The EU–Japan Partnership in the Post-pandemic Order: What Comes Next?

Abstract

EU–Japan relations have been treated in the literature as a ‘normal relationship’ between two mature actors with a long history of promises, expectations and indifferences. However, since 2004, the EU has been considering its relations with Japan as a strategic partnership; that is, a powerful relationship that plays an increasingly central role in the international system. Recent changes in the EU and Japanese domestic and international environments show how both parties’ relations have shifted from a period of indifferences and low expectations to a new momentum of cooperation in facing common global challenges such as open trade, climate change, multilateralism or the recent pandemic. The main objective of this article is, first, to suggest a framework of analysis to better calibrate the EU–Japan relationship, and second, to understand recent trends in EU–Japan relations that have enabled the Economic Partnership Agreement that entered into force in 2019.

Introduction

The EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which has been in force since February 2019, is one of the most significant achievements in the long-standing relationship between these two global powers. Beyond reaffirming their commitment to a liberal order based on multilateralism, freedom and free trade, they hailed the EPA as a landmark agreement that will bring about economic growth and job creation. This agreement stipulates the elimination of 99% of tariffs on European goods entering Japan and 97% of Japanese products in the EU, rendering it the most comprehensive bilateral accord ever crafted by the EU. President Juncker stated that ‘The depth of this agreement goes beyond free trade. Its impact goes far beyond our shores’ (European Council, 2019). Only one year after the EPA came into effect, EU exports to Japan grew by 6.6% and Japanese exports to the EU by 6.3%, demonstrating the tangible benefits of this agreement (Modern Diplomacy, 2020). Undoubtedly, it represents the culmination of a long history of promises, expectations and indifferences.

Beyond the reiterated rhetoric of good will and absence of conflict between both actors at any joint declaration, the overall EU–Japan relationship has been treated in the literature as a ‘normal relationship’ between two mature and relevant powers of the international system. The EU and Japan are two actors that share a combined population of 572 million, a nominal GDP that represents almost 20% of the world’s GDP and 40% of global trade—up to 70% in some key sectors like pharmaceuticals or aeronautics. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2019, exports to Japan reached €61.37 billion (2.9% of total EU exports) and Japan’s exports to the EU reached €62.8 billion (3.2 of total EU imports), Japan being the sixth largest trade partner (after the United States, China, Switzerland, Russia and Turkey) (European Commission, 2021). As the former EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Pattern, once pointed out, ‘The problem with EU–Japan relations is that there are no problems’ (Berkofsky, 2007).

However, current changes in the EU and Japanese domestic and international environments show how both countries’ concerns have shifted from trade issues to cooperation in facing common global challenges such as open trade, climate change, digital transformation, nuclear disarmament, the COVID-19 pandemic and more recently, the EU–Japan collaboration on the war in Ukraine. In a joint declaration made in June 2022, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President of the European Commission (EC) Ursula von der Leyen emphasised the significance of the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to reaffirm the strategic partnership between Japan and the EU, given their shared values (European Council, 2022). Furthermore, during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, Kishida expressed his belief in the broader implications of the Ukraine crisis, stating ‘Ukraine today, East Asia tomorrow’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 2022a).

Effectively, since the early 2000s, the EU has been considering its relations with Japan as a strategic partnership; that is, Japan is one of the nations that for the EU plays an increasingly central role in the international system. The result has been the signing of the EPA between Japan and the EU, an agreement that according to Rasmussen (2018), a former NATO Secretary, goes beyond economic benefits: ‘[i]t sends a powerful sign that United States retrenchment will not see the democratic world abandon our values. This trade agreement is about freedom, and we [the EU] need Japan to help us defend it.’

Although the relationship between the EU and the United States, and the United States and Japan, has been analysed in depth, the EU–Japan link has been underdeveloped in the literature, with some noticeable exceptions (Bacon et al., 2015: Berkofsky, 2012; Berkofsky et al., 2018; Castillo, 2014; Frattolillo, 2013; Gilson, 2020; Hosoi, 2019; Vanoverbeke et al., 2018; Suzuki, 2017; Tsuruoka, 2008). As pointed out by Berkofsky et al. (2018), most of the literature on EU–Japan relations offers ‘little more than self-congratulatory celebrations of the current state of the relationship’. Other scholars even go further and describe the relationship as ‘conducted in a climate of relative indifference’ (Nuttall, 1996), described it as an ‘important set of dialogues’ (Hosoya, 2012, p. 318) or as put by Tsuruoka (2008), following an ‘inadequacy of mutual awareness’. Even if we acknowledge a lack of awareness between both parties, over the past five years, we have witnessed a new paradigm shift that the traditional pattern of EU–Japan relations fails to detect. In light of the aforementioned, this article aims to explore two main aspects: gaining a better understanding of the contemporary relationship between the EU and Japan and examining whether there are indications of a new era of robust cooperation.

Given the lack of deeper analysis covering the topic, the first goal of this article is to suggest an analytical approach able to capture and interpret the relations between both actors. As will be shown, the most suitable framework for explaining the relationship between the EU and Japan is the study of interregionalism, specifically the interplay between a regional organisation and a nation-state. Moreover, both actors, being significant players in the international order, exhibit certain similarities, such as traditionally maintaining a low profile in the military realm and a degree of limited visibility as actors. The second objective of this article is to analyse the trends in the EU–Japan relationship, spanning from the Cold War era to the present day, with the aim of comprehending the recent shifts in the nature of their cooperation. Despite the prevailing narrative on both sides, characterised by a rhetoric emphasising the absence of conflict, normalcy (Frattotillo, 2012), indifference (Nuttall, 1996) and low expectations (Tsuruoka, 2008), their cooperation over the past five years has extended beyond the realms of economy and trade. It has encompassed areas such as security, as well as the promotion of normative power and a rules-based international order centred on democratic values and freedom, as the recent Ukrainian war has demonstrated.

