Multidisciplinary Recommendations for Improving the Credibility of Research on Posttraumatic Growth

Abstract

Research on posttraumatic growth (PTG) is widely invoked as evidence that adversity can catalyze positive change. However, existing research often conflates coping with transformation, relies on culturally specific assumptions, and lacks a clear standard for what counts as growth. Integrating philosophy, personality science, and cultural psychology, we articulate six necessary criteria—lasting change, conceptual distinctiveness, meaningful positivity, normative significance, causal linkage to trauma, and empirical verifiability—that a credible PTG account must satisfy. We propose a virtue-based framework that meets these criteria, reconciling universal aspirations with context-sensitive manifestations of character virtues in the context of adversity. This multidisciplinary synthesis resets PTG science on a clearly defined, culturally plural, and normatively robust footing by defining enduring post-traumatic positive change as the cultivation of culturally situated virtues.

In this paper, we build on critiques of posttraumatic growth (PTG) by conceptualizing such growth not in terms of self-reported benefits, but as the cultivation of special positive qualities or virtues, and by demonstrating that the content of those virtues, and thus the benchmarks of “growth,” vary systematically across cultural contexts. Whereas prior critiques have focused on measurement challenges, the conflation of self-reports of growth with coping strategies, and the risk of illusory growth beliefs (Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014), here we provide a framework for adjudicating what counts as meaningful change across different cultural contexts.

Building on an interdisciplinary analysis of perspectives from virtue ethics, personality science, and cultural psychology, we define PTG as enduring post-adversity changes in positive characteristics or virtues whose worth is intelligible within (and typically evaluated through) culturally embedded standards of the good life (while remaining open to ethical contestation both within and outside of the culture). We review central theoretical and methodological limitations in the PTG literature, focusing on conceptual conflations (e.g., meaning making vs. change; coping vs. transformation), the narrow scope of dominant PTG domains, and neglected temporal dynamics. Next, we articulate six criteria that any credible account of PTG must satisfy and use these criteria to evaluate prominent approaches that define growth in terms of PTG domains, well-being, or trait change. Building on this assessment, we propose a virtue-based framework that supplies an explicitly normative yet empirically tractable standard for positive change. Finally, we address some objections to a virtue account and conclude with concrete recommendations for measurement and design in cross-cultural PTG research and practice.

Current Theoretical and Methodological Limitations

One of the most persistent issues in discussions of PTG involves conceptual conflations—an overlap or confusion in how certain processes are defined (e.g., the model presented in Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Although researchers have long sought to explain how adverse experiences might yield positive outcomes, there is ongoing debate about what “growth” really means in this context. Indeed, we have noted that meaning-making efforts can be confused for genuine personality change, positive coping strategies can be mistaken for change, and positive reappraisals likely do not reflect enduring transformation (Jayawickreme et al., 2021; Weststrate et al., 2022).

Confusion Between Meaning-Making and Actual Growth

At the core of most PTG theories is the idea that adversity can catalyze meaningful transformation. But many PTG researchers have equated the meaning-making process—the stories people craft about their trauma or the insight they glean from it—with a substantive shift in personality traits (Jayawickreme et al., 2021). Of course, narrative revisions and a sense of newfound purpose in the wake of adversity can be adaptive. Someone might reframe a severe illness as a “wake-up call,” prompting them to cherish daily life more deeply. However, these interpretive shifts are not predicated on the fact that stable, trait-level changes in behavior or emotional patterns have occurred.

Typically, meaning making in the wake of adversity is transitory and unfolds to cope with distress. Patients, for instance, may discuss how a catastrophic event taught them to appreciate everyday positive experiences (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). But if we were to track those same individuals over time, we might find that while their explanatory frameworks changed, their fundamental disposition—how they react under stress, how they relate to others—remains relatively intact. In other words, a key distinction concerns the level of personality at which change occurs; meaning making may be central to psychological adaptation, while not necessarily resulting in enduring change at the trait level (Jayawickreme et al., 2021; Weststrate et al., 2022). That said, given that such meaning-making can lead to changes in narrative identity, such changes can be characterized as changes in one’s personality (Adler & Schwaba, 2024). Under the framework we develop below, lasting positive changes in narrative identity (such as developing a more hopeful, coherent, or morally engaged life story) could qualify as PTG, provided they meet the criteria of enduring change and normative significance that we articulate in subsequent sections.

Challenges With Differentiating Coping From Growth

This confusion is further compounded by how coping mechanisms such as positive reframing are sometimes labeled as “growth” (Weststrate et al., 2022). Coping reflects how a person navigates day-to-day challenges in the immediate aftermath of adversity. For example, focusing on gratitude or nurturing hope can help someone manage intrusive memories or persistent anxiety. It is comforting, even empowering, to highlight personal strength in the aftermath of trauma. Yet such reframing or coping alone should not be automatically equated with deeper personal transformation.

In practice, it is tempting to celebrate any resilient reframing (for example, “I’ve become so much stronger because of this crisis”) as evidence of PTG. However, these claims likely reflect short-term coping strategies that may not translate into stable changes (see Gangel et al., 2024). For instance, an individual might claim to experience greater empathy following adversity but then fail to exhibit consistent patterns of prosocial thoughts, feelings, and behavior in the months and years that follow. This mismatch points us to a larger question: How do we know if growth is real if it does not show up in someone’s stable pattern of acting, thinking, and feeling (Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014)?

Perhaps the most tangible manifestation of the above pitfalls arises when evaluating assessments of positive reappraisal, which rely on self-report items mirroring self-perception of growth, such as “I see the event as a way for me to become a better person” (Jayawickreme et al., 2021). Assessments of PTG thus risk conflating a coping strategy—or even a socially desirable response to adversity—with personality change (Weststrate et al., 2022). The research suggests that although positive reappraisal correlates with short-term well-being, it does not necessarily predict an actual increase in personality characteristics (Frazier et al., 2009; Jayawickreme et al., 2022). Collectively, these conceptual conflations underscore the need to distinguish perceived change from “actual”, authentic change (Gangel et al., 2024; Jayawickreme et al., 2021). By emphasizing this distinction, we open the door to more rigorous tests of whether adversity triggers short-lived perceptions of change or more enduring change.

Framework Problems

A second set of challenges revolves around PTG frameworks themselves. Traditional conceptualizations of PTG often emphasize domains like “new possibilities” or “improved relationships.” While these can be relevant, they may not capture the broader range of personality dimensions that can shift due to adversity (Brady & Jayawickreme, 2025).

