Saudi Arabia’s Diplomatic Odyssey: An Analysis of Riyadh’s Enigmatic Position on Normalization with Israel

Abstract

The process of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel had its groundwork set through Trump 1.0 following the genesis of the Abraham Accords. A path toward the normalization of relations between the two countries was further mediated by the United States under the Biden administration. However, following the October 2023 attacks coordinated by the Iran-backed Hamas against Israel, and Israel’s subsequent war waged on Hamas, complicated its relations with Saudi Arabia. Although the social and economic benefits of a potential normalization would largely benefit the two countries, the political unrest surrounding the recognition of a Palestinian state has found its way back into this particular discourse. In this regard, this paper tries to understand Saudi Arabia’s stance with respect to potential normalization with Israel from a neorealist purview. This is done through the achievement of the following objectives. First, to take a brief look at the rapprochement process initiated by the Abraham Accords under Trump 1.0. Second, to understand the past hostilities between the two countries and to identify the impetus for reconciliation. Third, to take a look at the setbacks in this process following Israel’s war with Hamas, and its current escalating conflict with Iran. Finally, to analyze the role of the United States under the second administration of Trump and to look at the areas of convergence and divergence of Israeli–Saudi interests.

Introduction

The major point of difference, which had kept the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel isolated for the better part of the twentieth century, was the issue of the Palestinian state. For the longest time, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the leader of the Arab world, which ranged arguments along the lines of a unanimous antagonism against Israel. If one were to consider the history of the region, a sense of historical anarchism in the region can be derived. Especially considering Jerusalem and the claim toward it, the antagonism from Arab states and the centuries of bloodshed, one example to put the magnitude of this aforementioned bloodshed can be seen around ad 70 when Titus, who was assigned with the siege of Jerusalem, murdered thousands of Jews, without making a distinction between rebels and innocents (Montefiore, 2012, pp. 2–13).

Given this anarchic historical nature, the form of politics undertaken by the respective modern Jewish and Arab states in the region must be analyzed from such a lens. Considering the fact that Jerusalem is commonly called the most fought-over city historically, Jerusalem came under siege a total of 23 times, the city was attacked 52 times, recaptured 44 times, and countless recorded riots and revolts. In addition to this, recent history has also shown how the Middle East has been the epicenter of countless wars and never-ending conflict between the Arab world and the Jewish state. It is in this context that we try to comprehend the nature of interactions and the process of rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In a much more critical discourse, the war waged by Israel against Hamas, and much more recently in its conflicts against the likes of Iran, we find that Saudi Arabia is caught up in a situation of uncertainty. Although Saudi Arabia has its economic interests set, it would likely eschew a political backlash from the Arab world. It is here where we observe three broad narratives that can be identified as the key drivers that would enable some forms of normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. First, the shared concerns over a nuclear-armed Iranian regime. Second, a need for better harmony and stability at a regional level so as to push for mutual economic growth—the same was cited by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his address to the United Nations on the September 27, 2024. Prime Minister Netanyahu displayed maps showing his and Israel’s conception of what ‘Blessing’ and ‘Curse’ could potentially look like. Coincidentally, this also aligns with the plans of Saudi Arabia to diversify its economy under Vision 2030. The curse involved the proliferation of terror in the region through Iran and its aforementioned backed factions. And the blessing involving the countries with which Israel has successfully arrived at normalization deals in accordance with the Abraham Accords, as was brokered under Trump 1.0, in addition to India and, interestingly, Saudi Arabia. In his address, he referred to Saudi Arabia five times, speaking of the historic reconciliation between Arabs and Jews (UN News, 2024).

Finally, the push to normalization can be made for the appeasement of the larger interests of the United States, the mutual ally of both these factions, the United States under both the Biden and Trump administrations has pushed for efforts of rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia mainly due to US hopes for a gradual strategic realignment. One that could inadvertently see a defense pact signed between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and more importantly, the genesis of a broader Saudi civil nuclear program, which involves extensive plans for uranium enrichment (Saba, 2025).

However, the blessing that Netanyahu mentioned was thwarted by the Hamas-orchestrated, unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Around 1,200 were massacred by the Hamas faction, ushering in a state of terror in Israel. The nature and the timing of the attack in itself have to be reevaluated and questioned. The response taken by Israel was unlike anything else seen before. One year after the October attacks, in the General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that 23 out of the 24 battalions of Hamas had been destroyed, which was cheered on by the families of the hostages who were in attendance at Netanyahu’s address to the United Nations. On July 31, 2024, the political chief of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated. Now, it was inevitable that all of the Hamas leaders would fall after the havoc that was brought about by them, but the fact that Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Iran, while being in Tehran to attend the oath-taking ceremony of the new Iranian president, is what makes it all the more interesting (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Now, correlating this incident with that of one of the statements made by Netanyahu in his address was that “there is nowhere in the Middle-East, wherein Israel’s arm cannot reach.” Israel’s approach toward any form of terrorism, or any entity closely associated with a threat toward Israel’s sovereignty, was a no-nonsense take now. On April 1, 2024, the Iranian consulate in Syria was destroyed by an Israeli missile attack. The endeavor killed 13 people, but the major target was the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Reza Zahedi. In response to the same, on April 13, 2024, for the first time, Iran launched 300 missiles and dozens of drones toward Israel. There were also projectiles launched by the Hezbollah and Houthis in an attempt at solidarity.

