Since the Cold War, scholars have debated the strategies of states in the context of great power competition. Recent studies on the US–China rivalry have highlighted the concept of ‘hedging’, where states avoid choosing sides. This article examines hedging theory through the lens of a country’s decision to engage in multilateral economic frameworks led by the USA and China, respectively. Using Singapore as a case study, with its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), this article argues that a new trend, where countries use multilateralism, a liberal approach, to achieve the realist goal of hedging, is emerging. It identifies three key reasons behind states’ decisions to join international economic frameworks: financial security, risk management and strengthening ties with like-minded countries. This study extends the application of hedging to the real-world scenario by offering a new empirical case and highlighting the political functions of multilateral economic institutions. Ultimately, it calls for a broader understanding of hedging beyond the traditional view of ‘aligning with the USA for security and engaging with China for economic gain’, underscoring the need to study the strategies of middle-power states in great power rivalries.
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