With the development of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), India’s nuclear deterrence has entered the maritime domain, and other capabilities such as sea-based nuclear cruise missiles and missile defence could follow. Since New Delhi’s sea-based cruise missiles and missile defence will not significantly reshape its deterrence against Beijing, the main issues between these two Asian powers are the Indian SSBN and the naval dynamics in which nuclear attack submarines (SSN) play a critical role. Geographic adjacency makes Pakistan sensitive to all Indian nuclear-related capabilities, potentially causing it to strategically respond to the challenge. Based on the pros and cons, New Delhi may concentrate on its SSBN project to catch up with Beijing, but it should also revive its lagging SSN project to complement the former. With respect to Pakistan, a focus on nuclear cruise missiles and missile defence is not likely to enhance security, but rather to produce intensified arms racing that will detract from stability. India’s capacity building vis-à-vis China would be adequate to deter Pakistan.
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