In this context, although Saudi Arabia has been critical of Israel, with respect to its countless violations of international law in its aggressive efforts not only with respect to Gaza, but also more recently, Iran. It is to be noted that Saudi Arabia holds antipathy against Tehran due to its conflict with the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. With the commencement of “Operation Rising Lion” and Israel’s surprise attack against Iran, which unfurled through the incursion of explosive drones stationed by Israeli commandos in Iran, possibly months before the strike on June, 13, 2025, aimed at several communication nodes and Iran’s air-defense systems, which then enabled a swarm of 200 Israeli fighter jets, most of them being Lockheed Martin’s F-35 carried out targeted strikes at hundreds of military and nuclear targets in Iran. In the process of also taking out several IRGC targets, this is nothing short of a larger goal, a regime change in Iran, of the region’s key players, including not only Israel but also the United States and, quite interestingly, Saudi Arabia. Thus, the puzzle of the enigmatic stance held by Saudi Arabia, when it comes to its relations with Israel, amidst the current crisis.

Due to such an anarchic form of geopolitics found in the region, this article will employ a neorealist approach to analyze the politics in the proposed efforts of rapprochement not only between Israel and Saudi Arabia but also in the relations between Israel and the rest of the Arab world. Neorealism, in essence, understands the actions of state actors in the context of the anarchical structure of the international system. States are naturally bound to prioritize their own safety and security against potential threats in the region. Hence, helping them navigate defensively or offensively in concurrence with the situation they are faced with (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). This article achieves it through fourfold objectives.

First, to look into the process of rapprochement as was initiated under Trump 1.0. Second, to analyze the rationale behind the efforts of reconciliation, and to deconstruct the impetus that may result in the juxtaposition of Israeli and Saudi interests. Third, to analyze how the events that transpired after October 7, 2023, and the war that Israel has waged on Hamas have affected this growth in relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Finally, a comprehensive discussion on the second administration under Trump with a due consideration of the interests of major powers in the region such as Iran, and in such an anarchic situation, amidst growing tensions between the Israel–US axis against the likes of Iran and groups such as the Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis that are backed by it, would cause a shift in the Saudi stance toward normalization of relations with Israel.

Trump’s First Term, Strategic Realignment, and the Genesis of the Abraham Accords

Under the Trump 1.0 Administration, a comprehensive deal was envisioned to bring the Arab states into an agreement of mutual benefit with the Jewish state. On January 28, 2020, the Trump 1.0 Administration unveiled its plan for carrying out the ‘Deal of the Century,’ the proposition for peace and future stability in the Middle East:

The deal essentially recognized Jerusalem as the only capital of Israel.

The plan also incorporated the establishment of an independent Palestine, agreed only upon the condition that there is an adequate process of demilitarization by the non-state actors.

The capital of this newly formed Palestine would essentially revolve around the parts of East Jerusalem.

There would essentially be a mutual coexistence ushered in by everyone who subscribes to any of the Abrahamic faiths.

At its initial release, Saudi Arabia was silent; however, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman applauded the efforts taken by the United States to broker peace in the region. It even went to the extent of suggesting that now was the time to open up dialogues between Palestinian and Israeli representatives so as to arrive at a solution. In addition to the aforementioned, there have been discreet diplomatic contacts between Israel and Saudi Arabia during this period. Eventually gearing up to the Abrahamic Accords, which were signed between Israel and some of the members within the Arab world in the year 2020. This was a phenomenal achievement considering the history of the conflictual nature of the relationship upheld by the countries ever since 1967 (Maher, 2020; Oren, 2017).

The Abraham Accords proved to be a way in which Arab and Jewish entities could essentially be united under one umbrella. The common denominator is Abraham/Abram/Ibrahim, the patriarch of the religions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Some of the prospects of the Abraham Accords, which, although radical at their inception, proved out to be the only way to assure peace and stability in the Middle-Eastern region, are highlighted below. The declaration of the Abraham Accords signed between Israel and countries of the Arab world, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, entails a threefold aim.

