India’s Security and Climate Policy: Navigating the China Challenge

Abstract

In a world rich in climate knowledge but short on climate action, it is important to understand the political reasons behind the apparent failure of states to address this planetary crisis. One underexplored dimension of this phenomenon is the impact of broader geopolitics and rivalry, in specific the ability and willingness of potential and actual security and economic rivals to leave their contention at the gates of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This article focuses on India’s multifaceted approach to its ‘China challenge’ with and outside the climate regime. While conventional scholarship focuses on the security and economic dimensions of this rivalry, this study offers a distinct perspective that examines whether this rivalry might lead to a breakdown of cooperation and an increased potential for conflict and weaponisation of seemingly disconnected issue areas. Drawing on a comprehensive triangulation of policy documents, government statements and scholarly literature, this article evaluates the domestic and international factors shaping India’s climate-related China policies, including the countries’ unique economic ambitions, development imperatives, energy needs and global climate commitments. Furthermore, the article examines Sino-Indian interactions in international arenas such as the UNFCCC and Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and how these interactions influence global climate governance.

Introduction: How Contentious Is India’s Climate Policy?

In a world rich in climate knowledge but short on climate action, it is important to understand the political reasons behind the apparent failure of states to address this planetary crisis. One underexplored dimension of this phenomenon is the impact of broader geopolitics and rivalry, in specific the ability and willingness of potential and actual security and economic rivals to leave their contention at the gates of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), so to speak. India, as an environmental power (Prys-Hansen, 2022), plays a unique role as a contemporary major emitter ¹ (yet without much historical responsibility for causing the climate crises). In this article, we focus on one important driver of India’s climate strategies, bringing together literature on global climate cooperation, and the Sino-Indian rivalry with an analysis of the simultaneity of cooperation and conflict among the two Asian climate powers. More specifically, we offer insights into the impact of the Indo-Sino rivalry on their ability to cooperate in the global climate regime. Different pieces of literature point to the possibility of a ‘side-by-side’ of cooperation and conflict across different contentious issues, yet surprisingly little empirical, qualitative research has been produced on the conditions for cooperation within an overarching bilateral rivalry. We focus here on the Indian perspective, as the seemingly weaker contender within the relationship, building on theoretical literature on rivalry that assumes that, for instance, ‘demonstrating resolve’ is more important for weaker states, especially if they have failed ‘in past disputes’ (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, 2024).

Indeed, China’s continued rise and its increasing assertiveness pose a massive foreign policy challenge to other states, and, sharing an extensive land border with China, Delhi has a specifically complex relationship with the People’s Republic. While the historical basis of India’s strategy towards China can be traced back to ancient trade and cultural exchanges, the modern relationship between the two nations is overshadowed by the consequences of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which resulted in a dispute that remains unresolved (Ganguly et al., 2023) and is illustrative of India’s overarching perception of threat and provocation coming from China. The list of India’s grievances with China is long and mostly related to territorial integrity but also positional conflicts about hierarchy in Asia and security provision expectations (Krothwal & Kumar, 2023), leading to expectations of deep rivalry and a focus on safeguarding its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This often is at odds with the extent of substantial economic ties that both share, representing the biggest intra-Asian trade numbers (Raha et al., 2023), yet mostly to the benefit of China’s export industries. We further find significant pockets of Indo-Sino cooperation on issues of global relevance, including in the WTO (Hopewell, 2023; Ramasamy & Ananth, 2021), climate negotiations (Kıprızlı & Köstem, 2023; Mizo, 2016) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) (Chaulia, 2021; Cooper, 2021).

This, often pragmatic, simultaneity is puzzling for realist approaches to international relations (IR), which expect conflict and balancing to prevail, but also for liberal approaches that in turn assume absolute gains to prevail in decisions about international cooperation. Consequently, scholars come to different, yet equally ambivalent descriptions of India’s China policy as asymmetric rivalry (Pardesi, 2022; Paul, 2018a), under balancing (Mastro, 2019), ‘evasive balancing’ (Rajagopalan, 2020) or a ‘double-edged sword’ (Ogden, 2022); these approaches also have different views on whether rivals can cooperate or not. More often or not, however, states are assumed to make a ‘categorical distinction’ between friends and enemies, and that relations between enemies are usually conflictual (e.g., Ganguly, 2023). Our main objective in this article is thus to discuss the impact of conflicts and rivalry between India and China on the global climate regime, specifically on the political willingness in India to cooperate with China on climate action. We build on existing literature on rivalry, status behaviour, and politics of contention and combine insights from this body of research to structure our empirical analysis and make informed predictions of Indo-Sino climate cooperation. We start with the assumption that, in the contemporary global order, cooperation and conflict must and will go hand in hand and states need to deal with complex simultaneities and inherent contradictions in their drive to resolve national and global challenges.

