Interrogating Political Crisis in Bangladesh: Limited Democracy,Islamization of Polity,and External Power Politics

Abstract

The August 2024 ousting of Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh, precipitated by a student-led uprising, actively supported and participated in by Islamist organizations and opposition, has precipitated profound political instability. This article identifies three interrelated causal factors contributing to the crisis: a deficit in democratic consolidation, the Islamization of the political sphere, and the intervention of external powers. AL’s successive regimes failed to institutionalize democratic norms, while Islamist constituencies persistently resisted democratic reforms. Concurrently, external actors have influenced domestic politics, exacerbating the crisis. Additionally, the nation’s fractured social fabric has hindered the development of a cohesive national identity, impeding democratic progress and political stability. Through a historical analysis, this article argues that these factors collectively elucidate the ongoing political turmoil in Bangladesh.

Introduction

If periodic elections to choose and change governments were reliable indicators of democracy, 2024 would seem promising for South Asia. With 1,233 million legitimate voters, the four major countries of the region—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—held elections to select their governments. However, despite the shared experience of elections, the experience with the nature and functioning of democracy varies significantly across the region. While India exhibits a sustained political stability, the majority of South Asian countries have long struggled to achieve similar outcomes. Recent political developments in Bangladesh serve as a stark reminder of the persistent political instability that many South Asian nations continue to face.

In early August 2024, the 15-year-long political regime led by Sheikh Hasina came to an abrupt end. A violent protest movement, spearheaded by students and supported by Islamist groups and political opponents, ousted the AL government. Following her resignation, Bangladesh plunged into crisis, marked by widespread violence against minorities and AL supporters (Mishra, 2024), extensive property destruction (UNHR, 2024), and a faltering economy (Khatun, 2024). While Bangladesh has a history of such political upheavals, the current crisis warrants scholarly examination for several reasons. It is essential to note that during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh experienced substantial economic growth. Once described as a “basket case,” Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) soared to US$460.2 billion in 2022, up from US$18.14 billion in 1980. Accordingly, the social progress achieved during this period is frequently attributed to economic growth (Iqbal, 2021; Islam & Ali, 2024; Titumir, 2021). Understanding the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government is crucial for three main reasons. First, established theories suggest a close relationship between economic progress and the sustainability of democracy. Lipset’s (1981, p. 31) thesis—“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy,” later adapted by Diamond (1992)—suggests that the greater the average wealth of people, the more inclined they are to support and sustain a democracy. This theory merits reevaluation in the context of Bangladesh. Second, the “Bangladesh Paradox” (Evans, 2001)—the phenomenon of steady economic growth coupled with political instability and violence—requires further investigation. Third, the limited success of social achievements in fostering political stability also presents a valuable area for scholarly inquiry.

This article identifies three interrelated causal factors contributing to the current crisis in Bangladesh: limited democracy, the Islamization of its polity, and the intervention of external powers. These factors are grounded in a historical analysis of Bangladesh’s political evolution, particularly following its liberation in 1971. The liberation movement was fundamentally a struggle for democratic rights and political representation. While it encompassed broader issues such as nationalism, grievances against exploitation, deprivation, and poverty, the core demand was the establishment of a democratic system. However, this movement faced significant internal opposition from pro-Pakistani Islamist organizations, notably the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), which resisted the democratic aspirations of the populace. This duality—one faction advocating for democracy and another opposing it on religious grounds—forms the basis for identifying the first two causal factors.

Post-independence, the political landscape of Bangladesh has been characterized by instability and authoritarianism. Successive regimes have undermined democratic institutions, leading to a cyclical pattern of democratic transitions and reversion to authoritarianism. This instability warrants an examination of the nature and functioning of different regimes in upholding democratic values and ensuring governance. The Islamization of the polity emerged as a significant development following the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. Successive military regimes, notably under Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad, adopted Islam as a tool for political legitimacy. This shift has had profound implications for the political and social fabric of Bangladesh, fostering an environment where religious ideology increasingly influences political discourse and challenges democratic values.

The intervention of external powers has further complicated Bangladesh’s political dynamics. The country’s fractured social fabric has made it susceptible to external influence. Additionally, the weakening of domestic opposition and Islamist organizations during Sheikh Hasina’s prolonged rule has created a power vacuum that external actors have sought to exploit. This underscores the importance of examining the role of external powers in shaping the political trajectory of Bangladesh. In the subsequent sections, each of these causal factors is analyzed in detail to elucidate their contributions to the ongoing crisis in Bangladesh.