First, the declaration highlighted the importance of the prospect of peace in the Middle East and the emphasis on how it should be based on the facets of mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. Second, the declaration also emphasizes the importance of maintaining human dignity, liberty, various essential freedoms and religious liberty. Finally, the aspect of tolerance was focused upon, in addition to the same vision of support toward the growth and development of art, medicine, commerce, and science in the region, which would enable further integration. The normalization of relations under the Abraham Accords was a historic achievement in itself. Israel signed the accords with the UAE in August 2020. The cooperation for peace was then signed with Bahrain in the month of September 2020. Israel signed the normalization agreement with Sudan in October 2020 and finally with Morocco in December 2020. Some of the major takeaways from all of the agreements within the Abraham Accords signed by Israel include the following facets:

As part of the deal with the UAE, Israel decided to put a pause on all of its plans with respect to the annexation of the regions included in the West Bank.

It had established a cultural exchange program with the UAE, and ever since the agreement was signed, about 130,000 Israelis have visited the UAE.

Following the Abraham Accords, the United States had recognized the claims of Morocco along the lines of the territorial disputes in the Western Saharan region.

Historical Hostility, Strategic Reconciliation, and the Key Impetus for Normalization

In the year 1947, Saudi Arabia denied the proposition for the creation of the state of Israel in the Palestinian region at the United Nations. Subsequently, they were also part of the three consecutive wars in the Middle East, the wars in the years 1948, the Six-Day War of 1967, and even the War of 1973. Saudi Arabia, in many ways, was the force that unified the Arab world against the likes of Israel. The prospects with respect to the foreign holdings by Saudi Arabia toward Israel were simple: First, it did not recognize the state of Israel; second, it was vehemently unwilling to compromise or reconcile with Israel; and, finally, there was a general unwillingness to negotiate with Israel. In addition to all of the aforementioned facets, Saudi Arabia was also constantly funding and supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). In the year 1973, at the height of the war in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia even used the resource provision of oil as a bargaining chip in the hopes of extending an external arm of influence upon the West to lay claim to the support from the West toward the Arab side. Saudi Arabia also took up the position of being the unanimous defender of the Islamic faith, following its decision to expel Egypt from the ranks of the Arab League following the infamous “Camp David Agreement” that Egypt had signed with Israel (Bickerton & Klausner, 1991; Niu & Wu, 2021, p. 174).

In cognisance of the aforementioned stance taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we can arrive at the following conclusions. First, there was mutual antagonism in the relations upheld by both Israel and Saudi Arabia, predominantly on the grounds of the Palestinian issue. The same is also paramount to certain levels of derived historical hatred in the region between Jews and Arabs. Second, there was no scope for peace, or even negotiations due to the hard and fast rule adopted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whereas an objective look at Israel’s strategy proves that there was an effort made from the end of the Israeli government, antithetical to the notions of isolationism and establish contact and normalize relations with Arab countries such as Egypt. Third, such a stance taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also enabled it to have a more influential voice of reason when it came down to the decisions made in Islamic interstate organizations such as the Arab League. Hence, helping the country increase its position among other such examples from the Islamic world. And, finally, one can thus assume a broad conflictual isolation between the two of these countries.

When it comes down to the relations between Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East, the next period can be characterized by discreet forms of interactions. If we were to objectively analyze the policies under King Khalid, which was predominantly led through by the then Crown Prince Fahd, there was an effort made toward bringing a faction of Egyptian officials and Syrian officials to Riyadh so as to open up talks with respect to an increased form of diplomacy amongst these three entities. Now, as mentioned earlier, this was not particularly the Saudi stance when it came to its interaction with Egypt in the following years. This is characterized by the general unwillingness within the policy of Saudi Arabia to come to any form of compromise with entities from the Arab world that associated themselves with Israel.

In the year 1976, as negotiations along these lines played out in Riyadh, wherein Egypt would, as a result, stop its criticism of Syria’s invasion of the territories involved in Lebanon. And Syria would consensually stop its criticism with respect to Egypt and their Sinai II agreement with Israel. The major argument is that Egypt prematurely agreed to the same, without Israel having to give up all of its occupied territories in the year 1967 (Kostiner, 2009, p. 418).

The success of Saudi Arabia in this endeavor must not be overlooked, as it improved the tense relations that were once present between Egypt and Syria. It gave Saudi Arabia the perfect position to hold a unified Arab front against Israel, essentially relying on a peace agreement amongst these three entities. The plan initially was to present the same to the then-President of the United States, Jimmy Carter. However, all of this changed by the year 1977, largely due to the regional instances that had transpired in the short span of a couple of months. The Egyptian side, led by the then-President Anwar al Sadat, engaged in bilateral peace talks with the Israeli government, as led by President Menachem Begin. This inadvertently thwarted the Saudi efforts, essentially making all of the efforts made from their end to be in vain.

