The China Mission in the Early Seventeenth Century: The Link between Higher Administration and On-the-Ground Missions

Abstract

Adopting an accommodationist strategy with a positive attitude, the mission in China had a breakthrough when Matteo Ricci reached the Ming Court in 1601. Valentin Carvaglio’s Lettre de la Chine de l’an 1601 reports on this historical moment and testifies that the Jesuits’ intelligent, discreet, and humble presence under the guidance of the policy was an effective strategy. However, after Ricci’s death, the high profile adopted by the mission and tensions between Carvaglio and Nicholas Longobardi caused setbacks. This article seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how new mission directions and tensions between the administration from above and missions on the ground can impact mission.

Introduction

On January 25, 1602, Valentin Carvaglio (1560–1631), rector of the Jesuit College of Macau who oversaw the China mission until 1603, ¹ sent the annual report Lettre de la Chine de l’an 1601, écrite par le P. Valentin Carvaglio Recteur du Collège de Macao au T. R. P. Claude Aquaviva Général de la Compagnie de Jésus to Claude Aquaviva (1543–1615), superior general of the Society of Jesus in Rome. An essential component of the letter was how Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) and his Jesuit companions successfully arrived in Beijing and obtained imperial permission to preach the Catholic faith in China. While written in a matter-of-fact tone, joy and optimism are easy to discern between the lines. The letter reported on a breakthrough in the history of Catholicism in China, acknowledging that Christianity had disappeared in 843 when Emperor Wuzong (reign: 840–846) of the Tang had banned Nestorianism, along with Buddhism. ² The efforts of the Society of Jesus opened China again to Christianity in 1601; thus, this letter summarized the best practices of mission work in China. However, this breakthrough did not mean that mission work would continue to be smooth sailing. Success was built on the Jesuits’ nuanced understanding of Chinese culture and their resulting mission policy. At another level, there was a consensus between the formulators and the executors of the mission policy in those years, as Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606) and Ricci supported each other in applying their accommodation policy. Soon after Ricci’s death, changes introduced to the mission policy caused setbacks for the work of the mission.

As part of a study of that mission, this article argues that an intelligent, discreet, and humble presence was key to effective mission work in China. Further, tensions between the administration from above and the mission on the ground harmed the work, offering an important lesson to be learned. We will examine the administration of Carvaglio, the new direction that mission policy took after Ricci’s death, and Nicholas Longobardi’s leadership. First, we will look at Carvaglio’s career in the Far East, because, compared to numerous other Jesuit missionaries, sufficient scholarly attention has not been given to Carvaglio. Second, we will review Carvaglio’s 1602 letter, an official Jesuit document that testifies to the outcome of the Valignano–Ricci policy. Third, we will turn to the case of Longobardi, who succeeded Ricci as Jesuit superior in China. Longobardi adopted new directions for missionary work that circumvented the Jesuit leadership in China and Japan. Finally, we argue that tensions between mission administration and work on the ground harmed the mission. Here, we reiterate the significance of Carvaglio’s 1602 letter for a better understanding of mission policy in China. Indeed, between 1582 and 1601, the Jesuits, represented by Ricci, devoted nearly twenty years to observing Chinese culture, learning its essential characteristics, and executing a missionary policy that had been effective in converting the Chinese.

Valentin Carvaglio, a Jesuit Administrator

Carvaglio was a professor of theology, but in the Far East he was essentially a Jesuit administrator, distinguishing him from missionaries working on the ground. Firstly, he seems to have prioritized compliance with Christian theology during the mission. Secondly, he adjusted the mission policy without fully understanding the mission field. Thirdly, senior missionaries on the ground may have challenged his authority when they considered taking the helm. Finally, he was the leader of the Jesuits when they were experiencing a schism with other religious orders. In particular, when the Jesuit mission was criticized, he vigorously defended it. ³

Born in Lisbon in 1560, Carvaglio entered the novitiate at the age of eighteen. ⁴ In 1580, he took the vows of the Society of Jesus and was ordained in Évora. ⁵ He taught philosophy in Lisbon. When Father Louis Cerqueira was named Bishop of Japan, Carvaglio was selected to accompany him. ⁶ In 1594, he left Portugal to join the Jesuit mission in the Far East. In 1595, he arrived in Macau but did not continue his trip to Japan as originally planned. Instead, in 1601 he began teaching theology at the Jesuit College of Macau. ⁷ After Ricci arrived in Beijing in 1601, Valignano reorganized the mission’s administration and appointed Carvaglio rector of the Jesuit College of Macau. ⁸ Carvaglio taught theology for four years in Macau and headed the College for eight years. ⁹ Then, he became the first provincial of Japan in 1611 and held that position until 1617. ¹⁰