Limited Democracy and Political Instability in Bangladesh

Before addressing the broader question of whether democracies ensure political stability, it is important to clarify how “democracy” is defined and applied in this article. Recent debates have shifted focus from the mere occurrence of periodic elections to the quality of democracy (Munck, 2014) and the characteristics of a “good” democracy (Morlino, 2004). Consequently, providing a comprehensive explanation of democracy is a scholarly challenge and lies beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this study adopts a more functional and operational definition, emphasizing aspects such as free, fair, and periodic elections; constitutionalism and the rule of law; citizens’ rights; and effective governance. Drawing on the work of Baxter (1985), democracy is understood here as “a system of government in which the authorities are responsible to popularly elected representatives and operate under freely enacted constitutions which guarantee the basic rights of citizens.”

Most South Asian countries, however, often fail to achieve the ideals of such a democracy. The minimalist democracy (Przeworski, 1999; Schumpeter, 1942) in South Asia, except for India, presents a paradoxical scenario. As Christian Wagner (1999) argues, “despite being the largest region of democracy (in terms of population), the form and nature of democracy range from liberal traditions with democratic competition on one hand to semi-feudal structures rife with corruption and governmental malpractice on the other.” The nature of democracy in South Asian countries can be analyzed through various theoretical frameworks. The democracy in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka can be described as “illiberal,” marked by the presence of a “non-neutral state, dominance of technocratic elites, and a managed public sphere” (Bell et al., 1995). However, contrary to Zakaria’s (1997) position, the illiberal democracies in these South Asian countries do not necessarily embrace authoritarian models; instead, the elected regimes restrict civil rights and freedoms. As such, illiberal democracies in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka often use elections as a legitimizing tool for the dominance of technocratic elites, which significantly limits civil rights and freedoms.

The legitimacy of these illiberal democracies is often rooted in the political traditions influenced by sociocultural practices. In this regard, important factors such as the close nexus between traditional models of power and authority (Pye, 1985), personalism, commanding political parties, and strong interventionist states (Neher, 1994) encapsulate the characteristics of what are often termed “semi-democracies” in these countries. The sociocultural influence on political traditions is particularly evident in the dominant role of specific religious orientations in shaping voting behavior and political culture. The assertion of radical Islam has a significant influence on the political traditions and cultures of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Consequently, the democracy deficit in these countries can safely be attributed to the Islamization of the polity. However, the religion-induced political traditions of authoritarian regimes often meet resistance from popular aspirations for democracy. Ironically, “the transition of an authoritarian regime does not automatically lead to the desired democracies but also creates an uncertain something else” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

The political crisis in Bangladesh is linked to its democratic deficit, which operates under authoritarian regimes, the Islamization of the polity, restrictions on civil rights and freedoms, the domination by the technocratic elites, and a guided public sphere. Bangladesh’s experience and struggle for democracy under various regimes are explored below.

Bangladesh’s Experiment with Democracy

The liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan and its formation as an independent state can be attributed to geographical separation of East and West Pakistan, cultural differences and denial of democratic rights, even after the electoral victory of the All-Pakistan Awami League Party of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the first general elections in undivided Pakistan (Choudhury, 1972; Huque & Hakim, 1993). With its liberation, Bangladesh raised expectations that the experiences of discrimination, exploitation, and denial of political rights would prompt political elites to adopt a more democratic approach in rebuilding its political system. Given the presence of a sense of national unity and the newly crafted “Bengali” nationalism, it seemed reasonable that political elites could consolidate democracy within governance, institutions, and popular spaces.

However, the newly formed government, tasked with reconstructing war-ravaged infrastructure, reorganizing the economy, and reestablishing the political system, quickly exposed its vulnerabilities and weaknesses in addressing these challenges. The first government under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman not only struggled to address issues of poverty, corruption, and exploitation but also failed to consolidate an inclusive political system and democracy. Despite receiving a massive mandate in the 1973 parliamentary elections, Rahman’s limited success in fostering democracy can be attributed to several factors: the absence of a credible opposition, one-party dominance, widespread corruption, ineffective governance in addressing the needs of a war-ravaged and economically impoverished population, and the lack of legitimacy of the ideological position of Mujibism.