To comprehend the recent trends in the EU–Japan relationship, this article will adopt a three-level analysis approach (Barbé et al., 2014; Gilson, 2020). First, the logic of the actors will be examined, exploring the significance of Japan for the EU and vice versa. Second, the relationship will be analysed in terms of the logic of structure, investigating how international relations facilitate or constrain the evolution of this relationship. Lastly, the focus will be on understanding the logic of interaction, delving into the institutional context in which this relationship unfolds. Our final goal is to show that we are witnessing a new paradigm shift in the EU–Japan relations.

This article proceeds as follows. In the following section, we address certain theoretical aspects relevant to our analysis in order to identify the nature of EU–Japan relations and suggest an analytical model that better captures and interprets their relations. In the second part of the article, we analyse in depth the relationship’s evolution during the Cold War and in the post–Cold War era as well as at the beginning of this new era of cooperation in which Japan and the EU have become two new global actors. We then analyse some recent changes in the EU–Japan relationship, such as the signing of the EPA and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The article concludes with some final considerations.

Interregionalism: A Recalibration of the EU–Japan Relationship Analysis

Most scholars have primarily approached the topic of EU–Japan relations from the perspective of statehood and a materialistic viewpoint, focusing on the study of diplomatic and economic positions and interests within the international system (Gilson 2020, p. 9; Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 263). As a result of this limited analytical approach, certain authors (Chaban & Holland, 2019; Mykal, 2011) emphasise the ‘lack of visibility’ or, as noted by other scholars, a perceived ‘lack of seriousness’ in EU–Japan relations (Hook et al., 2001, p. 258). Other observers have argued that despite ambitious plans for economic cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels, there is a ‘lack of political will’ to take further action in the realms of foreign and security affairs (Berkofsky, 2012), or a failure to adequately anticipate the mechanisms and resources needed to implement concrete actions (Castillo, 2014).

Consequently, the existing literature has portrayed the EU–Japan relationship as a conventional interaction between two ordinary actors within the international system, yielding limited outcomes. In this section, our objective is to overcome these limitations by recalibrating the analysis of EU–Japan relations and addressing two primary interrelated issues: exploring the nature of EU–Japan relations and the significance of interregional fora; and determining the most appropriate analytical approach to comprehensively capture and interpret their relationship.

Regarding the first issue, most of the work on EU–Japan relations does not take into account that this is not a regular bilateral relationship. Japan and the EU are not, in this sense, two ‘normal’ actors. Japan is an economic superpower whose role since 1947 has been limited in terms of security. Although recent changes in Japan’s security policy, such as the reinterpretation of its right to collective self-defence ¹ or the recent war in Ukraine have contributed to the normalisation of its profile in the field of security, Japan is still unable to engage in conventional warfare and follows an exclusively defence-oriented foreign policy. The EU, meanwhile, is not a federal state or full-fledged actor but a regional organisation with limited powers under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Thus, its ability to carry out a more substantial CFSP is highly determined by the foreign policies of its member states, not always coincident with those of the EU. Therefore, we argue that the nature of EU–Japan relations cannot be considered a normal bilateral relation between two states. Instead, it is the outcome of an interregional dialogue between a sui generis state and a regional organisation.

As some researchers have already pointed out, confusion occurs when dealing with the subject of interregional relationships and the many forms the phenomenon can take (Yeo & López i Vidal, 2008). Rüland et al. (2006) have carried out one of the most in-depth analyses of interregionalism. In their research, the authors distinguish between five distinct types of interregional relations (Table 1): (1) relations between members of two well-established regional organisations (such as ASEAN–EU and EU–Rio Group); (2) relations between a regional organisation, whether more or less institutionalised, and a group of states (such as ASEM); (3) two regional groups, neither of which is represented by a regional organisation (as in the case of FEALAC); (4) states, groups of states, and regional organisations from two or more regions (as seen in APEC); and finally, (5) a third state in conjunction with an international organisation or regional group, with Japan–ASEAN serving as a prime example.

Table 1.

Types of Interregionalism According to Rüland et al. (2006).

Type	Region A	Region B	Examples
1	Regional organisation	Regional organisation	EU–ASEAN ASEAN–Mercosur
2	Regional organisation	Regional group	ASEM Africa–EU
3	Regional group	Regional group	FEALAC (Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation)
4	Group of states form two or more regions		APEC ASEAN Regional Forum TPP
5	Regional organisation/regional group	State	ASEAN–China ASEAN–Japan ASEAN–United Kingdom (UK) Dialogue Partnership EU–Japan

Although Hänggi regards the fifth type—regional group/state—as an interregional relationship, or at least, a ‘quasi-interregional’ or ‘hybrid relation’ (Hänggi, 2000), other authors consider that the relationship between an international organisation or regional group and a third state should be classified as a relationship of purely bilateral interregionalism, with EU–Japan’s as one of the most prominent classic examples (Grevi, 2010; Oudjani, 2004; Renard, 2011). To avoid a conceptual overstretch (Baert et al., 2014), we agree with Hänggi and consider the fifth type in a broader sense and classify it as an interregional relationship. This classification captures the essence of interregional relationships, emphasising the presence of an international organisation. It serves as a framework for understanding, restructuring and reinterpreting the world through the lens of evolving forms of governance (López i Vidal, 2018, p. 46). Additionally, for leading regional actors such as the EU in Europe and Japan in East Asia, the concept of quasi-interregionalism highlights the recognition that these actors transcend the traditional notion of Westphalian states.