Mutual Isolation and Early Saudi Mediation in the Arab World

“The Camp David Accords” was signed and agreed upon by both Israel and Egypt on March 26, 1979. The relevance of this accord is still very pivotal, with respect to Israel holding strategic military positions in the region (New Arab, 2024). Saudi Arabia initially had made an attempt to discourage any form of radical isolation against Egypt from the Arab world. The frontrunners in this regard are Syria, the PLO, and Iraq. The coalition of the Arab states convened in Iraq, leaders of the Arab world, such as Saddam Hussein and many others, pushed for a unanimous boycott of relations with Egypt and the subsequent breakage of all diplomatic ties with Cairo. Saudi Arabia did not particularly favor such a radical proposition against Egypt, and in fact wanted to open up further dialogue. But it can be observed that their hands were forced to be unilaterally part of the bloc, which was necessarily anti-Egyptian in essence. Now this stance taken by the Arab world, and the fact that Saudi Arabia was a part of this antagonistic movement against Egypt, had essentially put them at odds with the United States, who had advocated for starting up a dialogue with respect to a peace process instead.

Hence, Saudi Arabia was essentially at a fix; the Kingdom was in many ways aware of the fact that the way forward was seldom to be fanning the flames for inter-Arab schisms that were already affecting the general stability and order of the Arab world. Saudi leaders started analyzing alternatives to reestablish some form of peace and stability in the region. Now, the question is as to why Saudi Arabia was concerned with the more radical states involved within the Arab world.

The answer to the same can be found in the fears of Saudi Arabia at the prospect of such radical Arab entities seeking help from the Soviet Union. This would inadvertently affect the export of oil from Saudi Arabia to the West and would essentially cause a radical schism in the region, further contributing to the politics of the Cold War, being separated by bloc politics. Knowing the dramatic implications of the same, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Prince Fahd, was in search of a new initiative for a peace plan. Saudi Arabia released their eight-point proposition for a new peace plan in the year 1981 (Dawisha, 1983; Cordesman, 1984).

Although most of what was this refined eight-point was nothing more than a reiteration of the demands that were already made by and large from the Arab world. Two points in particular stood out, there was a proposition made that all states within the Middle-Eastern region have their own respective right to live in freedom. And provided that Israel withdrew from the occupied regions within the Arab world, which predominantly included territories occupied by the Jewish state in the year 1967, Israel would essentially have the right to exist in peace. This was a landmark move made by the end of Saudi Arabia. Prior to this, it was only Egypt from within the ranks of the Arab world who had recognized Israel’s right to exist through the Camp David Accords. But for the first time, Saudi Arabia had formally acknowledged the right of the Jewish state to exist. This was different from how the rest of the Arab world interacted in this matter. All of the Arab states, by denying Israel’s right to exist, essentially opposed any form of political or economic engagement with the Jewish state (Abadi, 2019; Kostiner, 2009, pp. 419–421).

A fourfold characteristic of Saudi Arabia can be derived in this regard. First, it could be reasserted that Saudi Arabia was constantly trying to engage with innovative ways so as to broker peace in the region, thus making it a pioneer in the peace process of the Middle East in itself. Second, it was also an effort made to completely pacify the conflict between the Arab world and the Jewish state through the prospect of a mutual agreement from either faction. Thirdly, it laid the groundwork for the prospect of peaceful coexistence, and a viable way forward strategy, and would essentially place Saudi Arabia as the leader of the Arab world, and finally, it would essentially bode well toward US interests in the region, which would essentially integrate the policies of the United States as well.

Saudi Arabia, following the proposition of the Reagan Plan by the United States, was now poised to come about with a peace plan solution for the Middle East. The Fahd Plan was then reintroduced at the Fez Conference by Saudi Arabia to the members of the Arab League in the year 1982. However, there were several changes brought about from the initial proposition. This time around, the right for states to exist in the Middle East had been taken out. Instead, the argument made was that essentially the United Nations Security Council would provide the avenue for the purpose of the protection of peace and stability in the region; this would also potentially include a Palestinian state. The plan also reaffirmed the position of authority as held by the PLO and concluded that the PLO would ideally be the only legitimate body that would represent the grievances, needs, and wants of the Palestinian people. This renewed outlook favored the likes of the PLO, and dissolving Israel’s right to exist to merely a hint given in the plan garnered support from the countries involved in the Arab League. However, Israel rejected the propositions as given by the Fahd Plan at the Fez Conference (Walsh, 1982). Hence, the Fahd Plan was accepted as the legitimate organic plan from within the Middle East for the aspect of ensuring peace.