Politically, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s regime was characterized by a focus on personality rather than democratic principles. In response to growing discontent over poor governance, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for parliamentary elections to renew his popular mandate. The overwhelming victory of the AL reestablished his power but also led to increasingly authoritarian practices. Despite continuing corruption and poor governance, Mujib’s government suspended political parties, introduced one-party politics, amended the constitution without parliamentary debate, and transitioned to a presidential form of government—moves that diluted the spirit of democracy in Bangladesh’s formative years. Furthermore, the personality cult surrounding Mujib was reflected in the formulation of a state ideology, Mujibism. Introduced in 1972, Mujibism was a populist ideological project grounded in four pillars: nationalism, democracy, socialism, and secularism. However, this populist agenda came into conflict with the original popular project that had led to the liberation of Bangladesh (Hajjaj, 2023). The promises of Mujibism offered little to the disenfranchised population of East Pakistan, who had placed high hopes in Mujib’s leadership.

In contrast to the aspirations of the people, the government suspended the fundamental rights and slapped restrictions on civil liberties by imposing an emergency in December 1974. Worse still, the constitutional amendment in January 1975 introduced a one-party system, further stifling political opposition and controlling media and citizens’ freedoms. Mujib’s government, under the newly formed Bangladesh Peasants’ and Workers’ Awami League (BKSAL), adopted a Soviet-style political model, where officials, teachers, and military personnel were coerced into joining the party (Hashmi, 2004). The 1975 constitutional amendment was hailed as a “second revolution” intended to establish a system that legitimizes the systematic exploitation of individuals.

It is noteworthy that while the 1973 parliamentary elections excluded pro-Pakistan Islamist leaders, the government suppressed secular and leftist political opposition, such as the Sarbahara Party of Siraj Sikdar and the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) of Seerajul Alam Khan. The dominance of the BKSAL not only diluted whatever remained of democracy but also pushed secular and Islamist political forces underground, making clandestine politics the only option for resistance (Khan, 1984).

In summary, the one-party rule and the absence of credible opposition undermined the legitimacy of Bangladesh’s first government. The institutionalization of a one-party system through the 1975 constitutional amendment, arguably, played an important role in the assassination of Mujibur Rahman. His death, followed by the military coup, marked critical turning points in Bangladesh. The military coup not only generated doubts about the efficacy of democracy but also led to 15 years of military rule, which profoundly impacted the country’s political culture and governance system. Additionally, pro-Pakistan Islamist forces, previously excluded from parliament, seized the opportunity to consolidate their base, presenting an ongoing threat to democracy.

Military Regime: Authoritarianism, Elections, and Protests for Democracy

The 15 years of military rule (1975–1990) can be analyzed through important paradoxes. On one hand, there were hopes, and on the other, despair. Despite significant differences, the military regimes (under Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Mohammad Ershad) shared many commonalities. Both leaders attempted to garner legitimacy and entrench state authority by assuming civilian roles while instituting a restricted version of democracy (Evans, 2001). This restricted democracy was limited to conducting elections that were far from free and fair.

After assuming power, Ziaur Rahman quickly adopted measures to garner popular support and legitimize his position as a civilian leader. Notably, he founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1976. While civil liberties, fundamental rights, and freedom of the press and expression remained restricted, Zia’s regime garnered support from three key sources: pro-Pakistan organizations and political parties, anti-AL leftists, and serving and retired civil servants and army officers. In a significant departure from Mujib’s regime, Zia introduced several pro-Islamic initiatives, including constitutional changes emphasizing “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah,” directly opposing secularism. By lifting the ban on religious parties, especially JeI, Zia secured support from Islamist organizations but simultaneously exposed Bangladesh’s struggling democracy to greater vulnerabilities.

Arguably, Zia’s pro-Islamic initiatives were driven by two major motives (Evans, 2001). First, he sought to diminish the influence of AL and leftist parties in domestic politics. Second, he aimed to develop economic and political ties with Muslim-majority and Western countries. These initiatives represented a departure from the previous regime and sought to minimize dependence on India while gaining the favor of anti-India constituencies in Bangladesh. In his quest for political legitimacy, Zia conducted two elections during his tenure: a presidential referendum in 1978 and general elections in 1979 (Khan & Zafarullah, 1979). The 1978 presidential election was particularly significant as the first direct election for the presidency, as previous presidents had been elected by the National Assembly. The 1978 presidential election and the 1979 general elections gave Zia’s BNP a massive mandate, although the electoral process was widely criticized as neither free nor fair. Despite this mandate, governance and administration in Bangladesh were dominated by civil–military bureaucrats. Through a constitutional amendment in December 1978, Zia concentrated absolute power in the presidency (Islam, 1984). Consequently, his regime, despite holding elections, suffered from legitimacy deficits and a lack of democratic substance.

