Rashid Karami and the Palestinians: Lebanon’s Foreign Policy from 1958 Until 1976

Abstract

Rashid Karami, Lebanon’s longest-serving prime minister, had a long and distinguished political career. Since the late 1950s, Karami supported the Palestinian cause, which became a more pressing issue following the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. He envisioned integrating Palestinians into the Lebanese polity as part of a broader plan to align Lebanon with the Arab world. His consistency in this vision, beyond just the Palestinian issue, cemented his role as the leading Lebanese Sunni za’im (leader). This article examines how and why Karami prioritized the Palestinian cause within Lebanese politics.

Introduction

Following the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920, most Lebanese Sunnis opposed the new state. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, their main goal was to reunite Greater Syria, which included modern-day Lebanon and Syria. They viewed the structure of Lebanon, both under the French Mandate and after independence, as biased, favoring the Maronite Christian community. In response to this discontent, the French, beginning in the 1930s, granted the Sunni Muslim community the position of prime minister, the second-highest office in the government, to address their concerns (Salamey, 2009, p. 83). ¹

When Lebanon gained independence in 1943, the National Pact formalized that a Sunni Muslim would hold the premiership. However, the Sunnis were required to abandon their aspiration for the reunification of Greater Syria, a concession their community regarded as a major defeat (Battat et al., 2023, pp. 127–128). This “original sin” of the Sunni zu’ama ² —relinquishing the goal of uniting Lebanon and Syria—laid the foundation for the Sunni community’s long-standing disenchantment with its leadership. Despite gaining the premiership, many Sunnis remained dissatisfied. The leadership’s decision to abandon Syrian-Lebanese unity sparked accusations of betrayal, given the deep political, economic, social, and cultural ties dating back to the Ottoman era. Over time, this disconnection between the Sunni community and its leaders only grew, fostering a sense of alienation (Firro, 2003; Maktabi, 1999).

Beyond the community’s enduring ties with the Syrian hinterland due to historical reasons, Lebanese Sunnis also aligned themselves with the Palestinian cause, reflecting their broader identification with Lebanon’s place in the Arab world. Growing tensions on the Israeli-Lebanese border revived sympathy for the Palestinians and their struggle for self-determination. In response, Rashid Karami (1921–1987), a prominent leader Lebanese Sunni za’im, worked diligently to express his full support for the Palestinians. This became the cornerstone of his foreign policy from 1958 until 1976, which is the focus of this article. Karami’s journey as a political leader mirrors that of the Lebanese Sunni community, navigating complex regional alliances while remaining committed to being part of the Arab world.

Karami worked tirelessly to reshape Lebanon’s foreign policy, envisioning Lebanon’s integration into the Arab world, with the Palestinian cause fitting seamlessly into this vision. In contrast to his earlier political years (1951–1958), Karami became more assertive and unwavering in his approach. The 1958 crisis, marked by the conflict between predominantly pro-Western Christians and pro-Arab and pro-Nasser Muslims that ended with an American invasion, taught Karami the importance of cooperating with zu’ama from other confessions to advance his policies rather than merely seeking compromise (Battat et al., 2025, pp. 1–12; Hale, 2024, pp. 33–61). To fully realize his foreign policy goals, he needed to become the leading za’im, which required him to secure the position of prime minister. Additionally, Karami had to navigate the concerns of his conservative constituency, which remained deeply skeptical of the Lebanese state (Gade, 2009, pp. 115–116; Reilly, 2016, pp. 113–154; Salamé, 1999, pp. 52, 58). Gaining control of the premiership gave Karami the authority to implement his vision, specifically aligning Lebanon with the Arab world and, from 1958 to 1976, incorporating the Palestinian cause into the Lebanese political landscape.

The scholarly discourse on Rashid Karami, particularly his foreign policy between 1958 and 1976 and his relationship with the Palestinian movement, is scarce. Most of the literature dealing with this timeframe concerns Karami in the context of the post-1958 crisis until the beginning of Lebanon’s Second Civil War in 1976. Authors such as Kamal Salibi (1988), Marius Deeb (1980), and Joseph Chamie (1976/77) have examined Karami’s role during key periods in Lebanese history: the quiet years of the Fouad Chehab presidency (1958–1964); the Charles Helou presidency (1964–1970), when the Palestinian movement began influencing Lebanese political affairs; and the Suleiman Franjieh presidency (1970–1976), when the Palestinian issue exacerbated sectarian tensions fueled by frustrations with the confessional system. Others, such as Samir Khalaf (2002), Farid el-Khazen (2000), and Rashid Khalidi (1985, Khalidi 2009), have explored Karami as a pawn in a geopolitical chess match of external players guiding Lebanese political affairs.

Analyzing Karami’s career through these prisms is important, but the existing analyses do not provide an in-depth examination of the Palestinian movement in the context of his foreign policy during those years. This article attempts to fill this scholarly gap by examining Karami’s approach to the Palestinian question between 1958 and 1976. Specifically, how did Karami’s relationship with the Palestinians reveal underlying complexities or contradictions in his foreign policy during the inter-civil war period?