Limited Scope of Traditional PTG Domains

Mainstream PTG models (e.g., Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004) highlight discrete categories of growth—such as personal strength, deeper connections with others, spiritual change, a renewed appreciation for life, and recognition of new possibilities. Although influential, these domains can be somewhat narrow in scope, and exclude other dimensions that may reliably index growth, such as compassion (Brady & Jayawickreme, 2025).

A crucial addition, as we will discuss below, is considering virtues—such as courage, honesty, humility, or perseverance—and examining whether adversity fosters an increase in these domains (Weststrate et al., 2022). For instance, an adult who navigated a debilitating injury might develop greater perseverance not just as a coping mechanism but as a consistent trait manifested across situations. Similarly, adversity may foster compassion, integrity, or generosity—ethical qualities that are often overlooked in standard PTG frameworks (Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014). We might see, for example, that individuals who survive a communal disaster band together to champion social causes, indicating a new ethical stance that extends beyond a single narrative of “surviving and feeling stronger.” By systematically focusing on virtues, researchers can examine whether adversity triggers genuine expansions of empathy or altruistic behavior. Similarly, wisdom—encompassing emotional regulation, tolerance for uncertainty, and existential insight—deserves focused attention. An individual exhibiting wisdom may display nuanced judgment, empathy, and self-transcendence in daily life. However, whether such changes are common is currently unclear (Dorfman et al., 2022).

Evidence for a “Steeling Effect” Rather Than Transformation

Interestingly, a number of studies point to a “steeling effect”—enhanced resilience or stress inoculation—rather than wholesale, global transformation following trauma (Seery et al., 2010). Importantly, such steeling effects may themselves constitute a form of PTG when they reflect enduring improvements in stress tolerance, coping, or self-regulation. The critical distinction, therefore, is not between “growth” and “coping,” but between temporary, context-bound responses and more lasting changes in personality characteristics. This body of work cautions against assuming that trauma typically produces broad, transformative change, while leaving open the possibility of more circumscribed yet meaningful forms of growth.

Temporal Dynamics

Another pressing concern involves the temporal dimension of growth. Researchers often measure PTG at a single point in time, missing the chance to see whether what appears as growth early on endures—or whether certain transformations only emerge after an extended period of reflection (Weststrate et al., 2022). Most theoretical models mentioned do not specify when in the aftermath of adversity growth is most likely to appear—or how long it might last. Some individuals may report immediate shifts in perspective, but these may fade once the acute crisis subsides. Alternatively, others remain initially consumed by grief or distress, only to experience reflective breakthroughs years later. The empirical evidence currently does not provide evidence of a clear timeline (Grossmann et al., 2025; Hopwood et al., 2022).

Short-Term vs. Long-Term Changes

Relatedly, the difference between changes observable in the short term (e.g., a few weeks or months) and those that endure for years is critical (Jayawickreme et al., 2021). If a traumatized individual briefly embraces optimism, that might reflect an adaptive coping mechanism that will fade if it’s not reinforced. For the same individual, we might discover that meaningful personality shifts—like adopting new values or consistent empathy—take shape over a much longer arc. Relatedly, growth may be delayed until a person has the emotional bandwidth and time to process the event (Weststrate et al., 2022). For instance, to provide one hypothetical example, survivors of large-scale disasters might not report growth in the immediate aftermath, as they are fully occupied by meeting basic survival needs. Yet after reconstruction efforts stabilize their environment, they may revisit their trauma, re-evaluate life’s priorities, and cultivate new virtues or relationships. Pinpointing these delayed effects helps refine the difference between short-term coping and long-term personality development.

Stability of Changes

Crucially, to label a shift in one’s traits as “authentic” personality change, it must be somewhat stable. One question is whether changes that appear transient or context-specific would qualify as “real” shifts in personality traits (Infurna & Jayawickreme, 2019). Assessing traits at multiple intervals allows us to see whether new dispositions persist when adversity recedes. Were adversity to lead to deeper ethical reflection or a broadened sense of purpose that continues to manifest over time and be captured empirically, then we can more confidently conclude that change has occurred.

Reconceptualizing Growth on Firmer Foundations

Together, these three interlocking concerns—conceptual conflations, framework limitations, and the temporal dynamics of change—highlight why PTG requires a firmer theoretical framework (Gelman, 2025). Clarifying the difference between meaning-making and stable transformation, expanding PTG frameworks to include virtues, and identifying the timing of personality shifts can steer us toward a more rigorous and informed understanding of how adversity can shape the self. To make progress here, we now highlight six conceptual features of growth that any plausible account of PTG must capture, and which emerge from the critiques above.

Actual change. The growth in PTG must represent actual change and not simply change perceived or reported by the subject. That is, as Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) claim, the positive psychological changes that people have reported must be veridical and go beyond perceptions of change. PTG is thus different from “positive illusions,” “construing benefits,” and “perceived benefits.”

Beyond resilience. Growth is conceptually distinct from recovery and resilience, understood as a return to pre-adversity functioning. Instead, PTG is understood as change beyond pre-adversity levels of functioning.

Beyond coping. Coping is typically defined as the cognitive and behavioral efforts individuals deploy to manage demands that tax or exceed their resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). While PTG is often treated as conceptually distinct from coping, this distinction hinges on temporal dynamics. Coping strategies such as positive reappraisal may be deployed in response to a specific traumatic event without implying lasting personality change (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2014; Jayawickreme & Blackie, 2014). However, we acknowledge that it is possible that repeated use of these strategies may lead to enduring changes in characteristic adaptations or traits, although there is limited evidence for this, at least in the short-term (Gangel et al., 2024).

Significance. We might initially describe growth as positive psychological change in the aftermath of trauma. But many positive psychological changes can occur after trauma that do not, intuitively, count as growth. Some may be too short-lived or fleeting to constitute growth; think, for instance, of pleasures that one might feel once intrusive memories recede. Others may be longer-lived but not particularly valuable; for example, one might become adept at puzzle-solving to relieve the boredom of recovery. One way to capture this idea is to treat PTG as a significant positive psychological change—one that is meaningful insofar as it is closely tied to what the individual values and finds important in life. This criterion cuts across levels of personality, allowing growth to occur through enduring changes in characteristic adaptations or life pursuits, even in the absence of broad trait change (Weststrate et al., 2022).