Zia’s assassination in May 1981 by a faction of army officers paved the way for General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, a former army chief, to take charge of Bangladesh’s authoritarian military regime. The state of democracy during Ershad’s 8-year rule (1983–1990) was as dire as, if not worse than, that of his predecessor. Like Ziaur Rahman, Ershad implemented pro-Islamic policies to garner social support. His regime followed a three-pronged strategy to legitimize his rule. First, Ershad established the Jatiya Party to gain civilian support and successfully attracted both leftist and rightist ideologies. To enhance his regime’s credibility, he committed to returning to civilian rule while implementing long-term economic and social changes (Rahman, 1983). Second, he adopted policies to instrumentalize Islam as an ideological construct to manipulate public sentiment (Evans, 2001; Hakim, 1998). For instance, Ershad’s regime inscribed religious verses in Arabic in the constitution and, through a constitutional amendment in 1988, declared Islam the state religion of Bangladesh. The pro-Islamic policies during the military regimes empowered Islamist groups to consolidate extremism in Bangladesh. Third, his regime employed clientelism to create a support base, with both civil and military dimensions (Evans, 2001).

Administratively, Ershad’s regime was dominated by military personnel. While suspending many of Zia’s administrative arrangements, Ershad also expressed a willingness to return to civilian rule. On January 1, 1985, his government announced parliamentary elections, allowed the opposition to conduct political activities, and restored some civil liberties. More significantly, the lifting of martial law on November 10, 1986, raised hopes for a democratic transition in Bangladesh. The period between 1986 and 1990 was marked by significant political activity, including two general elections and the imposition of an emergency. The 1986 general election, which gave the Jatiya Party a simple majority, was criticized as a “tragedy of democracy.” Following this election, the imposition of an emergency further eroded democratic processes. With a large mandate from the 1988 general elections, the Jatiya Party passed several legislative bills, including the Eighth Amendment, which established Islam as the state religion and altered the secular characteristics. The 15 years of military rule, a period of “trial and error and hope and despair” (Hashmi, 2022b), significantly transformed Bangladesh’s democratic landscape. Ironically, both authoritarian rulers used elections to legitimize their regimes.

The opposition to the military regime, which came from the political parties, civil society organizations, and students, underscored the fragility of democratic culture in Bangladesh. Protests were often fragmented by the competing interests of the two main political parties, AL and BNP, as well as civil society and student organizations. By 1990, Bangladesh’s political landscape was characterized by multiple stakeholders: the authoritarian military regime, divided political parties (Rizvi, 1991), and civil society organizations opposing both the regime and the political parties. Despite these divisions, Bangladesh eventually succeeded in restoring “democracy.”

Return of Democracy? Dynasty and Vendetta Politics (1991–2024)

The end of the military regime, as argued, restored democracy in Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh’s experience with democracy between 1991 and 2024 can be divided into two periods. In the first 18 years (1991–2008) of post-military rule, power alternated between AL and BNP. In other words, during this period, Bangladesh endured “dynastic politics under battling Begums” (Hashmi, 2022a). Accordingly, the “success of democracy” can be best articulated through periodic elections that transfer political power. However, if elections alone were the parameters of democracy, it is worth noting that 15 years of military regimes in Bangladesh also conducted elections to legitimize their rule. Moreover, similar to the military regime, one can question the free and fair nature of elections under the “civilian” regimes in Bangladesh.

The civilian and democratic nature and spirit of the major parties also merit further discussion. Political parties such as the BNP and Jatiya Party were products of authoritarian rule led by military rulers. The Islamist parties like the JeI are fundamentally opposed to the idea of democracy, and the AL also exhibited authoritarian traits when in power. Accordingly, the governments formed through four general elections during this period included coalitions with political parties whose democratic credentials were questionable. For instance, the coalition governments of the AL and Jatiya Party in 1996 and BNP and JeI in 1991 exemplify these contradictions. The inherent contradictions of political parties with authoritarian backgrounds and limited experience with democracy impacted governance and administration in Bangladesh. The ideological rivalry between the ruling and opposition parties created a scenario of deliberate bypassing by the former and deliberate desertion by the latter (Moniruzzaman, 2009). Consequently, state machinery had limited capacity to formulate and implement policies as ruling parties focused on politicizing the administrative system, exacerbating governmental inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Zafarullah & Rahman, 2008).