Once we have classified the EU–Japan relationship as an example involving a regional organisation and a state, in order to effectively evaluate and calibrate this relationship, it becomes necessary to consider the four key functions of interregionalism that are relevant for their bilateral ties. First, interregional fora can act as mechanisms for the balance of power among several states within a certain region (Rüland et al., 2006). Rather than balancing through military force, interregionalism achieves a sort of ‘institutional balance’ in which coalitions of regional actors act in response to the agenda of the moment, as suggested by Maull and Okfen (2003). Reiterer (2006) has even stressed that at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU–Japan relationship served to counterbalance the United States, as it offered both parties a tool by which to diversify and avoid becoming over-dependent on the United States.

Second, interregionalism can act as a tool for bandwagoning; that is, a country aligning with the strongest actor or with a winning coalition in order to benefit from it. There was certainly an element of bandwagoning in the early 1990s when Japan sought to be excluded from the so-called European fortress. Meanwhile, Europe was aware of the rise of Asia-Pacific in the international economic system and incentivised a strategic approach to the region. However, bandwagoning has declined in importance, especially if we consider the gradual decline of Japan as an economic power, the economic and political crisis experienced by the EU since 2009 and the shift of global interest from Tokyo to Beijing.

Third, interregionalism has an institution-building function that cannot be ignored. As we will analyse, the interregional relationship that Japan and the EU have had since the 1990s gave birth to an institutionalisation process. Although they follow what could be called a soft institutional mechanism, in recent years the framework for EU–Japan dialogues has broadened considerably and it is comprised of a variety of mechanisms. The most important meeting is the annual EU–Japan summit attended by the President of the European Council, the EC and the Japanese Prime Minister, which forms the basis of the relationship and gives it a political impetus. Additionally, the EU–Japan’s Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the Japan–EU Political Directors’ Meeting are complemented by high-level consultations between officials of the European External Action Service and the Japanese government, as well as the Japan–EU High-Level Consultation on Economy; Japan–EU working groups on several issues; and Japan–EU Strategic Dialogues on different issues such as security, politics, trade policy, environment, financial policy, industrial cooperation, science and technology, maritime transport, etc. Moreover, there are some annual political discussion fora on strategic dialogues and annual inter-parliamentary meetings between the European Parliament and the Japanese Diet (the Japanese national legislature), with permanent committees on related EU–Japan issues.

Finally, interregional fora have a rationalising effect, acting as clearing houses where parties can reach a pre-agreement on several issues and subsequently participate in multilateral negotiations with a common position. As pointed out in the official document on EU–Japan relations from the MOFA (2021), considering the shared fundamental values and principles of both parties, there is a need to discuss the interests of the parties beforehand in order to reach a common position. In other words, there should be a sort of lowest common denominator that serves to set an agenda for discussion in other multilateral fora and which can reduce the bottleneck effect in multilateral negotiations, as we will see when discussing the EPA negotiation process.

Japan and the EU established important coalitions in the 1990s in several fora such as the United Nations, the OECD, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Six-Party Talks, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia–Europe Meeting. Moreover, in recent years, it has expanded to the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (2015) and the common position taken to condemn nuclear testing in North Korea (2017). The aforementioned fora enable discussion of a number of specific issues (trade policy, economic/financial policy, energy, science and technology, regulatory reform, United Nations reform, etc.). Using Dent’s terminology, the EU–Japan relationship is an example of multilateral deference, since it allows ‘pre-discussion of agenda items for forthcoming global-multilateral negotiations’ (Dent, 2004).

Regarding the second issue about the best analytical approach and considering that interregionalism is a theoretically underdeveloped, misinterpreted and overstretched concept, our attempt is to identify the best analytical approach to capture and interpret the nature of their relationship. As Gilson (2020, pp.10–20) has recently shown, EU–Japan relations have been shaped by a three-level analysis involving agents, institutions and context. In her research, Gilson (2020, p.10) suggested analysing the ‘complex duality of structure and agency’ alongside what she identifies as ‘cognitive filters’, an interplay between institutions and ideas.

In the same vein, Barbé et al.’s (2014) analysis of EU foreign policy stressed a model based on three logics: the logic of actors, of interactions and of structure. Accordingly, we will first examine EU–Japan relations following the logic of the actors, that is, which are the factors affecting the actorness of both countries. The nature of both actors as big players in the international order shares certain similarities, such as a traditionally low profile in the military realm, its normative power or a certain lack of visibility as actors. Japan’s actorness has been shaped by its bureaucracy, party politics, its leadership and its societal attitudes (Gilson, 2020), while the EU’s actorness has been shaped by its consideration as a sui generis actor characterised by its normative power. As pointed out by Manners (in Barbé et al., 2014, p. 26), the EU can be conceptualised as a norm modifier of the international system. Therefore, the normative nature of the EU is a defining factor in shaping the EU–Japan dialogue (Gilson, 2020, p.14).

Furthermore, we will analyse the relationship between the EU and Japan as a product of the logic of structure, which entails considering how the international structure enables or limits the development and progression of their relationship. The logic of structure assumes that history and past decisions have consequences on the decisions of the present. As expressed by Gilson (2020, p.15), a structural framing of its relationship enables us to understand how habits and routines become ‘embedded into particular contexts’. In this case, we are referring to the post-war experiences of both actors, their evolution as two allies of the United States during the Cold War or their position in the post-Cold War as two actors willing to play a more significant role in the international system.