There is an apparent pattern that can be essentially highlighted in the foreign policy as exercised by Saudi Arabia when it boils down to the aspect of peace in the Middle East. It was different from the Egyptian take, which had necessarily left Egypt isolated for the longest time from the Arab League. It destroyed the balance of power and the order among the Arab nations as well; it created several internal schisms which took the focus away from the real cause that had ought to be represented by the Arab states, which was the concerns of the Palestinians. So, in many ways, it was concluded by the Kingdom that the path toward peace is not through individual bilateral agreements formed with the Jewish state. This blurred the larger causes that were to be represented and, hence, it was consensually agreed that no Arab state would sign individual peace agreements with Israel without the larger consensus of member countries within the Arab League. This character was held by Saudi Arabia, wherein they are neither hard-lined against the Jewish state nor are they willing to compromise the integrity of other Arab entities for normalization of relations with Israel. Instead, the Kingdom favored the argument that a peace agreement should ideally largely benefit all the Arab states, and it should in turn contribute to a sustainable future, wherein there is an emphasis upon socio-political calm in the region. Now, this aspect of the mutually beneficial peace agreement became all the more strained as the resistance movements from the Palestinian faction increased. Right from the Munich Olympics massacre of Jewish Athletes, as concocted by the PLO in the year 1972. Israel had initiated a massive counterterrorist operation in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 1987, the region witnessed the first intifada and the formation of Hamas, which would in subsequent years replace the PLO as one of the major representative organizations for the Palestinian people.

Saudi Arabia’s Regional Balancing Act in the Arab World (2000–2010)

In the early 2000s, as a response to the second intifada in the Gaza Strip, and the retaliation that followed from the end of Israel, Crown Prince Abdullah strategized a new peace initiative for the region, which would have achieved a set of threefold objectives. First, there was a requirement for the Saudi leadership to quell the public demand and heed to certain arenas of the general interest and welfare of the Arab world. Second, as usual, they had to pacify the interests of the United States in the region. Third, although the Palestinians were at the center of this new peace initiative rubric, Saudi Arabia had to also pacify the interests of all of the Arab parties involved, which in particular involved countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, which had territorial claims within the Jewish state. With all of such major concerns, Crown Prince Abdullah presented the peace initiative at the Arab League summit, which was convened in Beirut in 2002.

In 2006, Saudi Arabia had several concerns in the Middle East; the destabilization of Iraq by the United States essentially put the risk of a Shia-led government coming about in Iraq. The Mahdi Army’s strengthening worried Saudi Arabia, because of its allegiance to Iran. And hence the prospect of losing out on an ally to the Shia faction deeply concerned Saudi interests. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia was also aware of the fact that, with Iran’s resurgence in the region, and its support for the Hamas, the Fatah and even some of the Sunni factions, which were the new chambers of resistance in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, would essentially be a radical pro-Iranian and a pro-Shia axis to the Middle East. This would defenestrate the Saudi role of being the frontrunner in the Palestinian cause and would put them in a position below Iran in the Arab games of balance of power. This had essentially set the stage for Saudi Arabia’s dichotomy in the years to come (Kinzer, 2011; Holliday, 2019).

King Abdullah’s position at this juncture was not necessarily to push or press Iran so as to change their respective policies. But the simple principle that was conveyed was that none of the states in the Arab world should be attacked. Second, the policy as retained by Abdullah also worked toward the limitation of Iran’s influence with respect to various arenas involved within the Arab world. Regional cooperation was up for grabs. For either of the parties involved, Saudi Arabia was willing to pursue a strategic cooperation; however, this did not mean that it would necessitate being a subsidiary to Iran’s broader goals for the region. King Abdullah and the then-Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad met at Makkah in 2007. Both of these factions that there should be a mutual effort put toward curbing all forms of dissent and tensions between the Shia and the Sunni fundamentalist groups in Iraq. Their meeting also involved a thorough discussion on the issues in Palestine and ways in which a solution can be brought about with respect to the confrontations between Hezbollah and the government of Lebanon (Kostiner, 2009; Podeh, 2014).

However, this mutual understanding between the two entities did not last very long. Saudi Arabia played the role of a mediator; however, it lacked a proper insight into what either Iran’s or Hamas’ goals were. Saudi Arabia did not fully account for the strength that was garnered by Hamas in the region. The delegation and discussion in Makkah, with respect to all such matters, took several days to fruition. Ultimately, there was a consensus toward a division of powers among Hamas and Fatah for the governance of the Palestinian people. The government would essentially be formed amongst six ministers and eight ministers from the Fatah and Hamas, respectively. There was an agreement that Hamas would accept the Palestinian Authority Agreement; however, Hamas maintained with quite a bit of certainty that it would not recognize the Jewish state. Provided that Hamas remained in line with the Palestinian Authority Agreement, King Abdullah maintained that about a quarter of a million dollars would be allocated to the Palestinian cause for the rebuilding and reconstruction of Palestine. The 2002 Arab initiative had been reconfirmed following this at the Arab League summit held in Riyadh in 2007 (Kinzer, 2011; Kosach, 2021; Kostiner, 2009).

