A world without violence and domination,from Athens to Kyiv: In dialogue with Jeffrey C. Alexander

Abstract

Can we imagine a world without wars, violence and domination? What does it take to build such a society? I pose the above questions as an attempt to dialogue with Jeffrey Alexander's analysis of the paradoxical nature of the modern ‘civil sphere’ in a time of local and global turmoil. In this dialogue, I restate some of the key claims from Alexander's analysis and offer possible ways of conceptualising and re-imagining a more humanistic, responsive and ethical civil sphere. Contrary to Alexander, I argue that at the centre of the crisis of the civil sphere is not how its conceptions are always informed by an unproductive and antagonistic binarism. But the root problem has got to do with how the civil sphere has tolerated or become invaded by private class interests. As a result, the greatest undoing of the modern civil sphere lies in its furtherance of a distinctive class/economic position. To understand or unravel the ‘paradox’ that Alexander discusses in his piece, I suggest the need to focus more on broader socio-economic dynamics. As I will show, these broader socio-economic processes are central not only in shaping the nature of the civil sphere, but also in the re-production of endless violence, wars and human domination.

The paradox of the civil sphere

Jeffrey C. Alexander's (2026) assertion that there exists a paradox (conceptually and in practice) in the way the civil sphere is treated as antithetical to incivility, evil, repression, and domination is mouthwatering and incisive. For Alexander (2026), the creation of imagined boundaries (binaries) between what is regarded as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘civil’ and ‘anti-civil’ has given rise to an exclusionary and polarising civil sphere. Its polarising effects are seen through the manifestations of wars, violence and other forms of human conflict. This is the problem of binary thinking (conceptualisation) which Alexander identifies as a central feature of the paradox. Based on this, the civil sphere only protects those who fall within its confinements and marginalises, stultifies and attacks anyone who happens to be perceived as an outsider (or falls outside its circumference). It treats those whose norms or values are not consistent with its own as ‘enemies’ and this, for Alexander, is the root cause of the unending conflicts, wars and violence that humanity has been forced to painfully endure and witness. Despite their noble intentions, most civil spheres thrive on a discourse that divides rather than builds. They create meaningless boundaries which undermine the prospects of achieving ‘universalizing solidarity’ (Alexander, 2026).

The (in)civility of the civil sphere: Decline and erosion

What has happened to the civil sphere since ancient Athens? What can we make of its erosion over the past few decades? I had expected Alexander to address the root cause of the incivility that has become characteristic of the modern civil sphere. This incivility (or paradox) we witness can be attributed to many factors, but there are some main ones which I will focus on in this dialogue.

First, the modern civil space has become a highly uneven arena where a few sectoral interests dominate. This competition for dominance and influence has undoubtedly weakened its liberatory and emancipatory potential. At the root of the erosion of the civil character of the civil sphere is the increasing participation of people, entities and corporates whose interest have nothing to do with the promotion and attainment of fundamental civil liberties. If anything, their actions have remoulded the civil sphere into an uncivil space. Alexander rightly points to some of this incivility that has become a key feature of the modern civil sphere. It would have been helpful if Alexander had made efforts to theorise such incivility by tracing its origins and the forces that shape its existence. Undoubtedly, the transformation that has taken place within the civil sphere warrants a more comprehensive analysis. Such an analysis would need to trace the historical transformation (from civility to incivility), identify the active participants to this incivility, and the role of each player in the instigation of hate, violence and destruction within society. Indeed, it is paradoxical to imagine that the modern civil space has become characteristic of these undesirable and repugnant vices.

Do we need a new theory altogether to understand the current state of the modern sphere, either in support or dismissive of Alexander's articulations about the binary labelling and name-calling that now characterise the modern civil space? Before I answer this question, I want to briefly turn to Partha Chattejee's (2006) useful distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political society’. Drawing on the Indian experience, Chatterjee argues that civil society is primarily dominated by the urban middle class, and it is an arena where corporate capital is hegemonic. A key concern for civil society becomes the broader project of modernity. On the contrary, ‘political society’ is the domain of politics for the poor (219). As a domain of politics, political society is associated with democracy, ‘everyday politics’ and the management of non-corporate capital (224). It is a sphere that sits outside the domains of civil society and the State. Unlike civil society, Chatterjee presents political society as the sphere with the potential to transform the conditions of subaltern groups in modern democracies.