Positivity. Significant growth in the aftermath of trauma must be positive. As we will see, some psychological accounts of growth struggle on this score, succeeding in describing psychological changes that are not obviously or uncontroversially positive. The notion of growth suggests progress with respect to some valuable end or goal, yet psychologists often struggle to identify a criterion by which we can measure such progress (Baltes et al., 1980). Note that criteria relating to significance, positivity, and causation (discussed next) also require sensitivity to cultural standards of excellence in character, as well as distinguishing between relative versus non-relative virtues (see more on this below).

Causation. Growth must result non-accidentally from trauma. It cannot simply be positive psychological change that is subsequent to trauma, since this would allow for changes that result from trauma but are not caused by the trauma. Growth needs to be the kind of thing that can be generated non-accidentally by the kind of thing that trauma is.

Considering Tedeschi and Calhoun’s Account

The above represent six conceptual or theoretical constraints on growth. How do central psychological accounts of growth fare in capturing these? One possibility is to follow Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995, 1996, 2004, 2018) and present a substantive account of the five dimensions of growth: appreciation of life, personal strength, new opportunities, relating to others, and spiritual change. On this view, we can understand growth as an increase in one or more of these domains. Tedeschi and Calhoun’s account has many strengths. It is rich, detailed, and aligns with descriptive accounts of growth from other researchers.

However, we have doubts as to whether their view can respect the theoretical criteria for growth. In particular, the view fails to capture the positivity of growth. There are, after all, cultures where changes along one or more of the five dimensions will not be interpreted positively, and as a result will not be regarded as growth. For example, some highly secular or ultra-materialist societies may interpret increases in spirituality or religious commitment as forms of decline. By the same token, cultures that place greater emphasis on collective interdependence may, on average, view increases in self-reliance less positively than cultures that emphasize individual autonomy.

Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) account thus fails to pay sufficient attention to the ways in which culture and context can affect or influence whether we regard some change as positive or not. This does not mean, however, that we have to take culture to be the final authority on whether something counts as a positive change, and hence as growth. Even within strongly collectivist contexts, individuals differ substantially in the extent to which they value autonomy and self-reliance. Moreover, as we will see, some values which are universally positive can have very different expressions in difficult cultural and individual contexts. What counts as courageous behavior - and hence what counts as a positive change in character - can differ quite dramatically from culture to culture, and indeed from individual to individual. A culturally sensitive account of growth needs to acknowledge the interplay between universal, cultural, and individual aspects in assessing the positivity of some change. We will argue later that our preferred account of growth can do precisely this, and in part by acknowledging the significant role that lay theories and cultural narratives play in our assessment of positive changes, and hence of PTG.

The phrasing of items on the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI) raises additional concerns. For instance, item 12 states “I am better able to accept the way things work out.” This might count as a positive change when things work out well, but it could reflect problematic complacency if things work out badly. Other criticisms raised in the literature—for instance, that the account is too narrow and fails to capture kinds of growth that go beyond the five dimensions, or that the account is not sensitive enough to the contextual nature of some forms of growth—are also relevant. As a result, the picture of growth we get from Tedeschi and Calhoun does not address the concerns that psychologists and philosophers have had about the nature and positivity of growth.

Related to this point, cross-cultural research indicates that the original five-factor structure of the PTGI seldom replicates outside Western samples, raising questions about the cross-cultural generalizability of its latent structure (see Weiss & Berger, 2010 for a review of studies). In addition, accumulating evidence highlights substantive construct underrepresentation, insofar as the PTGI omits several forms of positive change that are culturally central in many societies, particularly those emphasizing relational interdependence, moral development, and communal responsibility (Zapffe et al., 2023). Taken together, these findings suggest that although the overarching notion of post-trauma growth may be broadly recognizable across cultures, the PTGI’s specific operationalization reflects culturally bounded assumptions that constrain its validity as a universal measure.

Growth as an Increase in Well-Being

If Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) fail to capture the positivity of growth, we might turn to an account that understands dimensions of growth in terms of something that is uncontroversially positive. This is the kind of account we get from psychologists who understand growth in terms of an increase in well-being. Well-being can be defined as that which makes life good for the individual who is living that life (Crisp, 2021). Well-being describes what is “non-instrumentally” or “ultimately” good for someone.

An important distinction needs to be made between types of well-being, however. One is Subjective Well-Being (SWB), which refers to the balance of a person’s “affective states” and is a matter of overall feelings of satisfaction and happiness (Diener, 1984; Joseph & Linley, 2005; Keyes et al., 2002). Another is Psychological Well-Being (PWB), or “eudaimonic” well-being, which refers to things like a person’s “character strengths,” their sense of meaning or significance, and their psychological maturity (Joseph & Linley, 2005). Other psychologists prefer slightly different accounts of the constituents of PWB with different components, including autonomy, competence, positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning, and achievements (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Seligman, 2011; Tiberius, 2021). On these accounts, then, PTG is a matter of positive increase in PWB (Durkin & Joseph, 2009; Joseph, 2014; Ryff & Singer, 1996).

The PWB-based account of growth proposed by Ryff (Ryff & Singer, 1996) overlaps in context with Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) framework. Additionally, although this account can accommodate the five dimensions of growth highlighted by Tedeschi and Calhoun, it is not limited to these goods, so the account of growth is not unduly restrictive. However, despite these positive features, it is also possible that people can grow on one or more dimensions in the aftermath of trauma even though they are overall considerably worse off as a result of their trauma (Miller, 2014). Put differently, someone can experience PTG even when their overall well-being has decreased. Rabbi Harold Kushner’s reflection on the death of his son, quoted in Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004), provides a poignant illustration:

I am a more sensitive person, a more effective pastor, a more sympathetic counselor because of Aaron's life and death than I would ever have been without it. And I would give up all of those gains in a second if I could have my son back. If I could choose, I would forego all of the spiritual growth and depth which has come my way because of our experiences … But I cannot choose.

This suggests that a person can genuinely experience PTG, without being mistaken or deluded about their growth, even when their life is significantly worse from the standpoint of well-being. If so, we cannot understand PTG in terms of an increase in well-being.

Growth as Positive Personality Change

Jayawickreme and Blackie (2014) have argued that we should understand growth as positive personality change: as “meaningful changes” in characteristic patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving, which are to be understood as changes in personality. This follows because, in their view, personality consists of characteristic patterns of action, thoughts and feelings. Jayawickreme and Blackie’s view of personality is grounded in Whole Trait Theory (WTT), as developed by Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015). The first central element of WTT is descriptive: a trait consists of behaving in a relevant manner more or less often. The second central element of WTT is explanatory: it identifies the social-cognitive mechanisms that causally produce individual differences in trait-relevant behavior. To explain this, Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) point to a range of social-cognitive mechanisms that represent processes of thinking, feeling, and motivation for acting; different operation of these mechanisms explains different trait manifestations.