This article argues that Karami’s relationship with the Palestinians reveals a shift in his foreign policy from a moderate approach, focused on avoiding international entanglements through cooperation with zu’ama across confessions, to a more assertive stance that increasingly sought to integrate Lebanon into the Arab world. It further aims to situate Karami’s policies within broader debates on sectarian governance and regional politics, drawing connections between historical developments and contemporary challenges in Lebanon. More precisely, it critically examines the long-term implications of Karami’s alignment with the Palestinian cause on Lebanon’s sectarian dynamics and regional stability, highlighting how these policies shaped the fragile balance of power among Lebanon’s confessional groups.

Following the 1958 crisis, Karami prioritized the Palestinian question, making it central to his efforts to align Lebanon with broader Arab interests. This shift reflects the complexities and contradictions in his foreign policy during the inter-civil war period, transitioning from moderation to a stronger commitment to Lebanon’s integration into the Arab world. This change was influenced by his earlier experiences attempting to cooperate with other zu’ama within his community and beyond to advance his vision of maintaining Lebanese sovereignty while aligning Lebanon with the Arab world. These efforts proved unsuccessful, culminating in the 1958 crisis, which underscored the limitations of such an approach and prompted a recalibration of his strategy.

The article begins with a section that examines the 9 years following Lebanon’s 1958 crisis, specifically, the presidencies of Fouad Chehab (1902–1973) and Charles Helou (1913–2001) and Karami’s relationship with both men. It shows that Karami’s relationship with Chehab was quite strong due to their similar visions for the Lebanese Republic but tumultuous with Helou, particularly regarding the Palestinian question. This part also shows how the “quiet years” (1958–1967) of suppressing civil rights both damaged and strengthened Karami’s foreign policy and explains how the Palestinian issue entered Lebanese political affairs.

The subsequent sections address the events in Lebanon from the end of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War until the early years of the Second Civil War: Karami’s central role in the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the events of Black September in 1970, the 1973 Melkart Accords, the lead-up to the Second Civil War in 1975, the first year of the civil war, and Karami’s impact on Lebanon as a whole and the Lebanese Sunnis in particular during that period. As the article makes clear, Karami was fully in favor of the Palestinian movement’s presence in Lebanon as it sought to gain an independent state—a presence supported by the Sunni community both in Tripoli and other parts of Lebanon.

Nine Years of al-Nahj al-Shihabi (1958–1967): Rashid Karami, Fuad Chehab, Charles Helou, and the Palestinians

The historical consensus is that Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative quiet following the 1958 crisis under the leadership of President Fouad Chehab and his al-Nahj al-Shihabi (Path of Chehab) movement. Having created an alliance with Karami during his time as army commander in the lead-up to the war, Chehab appointed Karami as prime minister in 1958. The two political leaders cooperated closely, and Karami believed in Chehab’s vision for Lebanon because it corresponded with his foreign policy. While Karami’s collaboration with Chehab reflected a strategic alignment of Sunni grievances with broader Lebanese state-building efforts, this approach deepened sectarian divisions by sidelining non-Sunni perspectives, raising questions about its sustainability. Nevertheless, on the surface, the Chehab years were quiet and saw what some might term an attempt at reforming the system; however, they are also alleged to have been years of surveillance and suppression (British National Archives, 1965).

Chehab aimed to implement economic, social, and political reforms to resolve the long-standing grievances of the Muslim (both Shi’i and Sunni) and Druze communities with the ruling Maronite Christian community. A central component of his reform was modernizing Lebanon’s political system along loosely democratic lines. Chehab hoped that by opening the political system to other confessions, he could ameliorate sectarian tensions. He enjoyed close ties with the army’s internal security apparatus (mukhabarat), known as the Deuxième Bureau (Goria, 1985, pp. 58–73). Through his close cooperation with and reliance on the Deuxième Bureau, Chehab sought to ensure that civil unrest would not prevent him from implementing his reforms and would reduce the sectarian tensions following the 1958 crisis. Nevertheless, this relationship undermined his movement’s pretension of political reform and achieved the opposite effect (United States National Archives, 1965).

Under Chehab’s leadership, the mukhabarat and the military exercised their power to influence Lebanon’s political and social landscape. During the Chehab presidency, the Deuxième Bureau was comprehensively restructured: its budget was substantially increased, its activities were broadened to include all regions, and coordination with La Direction Générale de la Sûreté Générale (General Directorate of General Security) ³ was enhanced and began to be administered by the Ministry of the Interior (headed by Karami). From 1959, the Deuxième Bureau controlled all the security agencies that dealt with Palestinian affairs. A research department was also created to employ political analyses and assist the Deuxième Bureau in its activities, even aiding and abetting in some members’ parliamentary elections (Barak, 2009, p. 66).