It was within this political landscape that the 15-year-long regime (January 2009–August 2024) of Sheikh Hasina functioned. Seen by some as a “strongman regime” (Ruud, 2021), Sheikh Hasina’s rule invites debate on whether “development is democracy” or “democracy is development.” A closer examination reveals a mismatch between substantial economic and infrastructural development and democratic governance deficits. Over these 15 years, Bangladesh experienced relative political stability in terms of the continuity of a political party and one leadership in power. Considering the nation’s turbulent political history, this was arguably one of its greatest achievements. Moreover, the regime’s contributions to economic and infrastructural development have been widely acknowledged. These economic advancements also resulted in notable improvements in social indices (Islam & Ali, 2024). Consequently, the impressive growth coupled with political stability was seen as indicative of a “successful democracy” in Bangladesh. However, a critical examination of the policies and functioning of the Sheikh Hasina regime exposes significant democratic deficits.

Sheikh Hasina was accused of concentrating power within her party, the government, and political institutions. The abolition of a caretaker government to ensure free and fair elections through the 15th Constitutional Amendment, 2011, questioned the commitment of the AL government to democracy. Sheikh Hasina argued that such an arrangement was unnecessary as Bangladesh had matured democratically. The opposition, however, accused Sheikh Hasina of authoritarianism and boycotted the 2014 general elections. Similarly, in 2016, the AL government introduced the 16th Amendment, which elevated the parliament’s authority over the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The absence of a caretaker government to ensure free and fair elections and supreme power being vested with the parliament, Bangladesh experienced restrictions on individual and press freedom and association, and the crackdown on the opposition parties (Sapkota, 2022).

The crackdown on press freedom and expression was facilitated through legislation, the Digital Security Act 2018, which empowered agencies to apprehend individuals on suspicion of committing a crime or destroying evidence (Riaz, 2021). This controversial Act questioned the legitimacy of the Hasina government before being scrapped in 2023. Democratic backsliding during Sheikh Hasina’s regime was further evident in policies targeting opposition parties and conducting parliamentary elections that were neither participatory nor inclusive. Crackdowns on opposition parties included the arrest of leaders, such as BNP Chief Khaleda Zia. Notably, Khaleda Zia’s arrest in 2018 electorally benefited the AL, as the BNP struggled to find a credible leader to challenge Sheikh Hasina. While these measures provided electoral advantages for the ruling regime, they undeniably deepened the democratic deficit in Bangladesh.

The AL’s electoral victories in 2014, 2018, and 2024, coupled with limited opposition participation, raise questions about whether the mere conduct of elections equates to democracy. The 2014 election, held amid sharp polarization and violence that claimed 507 lives, witnessed the boycott of major opposition parties like the BNP (Riaz, 2014). This election also saw one of the lowest voter turnouts at only 22%. The polarization and hostility extended beyond government–opposition relations, affecting the armed forces and Islamist organizations like the JeI. The crackdown on Islamic extremism through the trial of war criminals unified extremist organizations, and the clandestine consolidation of such groups posed significant legitimacy challenges to Sheikh Hasina’s regime. Protests frequently erupted, led by both opposition parties and extremist organizations, influencing public confidence in the government. Major protests that challenged the regime’s legitimacy included the Pilkhana Mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles in 2009, the Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI) protests demanding blasphemy laws in 2013, the JeI protests in 2023, and the “student protest” in 2024.

The role of Islamist organizations in influencing and leading these protests was critical. Sheikh Hasina’s failure to sustain a credible democratic opposition diluted the safety net for her regime, allowing extremist organizations like the JeI to strengthen their sociopolitical base. The next section explores the Islamization of Bangladesh’s politics and its role in contributing to political crises.

Islamization of Bangladesh’s Polity

The Islamization of Bangladesh and its interaction with democracy have been critical topics in discussions about whether radical Islam is compatible with democratic principles and the implications for political stability when governance models of the two come into conflict. While a detailed exploration of the conceptual and theoretical aspects is beyond the scope of this article, it works within a definitional framework where Islamization refers to the application of an Islamist template to a country’s political and social structure. Additionally, an increased number of people participating in the practice, profession, and demand for the dominance of Islam becomes crucial. Borrowing from Akhand Akhtar Hossain (2012), the Islamization of Bangladesh’s polity is examined through the resurgence of the country’s social and political structures as a counter to secularism and an extremist movement guided by political Islam aimed at establishing an Islamic state.