Yet, IR theory is not necessarily known for being good at incorporating complexity, multiplicities and dissonance, for instance, cooperation and conflict are often conceptualised as dichotomy without a theoretical vision for co-existence. In this article, we argue that it is possible to explore cooperation and conflict to follow different dynamics and normal state relations emerge as a mix of both. This follows a model of ‘political contention’ developed by Mansbach and Vasquez in the 1980s. More recent insights from the literature on rivalry and status behaviour also show that even with a realist, power-oriented lens, behaviour can vary according to the stakes at play. Thompson, for instance, differentiates between capital ‘S’ and small ‘s’ status behaviour and states. In this argument, issues that would normally only cause irritation and are often ‘trivial’ failures, for instance, are not important in the absence of big ‘S’ considerations that concern conflicts regarding the global power hierarchies (Thompson, 2014, p. 244). Considering India’s rise and ambitions, this points to the plausibility that climate change policies might become victims of larger, geopolitical considerations. Along the same lines, literature on bargaining and rivalry states that, first, the weaker state (in our case India) is more likely to demonstrate ‘resolve’, that is, an unwillingness to compromise, especially if these states have failed in past disputes (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, 2024). While this literature is mostly oriented on militarised disputes, we find little reason not to transfer these insights to diplomatic disputes or even to research on an absence of cooperation considering potential mutual benefits.

In this article, we thus analyse India’s climate policy concerning China considering their strategic rivalry and assess whether the rivalry finds its way into the domain of environmental policy. Mansbach and Vasquez’ model of contention (1984) indicates how prior interaction and a range of other factors impact the type of resolution of ‘issues’ that prevail between two states and whether the relationship is likely to go through a set of stages in either a cooperative or a conflict spiral. Briefly summarised, cooperative and conflict dynamics can occur alongside each other and the respective shape and outcomes of political contention largely depend on a combination of three interrelated factors: background conditions, that is, the history of relations, similarity (e.g., in regime type) and status (equal/unequal); the types of ‘stakes’ at hand (concrete, symbolic, transcendent) and the dynamics of the contention process, that is, a focus on an absolute or relative distribution of costs and benefits.

Background conditions, including relations of trust and friendship vs. hostility and equity or inequity in a global status hierarchy, ‘affect patterns of cooperation and conflict by pre-disposing decision-makers to perceive and interpret issues in a selective manner’ (Vasquez & Mansbach, 1984, p. 423), where similarities may find it easier to cooperate, whereas dissimilarities can lead to misunderstandings and conflict, and thus on whether an issue takes on an ‘actor’ or a ‘stake dimension’. Issues that are defined by an actor dimension push contestation into a dynamic in which they are decided based on who gets what. In other words, the identity of the respective counterpart is more important than the stake at hand. Thus, issues become linked, that is, in the terms of the article, any form of cooperation in climate change cannot be cordoned off security relations and other conflicts. An actor dimension is, according to Vasquez and Mansbach, produced by high salience, equal status, dissimilarity, a history of disagreement, negative acts and/or hostility. When an actor dimension prevails, actors pay more attention to the relative distribution of costs and benefits in the resolution of contention and cooperation. Even a focus on single issues or situations is made more difficult as all issues are viewed through the prism of competition, ‘eliminating possibilities for cross-issue bargaining and encouraging a pattern of persistent disagreement’. Furthermore, tangible stakes that typically are amenable to compromise will be infused with a symbolic dimension, promoting zero-sum proposals for resolution and increasing the likeliness of an escalatory spiral. This is also how the model explains the emergence of rivalry as an aberration of a ‘normal’ relationship in which conflict and cooperation are balanced, moving towards one within which conflict and escalation are more likely.

Issues that, in turn, are defined by a stake dimension are driven by ‘some inherent aspect of the stake itself’, that is, states argue and contest the actual content of the issue, which brings actors together based on a substantive connection. A stake dimension is produced by low salience, unequal status, similarity, a history of agreement, positive acts and friendship. When a relationship is characterised by the presence of the stake dimension, conflictual situations tend to be resolved by bargaining, and the search for agreement and absolute gains. Any competitive situation is attempted to be encapsulated so that the scope of conflict remains limited to the specific stake at hand, actors tend to agree on some issues and disagree on others. Cross-cutting deals can be made with changing alignments which increases trust and reduces hostility.

The first step in this article is thus to debate whether contention between China and India is characterised by an actor or a stake dimension. An intensification of an actor dimension in Indo-Sino relations, we should also find efforts to infuse contention even within the field of environmental politics, which is generally considered to be a field in which cooperation is likely (Aklin & Mildenberger, 2020) because of its incentive structure, with symbolic or transcendent perspectives, growing importance of domestic hard-liners and/or growing investments into the hardening of positions. This may even imply that ‘prior cross-cutting issue-positions’ can be overridden and that new arising issues on the climate or other agendas are shaped and perceived to fit the ideological cleavages as they are added to the agenda.