He continued to rise within the Jesuit hierarchy. Succeeding Louis Cerqueira, who died in Nagasaki on February 15, 1614, Carvaglio became vicar general of Japan in 1614. ¹¹ As the Jesuit provincial of Japan, he was nominated as vicar general and administrator of the bishopric of Japan, despite the protests of Franciscan missionaries. ¹² In early 1614, after massive persecutions of Christians occurred in Japan, Carvaglio moved back to Macau. ¹³ In 1624, he was then appointed provincial of the Jesuits in Goa and died in 1631. ¹⁴

While spending considerable time in Macau, he was not a “frontline” missionary, having never set foot in China proper. Thus, Chinese scholarship on Catholicism in China seldom mentions his name, but his name as a Jesuit administrator appears in literature addressing some important events. First, he was the head of the Jesuits when the 1605 schism took place between the Jesuits and the mendicant orders in Macau. There are several versions of the details of this dispute. ¹⁵

In February 1606, it was rumored that the Italian Jesuit Lazzero Cattanei (1560–1640), who was allied with the Portuguese in Macau, was conspiring in a rebellion to conquer China. As a result, Guangdong province was mobilized, and the Chinese authorities arrested the Jesuit layman Francesco Martinez (ca.1568–1606) who had been sent from Macau to acquire authorization for Valignano to enter China. After learning that Valignano had died, Martinez was waiting for Carvaglio’s instruction on whether to stay in Canton or return to Macau. While awaiting a reply, he was denounced and died in prison in March 1606 after being brutally tortured. ¹⁶ Although the Chinese authorities later proved that Cattanei and Martinez were innocent, the alleged Jesuit-led conspiracy should have been a lesson for Jesuit administrators like Carvaglio. Firstly, conflicts among Catholic orders damaged the mission. Secondly, when missionaries were viewed by the Chinese as invaders, the mission suffered a loss. ¹⁷ Finally, the mission was harmed by the shock, confusion, and scandal this “conspiracy” created for nonbelievers and new Christians. Missionaries on the ground, such as Ricci, lamented this deeply. ¹⁸

The 1602 Letter on the Mission in China: Best Practices Illustrated

Carvaglio’s letter, dated January 25, 1602, vividly summarizes the mission in China in 1601. ¹⁹ As a valuable document drafted more than 400 years ago, it bears historical witness to the mission in China by recounting Jesuit activities at the College of Macau, Ricci’s journey to Beijing, patterns of mission work in China, and challenges the mission encountered. It provides a good illustration of the Jesuit mission strategy in early seventeenth-century China. The missionaries’ intelligent, discreet, and humble presence contrasts with the top-down approach of the administrators. Covering both Macau and the interior of China, this authoritative report of a fruitful year of the Jesuit mission in China deserves more attention from both scholars and missionaries today.

The four parts of the letter concentrate on the Jesuit College of Macau, Ricci’s second voyage to Beijing, the Jesuit residences in Nanjing and Nanchang, and the Jesuit residence in Shaozhou. The first part of the letter identifies the College of Macau as a critical institution on which the missions in China and Japan depended. ²⁰ In Macau, the Jesuits led prisoners to repent, healed the sick, converted nonbelievers, taught catechumens, and maintained good relationships with the community. These good relations with the community in Macau are evidenced by the fact that, when the college caught fire in 1601, the residents, including young women who were usually in seclusion, came out to provide rescue assistance. ²¹

The second part recounts Ricci’s second journey to the Ming Court and details the mutual appreciation between the Jesuits and Chinese literati. ²² On May 19, 1600, Jesuit Fathers in Nanjing departed to Beijing again to obtain imperial permission to establish a residence in the capital. Careful preparations were made, including acquiring letters of recommendation from major Chinese scholar-officials in Nanjing, preparing the gifts, and selecting Sebastian Fernandez (Zhong Mingren, 1562–1622), a Chinese Jesuit who was much liked by the Ming Court in Nanjing, as a member of the team. ²³

When dealing with Chinese people, Ricci valued friendships, embraced cooperation and patience, and tolerated animosity. He had made friends with the Chinese literati, not only by offering gifts but also by heartfelt expressions of respect. ²⁴ When facing animosity, Ricci adopted a tolerant and resigned attitude. For example, when Macon (馬堂), a powerful eunuch, tried to find faults with the Jesuits, Ricci chose cooperation over confrontation. ²⁵ In addition, before making each significant step forward, Ricci and his colleagues waited patiently for instructions from the Ming. These amicable relationships paid off when the emperor reacted to the portrait of Christ and the empress reacted to the portrait of Mary. Moreover, the emperor granted the Jesuits permission to live in the palace. ²⁶ Carvaglio concludes his letter with affection.

