Abstract
The induced-compliance paradigm is a fundamental pillar in the literature on cognitive dissonance. A recent failed replication by Vaidis et al. casts doubt on the widely used experimental method, thereby challenging the literature and prevailing theorizing about the role of perceived choice in cognitive dissonance. However, the nonreplication of the experimental effects could be attributable to methodological factors, such as laboratory settings and cross-temporal dynamics. We therefore reanalyzed the replication data to further explore the relationship between dissonant-attitude change and choice perceptions, employing self-report items instead of the traditional experimental manipulation of choice. Our analysis revealed a significant interaction effect between perceived choice and dissonant behavior (writing a counterattitudinal essay vs. a self-chosen essay) on attitude change: Participants who wrote a counterattitudinal essay aligned their attitudes only if they reported high (vs. low) freedom of choice. These findings suggest a crucial role of choice perceptions in dissonance reduction, consistent with the original theorizing. Future research can employ various methods and draw from adjacent fields, especially from the literature on control perceptions, to reconsider the induced-compliance paradigm and advance research on cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance is an aversive state arising from cognitive inconsistency, such as when individuals act contrary to their attitude (Festinger, 1957). This discomfort motivates dissonance reduction, typically by aligning the attitude with the behavior. A fundamental pillar in the literature is the induced-compliance paradigm (Cooper, 2007; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). It proposes that dissonance occurs only if individuals feel responsible for choosing their behavior. Low choice perception, on the contrary, allows ascribing the behavior to external justifications, obviating the need for behavior-consistent attitudinal change. Dissonance research has therefore commonly manipulated perceived choice (over writing a counterattitudinal essay) to qualify dissonance processes (e.g., Gosling et al., 2006; Steele & Liu, 1983).
In a recent multilab replication attempt, Vaidis et al. (2024) scrutinized the induced-compliance paradigm. They found that writing a counterattitudinal essay engenders more essay-consistent attitudes (dissonance reduction) regardless of experimental manipulations of choice. This failed replication calls into question key findings from dissonance research that relied on the induced-compliance paradigm. Moreover, it challenges the empirical underpinnings of theorizing regarding the role of perceived choice in dissonance.
Does the induced-compliance paradigm fail to replicate for methodological reasons? Vaidis et al. (2024) attempted a direct replication of the classic manipulation of choice, which “reminded [participants of] the voluntary nature of the task” to heighten choice perceptions. 1 The procedure drew on the assumption that choice perceptions are otherwise low. This method had several limitations because it mirrors obligatory choices people regularly encounter nowadays in (a) academic studies and (b) everyday life more generally.
First, participants receive such disclosures of voluntary participation in most scientific studies despite this voluntariness being self-evident. Consequently, the student sample in the replication study was accustomed to the reminders employed to induce perceived choice. Likewise, the proliferation of the internet increasingly confronts people with related experiences of ostensible choice in everyday life, such as when people accept browser cookies because of the strenuousness of opting out. If participants appraise the manipulation of choice as obligatory with only hypothetical relevance to their preexisting commitment to complete the study, the experimental method is limited.
These considerations align with debates on the validity of laboratory experiments (Diener et al., 2022; Pauer et al., 2023; Schwarz, 1996), cross-temporal dynamics in dissonance (Buttlar et al., 2024; Pauer, Rutjens, Hofmann, & van Harreveld, 2024), and historical change in psychological phenomena (Muthukrishna et al., 2021; Pauer, Rutjens, Brick, et al., 2024). Because perceived freedom of choice is the key conceptual precondition for dissonance reduction, we explored the role of self-reported choice perceptions, thereby bypassing methodological limitations of the experimental-choice manipulation.
Reanalysis
Given potential limitations of the experimental procedure to manipulate choice perceptions, 2 we explored whether self-reported perceived choice influenced dissonance reduction in Vaidis et al.’s (2024) data set. We aggregated the two manipulation-check items on choice perception (r = .41) and probed their role in behavior-consistent attitudinal change (while controlling for prior attitudes). An analysis of covariance yielded a significant interaction between perceived choice and dissonance induction (i.e., the contrast between writing a self-chosen or counterattitudinal essay; see Table 1 and Fig. 1). Simple slope analysis indicated that the effect of dissonance induction was nonsignificant at low choice perceptions but significant at higher levels.