As stated above, status is a crucial element of background conditions in Mansbach and Vasquez’s model as it influences the perception of equity or inequality in global hierarchies, shaping interactions between states. The history of relations, including trust or hostility, also plays a significant role in determining whether issues are actor- or stake-focused. Additionally, similarity in regime types and other attributes further impacts the dynamics of political contention, indicating that status alone cannot fully explain the nature of state interactions. The types of stakes involved, whether concrete (tangible resources), symbolic (ideological or cultural values) or transcendental (broader, overarching goals), also influence contention. These stakes determine the nature of the conflict or cooperation, as concrete stakes might be resolved through bargaining, symbolic stakes might evoke emotional responses and transcendental stakes might require more comprehensive, long-term strategies. In the next sections we hence first establish the background conditions for Indo-Chinese rivalry and look at India’s positioning towards China in the field of climate change. We observe whether an actor or a stake dimension prevails over time and what shifts and changes we can observe to assess how these may match towards the ‘stages’ of either escalatory or cooperative spirals, if at all, in Vasquez and Mansbach’s model of contention.

A Brief Review of the Indo-Sino Rivalry ²

India and China have been engaged in ups and downs of territorial conflict since India’s independence, with the 1962 border war marking an initial manifest confrontation. In 1967, the Nathu La and Cho La clashes, which were localised skirmishes, highlighted ongoing tensions. The Doklam standoff in 2017 brought renewed attention to the border issue, with both nations deploying troops near the disputed tri-junction area with Bhutan. The year 2020 witnessed a major escalation when violent clashes erupted in the Galwan valley, resulting in casualties and further straining relations. These incidents, occurring over several decades, underscore the complex and persistent nature of the border disputes and the complexity of ongoing efforts to manage these issues through diplomatic means, military posturing and negotiations. Additionally, geopolitical competition is evident in these efforts to expand their spheres of influence across Asia and beyond, with both nations seeking to strengthen alliances and partnerships to counterbalance each other, also within and through international and regional organisations. Further tools in this regard are technological and military capacity-building; economically, both countries vie for influence and access to markets and resources and have engaged in trade disputes and concerns over trade imbalances, especially on the part of India.

While historical disputes and territorial tensions represent continuities, simultaneously, both India and China are members of BRICS, sharing the ambition for reforming global multilateral institutions, along with establishing new ones, for example, the New Development Bank, which has expanded its membership beyond the BRICS. Most recently, this joint engagement hailed a few successes, including the announcement of the admission of six new BRICS members, namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Argentina, the UAE and Ethiopia (at the time of writing, Argentina has withdrawn from accession and Saudi Arabia has not implemented it yet) at the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023. Curiously, at the same summit, Xi and Modi discussed efforts to resolve their ongoing border dispute. Yet, in an almost typical turn of events, shortly afterward, India protested a new map of the area issued by China’s Ministry of Natural Resources, asserting territorial claims over Indian land. In September 2023, President Xi Jinping failed to attend the G20 summit hosted by India, which is a diplomatic affront to India, which strongly points towards an absence of trust and a relationship of much more hostility than friendship.

Overall, India’s China strategy currently ranges from cooperation in multilateral forums, strengthening regional competitiveness and the rejection of unilateral Chinese initiatives, to strategic deterrence along the Himalayas and in the Indian Ocean. In IR terms, this is generally classified as an awkward combination of hedging (Ciorciari, 2019; He & Feng, 2023), indirect balancing (Haacke, 2019) or limited hard balancing (Paul, 2018b), all ways to describe India’s attempt to manage its ‘asymmetric rivalry’ with China. Therein, India perceives China as its primary rival, particularly for regional dominance (Ali, 2023)—with global implications—while China regards India as a lesser adversary compared to the United States or Japan (Paul, 2018b). While India has risen economically and globally, it has concurrently experienced relative decline in comparison to China. The vast disparity in economic size and military spending between the two nations is evident today, with China outpacing India significantly (Pardesi, 2022). India engages in limited external balancing with the United States, for instance in the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), to bridge this material gap but is not interested in becoming a frontline player in any American strategy against China’s rise. Instead, it seeks to foster its emergence as an autonomous great power in a multipolar Asia without being exposed to the downsides of extensive US–China competition (Tierney, 2024). In the past decade, India has been increasingly recognised as an important partner in Asia and the world. With its ascent on the ladder of global status and influence and the significant improvement of US–India ties, studies regarding both contemporary and future global politics considering relations between India and China are needed and timely, especially in the light of persistent and potentially growing rivalry and its implications for global order. In this logic, Mansbach and Vasquez’s model of contention would imply at least an emergence of an actor dimension in issues between India and China, leading to an end of cross-cutting bargains, a linking of issues, resulting in an increasingly non-cooperative and competitive policy at the expense of cooperation across issue areas and potentially an escalatory spiral.