By the early 1960s, the Deuxième Bureau, reporting directly to the president, began overstepping its mandate, interfering in Lebanese political affairs. This shift caused the Sunni zu’ama, who had initially supported Chehab’s reforms, to distance themselves from the president as they realized these reforms threatened to curtail their power base (Beshara, 2011, p. 114). The most notable of these were the Beiruti za’im and Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (1905–2000). Once a strong relationship, the rapport between Salam and Chehab soured following the 1960 parliamentary elections due to Salam’s perception of Chehab’s reliance on Karami to implement his reforms. Salam and Karami had been on poor terms for quite some time, and Salam feared that Karami would use Chehab to undermine his power base as a Sunni za’im. The relationship between Salam and Chehab completely dissolved when Salam resigned as prime minister in October 1961 (Goria, 1985, pp. 66–67). With Salam stepping away, Karami found an opportunity to fill the political space and align himself more closely with Chehab’s vision for Lebanon.

Chehab’s movement suited Karami perfectly. He could now introduce his vision for Lebanon—something he had been unable to do under the previous president, Camille Chamoun (1900–1987). Chehab, who aspired for Lebanon to be on good terms with the Arab world and the West, wanted better relations with Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), whose pan-Arab nationalism had similar aspirations. Karami, who was closely aligned with Nasser, could, therefore, continue his attempt, backed by his Sunni community, to bring Lebanon into the Arab world. Karami’s community was still striving for self-determination, partially explaining why Karami wanted to side with Nasser and his pan-Arab nationalist movement (Battat et al., 2023, pp. 127–128). Egypt had fought two wars against Israel (1948 and 1956) and gave the impression of defending the Palestinians. Karami and Chehab thus had similar visions for Lebanon but for different reasons. The latter sought to provide greater concessions to other confessions and uphold a stance of nonalignment in international affairs, whereas the former prioritized preserving Lebanese sovereignty while aligning it with the Arab world. For the 6 years that Chehab was in office, Karami was able to pursue his foreign policy of siding with the Palestinians living in Lebanon, favoring the Palestinians’ aspiration for self-determination by supporting Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalist movement and moving Lebanon into the Arab world (Primakov, 2009, p. 41).

However, cracks began to appear early in Chehab’s presidency as members from both his confession and others began to complain of suppression and unwarranted arrests (el Khazen, 2000, p. 245; Salibi, 1976, pp. 3–4). In reality, Chehab was more focused on keeping a close eye on his own community through the Deuxième Bureau than on trying to implement his promised reforms. Following the end of his term in office in 1964, his successor and fellow Chehabist, Charles Helou, could not continue Chehab’s vision. For his part, Karami did not have the same close relationship with Helou that he had had with Chehab; he often complained about Helou’s lack of leadership, and the two disagreed on the issue of the Palestinians (United States National Archives, 1968).

Despite these disagreements, Helou allowed approximately 100,000 Palestinian refugees, along with the armed Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), to enter Lebanon following the 1967 Arab–Israeli War (Foley, 2005). This further increased tensions between the Lebanese Sunni community and the Maronite Christians as the more conservative voices within the Maronite community began to grow louder, suggesting that this was against Lebanese national interests (Sayigh, 1997, pp. 192–194). One might ask how the entry of more Palestinians into Lebanon and the voices opposing this new development were possible with a military intelligence unit like the Deuxième Bureau having such a tight grip on any dissenting views. The following section explores this possibility by discussing the secretive 1969 Cairo Agreement, which changed the landscape of Lebanese politics significantly for decades. ⁴

Karami’s Foreign Policy: From the Fallout of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War to the 1969 Cairo Agreement

In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, many Palestinians from the newly-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip sought refuge in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, driven by displacement and the broader consequences of the conflict. For around 2 years, the Deuxième Bureau significantly relaxed its grip in the areas where the PLO set up camp in the Mount Lebanon village of Kayfoun and other cities, mainly in southern Lebanon (Sayigh, 1997, p. 188). With the Deuxième Bureau’s easing of restrictions, Lebanon was soon embroiled with its southern neighbor, Israel, as the Palestinian movement in Lebanon grew significantly in number and began to organize its resistance in Lebanon (Naor & Lewin, 2021, pp. 359–362). Following an attack on an El Al aircraft in Athens in July 1968 (Picard, 2002, pp. 81–83) by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a faction within the PLO, Israel retaliated by sending commandos to Beirut International Airport and destroying 13 Lebanese aircraft (Fisk, 1990, p. 75). Despite protests from the United States, Israel continued its retaliations in Lebanon, aiming to force the Lebanese government to rein in the Palestinians (FRUS, 1968; Picard, 2002, p. 83).