Lastly, we will analyse their relations through the lens of the logic of interaction, focusing on the institutional context in which their interactions occur. In a world characterised by anarchy in the international system, it is important to examine how institutions facilitate cooperation and influence the behaviour of the actors involved. As pointed out by Barbé (2020), institutions play a crucial role in establishing the rules of the game and shaping the collective response to various challenges. In the following section, utilising the proposed model, we will conduct a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics in the EU–Japan relationship.

Overview of EU–Japan Relations During the Cold War: Forging an Economic Partnership

The evolution of EU–Japan relations can be divided into four main periods: a period of mutual distrust and indifference spanning from 1951 to 1990; a period of institutionalisation from 1991 to 2000; a phase of intense cooperation from 2001 to 2009, and finally from 2010 until 2020, a new period commenced with the adoption of the EPA, marking a significant turning point in their relationship. With regard to the first period, after the Second World War, Japan and Europe were both focused on their ally, the United States and on economic recovery, and their political and economic relations were rather limited. After a period of mutual distrust spurred by memories of imperial Japan in European colonies, both parties officially reconciled through the reparations stipulated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951).

Following the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, a first step towards the integration of major industrial powers of Western Europe, Japan was wary of the consequences that a customs union would have on Japan’s exports to the region. In contrast, with Japan’s acceptance as a member of the World Bank in 1952, in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1955, and as a member of the International Monetary Fund in 1964, Europeans were worried about the market impact of a possible dumping of Japanese products. Western Europe observed Japan’s miraculous economic recovery with anxiety as its products, much cheaper but of high quality, began to turn the country into a globally competitive trading power. One of the episodes that best illustrates anti-Japanese sentiment among Europeans took place during Prime Minister Ikeda Iyato’s visit to Europe in 1962 when he met with French President Charles de Gaulle. After their meeting, de Gaulle referred to Ikeda as ‘ce petit marchand de transistors’ ² (Mykal, 2011, p. 48).

Although during the 1950s and 1960s, both actors were focused mainly on issues of an economic and trade nature, following an analysis of the logic of interaction, we can find some initiatives such as Prime Minister Ikeda’s three-pillar theory, a first attempt at establishing political dialogue. Ikeda felt an alliance between Western Europe, Japan and North America was necessary to ensure a free and open economic order. Even though the three-pillar theory would later serve as the basis for the subsequent creation of the Trilateral Commission in the 1970s, at that time the future commission’s counterparts were not seduced by the initiative. The United States preferred a Japan that stuck to a pro-American foreign policy and Europe did not have enough power in matters of foreign policy, which still depended fully on the member states (Mykal, 2011, p. 48). Although in 1959 Japan’s ambassador to Belgium was named Japan’s Representative to the European Communities, until the 1970s European–Japanese political dialogue was carried out through bilateral foreign ministerial meetings between Japan and the UK, France, West Germany and Italy.

The year 1969 was a decisive moment in Europe–Japan relations, when EEC–Japan trade started to have a negative balance in favour of Japan ($147 million) due to an increase in car, electronics and machinery exports to Western Europe. This was accompanied by two shocks of the international system, the Nixon shocks of 1971, and the oil crisis of 1972, which prompted Japan to rethink its dependence on the United States. There was a resulting boom in foreign direct investment (FDI) between 1971 and 1973 (from $20 million in 1971 to $113 million in 1972) that troubled European industries. In their work, Hook et al. (2001, pp. 276–277) discussed how European industries lobbied the Japanese government and the Nippon Keidanren (Japanese Business Association) to introduce voluntary export restraints (VERs).

Consequently, the Japanese government launched a series of measures to solve trade disputes, such as a VER for the automotive sector or Japanese efforts to increase EEC imports to the country. To further relations, in 1979 Tokyo sent a mission to the EC in Brussels to deal with these issues. However, despite the Japanese government’s willingness to solve the problem, by 1981 the EEC deficit with Japan had reached $10 billion. As Togo (2005, p. 266) pointed out, the Japanese’s attempt to solve trade tensions at the end of the 1970s was short-lived, and countries such as the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg forced a VER on Japan, with Italy and France introducing new import restrictions. However, by the end of the 1980s, trade deficit reached $20 billion in 1987, a trade surplus that canalised to an increase of the FDI to the EEC, which ascended from $1.8 billion in 1985 to $3.4 billion in 1986 (Frattolillo, 2013, p.160).

In the political realm, in 1984 both parties decided to institutionalise annual EEC–Japan conferences between Japanese ministries (normally the MOFA and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and the EEC presidency to discuss issues of mutual interest, not only concerning economic issues. Prime Minister Nakasone’s administration went even further and in 1983 suggested the establishment of a forum between Japan and NATO countries to talk about defence issues. It was a new attempt to launch Ikeda’s three-pillar concept (Mykal, 2011, p. 56). Berkofsky (2007, p. 19) stressed that by the end of the 1980s, leaders of both regions had begun to intensify their political relationship and to embrace the idea of trilateralism, along with the United States (Hisashi, 1980). The period of confrontation and friction started to shift to a new era or dialogue.