Indo-Chinese Climate Relationships

Without the cooperation of environmental great powers, a group to which both India and China arguably belong as, for instance, major emitters of greenhouse gases (Buzan & Falkner, 2022), the world will not be able to mitigate climate change (and struggle to adapt to the inevitable repercussions of, for instance, the increase in extreme weather events). Both India and/or China are environmental great powers and have a significant impact on the climate regime. Both are confronted with expectations by both the ‘traditional’ great powers and by many of the (least) developing countries that are akin to great power responsibilities. This is even though both India and China are still categorised as ‘developing countries’ within the classification schemes of the UNFCCC and both states also frequently self-describe as such when it comes to their climate obligations. While these commonalities have led to some cooperation and positional alignments between India and China (see below), we increasingly observe a disruption of especially Indian cooperative rhetoric towards China internationally, substantiated by protectionist domestic material and infrastructure politics (Jayaram, 2024), despite the obvious gains both states may receive from cooperation for instance in the realm of a just transition towards renewable energies. India’s China strategy is thus paramount to the success of the global climate regime, as cooperation or non-cooperation of these two states within international climate agreements significantly influences efforts to address climate change globally.

We start our investigation with a brief overview of the globally often productive climate relationship between the two with a focus on the past 10 years. An important pretext of joint positions is their shared vulnerabilities to climate change as evidenced by a multitude of climate-related extreme weather events in 2023 and 2024 and an expectation for things to get worse in the future. Both states further share their position on the continued significance of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR) as a core principle of the UNFCCC and have maintained consistent negotiation positions, rooted in their historical experiences and characterised by a persistent divide between ‘Global North’ and ‘South’. Under the UNFCCC, both countries continue to benefit from exemptions from binding mitigation commitments and consequently, they resist any significant changes to these arrangements. They further side with developing countries on basically most other issues, including technology transfer, climate finance and loss and damages. Over the past few decades, this joint perspective and context has manifested itself in their cooperation in the BASIC climate coalition, which includes Brazil, South Africa, India and China. Before COP15 in Copenhagen, China and India had, for instance, played a vital role in opposing US-sponsored emission targets for them, aiming for emission reductions by 40% below 1990 levels by 2020, while other developing countries would reduce their emissions by 15% below 2005 levels. They based their argumentation on (largely justified) historical inequities in terms of carbon emissions, as developed countries both historically and contemporarily emitted an unfair share of greenhouse gases. With their economic rise, however, both states’ position on the ‘Southern’ side of the CBDR divide has become somewhat ambivalent and more difficult to argue. Just before COP21 in Paris, in 2015, China and India felt pressed to bilaterally agree to extensive cooperative measures including on new technologies and ambitious nationally determined contributions. This, arguably, contributed to the successful negotiations of the ‘Paris Agreement’ a year later. At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, the potential of Indo-Sino cooperation to disrupt progress was also shown, where their joint argumentation led to a replacement of the concept of coal phase-out with the idea of coal phase-down, leading to protests among civil society and disappointment among many of the extremely vulnerable, least developed states.

Security and/or Climate Rivalry

Against this often-cooperative background within the field of climate change—an indicator of a prevailing ‘stake dimension’ in India’s relationship with China—it is worth investigating whether any contention in security and economic rivalries has more recently been found or is likely to find in the future its way into the realm of climate policy-making. To this end, we analysed 154 speeches, press releases and policy documents from the years 2015–2023. We thus begin one year after Narendra Modi came to power in India and two after Xi Jinping took office in China a phase during which new foundations for the current climate and infrastructural policy were laid. Our data corpus includes reports and statements delivered by elite Indian political figures, including the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Environment, Minister for Energy and other representatives of the Indian government, at both national and international events. These contain keywords relevant to the subject corpus, such as ‘China’ and ‘Climate’ or ‘Energy Transition’. Since joint documents with China are also included, such as statements of the BASIC group, the BRICS, or the bilateral dialogue format for border conflicts, potential variations across domestic audiences and venues and diplomatic interaction are encompassed. These sources provide direct insights into the rhetoric, priorities and framing of issues by key Indian decision-makers. Such documents reflect the intentions, perceptions and narratives that are used to communicate positions both domestically and internationally. By examining a large and diverse set of official statements, we can identify consistent patterns in how issues are presented. Excerpts and particularly striking passages from these are directly quoted in the following analysis. This approach allows for a comprehensive and empirical assessment of the prevailing nature of contention, capturing the subtleties of political discourse that might be missed through other methods, such as large-scale data analyses of concrete cooperation projects or conflicts or cultural-historical approaches to current power balances between India and China, which may be used in additional, future research on the issue as a useful supplement.