The account captures many of our criteria. First, since Jayawickreme and Blackie focus on actual personality change, they rule out identifying growth with positive illusions or forms of coping. Second, the changes are meaningful rather than short-lived. Third, positive personality change is more than resilience and is different from forms of coping. Fourth, and importantly, their view provides a plausible explanation of the non-accidental link between trauma and growth. If trauma involves a significant disruption to our abilities to think, feel, and act, then thinking of growth as positive changes to our abilities to think, feel, and act suggests that trauma and growth are intimately and non-accidentally connected.

Despite these advantages, one worry about the account remains. We might question whether the account is successful in capturing the positivity of growth. For example, increases in some Big 5 traits may not be necessarily positive in that they contribute to the overall well-being or “good” of the person (Crisp, 2021; Tiberius, 2021); in this scenario, then we cannot equate PTG simply with positive changes in these traits. Consider the trait of extraversion, which arguably counts as positive insofar as it is associated with sociability. However, extraversion also involves things like cheerfulness, assertiveness, and excitement seeking. Even if increases in some aspects of extraversion might plausibly be regarded as positive, an increase in assertiveness or excitement-seeking is not necessarily so. What if my situation calls for restraint rather than assertiveness? What if I should not be seeking forms of excitement after a certain age, or in certain relationships? Similarly, an increase in sociability could reflect a genuine deepening of relational engagement, or it could reflect avoidance of solitude and unprocessed distress: the behavioral form alone does not settle whether the change is positive. The claim that an increase in extraversion necessarily constitutes a positive psychological change is unlikely to be true, and so we cannot understand growth simply as an increase in this kind of personality trait (Tedeschi et al., 2018).

We have seen reason to think that the idea of growth as positive personality change meets many of the conditions for a plausible account. But unless we can identify a way in which this account can capture the positivity of growth, it will fail to be normatively apt. In the following section, we argue that this standard or criterion is provided by virtue.

Growth as Increase in Virtue

The preceding impasse—traits can shift but not inherently in beneficial ways—invites us to move from a focus on specific traits to evaluative virtues. Can we identify the right criterion to measure progress when it comes to changes in thinking, feeling, and acting? We propose that this criterion is provided by virtue. To explain, we first say a little about what virtue is, and then present reasons for thinking it gives us what we want in an account of growth.

The Nature of Virtue

In standard English usage, “virtue” refers to morally good behavior or character—a good and moral quality. The Greek term for virtue, aretē, builds on this familiar meaning by highlighting that virtues are not merely good but excellent qualities—they represent the best of what a person can be, encompassing both ethical and broader forms of human excellence. Many things can be excellent and count as so as a result of their qualities. For instance, knives are excellent to the extent that they are sharp and can cut well; walking boots are excellent to the extent that they are sturdy, waterproof, and supportive. Human beings have excellences as well. We might therefore understand virtues as those features or qualities that make someone an excellent person (Battaly, 2015). Crucially, what makes someone an excellent person (as opposed to excellent at some particular activity) is the possession of qualities that are ethically and practically good. A skilled thief may possess certain excellences (e.g., dexterity, planning), but these do not constitute virtues in the relevant sense because they are not oriented toward what is ethically good. Virtues, as we use the term, are excellences of character oriented toward valuable ends—ends that contribute to a good human life and to the well-being of others. Such qualities are, moreover, deep, important, and long-lasting qualities (Annas, 2011; Zagzebski, 1996). As a result, virtues can be understood as deep and stable dispositions (Greco & Turri, 2015): the kinds of things that are akin to abilities, skills, and competencies (Lemos, 2007). It is common to regard virtues as traits or dispositions of character (Wright et al., 2021).

What makes such traits of character excellent? A traditional way to explain excellence is in terms of the relation to some valuable goal. To use an example from Aristotle, a knife counts as excellent because it has a certain quality—namely, sharpness—that is positively related to the achievement of some valuable end—namely, cutting. In the case of human excellences, two relations are particularly important. The first is intentional. As Robert Adams (2006) argues, virtue is a form of “being for” what is good and of “being against” what is bad. The second relation is causal: virtues are traits that are reliably or consistently manifested by the virtuous agent in their behavior (Wright et al., 2021; Zagzebski, 1996). Thus, to take one example, the compassionate person is not only for—in the sense of desiring or caring for—the well-being of others; they are also reliable in promoting such well-being.

We propose that these forms of excellence help to determine the kind of progress that constitutes positive personality change. That is: virtue provides the right kind of criterion for growth in the aftermath of trauma. Virtue certainly seems to meet several of the criteria governing growth that we outlined earlier. If we avoid the situationist challenge and are not skeptical about the reality of virtues (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2021; Jayawickreme et al., 2014), then an increase in virtue represents a genuine rather than illusory psychological change. An increase in virtue represents a change that goes beyond pre-adversity functioning, and so growth in virtue is not simply a matter of resilience, recovery, or coping. Virtue is, moreover, understood as a deep and lasting feature of a person. As a result, an increase in virtue represents a change that is significant or meaningful. Finally, increases in virtues such as compassion, honesty, conscientiousness, courage, and humility all seem clearly and uncontroversially positive changes, at least when we understand them as having the right kind of intentional and causal links to value. On this view, a virtue like humility will not lead one astray—will not, for instance, mean that one is too scared to speak up when speaking up is required—precisely because humility is distinct from timidity, and in part because the former, but not the latter, is reliably linked to the relevant values in play. As a result, virtue has the right kind of theoretical “fit” to constitute growth.

Equally, virtue promises to provide the right kind of criterion by which we can determine positive personality change. In one sense, given that virtues are themselves to be understood as excellent traits of character, the idea that they are criterial for positive change of character seems true by definition. It is thus no surprise that we should look to virtue if we are to identify a standard or criterion by which we can assess personality traits. In another sense, virtue provides the right kind of standard for PTG, because the kinds of changes in thinking, feeling, and acting that are needed in our responses to and recovery from trauma are virtuous responses. The changes in our thinking, feeling, and acting that are needed in order for us to respond rightly or correctly to trauma will be ones that aim at various goods and help us to be reliably successful in achieving these goods.