The Beginning of a New Era of Cooperation: Japan and the EU as New Global Actors

From 1990 until early 2000, trade disputes between Europe and Japan were replaced by a new era of cooperation, not only in the economic realm but also in a wide range of areas such as diplomacy, politics, security, the environment and cultural exchanges. Several factors enabled this phase of dialogue and cooperation, which can be understood through the lenses of the logic of structure, actors and interaction. In terms of the logic of structure, the emergence of a new geopolitical order and the subsequent establishment of an increasingly interconnected global economy played a significant role in fostering new hopes and expectations for EU–Japan relations. The end of the bipolar order and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe had a major impact on EU–Japan relations, posing new challenges but also new opportunities to the weakest link of a triangle formed by Europe, Japan and the United States. Once the demise of the Soviet Union was a reality, the European integration process was on track, and Japan was searching for a new role ‘commensurate with its economic power’ (Hook et al., 2001), the creation of a new Eurasian axis was seen as supporting a multipolar world.

Additionally, the acceleration of economic interdependence and the phenomenon of globalisation contributed to a sense of optimism regarding the benefits of international cooperation. Europe’s enlargement to the North and the East transformed it into a vast regional market and a significant global economic actor that Japan could not ignore. Concurrently, Japan, facing a period of economic stagnation known as the ‘lost decade’, sought deeper engagement with an increasingly integrated Europe, envisioning a new era of cooperation and mutual benefit. Similarly, Europe saw the opportunity to align itself with a rising power, recognising the shifting economic power from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Pacific axis. Overall, the combination of a reconfigured geopolitical order, economic interdependence and the shared pursuit of mutual benefits facilitated the emergence of a new phase of dialogue and cooperation between Europe and Japan.

Regarding the logic of actors, although the bilateral relationship with the United States continued to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy, Japan started to assume a more proactive profile in world affairs. The limits of Japanese foreign policy during the Gulf War (1990–1991) compelled Japan to reassess its security policy in order to be able to contribute to the international community as a ‘normal’ country. ³ On the other hand, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany, the signature of the Treaty of the European Union (1991), and the beginning of regional and international crises (Persian Gulf and former Yugoslavia) forced Europe to reconsider its external relations according to this new institutionally structured actor. Europe started to project itself with an image and identity of a new international actor, a combination of ‘civilian, military, social and material power’ (Pacheco, 2009, p. 270). As stated by Togo (2005, p. 269): ‘Japan and Europe were embarked on a new voyage in uncharted waters, with Japan and Europe appearing as two regions with their common values of democracy, market economy and peace binding them close together’. Both actors had to rethink their policies in accordance with their new status as economic superpowers that share some common values such as the rule of law and democracy, and they promote negotiated solutions to international conflicts (Kirchner, 2017, p. 4).

The transformation of the international system, and changes in its identity as international actors, impacted the institutional context in which Japan and Europe were cooperating. Considering the limits of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), when the EU was established by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), it incorporated a three-pillar system and established a CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty also added a new mechanism to strengthen the political visibility of Europe: A High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to coordinate the EU’s foreign policy. The strengthening of the EU’s institutional structure and its subsequent enlargement made it impossible for Japan to ignore the region’s political potential (Hook et al., 2001, p. 264). There was a need for great economic, political and security cooperation. As stressed by Frattolillo (2013, p. 68), ‘the construction of a true partnership between the two actors become almost natural’.

The 1991 Hague Declaration: Jointly Facing the Challenges of an Uncertain World

The first step to formalise a true partnership has been materialised at the first EEC–Japan bilateral summit in 1991 at the Hague, where Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, President of the EC Jacques R. Delors, and Prime Minister R. F. M Lubbers of the Netherlands, acting as President of the European Council, signed a Joint Declaration on relations between the EC and its Member States and Japan (European Commission, 1991a). Known as the Hague Declaration, it was the first document to highlight the need for dialogue and cooperation on a broad set of issues to jointly face the challenges that an uncertain world could pose. In the Joint Declaration, Japan and Europe committed themselves to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, market principles and the promotion of free trade, all of which enable a prosperous world economy (European Commission, 1991a). Moreover, the document established political goals such as the promotion of negotiated solutions to conflicts within the international institutions, joining efforts in meeting some challenges such as environmental issues or terrorism, or a mutual desire for global stability based on those shared principles previously mentioned.

In addition to this, looking at the logic of interaction, the Joint Declaration recognised a framework for continuous dialogue and consultations through an annual summit between the Japanese government, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission. Besides the summits, since then it has also enabled ministerial and parliamentary dialogues on different issues of mutual interest. Admittedly, after the signing of the founding document between the EC and the Japanese government, several issues were discussed such as the environment (EC–Japan Summit, 1992), trade imbalance and investment policy (EC–Japan Summit, 1992), conventional arms transfers within the UN structure (EC–Japan Summit, 1992), anti-personnel landmines (EU–Japan Summit, 1994), North Korea’s nuclear issue (KEDO, 1996) and the launching of a new interregional body in which to discuss issues of mutual interest (ASEM, 1996). In the field of multilateral mechanisms of security cooperation Japan started to meet with NATO and OSCE (1994), and with the Council of Europe, becoming an observer in 1996. The result of this renewed interest not only produced cooperation between the EU and Japan but also established a broad cooperation agenda based on bilateral programmes between Japan and major global actors such as the UK, France and Germany. Partly because of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s European policy based on the concept of a global partnership supported by bilateral country-to-country relations, the Hague Declaration boosted some bilateral programmes, the Japan–UK Action Agenda (1995), the Action Agenda for Japan–German Partnership (2000) and the Japan–France 20 Actions for the Year (2000) (Togo, 2005, pp. 270–272). A dual mode of interaction and exchange between Japan and Europe has developed, built on the idea of multilateral relations (interregional relations) and bilateral relations (country-to-country links) (Watanabe, 2016).

