A response to ‘societal polarization,academic freedom,and the promise of dialogical sociology’

Abstract

In this response to Sari Hanafi’s article on societal polarisation and academic freedom’, I critically examine three key conceptual claims he makes. The first relates to the claim that globally, we are witnessing societal polarisation. Secondly, this polarisation arises as a consequence of the political Left/Right binary, and that thirdly this binary leads to reduced levels of academic freedom. In contrast, I argue that it is not evident that society is more polarised in contemporary times than previously, that the narrative of a political Left/Right binary is overstated and misleading, and thirdly, I question the methodology that claims empirical evidence of declining levels of academic freedom.

It is a pleasure to be invited to engage in dialogue with my old colleague and friend, Sari Hanafi. This article is an engaging, original and important article on what Hanafi (2025) coins ‘symbolic liberalism’, which he examines in juxtaposition with a perceived increasing polarisation of societies globally through an examination of several case studies. I preface this response by firstly saying how much I appreciate Hanafi's scholarship and original contributions to global sociology. As such, I will focus in this response on several conceptual issues that I argue require further problematisation and nuance.

Hanafi argues that we are witnessing widespread ‘symbolic liberalism’ – which he defines as classical liberalism combined with political illiberalism (Hanafi, 2023). He goes on to argue that symbolic liberalism manifests as a ‘hegemonic and deculturised conception of good’ instead of a ‘unified conception of justice’, claiming that, as a result, this leads to ‘extremely divisive identity politics’ and ‘hierarchical polarization’ in societies in both the Global North and Global South. According to Hanafi, this polarisation is split in terms of the political ‘Left’ and ‘Right’. He argues that both the political Left and Right take sides and positions without explanatory arguments.

However, the binary framing of Left versus Right, I would argue, does not sufficiently allow for understanding the discourse weaponising academic freedom. Indeed, it has been argued that rather than the political Left and Right becoming increasingly polarised, neoliberal forces are arguably increasingly blurring this binary. But in addition to arguing that there is increasing polarisation, Hanafi argues that the far Left and the far Right are similarly curbing academic freedom. This implicitly draws on what is referred to in the literature as the ‘horseshoe theory’ – which makes the claim that the far Right and far Left are actually closer to each other than the political centre, as argued by the French philosopher Faye in the 1970s, although the concept dates back to the 1850s ¹ (Brincat, 2024). Not only is the binary portrayal of Left/Right potentially misleading and inaccurate but it is also dangerous. Public discourses thrive on binary portrayals but often miss the mark, presenting a simplified non-evidence-based narrative masking more complex issues at hand.

Hanafi (2025) argues that the presumed polarisation leads to declining levels of academic freedom, citing measures dating back over a decade. Indeed, in my book, Academic Freedom and the Transational Production of Knowledge (Kiwan, 2024), I have cited reports making similar claims, as well as studies based on surveys of academics’ views on the matter, and media reports globally. However, I have highlighted substantive empirical evidence that takes a longitudinal historical perspective and which challenges the popular narrative of declines in academic freedom (Kiwan, 2024). A large-scale global study led by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project systematically operationalised the measure of academic freedom into five measurable indicators. Using an innovative methodology collaborating with over 3500 country experts globally, and aggregating judgements on a range of indicators over time, the Academic Freedom Index is such a collaborative effort, working with 2000 country experts from around the world (V-Dem, 2022). In contrast to ahistorical and sensationalist narratives of declines in academic freedom, their findings instead show continuity over most of their indicators since 2013.

I also critically examine another dominant binary in public discourse that aligns to some extent to the Left/Right binary Hanafi (2025) refers to: where academic freedom is pitted against inclusion, resulting in a polarising discourse, assuming an ‘either/or’ position where it is presented that you either prioritise ‘academic freedom’ or ‘diversity’/‘inclusion’, and that the two are somehow at odds with each other. I note that:

Traditional libertarian approaches typically place a primacy on unfettered academic freedom and free speech, in contrast to approaches emphasising notions of ‘responsible’ knowledge production and speech, contextualising academic freedom socio-politically and historically recognising power dynamics inherent in the production of knowledge. (Kiwan, 2024: 1)