As a result, our account of PTG as an increase in virtue promises to capture the conceptual features of growth better than other existing accounts of PTG. There is, therefore, a strong pro tanto case in favor of thinking of PTG in this way. If this account is to be ultimately convincing, however, it needs to overcome several pressing objections. It is to these that we now turn.

Addressing Objections to the Virtue Account

Objection 1: Growth Requires Becoming an Excellent Person

We have claimed that PTG should be understood as growth in virtue. However, one might think that this sets the bar for PTG too high, since it might imply that a person grows only insofar as they develop the kind of excellences of character that constitute virtue. Surely saying that growth requires one to be an excellent person is an overly demanding criterion.

However, note that our account emphasizes that growth is to be understood as an increase in virtue, and one can undergo an increase in virtue without thereby becoming ideally virtuous or a paragon of excellence. For instance, someone might, in the aftermath of a life-threatening illness, become more compassionate (or less hard-hearted), without this implying that they are thereby ideally or extremely compassionate. And similarly with other virtues: an increase in courage or patience does not imply extreme courage or patience. As a result, someone can grow in virtue—in the sense of becoming more virtuous (or in moving away from vice)—without being a paragon of excellence.

Objection 2: Adaptive Traits That Fall Short of Virtue

There is another way in which the account of growth as increase in virtue might set the bar too high. There are positive changes that look like growth but which might well fall short of virtues, at least as traditionally conceived or as recognized as virtuous by some particular cultures. Think, in this regard, of “adaptive traits”: traits that enable someone to adapt to their circumstances and pursue their goals effectively, or that help people thrive. Such traits are typically biological—such as lactose tolerance or the ability to live at high altitudes—but they might also be characterological.

Consider, for instance, a trait of rudeness or insensitivity that a person develops as a result of having a serious life-threatening illness, but which is adaptive (because it is positively related to the accomplishment of specific goals) in their circumstances. Havi Carel movingly describes becoming ruder and more brusque after being diagnosed with a life-threatening lung condition, where these traits enabled her to better respond to rudeness or insensitivity that others displayed toward her condition (Carel, 2018). Another example would be feelings of rage that enable someone to cope with conditions of oppression and marginalization. Such changes might be regarded as positive and might represent PTG but seem to fall short of virtues that are universally admired or indeed recognized by the power structures responsible for marginalization.

This is a powerful objection. But it is not devastating to our view, since it is possible—and indeed plausible—to reframe such adaptive traits in virtue-theoretical terms and thus come to acknowledge and recognize them as virtuous. (This is not to say that everyone in a culture will; certainly, those who are in the business of oppressing and marginalizing others might disagree with this reframing. But nothing in our account suggests that we have to always agree with the norms or standards present in some culture, especially when such norms or standards are oppressive. We will return to this point below.) What might appear and be described as rude can equally appear as a praiseworthy refusal to be a victim of the insensitivity of others. It is a form of courageous and morally praiseworthy response to bad behavior, in tone and language that is more likely to be effective in changing that bad behavior than a polite and agreeable response. It is, in short, a form of hating what is bad that promises to be reliably successful in reducing what is bad—which is how we are understanding virtue all along. As a result, our account of virtue is flexible enough to accommodate the kinds of adaptive traits that enable people in conditions of oppression and marginalization to cope with and better pursue their goals.

Objection 3: Significant Changes That Fall Short of Virtue

A related objection to the one just discussed is that a person might experience significant and meaningful positive changes which appear to constitute PTG, even in the absence of broader trait changes, and hence even in the absence of virtue. For example, someone might, in the aftermath of trauma, develop a habit of volunteering for charitable organizations, in a way that would seem significant and meaningful to them, and which (intuitively) constitutes PTG even if they are not thereby virtuous: the person might still be largely disagreeable despite their charitable efforts. If so, then there can be PTG without increase in virtue.

However, it is (as per our reply to Objection 1) perfectly possible for a person to experience an increase in virtue without becoming extremely or ideally virtuous on some dimension. Thus, a person might become more compassionate and develop a habit of volunteering for charitable organizations without being a paragon of compassion. Moreover, it is even clearer that a person might become more compassionate (and moved to volunteer) without being all-things-considered virtuous, or virtuous tout court. Given this, such a person can be more compassionate, and hence experience PTG understood as an increase in this virtue, while remaining largely disagreeable. PTG, on our account, does not imply growth along all or most dimensions of virtue.

Objection 4: The Steeling Effect

There can be growth without growth in virtue, as evidenced by what is known as a “steeling effect.” This is a phenomenon where someone develops enhanced resilience and/or stress resistance in the aftermath of trauma (for instance, as described by Seery et al., 2010). Such changes look like changes in personality and so look like PTG, even though on our account they fall short; recall that we distinguish PTG from resilience and coping on conceptual grounds.

However, we describe resilience—as with many others in the psychological literature—as a matter of return to baseline functioning. It is difficult to see how this could count as growth. Perhaps the idea is that trauma can lead to the development of a new personality trait, one that is stable and appears to be a genuine excellence: this is how we should understand enhanced resilience and a greater ability to withstand stress. If so, however, then such a change would count as virtuous on our virtue-theoretical framework, since an increase in these traits seems akin to an increase in things like equanimity and fortitude, which are traditionally thought of as virtues.

Objection 5: The Account Fails to Be Suitably Context- and Culture-Sensitive

Recall our criticism of Tedeschi and Calhoun’s (2004) account from earlier: that their account was not sensitive to the fact that values (and hence virtues) can depend upon culture and context. Because of this, Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) appear to be promoting an account of growth which is overly-focused on western values and virtues, and as a result might strike some as failing to capture the positivity that growth is meant to have. Might not our appeal to virtue suffer from the same problem? Moreover, if we move away from a fixed list of virtues, won’t our account be subject to criticism from the opposite direction, as being too relativized to the dominant evaluative norms in one culture or another? For our account to be plausible, we therefore need to navigate between the Scylla of cultural insensitivity, and the Charybdis of cultural relativism where the norms or standards present in some culture completely determine growth. How might we do this?