Israel intended to provoke tensions between the Lebanese army and the PLO, hoping Lebanon would restrain the Palestinians (Naor, 2014, p. 412). Nevertheless, clashes between the Lebanese army and the PLO continued near the Israeli-Lebanese border in April 1969. Despite their already strained relationship and significant pressure from Arab nations as well as the Sunni community, President Helou again appointed Karami as prime minister in January 1969 as he was perceived as the only za’im capable of effectively managing the crisis with the Palestinians. However, the two disagreed regarding the handling of the tension: Helou felt that the Lebanese army’s actions were necessary to ensure Lebanese sovereignty, while Karami believed that Lebanese sovereignty was inseparably linked to the Palestinians’ autonomy to act in Lebanon (el Khazen, 2000, pp. 150–151). Karami’s position reflected the pressure that other Lebanese Sunni zu’ama felt, who did not want zu’ama from other confessions using the issue to their advantage. This was especially true of Druze za’im Kamal Jumblatt (1917–1977), who decided to link the Palestinian cause to his leftist Lebanese reform program (Goria, 1985, pp. 92–93). It also demonstrated Karami’s dedication to keeping the Palestinians inextricably linked to Lebanon. Some argue that Karami and other Lebanese Sunni zu’ama had a vested interest in the Palestinian presence in Lebanon because they made donations to or solicited funds for Fatah (Sayigh, 1997, p. 188).

Given the country’s complexities, the Palestinian entrance into Lebanon was a divisive issue, especially for the Christian community. The more traditional camp within the Christian community was so opposed to the idea of a Palestinian presence that later on, during the Lebanese 1975 civil war, they sided with external powers such as Israel and the United States in an attempt to remove them from Lebanon (Naor, 2023, pp. 626–631). This Christian opposition gave a stronger voice to those in Lebanon, especially Karami, who wanted the country to be part of the Arab world and have an active Palestinian movement (Farsoun & Wingerter, 1981/82, p. 100). The Sunni community was relatively united in its support for the Palestinians. Nonetheless, while different zu’ama attempted to speak for the Sunni community and ensure the zu’ama’s influence in the community, a Sunni za’im needed to make alliances with other zu’ama within both his community and others to ensure that his supremacy over the Sunni sect was guaranteed for him to become prime minister (Young, 2010, pp. 9–15; Zisser, 2009, pp. 38–45).

In May 1969, Karami delayed his efforts to form a new cabinet as he awaited the return of Ibrahim Sabri, the ambassador of United Arab Republic (UAR), ⁵ from his trip to Cairo with Nasser’s endorsement of Karami’s Fedayeen Plan—a proposal to control the Palestinian fedayeen ⁶ under the auspices of the Egyptians operating in Lebanon (United States National Archives, 1969b). Sabri had been recalled and reprimanded for his early expression of the UAR’s endorsement of this plan, probably due to domestic pressure on President Nasser for not resisting the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (United States National Archives, 1969c).

Several months after Karami proposed his Fedayeen Plan, in an attempt to suppress the fighting between the Lebanese army and the PLO, General Emil Bustani (1907–1963), under the authority of President Helou, signed a very similar (but secret at the time) Cairo Agreement with Yasser Arafat (1929–2004), head of the PLO, with the foreign and defense ministers of Egypt in attendance (Salibi, 1976, pp. 42–43). This was, in essence, the formal basis for Palestinian–Lebanese relations, even though the agreement was practiced more in noncompliance than in rule. In other words, without rewriting Lebanese regulations and legislation (existing since 1948), Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were granted limited autonomy in refugee camps, alongside broader rights to movement and certain forms of employment, though significant legal and social restrictions persisted (Rabinovich & Zamir, 1982, pp. 187–188). Nonetheless, the agreement was divisive, causing inter- and intra-sectarian tensions within Lebanon and creating an opportunity for the Palestinians to intensify their struggle for self-determination in Israeli territory (Sayigh, 1997, p. 192). In essence, the signing of the Cairo Agreement, which authorized the Palestinians to be part of the Lebanese polity, confirmed that Israel’s policy of deterring Palestinian attacks on its territory had backfired.

The Cairo Agreement can be interpreted as a strategic move by Nasser’s Egypt to garner the support of the Lebanese Sunni community for his pan-Arabist project. This effort appeared successful, as the Lebanese Sunni community demonstrated relative support for the agreement despite its secretive nature (el Khazen, 2000, pp. 148–150). Indeed, the entrance of the Palestinian movement into Lebanon gave the Sunni community a new sense of connection: they related to the cause, seeing the Palestinians, who are mostly of a Sunni denomination, as a people that does not identify with the country it inhabits, rather like the Sunni community in Lebanon. Like the Palestinians, the Lebanese Sunni community opposed the Israeli occupation of land they considered to belong to the Palestinians and upheld the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, thereby compelling its zu’ama to support the Palestinian cause (British National Archives, 1983; United States National Archives, 1969a).

As a Chehabist ally among the Lebanese Sunni zu’ama and a supporter of Nasser’s vision for Lebanon, Karami supported the Cairo Agreement. In his attempt to speak for the Lebanese Sunni community, it was important for Karami to solidify the Palestinian movement’s freedom to operate in Lebanon (Ajami, 1990). Still, while Karami championed Palestinian autonomy, these actions were perceived by many as prioritizing pan-Arab ideals over Lebanon’s national interests. Christians, particularly from the Maronite leadership, argued that the Cairo Agreement legitimized a “state within a state,” undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty and further destabilizing its sectarian balance (Salibi, 1976, pp. 34–36, 43–44). This episode illustrates the dual-edged nature of Karami’s policies: while they attempted to strengthen Lebanon’s alignment with the Arab world, they simultaneously alienated key domestic constituencies, foreshadowing future sectarian and political crises (Salibi, 1976, pp. 35–36, 66–70).