I argue that the polarising narratives of academic freedom versus inclusion are false dichotomies, and are not irreconcilable, but can actually be complementary (Kiwan, 2024). However, what I would particularly like to highlight is that discourses using a narrative of two polarised groups obfuscate the wider socio-political and historical context, both within and between different societies. While Hanafi (2025) makes reference to unequal power dynamics between groups, his analysis is not sufficiently grounded in this critical aspect. The claim that both far Left and far Right are curbing academic freedom does not take account of the intellectual history of academic freedom. In my book, I trace key concepts in the intellectual history of the development of the concept of academic freedom that are pertinent to remind ourselves of. Within the contemporary context, the university is the institutional context within which the concept of academic freedom is situated (Kiwan, 2024). Dating back to 859 AD, with the establishment of the first university in the world in Morocco, universities in the Islamic world began to flourish, with scholars from around the world gathering, typically sponsored by the Islamic empire, and enjoying professional and institutional autonomy and a certain amount of academic freedom (Dallal, 2010; Makdisi, 1981). Later, universities in mediaeval Europe had autonomy, although within the framework of Christianity, with this starting to be more substantively challenged with the rise of science in the nineteenth century, and the nation-state being the main constraint on academic freedom. In the early twentieth century US, a statement of academic freedom was codified, known as the 1915 ‘Declaration of Principles’. The AAUP 1915 – and subsequently the 1940 Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure – entail the idea that academic freedom is situated between the university and the general public to promote the public good through ‘truth’ (AAUP, 1940: 14).

So when we return to the framing of perceived Left/Right polarisation as the overarching lens through which we understand contemporary narratives of a perceived decline in academic freedom, we must keep in mind the historical rationale for the concept of academic freedom. Critically, the formulation of the AAUP statement aimed to protect those perceived to be challenging traditional knowledge and was associated with critical thinking (Kiwan, 2024). My empirical research has shown that the areas of scholarship currently most challenged transnationally typically pertain to populations traditionally marginalised, for example, those involving gender/sexuality, race/religion, immigrant populations and Israel/Palestine. These groups have been subjects of inquiry, with knowledge produced about them by others – those traditionally holding power and who are deemed credible producers of knowledge. These traditional conceptions of knowledge are hegemonic, ignoring the politics of knowledge production, positionality and the structural inequalities in higher education within which they are produced (Weiler, 2009). Calls from these groups for the decolonisation of knowledge have been met with derision from some, with new fields of study, such as ‘Women's Studies’ or ‘Black Studies’ divisively labelled as ‘grievance studies’ in the United States (Kiwan, 2024). Challenges to disciplines and Canons have resulted in the weaponisation of academic freedom to gatekeep the production of new knowledges that challenge the status quo.

As such, ‘cancel culture’ cannot be equated with ‘intolerance’ of debate, although of course, it can be weaponised in this way. To understand the cancellation of an event merely in terms of intolerance can be a misleading simplification, purposely construed in this way for political aims. Let's say a speaker is ‘cancelled’ or not offered a platform for espousing views that are extremist and lacking in empirical basis. This, I would argue is a sound response. Academic freedom clearly should not protect hate speech and must be responsibly exercised. For example, the pseudoscience of race and intelligence has been delegitimated by the contemporary scientific community, based on unjust and false beliefs deriving from nineteenth century knowledge. The term ‘cancel culture’ is a deeply problematic term, masking differentials in power. Yet the weaponisation of the term enables disingenuous calls for the academic freedom of all, despite (i) the power differentials between the hegemonic right-wing and the more vulnerable or marginalised communities in question and (ii) the use of such platforms being typically based on ‘opinion’ rather ‘expertise/knowledge’.

Similarly the concept of intellectual safety, or what Hanafi calls ‘culture of safetyism’, should be carefully considered. Drawing on Cudd (2019), Hanafi argues that invoking the concept of harm impairs critical thinking. He gives the example of Gaza protests being labelled as antisemitic, linked to notions of psychological harm and trauma. However, Hanafi does not address the question of who is calling for it and in which contexts: invoking the concept of ‘harm’ must be critically reflected on to consider who is using it and for what ends. For example, when arguments of harm are invoked by a dominant or powerful group, or a group with majority backing, to silence dissent typically by those who hold less power, this is not the intended purpose of the concept of ‘dignity safety’ (Callan, 2016),and arguably is a misappropriation of the concept. It is also important to consider the content of the research – is it empirically based or opinion rooted in hate? Finally, responsibility is invoked in the importance of academic freedom for the public good and pertains to the production of knowledge rather than freedom of speech based on opinion in public places.

To summarise my key arguments, there is insufficient evidence of increasing societal polarisation globally, and insufficient evidence to causally link this characterisation with a political Left/Right binary. Furthermore, I argue that this presumed increasing Left/Right binary is misleading and neglects a consideration of the intellectual history and historical rationale for the concept of academic freedom. Finally, the claim that this Left/Right polarisation leading to declining levels of academic freedom is not supported by empirical data based on a historical methodological approach to collecting evidence.