Voilà sommairement ce que nous avons ce qui s’est passé depuis que les Pères sont partis pour aller à Pachin, nous attendons d’heure à autre des nouvelles de la dernière resolution d’une chose tant désirée, de tous ceux qui sont en cette mission, voire toute la Companie, pour être de si grande importance, laquelle venant à succéder comme nous l’espérons, la porte sera toute grande ouverte à la conversion qui a été fermée tant de siècles en ce grand Royaume de la Chine. ²⁷

[This is a brief account of what we have been concerned about since our fathers departed for Beijing. Because of its great importance, we expect constant news of the final resolution of the matter to be highly desired by all those who are in this mission and the entire society. With the last resolution succeeding as we hoped, the door will be open to conversion, which has been closed for many centuries in this great kingdom of China.] ²⁸

The third and fourth parts of the letter report on the Jesuit residences in Nanjing, Nanchang, and Shaozhou. Once again, extreme caution is emphasized as the key to a smooth mission, especially in Nanchang, where many descendants of the imperial family resided. The aim was to avoid triggering distrust among powerful Chinese people. ²⁹ The Jesuits were able to win the respect of Chinese governors and local Mandarins; many Chinese Christians stopped practicing idolatry, and the Jesuits circumvented cultural restrictions to enable them to baptize Chinese women. ³⁰

New Directions after Ricci’s Death and Challenges: The Case of Nicholas Longobardi

After Matteo Ricci died in 1610, the Valignano–Ricci policy was quickly challenged, and the controversy over rites began to emerge. The Italian Jesuit Nicholas Longobardi (1565–1655) first raised the terminology issue in 1610, which was quickly brought to the provincial Carvaglio. The latter included similar questions regarding the terms used when Ricci was alive. ³¹ As previously mentioned, Carvaglio had never properly set foot in China. ³² With his limited understanding of Chinese culture, he ordered missionaries to investigate whether God, angels, and the rational soul were addressed in the Chinese sciences. ³³ Carvaglio’s lack of experience probably hindered him from making quick decisions.

Longobardi did not always agree with Carvaglio, who supervised the mission from a distance, thus there were tensions. Arriving in Macau on July 20, 1597, Longobardi first entered Shaozhou on December 28, 1597, and preached there until 1611. In 1610, he succeeded Ricci as the superior of the China mission and held that post until 1622. On May 3, 1611, he began to preach in Beijing. After the vice province of China was detached from the province of Japan under the order of Superior General Vitelleschi in 1618, Longobardi founded missions in Shanxi with Van Spiere. He became the superior of Beijing between 1623 and 1640. On December 11, 1655, he died in Beijing at the age of ninety. ³⁴ Longobardi’s long experience indicates he was a senior missionary, even during Ricci’s time. Thus, he entered China early, learned Chinese, and studied the essence of Chinese culture. Early in 1598, he had analyzed the major characteristics of Chinese culture and people and conveyed his findings to Claude Aquaviva. He observed that China was a unified country where Confucianism was taken as the standard, and the Chinese were learned and atheist. He also correctly pointed out that, while they did not resist the Catholic faith, the Chinese valued filial piety as one of the most important moral virtues. ³⁵ This summary indicates that Longobardi was confident in the mission work in China. He was a powerful presence as a Western missionary, as the Chinese viewed the Jesuits as people of rare virtue and well-versed in the sciences. Further, Longobardi had adapted to Chinese culture with as much ease as he had to his native Italian culture. ³⁶

Longobardi’s reaction to an alleged Jesuit-led conspiracy in 1606 further boosted his prestige. As one of the accused, he solemnly declared his innocence and was therefore not persecuted. The mission withstood the test and Catholicism came to be honored again and quickly spread throughout China. This turn of events should have provided missionaries such as Longobardi with tremendous confidence. Several priests under his administration began to baptize the Chinese using the vernacular. ³⁷ After Longobardi became the superior of China, two opposing signals encouraged him and his followers to expand and intensify the work of the apostolate. The Jesuits not only converted and won sympathizers among important members of the Chinese literati but were also enlisted by the Ming Court to undertake a calendar reform. At the same time, the mission in China was facing a financial crisis as regular subsidies from Macau were no longer arriving.

