This article examines the intersection of cyber warfare and nuclear security, emphasising the significance of addressing the emerging threats to nuclear facilities from cyberattacks. The article highlights a gap in the international security architecture: the absence of an international regime for nuclear cybersecurity. This deficiency challenges the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, threatening global peace and stability by undermining the treaty’s objectives and increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation and misuse. The research underscores the need for an international regime that integrates cybersecurity with nuclear security. It calls for the involvement of middle powers in international negotiations and consensus-building, alongside exploring innovative diplomatic strategies and robust legal frameworks. The article seeks to contribute to the discourse on international security, advocating for a coordinated global response to safeguard against the catastrophic consequences of digital threats in the nuclear domain.
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