The first set of documents shows how both states have focused on common challenges, for instance, in May 2015, about half a year before the Paris Conference, which discusses the ‘adverse effects [of climate change that] are the common concern of mankind and one of the greatest global challenges of the 21st century’ and highlights how both states ‘are undertaking ambitious actions domestically on combating climate change’. It further states that ‘the two sides believe that their bilateral partnership on climate change is mutually beneficial and contributes to the global efforts to address Climate Change’ (Embassy of India, May 2015). In this joint statement, the start of a high-level dialogue on domestic climate policies and further bilateral cooperation was announced, including in areas of clean energy technologies, energy conservation, energy efficiency and sustainable transportation including electrical vehicles, pointing towards at least rhetorical focus on absolute gains and the benefit of cooperative acts. The stakes discussed during this time were concrete and focused on bilaterally addressing issues arising from the threat of climate change and others. At the multilateral level, positive acts occurred, for instance with India’s acceptance as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2017, showing that a stake dimension seemed to prevail across issues. Cooperative efforts also extended to the WTO, for example, where in July 2017, India and China joined forces in a joint proposal for the ‘the elimination – by developed countries – of the most trade-distorting form of farm subsidies …’, and to ‘counter the efforts … to target the subsidies of developing countries while letting the developed countries retain their huge farm subsidies’ (MoCI, 2017).

Yet, at the same time, conflicts started to intensify, especially at the border with distinct escalation potential. Between June and August 2017, China started to build a road in Doklam, an area claimed by both China and Bhutan. India, as an ally of Bhutan, deployed troops to halt this construction, resulting in a standoff that persisted for over two months. This standoff marked the first time that both countries had deployed troops to the Doklam region, raising concerns about the potential for conflict between them. Yet, at this time, India was primarily concerned with public de-escalation, and in light of cooperation, as shown above, cooperation and conflict were possible side by side, as in a ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ relationship between states (Vasquez & Mansbach, 1984, p. 415).

Asserting that our Security Forces are capable of safeguarding our borders, Shri Rajnath Singh said that India has neither expansionist designs nor attacked any country. We don’t want confrontation; we want peace, he added. (MoHA, 2017)

And indeed, cooperative acts by both sides continued. For instance, in September 2017, China hosted the ninth BRICS summit, introducing the Partnership for Urban Environmental Sustainability. The initiative aimed to promote green development and a low-carbon economy as well as to enhance BRICS cooperation on climate change and expand green financing. In this context, Modi emphasised synergies between India’s efforts in expanding its global role in the expansion of South–South cooperation in solar energy and the new BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB), displaying cross-cutting bargains and a focus on mutual gains:

After more than a decade of existence, BRICS has developed a robust framework for cooperation. … The NDB can also establish an effective link with ISA [Indian-initiative International Solar Alliance] to support such cooperation. We would wish to see more clean energy funding, particularly in solar energy, from the NDB. (MEA, 2017)

The move provided a blueprint for India’s positive climate strategy in the years that followed, namely, to bring its national climate projects, often linked to industrial ambitions, into global institutions and market them as a win-win for all member states. Thus, at least until 2020, joint efforts in global climate policy (and elsewhere) continued to prevail. In a detailed statement by the Indian Prime Minister’s Office, after a meeting between the two state leaders, the ‘simultaneous emergence of India and China as two large economies and major powers with strategic and decisional autonomy’ was emphasised as well as its ‘implications of regional and global significance’. The statement further discussed the need for the ‘proper management of the bilateral relationship’ as a requirement for shaping the Asian Century. A focus on ‘jointly contributing in a positive and constructive’ in the realm of climate change, sustainable development and food security was added. Lastly,

… the two leaders agreed that as two major countries and emerging economies, India and China, given their vast developmental experiences and national capacities, should join hands to take lead in offering innovative and sustainable solutions to challenges faced by humankind in the 21st century. (PMO, April 2018)

The rhetoric chosen here, recognising both states as future economic and geopolitical powers, has also been used in other forums such as the BASIC group. In the summer of 2019, at a preparatory meeting for COP25, the Indian Environment Minister Javadekar affirmed that:

Brazil, South Africa, India, and China put together have one-third of world’s geographical area and nearly 40% of the world’s population and when we unitedly speak in one voice this shows our determination and the BASIC Group could play an important part in making Paris agreement accepted by all the countries in its true letter and spirit. (MoEFCC, August 2019)

This focus on unity among BASIC ropes off Indian divergences with major competitor China, again, pointing towards a stake dimension in their overarching relationship, focusing on the possibility of joint gains. This side by side is also illustrated on many other occasions within the realm of environmental cooperation, for example, during the COP14 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, during which both countries discussed in length the opportunities for bilateral cooperation in this field (MoEFCC, September 2019). In this period, just before 2020, we thus find many instances in which Indian and Chinese leaders voiced their readiness for cooperation on climate change, as expressed in an informal summit statement between PM Modi and President Xi, in which:

the leaders recognized that India and China have a common interest in preserving and advancing a rules-based and inclusive international order, including through reforms that reflect the new realities of the 21st Century. … India and China will continue to work together for open and inclusive trade arrangements that will benefit all countries. … Both also underscored the important efforts being made in their respective countries to address global developmental challenges, including climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals. (MEA, October 2019)