As a senior missionary in China, Longobardi did not always agree with the superiors of the provinces of Japan on the direction, scale, and pace of the mission work. He may have thought he had a better understanding of the mission, so sometimes he made decisions on his own. For example, in 1612, he sent Nicolas Trigault (1577–1628) to Rome without seeking Carvaglio’s permission. Both Carvaglio and François Vieira strongly opposed Longobardi’s action. ³⁸ The two administrators judged that Longobardi’s project was premature and imprudent and believed his views were illusory about the stability of the mission in China and the chances for rapid development. They also believed that Longobardi should be held responsible for later outbreaks of persecution and criticized the fact that the development of the mission in China had placed the province of Japan in a difficult financial situation. They also claimed that the information Trigault conveyed to Rome was illegitimate, as it had not come from Macau. Thus, the administrators believed that the missionaries on the ground (Longobardi, Trigault, etc.) were providing Rome with an overly optimistic picture of the mission in China. ³⁹

However, Longobardi’s plan to advance the mission to China and secure more independence was not entirely groundless. By 1613, the mission was well developed. Some missionaries and perhaps Carvaglio began to think Ricci’s cautious policy was becoming a barrier. Proud of the number of new Christians, they started to consider Ricci’s approach to be overly timid. It was under these circumstances that Carvaglio, as the provincial, decided the mission could ignore Ricci’s principles of circumspection and respect and exercise apostolic freedom in public. ⁴⁰ Further, in 1614, contra Ricci’s policy, Carvaglio ordered the missionaries to stop teaching mathematics and other sciences that were viewed as a distraction from the pure gospel. This new direction, although quickly annulled, shocked key Chinese Christians such as Xu Guangqi (1562–1633). An administrator like Carvaglio, who was far removed from the mission, could not see that breaking and burning idols had already caused hatred, even among Chinese believers. ⁴¹

Ironically, Carvaglio had earlier understood the importance of Western sciences in missionary work in China. For example, when Charles Spinola (1564–1622) arrived in Macau in 1599, Carvaglio invited Spinola to stay in China because his mathematical skills could contribute greatly to the mission. ⁴² In his 1602 letter, Carvaglio also stated that Chinese scholar-officials eagerly wanted to learn mathematics from the missionaries. ⁴³ Thus, stopping the teaching of mathematics to the Chinese was a miscalculation.

The consequences were immediate. Removing Ricci’s policy of discretion quickly led to severe problems. In 1616, the zealous yet indiscreet Alfonso Vagnoni (1566–1640), one of the most faithful executors of the provincial’s order, aroused terrible persecution against the Christians in Nanjing. He and some other missionaries were thrown into jail, tortured, and beaten. ⁴⁴ Diego de Pantoja and Sabatino de Ursis (1575–1620) were then expelled from Beijing while Vagnoni and other missionaries were expelled from Nanjing. ⁴⁵ Missionaries began to be viewed as evil men, disturbances to public peace, and masters of new laws and sects. ⁴⁶ Having “a high profile” was costly, as it seriously damaged the mission that Ricci had promoted for over twenty years. Pride, imprudence, and miscalculation were the major reasons for the harm the mission suffered.

Conclusion: Lessons to Learn

Based on a good understanding of Chinese culture, Valignano and Ricci agreed that compromises were sometimes necessary for effective missionary work and that an intelligent, discreet, and humble presence was key. Such a presence strategically drew similarities between Chinese and Western cultures and successfully converted high-ranking Chinese scholar–officials such as Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao,and Yang Tingyun (1557–1627). Later generations of missionaries benefited from Valignano and Ricci’s pioneering work: missionaries such as Johann Schreck (1576–1630), Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666), and Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688) combined cultural accommodation and Western science to continue the China mission. They became advisors to the Ming and Qing courts, which greatly benefited their mission. In 1692, Emperor Kangxi (reign: 1661–1722), impressed by the service provided by Verbiest, issued the Chinese “Edict of Toleration” that recognized the Roman Catholic Church in China. Therefore, when the relations between the administration at the top and the work on the ground were at their peak, the China mission experienced the most fruitful harvest.

However, the path of mission is always full of twists and turns, particularly when the relationship between the top and bottom begins to break down. After Valigano and Ricci’s deaths, Carvaglio and Longobardi did not always get along. While Carvaglio was a good Jesuit theologian, his understanding of Chinese culture was limited. Thus, his support for the accommodation policy decreased and scholastic rigidity began to dominate the mission. Longobardi was a senior missionary and Jesuit leader who grew as a result of his work in the field. His rich experience provided him sufficient confidence to formulate the mission’s new direction without consulting his superior, Carvaglio. As an immediate result, the 1616 Nanjing persecution broke out and caused severe damage to the mission. Thus, Carvaglio’s 1602 letter, an official Jesuit report that testifies to the most positive outcomes of the Valignano–Ricci policy in China, constitutes good material on which later missionaries can reflect when seeking the best approach to carry out mission work. Ricci’s success was essentially based on his skills in communicating with the Chinese literati on a cultural level. This historical narrative indicates the ongoing need for more training in intercultural skills and better communication between administrators and missionaries working on the ground. ⁴⁷