Furthermore, as pointed out by Gilson (2016, p. 795), the Hague Declaration established an institutional framework aiming at ‘building in particular on an expanding EC, and economically thriving Japan and existing institutional arrangement based around economic imperatives’. For Togo (2005, pp. 269–270), the Hague Declaration represents a turning point and the major document after the Second World War where economic conflicts were replaced by an era of cooperation and political dialogue. Hosoya (2012, p. 317) went even further to assess that the Hague Declaration enabled the development of a ‘normative partnership between the EU and Japan’. In our view, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Europe–Japan dialogue has improved as a tool for bandwagoning, a starting point for the development of the weak interregional political relations between a rising Europe and a Japan willing to become a responsible actor on the world stage. It also permitted the development of a truly ‘normative partnership’ between both actors (Hosoya, 2012, p. 317).

The 2001 Action Plan for EU–Japan Cooperation: Towards a Decade of Intense Japan–Europe Cooperation?

Following this normative approach, at the beginning of the new millennium, the previous conflicts between the EU and Japan largely dissipated, giving way to a new phase based on shared values and the acknowledgement of diversity. Both actors embarked on a path of addressing common problems, particularly in the realm of security, and assumed a shared responsibility as two significant civilian powers (Togo, 2005, p. 286). In line with the policy speech delivered by Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, in Paris titled ‘Seeking a Millennium Partnership’ (MOFA, 2000a), the Ninth EU–Japan Summit in 2000 witnessed the agreement of Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō, President of the EC Romano Prodi and the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, to initiate a ‘Decade of Japan-Europe Cooperation’ (MOFA, 2000b). To give an impetus to the relationship, the leaders agreed to establish three main pillars of cooperation: (a) political cooperation on issues such as arms control, non-proliferation and reform of the United Nations; (b) commitment to peace, freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights and (c) sharing the benefits of globalisation. A year later, in 2001, Romano Prodi presented a lecture in Tokyo at the Keidanren in which he insisted on the idea that Japan and the EU shared common interests and therefore an enhanced global partnership between both actors was necessary. Aware that the Hague Declaration was criticised for being a mere codification of consultation mechanisms, Prodi highlighted the need for translating the idea of common values into joint action (MOFA, 2000c).

In line with Prodi’s remarks, two months after the September 11 attacks in 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, Romano Prodi, Javier Solana and Guy Verhofstadt, President of the European Council, adopted a Joint Action Plan for EU–Japan Cooperation entitled ‘Shaping our Common future’, a key official instrument with concrete actions aimed at achieving the goals stated by the Hague Declaration. After restating both actors’ convergence on a range of global and regional issues, such as the promotion of democracy, stability and peace, the fight against terrorism and the promotion of social cohesion, the document specified four main goals: (a) promotion of peace and security at a multilateral level; (b) the need for an economic partnership; (c) the need to cope with global and societal challenges such as an ageing society and achieving gender equality and (d) the promotion of people and cultures (MOFA, 2001). In total, the document named more than 21 areas and 100 possible actions for bilateral cooperation in the period from 2001 until 2010; it proved to be an ambitious document to improve the Japan–EU relationship.

Regarding the logic of structure, the decade of the 2000s was marked first by the 09/11 attacks, the US’ launch of a military campaign in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the EU’s fragmented position on the war in Iraq, and by Japan’s strong support of President Bush, although with limited participation in the joint operations against terrorism in the region. As put by Togo (2005, p. 309), Japan was following a strategy categorised as ‘Blair without armed forces’. Against this background, and conditioned by the international situation, the EU and Japan started to broaden cooperation on traditional and non-traditional security and undertook several joint initiatives and bilateral fora to deal with security issues. Among these were a common adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the promotion of the Ottawa Convention (1997) on the abolition of anti-personnel landmines and support for the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002). In regard to North Korea, Japan and the EU have cooperated through the KEDO, exchanging information on Japan’s participation at the Six-Party Talks (2003), signing the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation (2005) and condemning North Korean missile testing and criticising North Korean human rights violations (2017).

In the economic realm, the Action Plan consolidated the EU and Japan as two main trading partners with common interests to enhance mutual trade and investment, bilaterally and through the WTO system. In 2003, the EU recognised Japan as a strategic partner, a tool aimed at deepening relations with key actors playing an increasingly central role in the international system. As a result of this solid trade relationship, in 2005 Japan was the EU’s fifth largest export market, and Japan was the fourth largest import country into the EU, with a trade billion deficit of €30.5 billion in favour of Japan (Eurostat, 2021). Although from 2000 to 2010, imports from Japan to the EU decreased by around 30%, and EU exports to Japan decreased especially because of the 2008 economic crisis, in 2010 the EU was Japan’s third largest trading partner with a total trade amount of 115 billion euros (Eurostat, 2021). In the field of investment, an EU–Japan Regulatory Dialogue boosted investment between the two actors, and by 2002 the EU was Japan’s main foreign investor, fundamentally in companies related to car manufacturing, insurance sectors and telecommunications. Likewise, following the introduction of the Euro in 2002, and the successive EU enlargement to the West, the Japanese government promoted FDI in the EU, and by 2008, Japan was one of the major investors with 5% of the EU’s inward FDI originating from Japan. Japanese companies decided to sell in the EU–Japanese products that were manufactured in Europe.