Saudi Arabia was in a tight spot during this period, with respect to how they would have effectively navigated through its intersectional ties with Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon and prevented any form of escalation of conflict in the Middle East, thereby involving in one way or the other a form of secret diplomacy with even Israel. But the position and the power held by Saudi Arabia were now at the edge due to Iran’s involvement with newer entities, predominantly non-state actors, having greater influence in the region, such as Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, Houthis in Yemen, and Hezbollah in Lebanon (Takeyh, 2006; Allin & Simon, 2010; Kosach, 2021).

Gradual Rapprochement and Regional Setbacks to Normalization

Progressive Reconciliation

In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly declared that the prospect of the United States isolating its trusted allies and partners in the Arab world in pursuit of other agendas in the region was a historical wrongdoing (Telhami, 2015). The argument was essentially from the perspective of Iran being an entity that constantly supported and aided terrorist factions across the Middle-Eastern region, and a solid nuclear doctrine being handed out to such an entity did not sit well just with Israel but also with Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia never openly came forward with a strong antagonistic front against Iran’s nuclear deal, it did, however, express concerns with respect to the balance of power in the Middle East and the general peace and security within the region.

As soon as Trump took office, there was a radical shift in the US policy toward Iran. It started off with the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement. In its place, sanctions were imposed on Iran. This renewed outlook, although being detrimental to Iran’s efforts at attaining a nuclear arsenal, was rather supported by both Israel and Saudi Arabia. This brought the two entities closer together (Lieber, 2016; Goldberg, 2017; Podeh, 2018; Beck, 2020; Niu & Wu, 2021).

However, what followed were much more radical measures. Starting with the 2017 move of the Trump-led administration in the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state. This would have been met with an extreme form of resistance had this been the previous decade, even from Saudi Arabia, for that matter. However, Riyadh remained silent, thus raising ambiguity in understanding the position of Saudi Arabia. Jordan, on the contrary, had called for the requirement for an urgent convening of the Arab Summit. However, Riyadh maintained that the summit would happen on the scheduled date, that is, March 2018, and hence did not require the urgency that Jordan had requested. The only comment made was that the way in which the United States approached the same was extremely dangerous (Al Jazeera, 2017). In 2019, however, there was an active cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel in their efforts against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the paramilitary forces in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen (Penkovtsev et al., 2019; Fitzgerald, 2023).

Thus, a line of interest was born between Israel and Saudi Arabia, predominantly based on the threat that Iran’s rising hegemony had posed in the region, bringing them closer together than ever before. This common denominator would prove to be further beneficial in the construct of the developing relations between these two entities, even as the conflict rages on, with Iran being directly involved post-October 2023 as well (TOI World Desk, 2024).

Elusive Regional Fallout: The Iran Factor

The diplomatic fallout between Israel and Saudi Arabia can be seen in the events that transpired after the October 7, 2023, attacks. Israel’s war waged on the Palestinian people, and the turn of its conflict with Iran from being discreet to open further complicated rapprochement efforts. Following the death of Ismail Haniyeh on July 31, 2024, Iran gave Israel a strong warning. This time around, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself warned of a harsh punishment that would come Israel’s way. From September 2024, Israel focused its attacks on Iran-backed Hezbollah. It had annihilated Hamas forces in Palestine, leading to a death toll of 55,000 ever since the October 2023 attacks. Between September 23 and 27, 2024, Israel killed more than 700 people in Lebanon through its 650-odd air strikes. A pivotal moment came wherein Israel managed to eliminate the very influential senior Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah, by the use of specifically designed bunker buster bombs. In that attack alone, around 2,000 Lebanese civilians were injured.

On October 2, 2024, Iran retaliated in response to the killings of a series of senior leaders associated with Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hamas through targeted air strikes. Around 180 missiles were fired by Iran at Israel (Gritten, 2024). It resulted in minor damage to a southern Israeli Airbase, with most of the missiles in both instances being fired by the Iranian regime being shot down by Israel, assisted by its Arab and Western allies. Israel, in response on October 26, 2024, launched airstrikes at the military bases of Iran in retaliation for the attacks prompted by Iran on October 2, 2024.

On October 30, 2024, Saudi Arabia organized a two-day meeting in Riyadh, which involved nearly 90 independent states and many other international organizations, to address the immediate concerns in Palestine and work toward the statehood of Palestine. The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia condemned Israel’s approach and called it a genocide.

