2024).

Finally, the blame game feeds a self-reinforcing loop that indirectly supports the ISKP. These conflicting narratives, which deflect attention away from joint counterterrorism methods, may create ideal ground for ISKP recruitment. Local people, dissatisfied with their own governments and the steady stream of allegations and counter-accusations from national leaders, may fall much more easily for ISKP propaganda and extremist ideology. The ISKP’s vision of a worldwide caliphate may, therefore, gain more legitimacy.

Recommendations and Conclusions

First, nations must acknowledge the ISKP for what it is: a serious regional and global danger that can only be tackled through cooperation and resource consolidation fostered via a global initiative akin to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Second, states must encourage independent research and dialogue between governments, think tanks, and international organizations in order to develop an international framework for accurate threat assessments and the transparent evaluation of counterterrorism responses and policies. This may allow the affected states to overcome the faulty political narratives that see the ISKP as a tool of geopolitical rivals and enemies. Third, the ISKP’s recruiting pipelines must be dismantled by building focused counter-narratives to counter the ISKP’s propaganda. This would require international cooperation. Finally, it would be a mistake for affected states and governments to believe that they can deal with the ISKP threat by concentrating only on military counterterrorism operations. To undermine the ISKP’s intellectual foundations and to deny it fertile recruitment grounds, the affected states and government must address the deeper sociopolitical problems that drive and legitimize the ISKP’s narrative.

In conclusion, the ISKP is a reality and poses a serious security challenge to the region and to the world. The absence of a cohesive international counterterrorism response aimed at dismantling the group has allowed the ISKP to thrive and get stronger, and to extend its operational reach and lethality. Operating in one of the poorest regions of the world with a harsh terrain and porous borders has further helped the ISKP to become stronger and more resilient as an insurgent organization. The states and governments in the region must wake up to the reality of the significant threat they face from the ISKP. This threat cannot be countered by any state or government alone. It would be essential, therefore, for the states and governments in the region to acknowledge the ISKP as a “common threat” to their security and well-being. Creating a comprehensive and cooperative counterterrorism strategy is, therefore, a sine qua non if this threat has to be successfully neutralized.