As Berkofsky (2007, p. 10) stated, the document adopted in 2001 covered so many issues that it was criticised for being a mere ‘shopping list’ of unresolved issues. For Gilson (2020, p. 98), the document was ‘replete with ideas for cooperation, rather than strategies for tangible cooperative actions’ and in the end, Japan and the EU were deeply affected by the international context and other foreign policy priorities (p. 103). In our view, international conditions such as the unilateral US momentum, the 2008 economic crisis, the normalisation of Japanese foreign policy, the blockage of the Doha Round, some EU intra-regional dynamics and the rise of China have been determinant to the long-term evolution of relationship during the 2000s. Despite this background, why did the EU and Japan manage to conclude the EPA and SPA? What is the rationale behind those agreements?

EU–Japan Strategic and Economic Partnership Agreements: Towards a New Phase of Cooperation

During the 2010s, EU–Japan relations were marked first by the logic of structure and the return to multilateralism and a US-led trade and economic order proposed by Barack Obama after his victory in the presidential election in 2008. Although the new Obama administration attempted to improve the US’ relationship with the EU and to heal the wounds produced during the Bush period, the actual focus of its foreign policy was the Asia-Pacific. The US ‘pivot to Asia’ or rebalancing towards Asia strengthened the idea of a region free of trade barriers and proposed to reshape the rules for trade in the twenty-first century (Clinton, 2011). Washington attempted to persuade Tokyo to bandwagon with the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), and Japan promptly became the US’ strategic partner within this Free Trade Agreement. In addition to it, the US’ alliance with Japan sought to limit the rise of China in the region (Ye, 2015, p. 208) and restore a North American leadership that had been damaged by the 2008 economic crisis.

Within the EU, the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis produced some of the darkest episodes in the history of European integration, namely, a draconian debt crisis in Greece that also heavily affected Spain, Portugal and Ireland, and the corollary rise of populist and xenophobic movements in different EU countries (Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Euroscepticism in Czech Republic or Kaczyński’s ultraconservatism in Poland). In addition to these, the refugee crisis in 2015 and the EU’s management of the crisis cast some doubts about the Kantian cosmopolitanism of perpetual peace and security (Kagan, 2004). As pointed out by Gilson (2020, p. 63), a discourse of ‘liberal’ versus ‘illiberal’ was threatening the very foundations of the EU. Finally, the 2016 Referendum on Europe in the UK shocked European public opinion and the country decided to leave the EU after 43 years of membership. These factors progressively weakened the European integration process and projected an image of a continent unable to tackle fundamental issues in its foreign and migration policy.

Following the logic of actors, the relationship has been marked by two general elections in Japan. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan won by a landslide victory in the general election, and Hatoyama Yukio became the first non-LDP Prime Minister of Japan, putting an end to an almost unbroken LDP control of the Diet during the past 54 years. However, after three years of government, and three different prime ministers who were unable to manage the Fukushima crisis, the worsening of relations with the United States, and the economic crisis, in the 2012 general election, the LDP returned to power and Abe Shinzō again became the Prime Minister of Japan (Abe was Prime Minister for a short period in 2007). Since Abe’s landslide victory, Japanese foreign policy has undergone major changes under the so-called Abe Doctrine, a policy based on the idea of expanding Japan’s defence capabilities, broadening the US–Japanese alliance, and strengthening security cooperation with third-party partners in the international community. It is precisely in the field of security where further progress can be made. As stated by Frontini and Pardo (2016), security is the key field if Japan and the EU want to make their relationship a ‘solid and mutually advantageous anchor in the troubled waters of international politics’.

According to the logic of interaction, the interregional relationship between the EU and Japan witnessed a significant sense of institution-building during the 2010s. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the EU’s foreign policy gained greater consistency and coherence. The treaty also established the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who assumed responsibility for the newly created European External Action Service. As part of efforts to enhance the EU’s presence in the international arena, the EU began establishing Delegations across the world.

During this period, in a sort of soft institutionalisation, the framework for EU–Japan dialogues underwent substantial expansion, incorporating a diverse range of mechanisms. The annual EU–Japan summit, attended by the President of the European Council, the EC and the Japanese Prime Minister, played a crucial role in shaping the relationship and imparting political impetus. In addition to this summit, other significant meetings included the EU–Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the Japan–EU Political Directors’ Meeting and high-level consultations between officials from the European External Action Service and the Japanese government. Moreover, there were specific mechanisms such as the Japan–EU High-Level Consultation on the Economy, Japan–EU working groups addressing various issues, and Japan–EU Strategic Dialogues covering topics such as security, politics, trade policy, environment, finance, industrial cooperation, science and technology, maritime transport, etc.

The EU–Japan SPA: From a Payer to a Player Status

The period from 2010 to 2020 marked the beginning of a final phase of intense cooperation, driven in particular by two agreements that reignited the interest of both parties in deepening EU–Japan cooperation: the SPA and the EPA. At the 19th EU–Japan summit in 2010, both parties agreed to update the ten-year 2001 Action Plan, and the new DJP Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, the EU Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council and Mr José Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, stressed that 2010 was a year of renewal; in Japan’s political system with the new DJP government and in EU with the Lisbon Treaty as one of the most important institutional milestones in the history of the organisation. Consequently, the Japan–EU relationship grew stronger, with its leaders stressing that there was ‘much more to be done between Japan and the EU’ (European Commission, 2010).