Hence, Saudi Arabia’s position amidst this crisis becomes extremely ambiguous. With many of the political executives within the state unwilling to make any comment with respect to the matter. Saudi Arabia is deeply involved in the welfare of the Arab nations. It can even be argued that Iran’s efforts proved to be victorious, so as to thwart any progression in the Saudi–Israel normalization talks and in that process any efforts that were intended toward a gradual rapprochement. The October 7, 2023, attacks worked in favor of Iran. Although it might be far-reaching to assume that Iran orchestrated the same to prevent closer ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the timing of the attacks and the deep ties involved in the relations between Hamas and the Iranian regime might lead one to think otherwise.

In light of the current direct escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel following “Operation Rising Lion,” wherein Israel launched a preemptive attack against Iran, claiming that the ongoing uranium enrichment of Iran was a threat to its existence in the region. On June 13, 2025, 200 fighter jets were deployed by Israel, targeting military and nuclear bases of Iran; in total, 330 munitions were dropped, a total of six Iranian cities, including Iran’s nuclear facilities in Natanz. Tehran responded immediately, on June 16, 2025, Iranian missiles bombarded Tel Aviv as well as Israel’s Port City Haifa. The method of attack utilized by the IRGC, according to sources in Iran, allowed the missiles to successfully hit the intended target, avoiding interception from Israel’s defense systems. The crossfire continues to rage, as the United States is likely to be involved, with President Trump reportedly leaving the G7 summit early to deal with the developing confrontation between Iran and Israel.

Operation Rising Lion, although it seems as a defiant act of uncalled aggression, thwarting years of work in diplomacy put into bridging a nexus between Israel and the Arab world, is rather much more strategic than it may seem. President Trump, in his letter to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, gave Iran 60 days to come into a new nuclear deal. Iran delayed the same. As per the report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency on May 31, 2025, Iran had several hidden nuclear projects involving materials, which were never disclosed to the United Nations nuclear watchdog in at least three locations, which were used from the early 2000s. The report also stated that the uranium enrichment of Iran was at around 90% of weapons-grade quality, which, if enriched a bit further, can amount to almost nine nuclear weapons (Murphy, 2025).

In this context, the targets of Israel stand out; they have consistently targeted members of the IRGC and not the Artesh, which is its regular military: Hossein Salami, the head of the IRGC, Mohammad Bagheri, the Chief of Staff, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of IRGC Aerospace Forces, and Gholamali Rashid, the commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. This is pivotal, as the aim of Israel is not only to weaken Iran’s nuclear ambition but also to instigate a form of domestic imbalance which would inadvertently disestablish the control of the IRGC and, in turn, cause a regime change. This has coincidentally been a discreet desire of Saudi Arabia and the United States. In 2017, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman referred to the Supreme Leader of Iran as the new Hitler of the Middle East, amidst the regional tensions that existed between Iran and Saudi Arabia back then (BBC, 2017). However, the Saudi stance changed in the larger interest of integration in 2023, before the Hamas attack. Hence, keeping the conflicts that Israel is engaged in, with respect to Hamas and currently Iran in focus, an analysis on factors that could result in convergence and divergence of interests is discussed next.

Conclusion: America’s Strategic Position and the Convergence/Divergence of Israel–Saudi Interests

Based on the above discussion, we can arrive at the following conclusions. First, the process of rapprochement was well underway as both Israel and Saudi Arabia found common ground in their regional differences with Iran. Second, Saudi Arabia, being the presumed leader of the Arab world, cannot abandon the Palestinian cause. Third, although at the moment all talks for normalization are off the table publicly, it is seen that the Saudi government is still very much keen on resuming the rapprochement process. A bipartisan delegation consisting of lawmakers from the United States, in their visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in June 2025, commented that, by and large, the message was about the dangers that come about with a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. Considering it an existential threat not just to Israel but to the rest of the Arab world as well. However, Israel’s approach from October 2023 onward has largely complicated the discourse on normalization.

It is only through a neorealist lens that Israel’s actions can be potentially rationalized, their disproportionate retaliation in the wake of October 7, 2023, and its preemptive strikes on Iran, again citing the reasons of existential threats to be eliminated for the survival of the state in the anarchical order of the Middle East that they have to navigate. Similar is the inference that can be derived from the Saudi stance amidst the unrest in the region. There are numerous lucrative economic prospects with a potential normalization with Israel; however, this could lead to an isolation from the rest of the Arab world, as was the case with Egypt in the past. The key profiteer from the normalization is the United States. The United States aims for better strategic control in the Middle East through normalization, which would push its existing exceptionalism in the region.