The answer, we propose, is to allow for the existence of values and virtues that are cross-cultural or universal (such as compassion, courage, and honesty) while maintaining that there are culturally specific and hence relativized expressions of these values and virtues. To illustrate, think of the many different things that different cultures can regard as shameful or disgraceful, and equally the many different concepts and expressions of friendship, courage, loyalty, esteem, and similar. Consider, to illustrate, how courage—widely recognized as admirable across human societies—takes different behavioral forms depending on cultural models of selfhood. In contexts emphasizing independent self-construal, courage might manifest through personal risk-taking or standing alone against majority opinion. In contexts emphasizing interdependent self-construal, courage might instead involve enduring hardship for one’s family or speaking difficult truths in ways that preserve relational harmony. In post-conflict settings, courage might involve testimony about past violence or reconciliation with former adversaries. Each expression shares the underlying structure of confronting fear in pursuit of valued goals, yet differs in behavioral manifestation and cultural meaning. As a result, one and the same good (courage) might seem universal, in the sense that (nearly) all cultures admire and respect this trait of character, while what counts as courage might seem culturally-specific, in the sense that different people at different times and in different places have thought that courage requires quite radically different attitudes, norms, and behaviors.

Recent work in moral psychology supports this view that cultural diversity can arise from cognitive universals. Gray and Pratt (2025) argue that moral judgments across cultures share a common cognitive template centered on perceptions of harm, but that cultures construct different perceptions of what causes suffering (i.e., different causal ontologies). We propose that virtues operate in a similar way: cultures share universal concerns about prima facie goods—safety, flourishing, social bonds, esteem—but construct different theories about what threatens these goods and what cultivates them. These causal ontologies then determine which character traits are emphasized and how universal virtues like courage, compassion, and wisdom are behaviorally expressed. The structure of virtue (being reliably oriented towards the good) remains constant, while the content (which specific behaviors instantiate the virtue) varies with cultural ecology. This framework explains why courage is universally admired but what counts as courageous differs dramatically across time and place.

Similar support for this framework comes from cultural psychology. Drawing on dual inheritance theory (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019), Chentsova-Dutton and Ryder (2025) argue that evolution has shaped humans both for particular psychological capacities and for the propensity to calibrate these capacities to specific sociocultural contexts. Just as humans have evolved to acquire language universally but speak specific languages locally, they may be evolved to develop virtue universally but express it in culturally specific ways. On this view, the heterogeneity of virtue expression is not a problem for virtue theory but a design feature of human psychology.

This framework yields a principled resolution of the apparent tension between cultural sensitivity and universal evaluation. The position we adopt is one of constrained pluralism: there exists a set of universal goods (grounded in basic human needs and capacities) that all cultures recognize in some form, but the behavioral expressions and social practices through which these goods are pursued vary substantially across cultural contexts. When an individual experiencing genuine PTG develops a quality that their culture does not endorse, this can still count as authentic growth if the quality is defensibly connected to a universal good. For example, someone who, as a result of adversity, comes to accept and express a stigmatized aspect of their identity may be developing authenticity (a form of integrity and self-knowledge) even in a cultural context that does not recognize this change as positive. The conflict in such cases is not about whether integrity and self-knowledge are genuinely good (they are, on any plausible accounting of universal goods), but about how these goods may be expressed in a particular cultural context. In such cases, the individual’s development can be evaluated against the universal goods, not only against locally dominant standards. This does not mean that individuals can count any change they happen to value as PTG; the change must be defensibly connected to a universal good, not merely subjectively preferred. But it does mean that the framework is not held hostage by the most conservative or restrictive elements of any particular culture. This is because the locally dominant standards in any particular culture can themselves be evaluated against the universal goods, and might often fall short. As a result, our virtue-theoretical account of growth is both sensitive to culture, while also not being completely beholden to culturally dominant norms in determining what counts as growth.

Objection 6: The Account of Value Is Under-Described

We have, throughout, described virtues as traits that are intentionally and causally related to valuable goals. On this understanding, virtue is a matter of “being for” what is good and of “being against” what is bad. This raises the large and very difficult question of the account of value we are deploying and how we understand the nature of what is good and what is bad. Without an overarching theory of value, is not the substantive account of PTG we are proposing under-described?

In response, we can say a few things. First, as argued in our response to Objection 5, our understanding of virtue is grounded in a set of universal prima facie goods—goods that are tied to basic human needs and capacities, and that are recognizable across cultures even though their specific expressions vary. Thus, it makes sense, other things being equal, to pursue knowledge, safety, social connection, integrity, and similar goods, because these are grounded in features of human life that all cultures share. By the same token, it does not make sense, other things being equal, to pursue ignorance, isolation, and shame. These prima facie goods and evils provide the evaluative foundation for our account of virtue: a trait is a virtue insofar as it reliably orients the person toward universal goods, even when the specific behavioral expression of that orientation varies across cultures.

Second, this grounding in universal goods provides a principled basis for adjudicating difficult cases. When a person develops, as a result of adversity, a quality that is valued differently across cultural contexts (such as assertiveness, emotional expressiveness, or independence) we can evaluate whether this quality represents a culturally specific expression of a universal good, such as self-determination, authenticity, or practical wisdom, or whether it fails to connect to any such good. Not every change that an individual values will count as genuine PTG on this framework; the change must be defensibly oriented toward universal goods, even if its specific form is culturally shaped.

Third, we acknowledge that claims about prima facie goods and evils remain open to debate and discussion, and claims about virtues related to these goods are therefore revisable. We do not claim to have produced a definitive list of universal goods. What we do claim is that the existence of such goods grounded in shared features of human psychology and social life provides a principled foundation for evaluating character change that neither collapses into cultural relativism nor imposes the values of any single cultural tradition.

The Importance of Lay Theory

Our account of PTG as universally-grounded but culturally-sensitive enjoys a further measure of support from what lay theory - those cognitive and evaluative frameworks that individuals employ to interpret the world and themselves - tells us about our interpretations of trauma and adversity themselves. Lay theories are shaped by many factors, such as personal history, social interactions, and cultural narratives (Hauser et al., 2017; Wilson & English, 2017). In many non-Western cultures, lay theories of adversity often emphasize fatalistic, spiritual, or supernatural explanations, with fatalistic or deterministic perspectives appearing more prevalent in certain cultural contexts (Furnham, 1988, 2017; Helman, 1990; Kashyap & Hussain, 2018). An individual from a more fatalistic framework may respond to trauma with acceptance and contemplation rather than with agentic action and problem-solving approaches. Splevins and colleagues (2010) argue that Western models of trauma recovery emphasize cognitive consistency and the resolution of dissonance between pre- and post-trauma worldviews. However, while self-consistency is likely a universal drive, cultural variability exists in which elements of the self are desired to be consistent. Individuals from collectivist cultures, where the self is defined relationally, tend to have less consistent self-views and more identity-related inconsistencies than those from individualistic cultures. Splevins et al. (2010) note that for individuals with a strong sense of communal self, distress following trauma may stem not from incompatible pre- and post-trauma identities but rather from the trauma’s impact on their ability to maintain social roles. The emphasis on cognitive consistency in Western trauma models may therefore be less relevant for people from cultures that do not anchor behavior in personal thoughts and feelings but instead in a social context that values flexibility.