The role of the “Two Nation Theory” in the formation of Bangladesh, through two partitions—one in 1947 and the second in 1971—established the primacy of Islam in the country. Deep-rooted Islamization, initially pursued through Hindu phobia, especially resistance to Hindu landlords and traders (Hashmi, 2004), helped East Bengal decide to join Pakistan during the 1947 partition. As East Pakistan, the experience of living in an Islamic state further consolidated the primacy of Islam in Bangladesh’s sociopolitical fabric. The idea of secularism in Bangladesh politics was arguably short-lived, gaining support only during the liberation struggle. The Islamization of Bangladesh’s polity was further pursued by successive governments and various Islamist groups. The resistance to the ideas of democracy, secularism, socialism, and nationalism, arguably, affirms Bernard Lewis’s (2002) thesis regarding the Muslim world’s inability to adapt to the modern age. The Islamist opposition to secularism was based on the premise that it directly negated the fundamental Islamic belief in the integration of political and religious morality (Wright, 1987). Accordingly, the military regimes significantly contributed to the Islamization process by diluting secularism and integrating religiosity into the constitutions, aligning them with the Islamist agenda. Replacement of secularism with “absolute faith and trust in Allah Almighty,” through a constitutional proclamation in 1977 and declaration of Islam as the state religion, through a constitutional amendment in 1988, substantially helped the process of Islamization.

A close look at Bangladesh’s politics reveals that political conflicts are invariably centered around the assertion of Islamic supremacy versus the ideas of democracy. Just as secularism faced resistance, the idea of nationalism was also significantly opposed and reoriented to align with Islamist orientations by successive governments and Islamist organizations. “Bengali Nationalism,” which played an important role during the liberation war, was systematically replaced by “Bangladeshi nationalism.” It is important to note that while “Bengali nationalism” denoted a cultural–linguistic and secular identity, “Bangladeshi Nationalism” represents a Muslim Bengali identity (Wright, 1987). The shift from “Bengali nationalism” to “Bangladeshi nationalism” was also motivated by anti-Hindu and anti-India sentiments. Importantly, the anti-India narrative is a central aspect of the Islamization process in Bangladesh. The construction of a distinct “Bangladeshi Muslim” identity became a means of resistance against a perceived deep-rooted Indian dominance in Bangladesh politics. The military regime used the anti-India sentiment to delegitimize Sheikh Mujib’s policies, often adopting pro-Islamic measures that contributed to the Islamization process. Similarly, the ideas of socialism were resisted and reoriented around religious objectives. One important resistance to socialism came from Maulana Bhashani, who advocated for “Islamic Socialism.” His version of Islamic socialism included violent anti-AL and anti-India components (Hashmi, 1994). While Maulana Bhashani’s Islamic socialism had limited appeal, Ziaur Rahman’s form of socialism, which focused on “economic and social justice” (Westergaard, 1985), found more support. While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman kept socialism separate from Islam, subsequent regimes not only diluted socialism but also incorporated more Islamic elements into governance and administration.

Looking back at Mujib’s regime, one finds that radical Islam was a shadow of the past that he struggled to address. He imposed a ban on extremist groups while offering generous support to madrassas and other religious institutions, which were often fronts for extremist organizations. Similarly, the violent suppression of leftist and non-Islamist opponents deprived his regime of a safety net from radical Islam. As Islamist forces surpassed the leftists and other opposition groups, Bangladesh witnessed the promotion of political Islam (in various forms) by the military regime, followed by the coalition government of JeI and BNP. The argument that the military regime’s promotion of political Islam aimed to contain the extremism of JeI (Hashmi, 1994) does not hold much weight, as it was during this period that bans and restrictions on radical groups were lifted.

While the military regime and the coalition government of BNP and JeI played significant roles in the Islamization process, Sheikh Hasina’s regime also contributed in important ways. Contrary to popular belief, Sheikh Hasina’s crackdown on militant organizations, her actions against war criminals, and her restriction of opposition and press freedom were critical factors in uniting Islamist organizations. As previously mentioned, the protests organized under the banner of HeI demanding blasphemy laws and Islamic supremacy were a case where the convergence of Islamist organizations could be observed against Sheikh Hasina’s regime. Additionally, her crackdown on opposition parties, particularly the BNP, and the arrest of Khaleda Zia, strengthened ties between JeI and the BNP.