The al-Nahj al-Shihabi movement came to a sudden end when the conservative and sectarian Suleiman Franjieh (1910–1992) was elected as the next Lebanese president in the 1970 elections, narrowly beating his al-Nahji opponent, Elias Sarkis (1924–1985), by one vote. These elections were of great significance and involved larger issues than just the appointment of the next president (Zamir, 1980). Despite this major blow to his foreign policy, Karami remained determined to work with the new president to guarantee the Palestinian presence. Notwithstanding his strained relations with Helou (United States National Archives, 1968), Karami was able to officially interject the Palestinian movement into Lebanese political affairs by signing the Cairo Agreement. This received the overwhelming approval of his community, as testified by his relevance in Lebanese political circles.

The presidential elections can be regarded as a struggle between the Christians, headed by the Maronites, who sought to retain the Christian character of Lebanon and their privileged status as embodied in the 1943 National Pact, and Karami and the Muslims (and their Christian reformist proponents). By becoming a majority due to recent demographic changes, the Muslims now demanded an equal share of political power and wealth distribution (Ali, 2023, pp. 95–128). More importantly, the 1970 presidential elections exposed deep internal divisions within the Maronite leadership that had been suppressed since the 1958 crisis and tensions among Lebanon’s various confessions (Zamir, 1980, pp. 49–70).

Karami’s Foreign Policy and the Fallout of Black September in Lebanon (1970–1971)

Following the 1970 presidential elections, another regional event erupted that plagued the Lebanese state when a civil war broke out in Jordan (more commonly known as Black September), pitting the Jordanian Armed Forces against the Palestinian fedayeen. The PLO and its fedayeen, who were headquartered in Jordan, begun to step up attacks on Israel, mainly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, supported by most of the Arab world, including the Lebanese Sunnis. By early 1970, the PLO’s popularity had grown, and some factions within the organization began to call for overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan (Shlaim, 2009, pp. 311–340). In June 1970, violent clashes broke out. At first, King Hussein (1935–1999) hesitated to use force to quash the violence, but this changed on September 6 when PFLP fedayeen hijacked three civilian planes and landed them at Dawson’s Field in the Jordanian city of Zarqa. They took all foreign nationals hostage and blew up the planes in front of the international press. As a result, King Hussein ordered the Jordanian Army to take action (Shlaim, 2009, pp. 311–340).

On September 17, the Jordanian Armed Forces surrounded all the cities where the PLO operated, including Amman and Irbid. The following day, 10,000 Syrian troops (under the banner of the Palestinian Liberation Army) entered Irbid in the north. On September 22, the Syrian troops withdrew after suffering heavy losses. On September 27, Nasser brokered a ceasefire agreement between the Jordanians and the fedayeen after much pressure from the Arab world (chiefly Iraq) (Shlaim, 2009, pp. 311–340). On October 13, King Hussein signed an agreement with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to control the fedayeen presence in Jordan. However, in January 1971, the Jordanian Army attacked again, and the fedayeen were forced out of all cities until they surrendered on July 23, 1971. With the conflict formally ended, Jordan allowed the remaining 2,000 fedayeen to relocate to Lebanon (Shlaim, 2009, pp. 311–340). With the fedayeen now officially repositioned in Lebanon, approximately 500,000 Palestinian refugees were living in Lebanon (Haddad, 1983, p. 16). Both the Muslims and Druze already felt that Lebanon had tilted in favor of the Maronites. With the positions of power distributed according to denominations (based on an outdated and flawed census), the addition of half a million (mainly Sunni Muslim) Palestinians increased tensions in an already apprehensive environment. It divided an already split Maronite Christian community but also gave the Lebanese Sunni Muslims a new raison d’être.

Ultimately, Karami’s support for the relocation of Palestinian fedayeen to Lebanon backfired, achieving the opposite of his intent to maintain Lebanon’s delicate sovereignty. Instead, it heightened tensions within the confessional system, particularly among the Christian zu’ama, who saw the influx as a demographic and political threat to Lebanon’s stability (el Khazen, 2000, pp. 82–83). Following the June 1967 War, which marked a significant turning point in the decline of Nasser’s pan-Arab nationalist movement, the Palestinian movement emerged as a prominent force, reflecting a new demographic reality and offering a renewed sense of political voice (Rabil, 2011, p. 22). Thus, it can be said that Karami’s handling of Black September exemplifies the complex implications of his leadership: his alignment with the Palestinian cause might have given the perception of strengthening Lebanon’s ties with the Arab world but it simultaneously exacerbated domestic sectarian rifts, setting the stage for future political unrest.