Although there are theoretical difficulties that arise from Chatterjee's distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society, his thinking is helpful to show what has become of the modern civil sphere. ¹ Mainly, the civil sphere is no longer a space for advancing the needs, aspirations and struggles of the weak, poor and vulnerable members of society. The once promising liberatory and transformative potential of the civil sphere has been eroded by corporate capital and class-based interests. Given this reality, it is not surprising that violence and other forms of evil have become endemic features of the modern civil space. The pursuit of capital and class-based interests has narrowed the divide between what is right and wrong. It is inconsistent with values and ideals that are consonant with normative conceptions of a democratic civil sphere. As Alexander has rightly pointed out, the State – as an institution with a complete monopoly over the use and administration of violence – is largely responsible for the decline and erosion of the civil sphere. ² In this decline, the role of the State occurs in two different ways. First, the State is an enabler to the broader social, economic and political processes that have led to the crisis of the civil sphere. Capitalism, neoliberalism and globalisation are examples of such processes. Second, with its ties to capital, the modern State has become so powerful and unyielding. Apart from the weakening of the civil sphere, among others, the dangers of a powerful State include anti-democratic tendencies, silencing of civil voices and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties. In any attempt to make sense of the incivility of the modern civil sphere, the State needs to take centre stage. ³

Powerful states and a weak and fractured civil sphere

While the emergence of the civil sphere was a product of human civilisation, its crisis has become one of the major problems of modern civilisation. This stands out as one of the biggest paradoxes confronting humanity. We witness the debilitating effects of a strong and destructive nation-state and the inactivity of a weakened and passive civil sphere. Growing levels of populism, anti-immigration hate, environmental destruction, xenophobia, war and violence have festered into the civil sphere largely because of ‘the paradox’ (Alexander, 2026) of the powerful state and a fractured and somewhat non-existent civil sphere. The State, instead of guaranteeing the safety and security of those whom it manages, has become an instrument of violence and insecurity.

At the same time, the civil sphere has not been able to live by its civil ideals. Whilst it is a positive development in some way, the growing influence of social media within society has also seen the civil sphere being used as a purveyor of hate, violence, moral panics and other forms of uncivil discourse. It is true that there are countless moments in the past decade where the civil sphere has used social media as a leverage to promote good governance, demand accountability and promote the preservation of basic human rights. In these moments, social media served the purposes of disseminating crucial information, establishing networks and creating solidarities across space and time. Among others, the Arab Spring uprisings, Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement and student protests in South Africa could not have been successfully coordinated or to some extent have achieved some of their objectives without social media and the support from key actors within the civil sphere. Despite the use of social media as a tool to wage resistance against an ever more powerful nation-state, there is also a darker side to its appropriation, especially by civil actors. As stated earlier, this darker side has contributed to the erosion of civil virtues and ideals. Crucially, this erosion (decline) is linked to large-scale (macro) processes unfolding within society. It seems, Alexander's analysis has not given enough attention to how these processes are shaping the nature of the modern civil sphere. Surely, the paradox central to Alexander's critique of the civil sphere cannot be delinked from some of these macro processes. ⁴ In fact, social media in some cases has been instrumental in shaping the framing and transmission of distasteful and uncivil discourse within society.

The civil sphere – an active homogenous space?

While I agree with Alexander's overall analysis and critique of the modern civil sphere (its limitations and latent potential), one obvious gap in his analysis is the way the civil sphere is treated as a single (monolithic) and homogeneous active/acting space. This treatment of the civil sphere as an idealistic ‘universalising’ democratic space is not unique to Alexander but can be seen in other previous analyses on the civil sphere (society). ⁵ It is correct that there are certain norms and values that are akin to any civil sphere. For example, achieving peace, democracy, ending wars, violence and tyranny are values that are central to any civil sphere. ⁶ But the pursuit of such shared norms and values does not remove the possibility of ‘counter-civil spheres’ (or ‘multiple civil spheres’) emerging within a single political territory. ⁷

Thinking of the civil sphere as a fractured and diverse space creates more room for explaining the reasons behind its successes and failures over time. These ‘counter-civil spheres’ are not necessarily oppositional to the mainstream ideals, but they may present a different strategy to how civil ideals can be achieved or pursued. The choice between peace and violence as a pathway to freedom, liberation and democracy is an example of this difference in strategy as it relates to the interaction between ‘civil’ and ‘counter’ spheres. In some cases, the choice/path to violence has in my view undermined ‘humankind's most creative and courageous’ (Alexander, 2026) efforts aimed at challenging domination and social injustice. Here also lies another form of a paradox: the (counter) civil sphere using violence to confront violence. We see this quite often with some movements whose cause is undoubtedly noble, but their repertoire of resistance and contest is largely based on the deployment of violence to achieve their broader objectives. Understandably, violence in some of these situations is used as an action of last resort, but its use ends up having damaging and long-lasting effects on people and society. ⁸ But as we already know, ‘violence begets violence’ and if the civil sphere in its plural form is for peace, safety and human security, there could be better ways of achieving these without resorting to what it opposes in the first instance.