Importantly, the anti-India rhetoric remained central as Islamist organizations, in collaboration with political parties like the BNP, continued protests and disruptions, labeling Sheikh Hasina as “anti-Islam” (Islam, 2023), with her good relationship with India often cited by the opposition. The “anti-Modi protest” led by the HeI (Johny, 2021) in March 2021 offers two important observations. First, the alleged “anti-Muslim” policy of India was used to garner more legitimacy for the Islamists, and second, Sheikh Hasina’s relationship with India was framed as anti-Islam. Consequently, the Islamization process that began with “Hindu phobia” in the colonial era now operates around “Indo-phobia” rhetoric. Looking at Sheikh Hasina’s responses to the Islamists, one can observe that the absence of a democratic opposition made her position vulnerable. This was evident from the “students’ movement” in 2024, which eventually led to her ousting. The active role of Islamist organizations, especially that of the JeI, in organizing the movement against Sheikh Hasina’s regime cannot be overlooked. Thus, in discussing the Islamization of Bangladesh’s polity, the role and agency of JeI are arguably pivotal.

JeI, Political Islam, and Islamization in Bangladesh

The role of JeI in furthering the Islamization process in Bangladesh is critical. Driven by the political Islam ideas of the founder of JeI, Maulana Syed Abul A’la Maududi, JeI is the largest and most influential Islamist party in Bangladesh (Islam, 2021). Arguably, JeI’s organizational strength and capability outpace all other Islamist organizations that wish to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh (Kumar, 2009). Following the Liberation War, the JeI in Bangladesh, which continued to operate under the umbrella of JeI Pakistan, underwent various phases. It faced a ban after the liberation of Bangladesh for its role in siding with the Pakistan army in killing supporters of an independent Bangladesh. It was revived following the promulgation of the Political Parties Regulation in 1976 under Ziaur Rahman’s regime. In 2010, several of its leaders were tried in the International Crimes Tribunal. In 2013, it was declared and banned from contesting in elections. By 2016, most of its prominent leaders had been executed. Given this journey, it becomes challenging to comprehend the role of JeI in Islamizing the polity, despite the restrictions and bans imposed on it.

To understand JeI’s role in the Islamization process, it is crucial to examine its support base, modus operandi, and capacity. Contrary to popular belief, JeI’s activities extend far beyond the political sphere. Its reach and control over education, administration, security forces, and financial resources surpass those of any other Islamist party in Bangladesh. Arguably, while the AL governments were successful in banning JeI from participating in electoral activities, they could not curtail its influence in the socioreligious spaces. Furthermore, JeI’s alliance with the BNP often lends political legitimacy. JeI runs hundreds of madrassas across Bangladesh, where it propagates its version of political Islam. Through its student wing, Islamic Chhatra Shibir (ICS), it has a significant influence on major universities and other higher educational institutions. In this context, JeI has often used international issues to create domestic scenarios that serve its agenda. The party furthers its extremist agenda through alliances with militant organizations like Al-Badr and Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Importantly, JeI has been successful in rendering secularism an irrelevant concept in Bangladesh’s politics (Pattanaik, 2009). While some argue that JeI’s influence is more evident in the realm of social engineering, its capacity to shape the political landscape of Bangladesh should not be underestimated.

JeI’s involvement in planning and executing the so-called student movement that led to the end of Sheikh Hasina’s regime is pivotal. The former foreign minister of Bangladesh stated that JeI, in collaboration with BNP, hired lobbyists from the United States to spread misinformation about the AL government and discredit it (BD News, 2024). It was alleged that JeI and BNP sought to exploit the protests to seize unconstitutional power through violence and terrorism (Chaudhury, 2024). JeI’s official position in supporting the protest and its active participation in it corroborated the concerns voiced by former government officials. The government’s decision to impose a ban on JeI and ICS (The Hindu, 2024) on July 30, 2024, was ultimately too little and too late to curb their activities.

Viewing JeI’s objectives and activities solely through an electoral lens offers a limited perspective. JeI remains the fountainhead of Islamic extremism and continues to play a significant role in the Islamization of Bangladesh’s polity. The political crises in Bangladesh, which are driven by both the democracy deficit and the Islamization process, have created openings for external actors to intervene. While the political opposition, especially JeI and BNP, often accuse India of interfering in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs, recent political developments have exposed the involvement of major powers in influencing (or shaping) the regimes.

