Abstract
Environmental justice (EJ) groups are increasingly turning to courts to address socio-ecological conflicts. Central to these efforts is the production of evidence and the translation of collective grievances into arguments recognized by judicial institutions. This article develops the concept of ‘science-based legal mobilization’ to capture the strategic use and foregrounding of scientific knowledge and expert testimony to meet evidentiary standards and advance EJ claims. Drawing on a qualitative case study of rights of nature litigation in Intag, Ecuador, the article examines how community members, activists, scientists, and legal actors assemble and mobilize diverse forms of knowledge. These include local knowledge, science, regulatory administrative knowledge and legal knowledge. Focusing on a key moment in the legal defense of territory through rights of nature—centered on the protection of threatened species such as the long-nosed harlequin frog and the confusing rocket frog—the study traces how knowledge is co-produced, legitimized, and presented in court. The findings show that, while rights of nature frameworks signal openness to plural knowledge systems science and credentialed expertise continue to play a central role in engaging the judiciary and shaping legal arguments and judicial reasoning. Science based legal mobilization enables EJ groups to meet legal standards and secure ecological protection, yet it also reinforces epistemic hierarchies by privileging knowledge forms that are traditionally recognized as authoritative. As a result, local perspectives and broader socio-cultural harms risk being marginalized. The article concludes that the transformative potential of rights of nature litigation depends on confronting these epistemic hierarchies. Advancing knowledge pluralism requires not only the strategic use of science but also greater recognition of diverse ways of knowing in legal processes, which shape both what counts as evidence and which ‘natures’ are ultimately protected.
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