This study will describe an indirect link of the US Invasion of Iraq (2003) and test how the US occupation of Iraq served, from an American perspective, as a derivative product with negative side effects several years later in the Middle East. In seeking to understand the dynamic of any event in foreign policy, political scientists need to be aware of the role and spread of key ideas and how they emerged, developed, and eventually influenced events. Accordingly, analysis of existing perceptions should also consider the critical impacts of past events and crises. “The power of the ideas,” as presented by the rebirth of the ancient idea of the Muslim Caliphate, was mostly covert throughout the years. However, understanding this event requires examining the formative influence of the US Invasion of Iraq (2003), which ended with the Islamic State taking power in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This radical group has declared a Muslim Caliphate and claims control over a large area of Iraq and Syria.
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