This substantial and fresh numerical modification to Lebanese political life gave the non-Maronite Christian zu’ama, especially the Lebanese Sunni zu’ama, a rallying point for gaining support. It appears that Karami, in particular, was both listening to his community and trying to implement his vision to maintain Lebanese sovereignty while simultaneously attempting to integrate Lebanon into the Arab world. With the Palestinians now a fact of life in Lebanon, Karami always made sure to voice his opinion about the Palestinian aspiration for self-determination. Karami did not shy away from criticizing Israel as the occupying power. In 1973, Karami criticized Israel for what he perceived as its aggressive policy toward the Arab states and called for united efforts in the struggle for a lasting peace (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, 1973).

In the meantime, President Franjieh proved ineffectual in defusing the increasingly growing tensions in the Lebanese political system and society, unable to protect the fragile structure of the state. At a time when internal pressure on the Palestinian issue and inter-Arab regional rivalry was threatening to split the country apart, there was a need for a president who would strengthen national unity and help the country survive without partition or loss of national sovereignty. However, Franjieh lacked the vision and capability to face this challenge. He not only failed to preserve the existing delicate balance between Christians and Muslims but also added to the division by aligning himself with the hardline Maronite cause, especially the confrontational stance of Camille Chamoun. It is therefore not surprising that, from the early stages of the civil war, the Muslims, including Karami, along with the leftist forces, demanded Franjieh’s resignation as a precondition for ending hostilities (Zamir, 1980, pp. 67–68). However, Franjieh, recognizing that his resignation would not only undermine the constitutional authority of the presidency and be perceived as a victory for the Muslim factions but also be interpreted as an admission of culpability for the crisis, was unwilling to comply (Zamir, 1980, pp. 67–68).

Rashid Karami’s Foreign Policy: From the 1973 Melkart Accords to the Early Stages of Lebanon’s Second Civil War (1975–1976)

In May 1973, despite the signing of the Cairo Agreement, the Lebanese army, on Franjieh’s orders, attempted to reassert control over the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, creating a rift between Franjieh and the Sunni community (Naor, 2014, pp. 416–421). In response, the Palestinians, the Sunni Muslims and the leftist Lebanese staged popular uprisings in Tripoli, Sidon, and the Sunni areas of Beirut. Unlike in 1958, the United States did not interfere; Moscow and Washington allowed Lebanon and other regional actors to take the lead. The tension between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians led to the Melkart Protocol, which amended the original Cairo Agreement (Naor, 2014, pp. 416–421). It defined the areas where the Palestinians were allowed to operate in Lebanon, demarcated the Palestinian fedayeen training camps, and specified the methods to supply Palestinian fedayeen military bases and other details about Palestinian military bases in Lebanon (Siklawi, 2017, p. 928).

Interestingly, Karami and fellow Sunni za’im Saeb Salam stood on the sidelines and approved of Franjieh’s new appointment for prime minister, Amin al-Hafiz (1926–2009)—a Tripolite politician who lacked an independent base and a protégé of Karami. However, when al-Hafiz authorized the use of the Lebanese Army, Karami and Salam protested by instigating a Sunni boycott and declared they would not participate in parliamentary sessions until the prime minister resigned (Naor, 2013, p. 993). Aside from the fact that sending in the army violated the Cairo Agreement, al-Hafiz’s decision ultimately marginalized his role as prime minister and made his opponents, like Franjieh and Chamoun, stronger (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 89–90). The two Christian zu’ama, who controlled the justice and defense portfolios, could make key decisions in al-Hafiz’s cabinet due to his weakness as a leader and lack of support from the Sunni zu’ama. Karami was determined to listen to the desires of his community both in his hometown of Tripoli and other cities across Lebanon. His resolve played a significant role in the Palestinians’ settling in Lebanon, with the majority encamped in southern Lebanon. Essentially, pursuing his foreign policy vision of integrating Lebanon into the Arab world also meant fostering a close relationship with the Palestinian movement. Karami’s tenacity in bringing the Palestinian issue to the forefront of Lebanese political affairs was evident.

On November 14, 1974, Arafat spoke at the UN General Assembly’s debate on Palestine. The previous day, in Rabat, the Arab League had chosen Franjieh as its representative at the debate. In his speech, Franjieh praised the UN for recognizing the PLO, based in Lebanon, as the credible interlocutor for the Palestinians on the issue (Palestine at the United Nations, 1975). What had seemed unimaginable a decade earlier—Lebanon being chosen by the Arab League to speak at the UN on behalf of the Palestinians—was made possible in large part due to Karami’s work on the Palestinian issue, which was one element of his broader vision of Lebanon aligning with the Arab world. The Melkart Accords underscore the inherent contradictions in Karami’s political strategy: his efforts to institutionalize Palestinian autonomy in Lebanon solidified his Arabist credentials but alienated Christian factions, further polarizing an already fractured political landscape.