External Forces and Political Crises in Bangladesh

In addition to the internal factors, the role of external forces, such as the United States, Pakistan, and China, is often discussed in the context of the recent political crises in Bangladesh. While the existing literature highlights the United States’ role in fueling unrest in Bangladesh, there is little credible evidence to suggest China’s involvement. However, the role of Pakistan in supporting pro-Pakistan groups against the Sheikh Hasina regime is widely recognized. This article presents the following propositions regarding the role of the United States in regime change in Bangladesh: Countries of significant geopolitical interest to the United States often experience intervention aimed at “restoring democracy.” Countries that lack sociopolitical cohesion and whose regimes do not align with the “US line” are more susceptible to the United States’ “regime change” initiatives. Against this backdrop, the United States’ involvement in changing the regime in Bangladesh is analyzed here.

Three major explanations capture the rationale behind US intervention in Bangladesh, which led to a regime change: first, the growing strategic interest of the United States in Asia, particularly South Asia, in connection with its rivalry with China; second, the promotion of its hegemonic culture to assert “American Exceptionalism” and the “triumph of liberalism”; third, the advancement of its strategic interests through a “regime change” policy for countries that do not align with American goals. Bangladesh, under Sheikh Hasina’s rule, met all three of these conditions. The country holds critical geopolitical significance for the United States, highlighted in the US Relations Fact Sheet (USDS, 2012), as its location serves as a gateway to South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, the Congressional Research Service Report (CRS, 2017) emphasized Bangladesh’s importance to both South Asia and the geopolitical dynamics of Asia.

The diplomatic relationship between the United States and Bangladesh, which began in 1972, faced challenges in recent years. The growing Chinese involvement and investment in Bangladesh has raised concerns in Washington. Bangladesh’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and the subsequent influx of Chinese investment have not been well received by the United States. Notably, Chinese investment in Bangladesh, amounting to US$38.5 billion, is equivalent to 10% of Bangladesh’s GDP (Mirdha, 2020). Strategically, China’s interests in Bangladesh are best served if the country maintains neutrality, slightly tilted toward China, among the major powers. China also wants Bangladesh to be part of its Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative (Mostofa, 2022). Just 1 month before the regime change, as US pressure on Sheikh Hasina was mounting, her visit to China did not send favorable signals to the United States. During her visit to China in July 2024, the relationship between the two countries was elevated from a “strategic partnership” to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” (Khasru, 2024). Moreover, Sheikh Hasina’s refusal to cede St. Martin’s Island to the United States (Bose & Mishra, 2024), which would have allowed the United States to assert control over the Bay of Bengal, became a new point of contention.

Since the United States was not receiving the desired cooperation from Sheikh Hasina’s government, its “regime change” project became more active. Reports indicate that several US think tanks, such as the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), were actively involved not only in discrediting and delegitimizing the government but also in fueling unrest using opposition and extremist forces (Green & Debata, 2024). Pro-Islamic constituencies among the “democracy crusaders” in the United States played an important role in supporting Islamist forces to protest and disrupt Bangladesh’s political situation (Mazumdar, 2024). As part of its “restoration of democracy” campaign, the government was accused of democracy backsliding and human rights violations. One year before her ouster, Sheikh Hasina accused the United States of plotting a regime change (Sinha, 2023). It is noteworthy that the literature from most US think tanks supports regime change (Staniland, 2024) and blames domestic factors for the crisis. While it remains to be seen to what extent regime change in Bangladesh will serve the United States’ geostrategic interests, its role in creating political crises in Bangladesh has been significant.

Conclusion

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government has marked the beginning of a new phase in Bangladesh’s political crisis. The ability of the interim government to facilitate a smooth transition of power remains highly uncertain. The democratic and human rights situation has further deteriorated, with Islamist groups continuing to target Hindus and other minority communities, while the government has largely turned a blind eye to these developments. Based on the discussion above, it can be argued that, in the absence of a strong democratic culture, including robust state institutions and a politically socialized populace, the ritualistic electoral process has only reinforced competitive authoritarianism in Bangladesh. The limited legitimacy of civilian governments not only provides a conducive environment for Islamists to thrive but also accelerates the Islamization of both society and polity, which in turn undermines the state of democracy. A fractured social fabric, driven by Islamization, has resulted in a lack of internal cohesion, further complicating the political landscape. In such a scenario, the influence of external powers becomes more pronounced. The United States’s “regime change” strategy, under the guise of restoring democracy, has a poor track record of ensuring stability, and Bangladesh’s experience may merely echo past failures. With escalating political crises and growing Islamist dominance in the sociopolitical space, the prospects for stability and democracy in Bangladesh remain grim.