However, it is to be considered that the distancing of Saudi Arabia from any of such conversations in the public sphere post 2023, amidst Israel’s war against Hamas and Israel’s conflict with Iran is an indicator, that as a safer option for survival, Saudi Arabia may even opt for a strategic rapprochement with Iran, instead of Israel. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s renewed position on the clause that no forms of diplomatic relations will be established with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestine, having East Jerusalem as its capital, affirms this (Al Arabia, 2024).

Trump’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia addresses how the United States engaged in ensuring the bombing of the Houthis, with whom Saudi Arabia had issues for the longest time. He revoked the sanctions against Syria and ensured investments worth billions of dollars. Trump also highlighted a realist approach of non-intervention from the United States in Gulf affairs. However, in his trip to the Middle East, President Trump did not make a trip to Israel, which is very rare for any US President.

In addition to this, Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer, the Israel–US attack on Iran has brought in condemnation from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia declared it to be an unprecedented attack on Iran’s sovereignty and a blatant act of aggression (Shafaq News, 2025). Saudi Arabia also condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes aimed at the US base in Qatar. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman yet again referred to the attacks as unacceptable and unjustified (Arab News, 2025).

Hence, in such a climate of several uncertainties, listed below are the key areas of potential convergence and divergence of interests in the current scenario of the Middle East for normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Convergence of Interests

Iran’s progressive influence on the region and its nuclear program can pose an existential threat to both Saudi Arabia and Israel. The history of the regional tensions that exist between Iran and Saudi Arabia can lead the narrative in favor of normalization in the long run. However, the devastation caused by Israel in the wake of the October 2023 attacks, and its escalating tensions with Iran, and the US involvement in the conflict between Iran and Israel have largely altered the Saudi stance. However, an unofficial hint of regime change in Iran could also be a common interest of Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, as was discussed previously. Saudi Arabia’s discreet involvement in letting Israel use its airspace in countering Iran’s attacks somewhat justifies the Saudi dual policy (Knipp, 2025).

Vision 2030 has been one of Saudi Arabia’s flagship projects aimed at drastically diversifying the economic, cultural, and social sectors of Saudi Arabia. It is interesting to note that this was also one of the key drivers in 2016 when it was first announced, which initially led to the prospect of normalization of relations with Israel. Vision 2030 would potentially see Saudi Arabia moving away from the overreliance on oil, which accounts for 43% of the country’s GDP.

Although the Houthi issue in Yemen has been momentarily pacified with US involvement, if it tends to reemerge, it could lead to Saudi Arabia working closely with Israel so as to counter any potential threat. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia have faced countless forms of aggression from the Houthis in the region.

The idea of a larger economic corridor that opens with the normalization may perhaps be the strongest point for a potential convergence. Initiatives comprising energy sector, new rail lines (transport of goods), communication channels (fiber optic cables), and much more would connect Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Europe.

Hence, the dual policy adopted by Saudi Arabia can be justified; it seeks normalization with Israel due to the large-scale benefits it provides, which also involves further strategic benefits from the United States, all the while championing the cause of Palestinian statehood diplomatically. This helps the Crown Prince not only gain legitimacy within the Arab world but also achieve a monumental success domestically (Guzansky, 2025).

Divergence of Interests

Israel’s unending war on Hamas, and the merciless bombing and killing of Palestinians by the thousands, in turn, hurt the Saudi interests in establishing a Palestinian state, and the political unrest surrounding East Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements in the West Bank further increases the antipathy between the two.

Saudi Arabia’s easing stance with respect to Iran could further deteriorate any efforts made toward normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It could further be worsened if Saudi Arabia opts for reconciliation and the opening up of diplomatic ties with Iran, which is already taking some shape, following the preemptive strikes of Israel made against Iran on June 13, 2025, and the escalation of conflict between Iran and Israel that followed, as previously mentioned. Saudi Arabia would further distance itself from Israel, in the larger fear of backlash from the Arab world.

The recent visit of President Trump to the Middle East, isolating Israel from the picture, led Saudi Arabia to unilaterally push for its demands with the United States. The US arms deal signed with Saudi Arabia, worth $142 billion, making it the largest defense sales agreement in history, is a testament to this. This would render any prospects of normalization moot due to the simple fact that the Kingdom receives what it wants regardless of whether or not normalization is on the table.

In a neorealist purview, Saudi Arabia’s position on normalization with Israel becomes extremely puzzling, due to its multifaceted interests in the region. The change in administration from Biden to President Trump further complicates the issue, due to the present US administration’s ‘America First’ approach. The offensive stance taken by Israel following the October 2023 attacks against Iran and Iran-backed factions Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis further makes the stance of Saudi Arabia enigmatic.