Similar statements, emphasising the lack of progress on climate finance, technology transfer or, in other words, most of the issues of vital concern to developing countries, have been regularly made by the BASIC coalition within the UNFCCC; more often than not, the achievements and ambitions of the BASIC countries are highlighted, despite ‘the multiple challenges all BASIC countries face, including in poverty eradication and achieving socio-economic development and environment protection. …’ and ‘above and beyond [our] historical responsibilities’ (BASIC Group, December 2019). Confirming previous initiatives, at COP28, India’s Environment Minister Yadav emphasised the significance of the newly established Loss and Damage Fund, a result of the joint lobbying efforts by India and China, and hailed this development as a crucial step towards addressing the climate-induced vulnerabilities of developing nations (MoEFCC, 2023). Aside from joint rhetoric, (limited) willingness to cooperate is also reflected in joint actions and projects. An example is a dialogue meeting between the planning authorities of both states in autumn 2019, in which joint connectivity projects were discussed, including trainings of Indian senior railway management staff in China and cooperation in the transport sector, as well as the setting up of working groups on resource conservation, energy and cooperation in R&D (NITI Aayog, 2019). Even after 2020 and despite an overall deterioration of relations which is described below, new initiatives for cooperation between India and China pop up at often unexpected places, for example, in relation to climate change and disaster prevention. In spring 2024, for instance, an Indian comprehensive programme for flood defence resilience and forecasting was launched with a focus on the border regions, financed by the central government as well as involving exchanges on construction projects and water management with neighbour states (Cabinet Secretariat, 2024).

Yet, little is known if the protocol led to actual progress in these areas, as information on concrete project commitments, let alone a commitment to putting in the necessary sums of investment, was lacking. Thus, within these identified pockets of cooperation in the form of statements and expressions of intent, there remains a discernible disparity between rhetoric and action, as both nations have yet to make substantial climate investments or engage in meaningful joint infrastructure projects (Sattich et al., 2023), raising concerns about the sincerity of their commitments to collaboration on environmental sustainability. Despite tangible ‘positive acts’ (Vasquez & Mansbach, 1984) by both India and China, especially in the realm of climate politics, many announcements and declarations have remained unsubstantiated and, for the most, little practical implementation of collaborative measures followed. Moreover, 2017 saw a setback in both bilateral relations and joint infrastructural policies. In May 2017, India officially declined China’s invitation to take part in the summit of the Belt and Road Initiative held in Beijing and it has persistently articulated its concerns and objections regarding the project, by highlighting that

‘Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; balanced ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards …’ and that ‘no country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity’. (MEA, 2017)

A growing focus on territory, the issue that is often described as the one most amenable to escalation (Hensel & Goeman, 2024) has grown since 2020, marked by a rapid deterioration in bilateral relations, particularly on the border issue. This has occurred in a context of significant shifts in global order, a global pandemic as well as wars in Europe and the Middle East, which both China and India have also, at least in parts, used for their own gains. A crucial bilateral incident occurred in May 2020 that would influence relations across policy fields, as India announced the connections of border villages around Kailash Mansarovar Yatris by road for the first time (MoRT&H, 2020). Simultaneously, a major clash occurred between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan valley, Ladakh, during which 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers died. This event was interpreted as a wake-up call for the Modi administration about Chinese assertiveness towards its borders.

Our history has been that of a peace-loving country. … We have always worked closely with our neighbours in a cooperative and friendly manner. We have always wished for their development and welfare. … We never provoke anyone, but we also do not compromise with the integrity and sovereignty of our country. Whenever it was needed, we have demonstrated our strength, proving our capabilities in protecting and defending the integrity and sovereignty of the country. (PMO, 2020)

Subsequently, a less conciliatory and more military tone appeared, focusing on the dead soldiers, as well as the resolve to prevent any similar situation in the future. This new rhetoric of resolve and strength was not limited to the border issue or security at large but also showed an overall recalibration of India’s approach to China, indicating a shift from a stake dimension to an actor dimension, and hence a greater likelihood of conflict and even escalation. This also explains economic sanctions in June and September 2020, including the ban of Chinese apps for the Indian market, which has little to do with the issue conflict itself, apparently out of ‘concerns of security and to ensure safety and sovereignty of the Indian cyberspace’. Simultaneously, the government announced the programme of Digital India Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Innovate Challenge, pitching promising Indian apps as global competitors against Chinese alternatives (MoCI, 2020). Further, initiatives to achieve more independence from China in the manufacturing industries were pursued, such as Aatma Nirbhar Bharat, with a particular focus on industries relevant to the transition to renewable energies, including the production of solar panels (Sattich & Huang, 2023). Tensions subsequently cooled down a bit, yet no bilateral meetings between the two government leaders were held, while border talks at a lower, military level continued and at least on India’s part, it was emphasised that ‘peace and tranquillity in the border areas’ were their priority (MEA, 2020). In November 2020, the same month in which a virtual BRICS summit took place, India announced the launch of the second edition of production-linked incentives schemes, covering 10 key sectors, including solar manufacturing. These initiatives aim to bolster domestic manufacturing capacities, with a particular focus on the solar sector. The year thus ends with a tendency, reinforced by the border conflict, to safeguard common global interests where possible while, on the Indian side, developing its production capacities to reduce dependencies on China.

