This article explores how Puerto Rico’s anticorruption laws have spurred the development of a new market for public procurement. This market enables significant investments in platforms, websites, training and educational materials, and consulting services to aid compliance with anticorruption legislations. This has given rise to an emerging economic sector where consulting, law, and technology firms thrive. This article aims to elucidate how the Puerto Rican government’s commodification of anticorruption and anti-fraud interventions, and its outsourcing to consulting firms can be understood as part of a colonial regime of permission which normalized corruption and capital accumulation through wealth extraction. Through four examples of anticorruption public procurement – anticorruption legislation, post-Hurricane María recovery, and economic assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic – it demonstrates that wealth extraction is a key driver behind these anticorruption laws, ultimately creating an anticorruption market.
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