From Denial to Punishment: Strategic Shift in India’s Deterrence Strategy Towards China Post-Galwan

Abstract

The dynamics of the India–China relationship have undergone a significant transformation in recent years, with mistrust and suspicion clouding the bilateral ties. This article argues that India’s strategic deterrence posture towards China has shifted from denial to punishment following the 2020 Galwan crisis, which resulted in casualties on both sides. The study aims to examine the measures taken by India post-2020 that demonstrate this shift in strategy and the implications for the overall India–China relations. This article contends that India has applied punitive measures in the military, economic and diplomatic domains to deter China’s actions along the border, with the goal of raising the overall cost for China. The theoretical framework of deterrence is employed to analyse the shift from denial to punishment, highlighting the importance of military capability, credibility and communication in enhancing a state’s deterrence posture. This article also discusses the evolution of deterrence theory in the post-Cold War era, with the emergence of technologically advanced conventional weapons altering the nature of modern conflict. The study concludes that the shift towards deterrence by punishment is likely to intensify competition between India and China, making it the new norm in their bilateral relations. The findings contribute to the understanding of India’s evolving conventional deterrence posture towards China and its multidomain approach to deterrence.