Kyiv: A case in point

The reference to Kyiv in Alexander's article is quite significant and relevant in contextualising recent developments in society, particularly the nature of global politics. I would have expected Alexander to explain what Ukraine (or other similar cases) represents in relation to the broader politics of the modern (global) world. To help bridge this gap, I offer a few insights here.

First, Ukraine is highly relevant to various broader processes that are responsible for violence, wars and anti-democratic practices. Crucially, it represents the limits to what global governance can do and achieve in crisis times. Despite the various attempts, the very fact that there is no end in sight to the war in Ukraine after nearly four years of instability demonstrates this point.

Second, Ukraine epitomises the collective capacity and resilience of the civil sphere in the struggle for peace, security and democracy. ⁹ This applies to both local and international civil sphere actors inside and outside of Ukraine. There are other examples of this civil sphere coordinated resilience and solidarity in several places across the world.

These examples show that despite its own limitations, as discussed here and in Alexander's article, the promise of the civil sphere in war and peace lies in its capacity to initiate broad-based actions and responses for peace and democracy. Undoubtedly, more can still be done to make peace a reality in the different conflict zones of the modern world (among these, Gaza comes to mind). For this to happen, the civil sphere would need to resolve its own paradoxes and contradictions. As Alexander argues, the ability and willingness to embrace those whose ideas and actions are seen as alien to those of the civil sphere is key to this process.

Conclusion: What is the future of the civil sphere?

What is the future of the civil sphere? Alexander's projections are more optimistic about the future of the civil sphere and what it can achieve despite its obvious limitations. In fact, Alexander is not wrong to be overly optimistic about the potential of the civil sphere. Since ancient Athens, the civil sphere has scored several gains in the areas of peace, human rights, climate justice and democratic reform. With these achievements, there are also threats to its survival, as Alexander argued. It is correct that the nation-state remains the biggest threat to the survival and effective functioning of the modern civil sphere. But could it also be correct to predict that the paradox central to Alexander's analysis might pose the same degree or level of threat? Only time will tell. For now, the survival of the civil sphere will depend on how best it is able to address its own contradictions (incivility) in the face of an increasingly powerful, intruding, and sometimes violent nation-state.

In a world where the future of formal politics looks bleak, the civil sphere is the only remaining hope. Growing populism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia and polarisation are all hallmarks of this failing politics. As this politics entrenches itself far and wide, its damage to the civil sphere is evidently going to worsen.

Given this possibility, I would be less optimistic than Alexander about the future and potential of the modern civil sphere. There are several reasons to give for this position. Mainly, the civil sphere has been under constant attack from different angles, and there appears to be concerted efforts to undermine its relevance, resulting in its eventual extinction. Its extinction would become a real possibility if no immediate action is taken. At all costs, the extinction of the civil sphere should be avoided and resisted by all and sundry. What would the world look like without a civil(izing) sphere? It would be unbearable to imagine a world without peace, justice and human compassion. From its inception, these are all ideals that the civil sphere has come to propagate and represent. Its extinction would therefore spell an end to not only these ideals, but also to the promise inherent within humanity.

There is every reason to be less optimistic about the future of normative politics and the survival of the modern civil sphere under current conditions where egotistic tendencies (individualism, corruption, patrimonialism etc.) have narrowed the once clear divide between the nation-state and the civil sphere. While the uncoupling of the civil sphere from its key ideals has happened over time, it has worsened in recent years. ¹⁰ Also, during this period, there appears to have been a very deliberate attempt from some actors within and outside of the civil sphere to undermine its relevance and transformative potential, as highlighted above. ¹¹ At the same time, the civil sphere itself has been so inward looking. Rather than being an inclusive space, it has become more exclusionary in some cases. Such factors have a debilitating effect on the capacity of the civil sphere to defend and protect the weak and vulnerable. For this reason, the promise of the civil sphere under these circumstances remains dim, and this makes its future impossible to predict. It is, however, almost certain that the survival of the civil sphere is contingent on its ability to defend itself from the onslaught of marauding nation-states. Its survival will also depend on how it recovers from its own internal weaknesses and crises.