It is important to note, however, that the lay theories that shape expectations of post-trauma functioning are shaped by basic and universal needs: for safety, security, companionship, esteem. Because of this, some aspects of lay theory reflect values which are more or less universal and present in all cultures – as the goods of safety, security, etc., seem to be, while other aspects of lay theory reflect the differing behavioral expressions and practices through which these values are pursued in and by particular groups. This is arguably the situation with constructs which are distinctive of individualistic cultures in the West, highlighting narratives of overcoming and adversity; and constructs in many non-Western cultures that emphasize fatalistic, spiritual, or supernatural explanations. Many other contextualized and relativized elements can help make up a person’s interpretative framework: they might be conservative or liberal, religious or atheist, sociable or introverted, adventurous or risk-averse, and so on. In addition, there will be very many idiosyncratic, bespoke, and personal desires, projects, wishes, commitments, and similar which help constitute a person’s distinctive identity.

Lay theories can be integrated into our account of PTG, precisely because lay theories are likely to play a central role in a person’s interpretation and evaluation of the psychological changes that trauma generates, in line with the universal and culturally-specific values present in their cognitive-evaluative framework, and which are used to determine what counts as virtuous. As a result, those in Western, individualistic cultures will tend to interpret psychological changes in self-efficacy as growth in individual strength, or changes in one’s philosophical or metaphysical outlook in terms of greater spirituality; culturally endorsed resilience narratives in Western contexts will at the same time highlight individualistic virtues like self-reliance and optimism. In many non-Western, collectivistic cultures, individuals might regard the former as a way in which a person is diminished insofar as this reflects a movement away from the collective, for instance. Collectivist cultures may prioritize virtues like social harmony, communal interdependence, and humility in the face of adversity. Indeed, it is possible that the same psychological changes might generate different outcomes when it comes to growth and diminishment in virtue, if those changes reflect different culturally-specific expressions of certain values or disvalues.

It is also important to acknowledge that culturally dominant growth narratives often reflect the values and experiences of powerful or majority groups within a society. Marginalized individuals may face pressure to display “growth” in ways that reinforce existing power structures; for instance, expectations that oppressed groups demonstrate forgiveness or gratitude toward their oppressors (Jayawickreme, 2026; Syed & McLean, 2022). A virtue-based framework is better positioned than existing models to resist such pressures, because it grounds evaluation in universal goods rather than in culturally dominant scripts. As we argued in our response to Objection 2, adaptive traits that enable individuals to cope with conditions of oppression and marginalization can be reframed in virtue-theoretical terms, even when the dominant culture does not recognize them as virtuous. This means that what counts as growth for marginalized individuals may differ from (or even directly conflict with) the growth narratives endorsed by dominant cultural institutions. While a full analysis of the intersection between power dynamics and PTG is beyond the scope of this paper, the virtue framework’s commitment to universal goods provides a principled basis for contesting culturally imposed growth expectations that serve the interests of the powerful rather than the flourishing of the individual.

The above shows how we can accommodate both universal goods and culturally-relative expressions of these goods in our model of PTG. The role of lay theories is one of interpretation of the psychological changes that trauma generates, leading to judgments of growth if the changes are positively endorsed by those theories. Of course, things are complicated somewhat by the fact that lay theories might have some influence – at least at the margins – as to which events are labelled traumatic in the first place. Loss of faith might be traumatic in some religious cultures, although not in others. But we hope that the basic picture of how lay theories play a role in perceptions or reports of growth – and indeed, in actual genuine growth, when these reports are veridical – is clear.

In summary, adopting a virtue approach effectively accommodates both culturally specific and universal aspects of values and of virtues. Universal goods, grounded in basic human needs and capacities, are recognized by all cultures, in some form. These goods ground universal virtues, such as wisdom, compassion, honesty, and courage. But the behaviors and practices through which such goods are expressed and pursued can vary significantly in different cultural contexts. Because of this, universal virtues are likely to have many culturally-specific expressions and behaviors associated with them. (What counts as courageous behavior, for instance, can thus vary dramatically.) In spite of this diversity, the appeal to virtue provides a common normative criterion for evaluating genuine growth following adversity.

This dual approach thus enriches the psychological understanding of adversity and provides culturally sensitive yet universally grounded standards for assessing authentic growth, and at the same time promises to foster both cross-cultural respect and meaningful dialogue about human resilience and transformation.

Implications for Research and Practice

How a Virtue Framework Addresses Earlier Limitations

Re-conceptualizing PTG as enduring post-adversity change in culturally situated virtues provides a direct response to several longstanding weaknesses in the PTG literature. First, it helps resolve common conceptual conflations by supplying a clearer criterion for what counts as growth: not the presence of meaning-making, positive reappraisal, or coping efforts per se, but the emergence of stable, excellence-relevant patterns of thought, feeling, and action that are normatively praiseworthy within a cultural niche. This distinction reduces the risk of treating narrative reconstruction or temporary shifts in outlook as evidence of enduring transformation—an inferential leap that has compromised much PTG interpretation.

Second, a virtue-based conception expands the scope of PTG beyond the familiar five PTGI domains by allowing growth to be indexed in the virtues a cultural ecology identifies as central (including, but not limited to, compassion, courage, humility, self-control, gratitude, honesty, or practical wisdom). This matters because the “content” of growth—what is regarded as good—varies across cultural contexts, and existing measures may under-detect growth that is ethically or socially salient in different cultural settings. As argued in our response to Objection 5, the virtue framework addresses this challenge by positing that growth is indexed against culturally specific expressions of universal goods—allowing measures to capture locally salient forms of virtue while maintaining cross-cultural comparability at the level of underlying goods.