In 1975, Lebanon slid into its second (and longest) civil war. The catalyst for this civil war was the attempted assassination of Pierre Jummayil (1905–1984), a prominent Lebanese Maronite za’im, on April 13, 1975, when four gunmen opened fire, killing four Phalangists and attempting to kill Jummayil. Assuming that the Palestinians were behind this attack, the Maronites responded by ambushing a bus of Palestinians, killing 27 passengers and three bystanders (Johnson, 2001, p. 61). Following the attack on April 15, clashes spread into other cities, like Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre, between Palestinians, joined by armed communist, Nasserist and Ba’athist forces, and al-Kata’ib (also known as the Phalange Party), supported by Chamoun’s militia. On April 16, the Arab League Secretary-General Mahmoud Riadh (1917–1992) brokered a ceasefire, leading the conflicting parties to withdraw their armed forces from the streets. However, this break was only temporary, giving all sides time to rearm and regroup for future battles (Naor, 2013, pp. 99–997, 1002–1003).

The usual political squabbles ensued; however, the differences were greater than usual. The National Movement, a coalition between Muslims and leftist groups led by Jumblatt, declared that it would veto any members of al-Kata’ib being part of the government. Chamoun’s National Liberal Party (NLP) maintained that their support would be conditional on having members of al-Kata’ib in government (Salibi, 1976, pp. 108–111). This was reinforced by the Maronite religious figures who found the National Movement’s behavior unacceptable. More importantly, President Franjieh vehemently opposed the National Movement’s behavior and hinted that he would use robust actions to combat it. To force the issue, al-Kata’ib and NLP ministers began to resign from the Rashid al-Solh (1926–2014) government, compelling al-Solh to resign on May 15 (Naor, 2013, p. 996).

On May 23, Franjieh announced that a new cabinet would be created under the premiership of Brigadier Nur al-Din Rifai (1899–1980), with army officers filling key posts: most notably, the highly partisan Christian army commander, General Iskander Ghanim (1911–2005), was to serve as the minister of defense. Not surprisingly, the NLP and al-Kata’ib supported this new cabinet, while the Muslim groups quickly buried their differences and opposed it. Jumblatt joined forces with conservative Sunni za’im Saeb Salam and Karami, who were then joined by Shi’i Imam Musa al-Sadr at a Muslim conference chaired by Mufti Hassan Khalid (1921–1989) denouncing the Rifai cabinet (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 85–87; Salibi, 1976, pp. 107–108). These leaders and groups, now allied with the National Movement and backed by the PLO, promised to take up arms if this cabinet was not dissolved.

Thus, clear signs of divisions between the various confessions began to emerge with new, broader and more threatening dimensions, and differences that were far too great to resolve politically. It was at this point that Syria, whose press had repeatedly stressed their country’s support for the rights of the Palestinian people, perceived the developments unfolding in Lebanon as a threat and intervened in the crisis (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 85–87). The formation of the new cabinet was thus the catalyst for a firm response from Syria. Several red lines had been crossed. First, Lebanon’s social and political system polarization became a real possibility. Second, the new minister of defense was using the Lebanese army to crack down on Palestinian and leftist forces. Third, as Syria was the Palestinians’ primary supporter on the international stage, the Syrians were aware that they would be forced to intervene in the event of a confrontation between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 85–87).

On May 27, 1975, 3 days after two Syrian emissaries met with Franjieh, the Rifai cabinet resigned. These same emissaries were also able to persuade Franjieh to call on Karami to form a new cabinet. Karami’s appointment as prime minister suited Syria because Karami was a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause (O’Ballance, 1998, pp. 8–9). However, the Karami premiership did not alleviate the tension. Karami and the National Movement would not budge on banning any al-Kata’ib members from the cabinet, while the al-Kata’ib leadership insisted that no government was possible without their members. In the meantime, Franjieh refused to cooperate with Karami, creating a deadlock that had a spillover effect on the social system (Dawisha, 1980, p. 88).

As the deadlock persisted, the clashes intensified. The fighting was initially confined to Beirut but quickly spread to the south between the Christians of Damour and the Shi’i of Harat al-Naima. Battles in Beirut concentrated in the port and commercial district, and, for the first time, rockets and heavy mortar fire began to inflict heavy damage on buildings and other infrastructure, causing mass destruction (Dawisha, 1980, p. 88). Thanks to Syrian mediation, the violence was subdued for a couple of months, during which time Karami was able to form a six-member cabinet in which he also held the defense portfolio while Chamoun was appointed minister of the interior, thus satisfying all sides. However, the relative calm had less to do with compromise and more with each side preparing for the next round of violence (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 88–89).

For the remainder of 1975, Syria played a brokering role in quelling violence or political deadlocks between the different political camps and their militias. Karami met with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who urged Karami to use his loose connections with Jumblatt, Salam, and other confessional heads, including Franjieh and Chamoun (with the help of Syrian mediation) and the PLO leadership to maintain the delicate balance and avoid Lebanon’s disintegration (Dawisha, 1980, p. 94). Paradoxically, Karami’s erstwhile support for the Palestinians paid dividends. He was now seen as the only political figure trusted by all sides.