Modi’s administration further enhanced India’s ability and willingness to play on multiple fields with different means, for instance via its participation in the Quad since 2017, but with a clearer focus since March 2021, when the Quad established a broader mandate across policy fields including a Quad Climate Working Group. Although this expansion may be interpreted as a move to lessen the military focus, the inclusion of climate and technology may also indicate a closer relationship of the group members across the board of policy fields and more importantly a closer interlinkage of climate and military concerns. Of importance may also be that China, as a market leader in green technologies, was left out of the standard-setting and goal-declaring process. Increasingly, a more formative role on the global climate stage became part of both states’ global power aspirations, thus also substantiating potential competition in this field between India and China. One example can be found in India highlighting its international activities with significantly smaller partners, such as:

As a responsible international actor, India has recently developed several forward-looking and participatory global initiatives, partnerships, and coalitions to combat climate change and foster greater collaboration. … India launched the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) at the 2019 Climate Summit. … At COP26, India co-launched the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) Initiative, which aims to improve the resilience of infrastructure to climate change and disaster risk in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). (MoEFCC, 2022)

For instance, India’s launch of its comprehensive National Hydrogen Mission may be seen as an offer in competition to China’s ambitions and partnership in the field, particularly in times when ‘de-risking’ from China has become increasingly popular in both the United States and the EU. Furthermore, India linked its expansion of renewable energies to the development of green infrastructure in its territory, also near the Indo-Chinese border. In February 2023, for instance, India approved a $3.9 billion hydropower project, namely the 2,880-megawatt Dibang project, in Arunachal Pradesh. Beyond its contribution to India’s energy security, this project also helped to mark its territorial claims and thus can be interpreted as a response to China’s increasing infrastructure development in the border areas.

Bilateral and geopolitical tensions are also evident in this supposedly simple domain. An India-China memorandum of understanding for the provision of hydrological information on the Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra River during the flood season, initially signed in 2002, was renewed three times but expired in June 2023 (DoWR, 2024), indicating tensions even within the most essential climate-security related issues of concern. Additionally, and this is particularly true for the Brahmaputra basin, further (small-scale) actors such as Bhutan and Bangladesh come into play with their agendas and their very distinct relationship with both India and China as well as their positioning in the power struggle between them (Vij et al., 2023).

August 2023 again saw a significant development in the ongoing border tensions between China and India. Military commanders from both countries pledged to maintain peace along their disputed border. The joint statement, released after the 19th round of commander-level talks, indicated that constructive discussions had taken place, primarily focusing on resolving issues concerning the Line of Actual Control in the western border sector. This de-escalation came shortly before the 15th Summit of BRICS Heads of States in South Africa. On the summit’s sidelines, President Xi Jinping and PM Modi reportedly further engaged in discussions and directed their officials to expedite efforts in resolving the ongoing border dispute. Shortly thereafter, however, India lodged a formal protest with China concerning a new map issued by China’s Ministry of Natural Resources, which asserted territorial claims over Indian territory. Beijing responded by urging neighbouring countries to avoid ‘over-interpreting’ the matter and called for a calm approach. Additionally, in September 2023, China’s foreign ministry announced that its delegation for the G20 summit hosted by India would be led by Premier Li Qiang, rather than President Xi Jinping, unanimously regarded as a diplomatic affront to India.

The events of September 2023 can thus be taken as a textbook example of the apparently paradoxical pattern of the India–China rivalry: On the one hand, we find joint global advocacy for institutional change that benefits both China and India showcasing momentous, high-profile harmony. On the other hand, both states make no compromises on bilateral border disputes and frequently commit diplomatic affronts. Climate change action sits uncomfortably between these two poles and yet is in danger of drifting to the side of conflict. Looking at this pattern from the perspectives offered by Vasquez and Mansbach, whose main contribution is to dissolve the dichotomy between cooperation and conflict, this is much less of a puzzle, but instead conveys a certain ‘normalcy’ of this mix but also points towards its potential of entering an unintended escalatory spiral. In fact, since September 2023, joint exercises of the Indian Navy with those of the ASEAN states and subsequent bilateral exercises with the Philippines in May 2024 (MoD, 2024) have taken place. The Philippines, back in a strong US partnership under President Marcos, experienced an increased naval confrontation with China in 2024, whether through fishing boat attacks or the use of water cannons. In addition to rhetorical support from the United States, India’s joint exercises sent a clear signal to China that it would not tolerate aggressive regional manoeuvres under any circumstances.

