The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, constituted a profound shock to regional stability, prompting questions about its strategic rationale given the anticipated severe Israeli retaliation. This article argues that the timing and execution of the operation are primarily explicable when situated within the escalating geopolitical competition and shifting alignments in the Middle East, particularly the drive toward Israeli–Arab normalization and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). From this perspective, Hamas’s attack can be analyzed as a calculated, albeit high-risk, intervention designed to disrupt these transformative regional projects, which were perceived by Hamas and its regional allies, notably Iran, as detrimental to their respective interests and the broader Palestinian cause. Applying a Neoclassical Realist framework, the analysis explores how a non-state actor, such as Hamas, responds to these evolving systemic and regional dynamics, driven by an assessment of threats and opportunities within this wider power contest. By focusing on these overarching regional interests and rivalries, this article seeks to explain the October 7 attacks as a critical juncture in the re-emerging multipolar competition, where Hamas’s actions, while rooted in the Palestinian context, were shaped and enabled by broader geopolitical currents aimed at challenging the US-led regional order and its associated diplomatic initiatives.
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