Third, the virtue framework foregrounds temporal dynamics. Virtues should display some stability and generality across time and contexts. As a result, the framework discourages cross-sectional inference and incentivizes designs that can distinguish short-term coping from durable change in virtue. Finally, defining growth in terms of virtues shifts attention from perceived to veridical change. Because virtues have behavioral implications and can be evaluated through multiple sources of evidence—informant reports, observed behavior, ecological indicators—this approach provides a principled way to move beyond the field’s heavy reliance on self-reported benefit as the primary evidentiary base.

Methodological Recommendations for a More Credible PTG Science

A virtue-based approach will only be as useful as the empirical strategies used to operationalize it. We therefore highlight several methodological priorities for research programs aimed at improving the credibility of PTG claims.

Develop culturally adaptable measures of virtue. A central implication of the present framework is that the measurement target should be virtues rather than generic “benefits” or culturally scripted PTG domains. This does not require abandoning cross-cultural comparison; rather, it requires a more careful measurement architecture that can represent both (a) virtues that are plausibly present in all cultures, and (b) virtues that represent culturally-specific expressions of universal goods. Practically, this suggests future research on both culturally grounded expressions of virtue (including emic indicators of virtue), and explicit theorizing about which components are expected to generalize.

Do not rely exclusively on self-report. If PTG is taken to involve enduring character change, then exclusive dependence on self-report is poorly matched to the construct. Multi-method assessment should be treated as a default expectation rather than an aspirational add-on. Minimally, studies should incorporate (a) informant reports from close others, (b) behavioral indicators (including lab tasks where appropriate, but especially naturalistic indicators), and (c) ecological/experience-sampling strategies that can capture repeated enactments of virtue-relevant behavior in daily life. Triangulation across sources will also help separate identity-relevant narratives (“I became a better person”) from observable changes in how individuals actually behave under stress, relate to others, or respond to ethical demands.

Use multi-wave longitudinal designs that can test durability and causal linkage. A virtue account makes durability non-negotiable: growth must persist beyond acute adaptation. Longitudinal designs should include enough waves to model (a) the immediate aftermath (where coping and identity work are most active), (b) a consolidation period (where new habits may stabilize), and (c) longer-term follow-up (where regression to baseline is common). Where possible, designs should also strengthen causal inference about adversity’s role—through prospective cohorts, quasi-experimental comparisons, or careful modeling of timing (e.g., whether virtue change follows the trauma rather than preceding it).

Treat culture as more than a moderator. Cross-cultural research should not merely test whether a Western PTG measure “works” elsewhere; it should ask whether the virtues that constitute growth differ by context. This implies integrating cultural psychology methods (e.g., ethnographic or mixed-method approaches) into measure development and interpretation and being explicit about what kind of invariance is required for a given inference (e.g., within-culture prediction versus between-culture mean comparisons).

Test mediators and moderators that plausibly shape virtue development. The virtue framework also clarifies what explanatory variables should matter. PTG research has often focused on broad cognitive processes; a virtue account pushes researchers to model the conditions under which stable virtue change is more or less likely. These include (but are not limited to) baseline character/virtue levels, socialization and role expectations, social support, and adversity type and context (e.g., interpersonal harm vs. natural disaster; moral injury vs. illness). Such moderators are not peripheral; they are essential to explaining heterogeneity and to avoiding one-size-fits-all growth narratives.

Implications for Clinical and Applied Practice

Clinically, the virtue framework motivates a more cautious and culturally respectful stance toward discussions of PTG. If PTG narratives in specific cultural settings can function as culturally scripted expectations about how suffering should transform the self (e.g., the USA; Jayawickreme, 2026), then exhortations to “find growth” risk becoming prescriptive and potentially moralizing. A virtue-based approach instead encourages clinicians and practitioners to (a) attend to culturally specific understandings of what constitutes a good life and admirable character, (b) avoid imposing specific cultural scripts, and (c) focus on observable patterns of action and relationship rather than self-reported growth alone.

This reframing has two practical payoffs. First, it supports more patient-centered goals: rather than treating “growth” as a generic endpoint, clinicians can collaboratively identify virtue-relevant aims that are meaningful within the client’s own worldview (e.g., rebuilding trustworthiness, cultivating courage in daily functioning, strengthening compassion toward family, developing practical wisdom in navigating constraints). Second, it helps guard against the risk of interpreting absence of growth as a failure. If growth is defined as a form of enduring excellence, then it becomes easier to separate the task of recovery from the distinct—and not always appropriate—project of post-adversity virtue change.

Limitations

The present framework also has limits that should be acknowledged clearly. Most importantly, any virtue-based account must navigate ongoing philosophical debates about (a) how “the good” is grounded (culture endorsement, universal goods, or hybrid/intersubjective views) and (b) how to adjudicate conflicts between culturally valued traits and ethical standards endorsed by other cultural traditions or by the universal-goods framework proposed here. In addition, the framework’s empirical viability depends on future measurement work: culturally adaptable virtue assessments, multi-method validation of these measures, and longitudinal assessments are feasible but resource intensive. Finally, although the framework is designed to improve conceptual clarity, it does not imply that virtue change is common, likely, or always necessary; it provides a standard for identifying growth when it occurs and for studying the conditions under which it is more plausible.

Conclusion

By integrating insights from philosophy, personality science, and cultural psychology, we have articulated six criteria that any satisfactory account of PTG must meet and showed that extant models fall short on key dimensions of durability, distinctiveness, and normative grounding. The proposed virtue framework supplies a coherent object of explanation—change in virtue. Practically, it redirects clinical practice and policy toward evidence-based cultivation of specific virtues in ways that respect variations across cultures.

In response to this proposed framework, researchers should develop and validate culturally adaptable measures of virtues, test mediators and moderators—such as baseline traits, social support, and type of adversity—that condition growth in virtue, and examine downstream social consequences, including mental health, prosocial engagement and civic participation. Collaborations across moral philosophy, personality science, and clinical science will be essential to realize this agenda.

In conclusion, trauma is an inescapable feature of human life; whether it yields lasting “good” is an empirical question. We argue that PTG is best defined as changes in specific virtues—yet which virtue changes depends on the specific cultural niche. By anchoring that question in a culturally sensitive virtue-based framework, the present work offers a path toward a science of growth that is at once culturally plural, ethically meaningful, and empirically credible.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Multidisciplinary Recommendations for Improving the Credibility of Research on Posttraumatic Growth

Supplemental Material for Multidisciplinary Recommendations for Improving the Credibility of Research on Posttraumatic Growth by Eranda Jayawickreme, Michael Brady, Nuwan Jayawickreme in Personality Science.