Conclusion and Avenues for Further Research

We conclude from our analysis that the India-Sino rivalry has entered the global climate regime. This underscores, beyond our specific case, the intricate dynamics of cooperation, status-seeking, protectionism, nationalism and rivalry that define the contemporary discourse on environmental sustainability and energy transition. While there may be shared global objectives, such as a renewed international finance order or technology transfers for carbon reduction measures, rivalrous states’ domestic interests and strategic competition threaten to obstruct collective action. Cooperation is often outweighed by strong elements of protectionism and nationalism, increasingly at the expense of international cooperation. We argue, therefore, that while India and China, for instance, jointly pressure the West for more financial aid and technology transfers, climate change mitigation through energy transitions is predominantly considered a national matter in which rivalry is an active and present driver of India’s strategy. This is illustrated, for example, by the expansion of domestic value chains in key industries such as solar power as well as in the lack of funding for pan-Asian infrastructure projects; and the rivalry is particularly apparent in India’s active expansion of capacities to compete with China for leadership across emerging green technologies, regarding access to critical resources, and influence on the Global South in international negotiations, just to name a few examples. We thus find that both rivalry and status competition between India and China have significant implications for the global climate regime as their rivalry in other issue areas, such as territorial disputes and economic competition, spills over into the climate domain when relations between two states take on an actor dimension. This spill-over manifests, for example, in a reluctance to commit to ambitious climate targets or a desire to maintain a competitive edge by prioritising economic growth over emissions reduction. Sino-Indian rivalry has also affected global cooperation in renewable energy transitions, and such tensions have undermined the effectiveness of global cooperation in this arena. While a clear link is hard to prove, we do find that, at least on the Indian side, after years of ‘managed rivalry’ (see Paul, 2018a), Sino-Indian relations are viewed through the lens of the border conflict, manifested in announcements by the Indian Ministry of Defence that ‘all issues at the LAC need to be resolved in accordance with existing bilateral agreements and commitments … [and] that violation of existing agreements has eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations’ (MoD, 2023). Such statements prove that no matter how symmetrical interests are on climate change or other issues in principle, territorial integrity and its defence remain the yardstick for any potential interaction. Consequently, all joint interventions at WTO, BRICS, G20 or UNFCCC are more likely expressions of simple interest coalitions focusing on the lowest common denominator rather than on a common regional or global fate that foresees a long-term coexistential political future.

Further, our analysis implies that climate cooperation can swing more towards a more cooperative direction when the stakes at hand are interpreted by both sides as concrete and tangible, and further research is needed into the dynamics that shape these interpretations. Especially since 2020, we argue that the relationship, particularly when it comes to climate-relevant infrastructures and technologies, is leaning towards an interpretation of issues as symbolic, or even transcendental, that is, less easy to resolve and more tied to a zero-sum perspective on the possible resolution of any conflicts, when seemingly separate issues become linked together, and conflicts in one issue can no longer be separated from conflicts on other issues. Prime examples for this shift include India’s rejection of the BRI, in line with its role in the EU’s competitive Global Gateway and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, proposed by the EU and the United States. In addition, domestic manufacturing promotion for solar panels, as well as hydrogen technologies, EVs and other climate-relevant technologies, serves as a signifier for an increasingly protectionist approach towards climate protection.

While India thus outwardly engages in cooperative initiatives, such as its participation in global climate accords, this does not prevent a behind-the-scenes strategic contemplation on how these initiatives can be leveraged to safeguard its national interests and security. This dual-track approach, one of apparent cooperation and parallel strategic contemplation, has become emblematic of India’s prudent and multifaceted foreign policy, one that seeks to secure advantages in an evolving multipolar global landscape. Moreover, it is essential to recognise that the ambivalence exhibited by India in its China strategy is often not merely a manifestation of inconsistency but is, in fact, a calculated tactic that can yield substantial benefits in a fragmented, polarised world. In an international arena characterised by shifting alliances, competing interests and unpredictable power dynamics, maintaining a degree of ambivalence allows India to keep its options open and respond to rapidly changing circumstances with flexibility. By pro-claiming independence and ‘multi-vector alignment’, India can extract concessions from various parties while minimising the risk of being ensnared in intractable conflicts. This strategic ambiguity serves as a valuable tool in India’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling it to optimise its position and advance its interests amid the geopolitical complexities and uncertainties that define the modern world.

Nevertheless, India’s increasingly resolute response to China in recent border crises highlights the ongoing complexity and sensitivity of Sino-Indian relations. While the future under Modi 3.0 remains uncertain, recent actions emphasise New Delhi’s stance on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border as essential for bilateral relations. Concurrently, China’s new land border law and enhanced military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control signal heightened security concerns and potential for escalation. This dynamic interplay between security measures and broader geopolitical strategies adds layers of ambiguity and complicates global efforts to secure public goods, such as climate change mitigation.

Avenues for future research thus lay in the recognition of an intricate interplay between security and environmental policies, as strategic rivalries increasingly permeate climate policy discourse and influence its dynamics. A further examination of the rhetorical and practical overlaps in security interactions hence may not only shed light on the nuances of Sino-Indian bilateral relations but also contribute to a broader understanding of international cooperation amid growing global fragmentation and polycrises that challenge contemporary multilateral institutions. For the global community, understanding and managing this rivalry will be crucial in facilitating effective international climate policies, as well as preventing conflict escalation in territorial or trade disputes.