These results persisted in robustness checks (without controlling for prior attitudes and in separate analyses of the choice perception items; see R script at https://osf.io/hb58p/?view_only=d2902b3f2e884b7383d2ab4214c72e93).
Interaction Effects Between Self-Reported Perceived Choice and Condition Contrasts on Attitudes in Favor of Tuition Fees (Dissonance Reduction), With Bonferroni-Corrected Post Hoc Simple Comparisons
Note: The overall interaction between condition (HC-NE vs. HC-CE vs. LC-CE) and perceived choice was significant, F(2, 1098) = 7.07, p < .001, η²partial = 0.01. CI = confidence interval; HC-NE = neutral (self-chosen) essay with high-choice condition; HC-CE = dissonant essay with high-choice condition; LC-CE = dissonant essay with low-choice condition.
aWhen excluding participants who defied the essay instructions (e.g., HC-NE participants who wrote essays to counteract increased tuition), as in Vaidis et al. (2024)’s secondary analysis, the simple effect of perceived choice in the HC-NE condition turned nonsignificant (β = -.13, p = .086), whereas the other effects remained unchanged.
Simple slopes of self-reported perceived choice on attitudes in favor of tuition fees (dissonance reduction) by condition, with 95% confidence intervals.
Discussion
The interaction between dissonance induction and perceived choice indicates that behavior-consistent attitudinal change occurred only among participants who genuinely felt a sense of choice over the counterattitudinal behavior. This finding contradicts the conclusions of Vaidis et al. (2024), who questioned the role of choice in dissonance. They observed dissonance reduction both after making participants’ choice salient (experimental condition) and without such choice reminders (control condition), whereas our reanalysis indicates actual choice perceptions are indeed a crucial precondition of dissonance reduction. Specifically, we observed no significant dissonance reduction in participants who reported low levels of choice perceptions.
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the induced-compliance paradigm. Therefore, instead of discarding the framework, we suggest that the original methodology for manipulating choice perceptions is insufficient. The shortcomings of this experimental method might stem from recent societal and scientific practices: If participants are desensitized to obligatory reminders of voluntary study participation, such disclosures will hardly manipulate feelings of choice. However, this reflects a post hoc response to Vaidis et al.’s findings, and our reanalysis is limited by relying on two manipulation-check items.
The present perspective highlights the need for dissonance research to refine its methods and theoretical frameworks in multiple ways. First, a promising avenue may be to borrow from models and methods from personal-control research (Hamann et al., 2023; Pauer, Rutjens, & van Harreveld, 2024; Skinner, 1996). This could involve manipulating not only behavioral control (perceived choice) but also control over behavioral outcomes, compensatory control, and generalized control. Second, researchers can draw on behavioral tasks (e.g., Berger & Wyss, 2021; Lange & Dewitte, 2021) designed to induce conflict between behavioral engagement, its outcome, and a given attitude object. These tasks readily lend themselves to manipulating choice perceptions and dissonant behavior under well-controlled conditions. Third, various additional methods beyond traditional laboratory experiments are essential for advancing the generalizability and reliability of the field (Diener et al., 2022; Grosz et al., 2020; Yarkoni, 2022), such as by investigating naturally occurring instances of dissonance and the role of choice perceptions in daily life (Pauer, Rutjens, Hofmann, & van Harreveld, 2024). Finally, historical data could yield meta-analytic insight into the trends in effect sizes of the induced-compliance paradigm over time (Muthukrishna et al., 2021). Overall, the implications of the failed replication open up fruitful opportunities for advancing cognitive-dissonance research.
Footnotes
Transparency
Action Editor: David A. Sbarra
Editor: David A. Sbarra
Author Contributions