As 1975 ended, Syria saw the situation in Lebanon as troubling but not desperate. However, by January 1976, things had worsened. On January 4, Maronite Christian forces ambushed two Palestinian refugee camps, Tel al-Za’atar and Jisr al-Basha, in Christian territory, aiming to expel the Palestinians. This escalation deepened the ongoing violence but did not yet signify a full-scale civil war, as the conflict continued to evolve with increasing polarization and external involvement (Dawisha, 1980, pp. 116–124; Salibi, 1976, pp. 148–159). Christian attacks escalated throughout January, prompting Muslim retaliation and raising concerns in Syria about Lebanon’s future. On January 18, Christian forces killed 1,500 Muslims in Karantina and Maslakh, further alarming Syria. Recognizing the severity of the instability, President Hafiz al-Assad brokered a ceasefire on January 22 while sending 13,000 troops from the Syrian-led Palestinian Liberation Army into northern Lebanon. By June 1, he had openly deployed Syrian Army soldiers, increasing the force to 25,000 (Nisan, 2000, pp. 52–53).

In May 1976, Elias Sarkis was elected by an overwhelming majority in parliament as the new president of Lebanon. Lebanon found itself in an unusual position where the newly-elected president, Sarkis, officially began his term in September, while the sitting president, Suleiman Franjieh, had not yet completed his tenure. Karami served as prime minister until December 1976, 3 months into Sarkis’s presidency. As premier under both Franjieh and Sarkis, Karami could not deal with the opposition’s demands for reform and the resistance by Maronite Christian zu’ama like Chamoun. For example, in an attempt to quell the heavy fighting in Beirut between Christians and Muslims, Karami unsuccessfully proposed a flurry of peace overtures in October 1975: the formation of a Committee for National Dialogue, a Security Board, Syrian mediation, an Arab foreign minister conference in Cairo, and special missions by an emissary from the Vatican and a foreign minister from France (Hudson, 1985, p. 284).

As an illustration of the extent to which Karami had changed since his early years as za’im and during his time as premier under Sarkis, he put himself forward as a potential candidate for the presidency after the fighting between Christian and Muslim forces (from October 1975 until October 1976 (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, 1984)). This was a position normally reserved for a Maronite under the 1943 National Pact, and he thus invoked much anger within the Christian community and its forces. Nevertheless, Karami played a crucial role in Lebanon’s Second Civil War, while the Palestinian question and Lebanon’s neighbors remained critical issues in Lebanese political affairs throughout the ensuing decades.

Conclusion

Rashid Karami’s integral role in the signing of the 1969 Cairo Agreement and his support for the Palestinians after Black September in 1970 marked a decisive shift in his foreign policy, whereupon he adopted a stronger and more assertive stance on integrating Lebanon into the Arab world compared to his earlier approach in the 1950s. He remained closely attuned to his Sunni community’s desires in Tripoli and other Lebanese cities, ensuring that Lebanon adhered to the principles set out in the constitution. Following the 1958 crisis, he matured as a politician and became more vocal about his vision, which included allowing the Palestinian refugees and fedayeen to remain in Lebanon permanently. Openly supportive of the Palestinian movement and its aspiration to have a state of its own, Karami defended the movement, particularly after the June 1967 War. Already quite popular with his community for allying himself closely with Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, his support of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon and its aspirations for a state, coupled with his constant criticism of Israel, increased his popularity even more.

What set Karami apart from other Lebanese Sunni zu’ama and prime ministers during the decade or so following the 1958 crisis was his ability to understand the Palestinians’ grievances and attitudes toward issues like self-determination. He created a connection between the Palestinians and his community and aggressively pushed for their ascension in Lebanese political affairs. Karami’s strong relations with Nasser’s Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and Assad’s Syria in the 1970s enabled him to address his community’s grievances and align them with the Palestinians’ aspirations as part of his effort to integrate Lebanon into the Arab world. Notably, integrating the Palestinian question into Lebanese politics shaped the trajectory of sectarian dynamics during Karami’s tenure and laid the groundwork for the current debates over Lebanon’s identity and political stability.

Revered in his community today as a martyr, Karami was awarded this title in large part due to his candid talk. Tripolites and Lebanese Sunnis from other cities admired Karami for his firm stances when other politicians (e.g., Chamoun and Franjieh) attempted to infringe on political decisions that did not favor the community. Since Karami’s assassination on June 1, 1987, there has yet to be a Lebanese Sunni za’im who has talked with such frankness. Indeed, it might be said that the old way of doing internal Lebanese politics died with his assassination. Today, Karami’s foreign policy legacy resonates in contemporary Lebanese politics, where unresolved tensions surrounding Palestinian refugees and sectarian competition remain pivotal challenges. With no Sunni za’im speaking on behalf of the Lebanese Sunni community, its aspirations and beliefs, Rashid Karami’s voice is sorely missed in Lebanon’s political affairs.