This somewhat ambiguous and empty slogan arrived at the EU–Japan Summit of May 2011 and both countries agreed to initiate the negotiation of an SPA, a political agreement which would be the first legally binding agreement between two actors that have defined themselves as two democratic powerhouses in the Eurasian continent. The goal of the SPA was to officially reinforce the partnership and to establish a series of consensus in various fields of cooperation. Despite the lack of concrete issues, at the 23rd EU–Japan Summit held in Tokyo in 2015, both parties agreed to develop a strategic partnership to achieve global peace and security, foster growth, prosperity and sustainable development and deepen mutual understanding. In July 2017, at the 24th bilateral summit, Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, specified that an SPA would reinforce their partnership in new areas such as cybersecurity, disaster management, migration and energy security. Considering the lack of concretion, officials from both countries established a Joint Committee, which coordinates the whole partnership and certifies the correct implementation of the Agreement.

After a total of 13 negotiation meetings, the agreement was signed on July 17th, 2018, at the 25th EU–Japan Summit. Aware of the fear to repeat the ‘shopping list’ rationale of the Hague Declaration and the 2001 Action Plan (more than 100 areas), the SPA listed at least 40 areas of mutual interest to be tackled by both parties, such as non-proliferation of WMD and disarmament; counter-terrorism; disaster management and humanitarian action; economic and financial policy; science, technology and innovation; cyber issues; personal data protection, education and culture. Although the SPA has not yet entered into force since it is pending ratification by the EU member states, since 2019, both parties have jointly cooperated on a key area, connectivity and investment, signing a Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure (July 2019) and a Memorandum of Understanding between Japan’s International Cooperation Agency and the European Investment Bank (October 2019) to promote investment in developing countries.

The aim of these projects is not only to foster a joint response to the crisis of the liberal world order and establish norms and values that have recently been questioned but also to counterweight the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s macro-project to invest in infrastructures. As put by Söderberg (2020), the EU and Japan attempted to ‘transform itself from “payer to player” where trade, aid and investments should be used together to achieve strategic foreign policy goals’. In the same vein, the Japanese government has recently begun contributing to EU Common Security and Defense Policy missions in countries such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger. Moreover, the SPA has facilitated cooperation in security domains, including cyber dialogues on cybercrime and cybersecurity.

In line with a more dynamic security profile of the EU and Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to Peace’ (MOFA, 2016), both actors have started to cooperate on a number of soft and hard security issues as a part of their goal to contribute to regional and global security and to Japan’s human security concept (Berkofsky, 2017, p. 5). Abe’s strategy of promoting Japan’s vision for a ‘Free and Open Pacific’ to protect and maintain freedom of navigation and the rule of law at sea, announced in August 2016, paved the way for more proactive cooperation to counter piracy. In October 2020, the EU and Japan carried out joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Aden, which was followed by a joint port call in Djibouti by warships and maritime patrol aircraft of the EU Naval Force and vessels of the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force deployed on patrol against piracy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rise of China and the emergence of a new Cold War between two defining blocs have resulted in mutual interests between the EU and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. On the one hand, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Japan and the EU to enhance strategic coordination with European nations (Smith, 2022). Japan has actively participated in imposing sanctions against Russia and has provided significant assistance to Ukraine and neighbouring countries, including a package of $200 million in emergency humanitarian aid, $500 million in reconstruction assistance and $600 million in financial support loans (MOFA, 2023b). Moreover, a notable transformation has occurred in the collaboration between Japan and NATO since the onset of the Russian invasion. In June 2020, Hayashi Yoshimasa, Japan’s Foreign Ministry representative, emphasised that ‘it is not possible to speak about the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region separately’ (MOFA, 2022b). On the other hand, the growing alliance between China and Russia served as a catalyst for the EU and Japan to formulate their respective Indo-Pacific strategies. These include the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (2021) and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, which represents an updated version of the previous strategy initiated by Prime Minister Abe (Government of Japan, 2022).

The EPA: Beyond Automobiles and Agriculture

Regarding the second agreement, in the 19th EU–Japan Summit held in Tokyo in 2010, the new Prime Minister of Japan, Hatoyama Yukio, the President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy and Commission President José Manuel Barroso discussed the need to replace the 2001 Action Plan. Although in 2013 the EU Commission started the negotiations, as pointed out by Felbermayr (2019), at that time the Free Trade Agreement with Japan was secondary, as the EU was focused on the signing of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and Japan sought to finalise the TPP. As put by Felbermayr (2019): ‘For both Europe and Japan at least part of the rationale for negotiating an FTA between them was to avoid the TTIP and TPP putting Japanese firms in Europe and European firms in Japan at a competitive disadvantage.’

After a long period of negotiations and despite the deadlock of the TPP, in January 2018, the EU and Japan announced the signing of an EPA, an agreement described by some media sources as a ‘mammoth trade deal’ (Saeed, 2017). According to the President of the EC, Jean-Claude Juncker and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, it was the biggest trade deal ever negotiated by both parties. In a Joint Statement by the EC President and the Japanese Prime Minister, both leaders announced that a new era for Japan and the EU was about to begin. The EPA was not only going to eliminate 98% of all tariffs on products such as wine, cheese, pork and cars, but also reduce non-tariff barriers such as intellectual property rights, labour protection and environmental protection. To give some examples, Japanese consumers would enjoy Gouda and Cheddar and European consumers could by cheaper Japanese cars. However, it is not only an agreement of ‘cars for cheese’; it is intended to help both parties write the rules of twenty-first-century trade in line with their high standards and shared values. At the same time, it sent a strong message to their natural ally, the United States, that Japan and the EU strongly reject protectionism (EC, 2019).

The signing of the EPA must be understood first and foremost as the product of different systemic logics: recent changes in the United States, the weakness of the EU, and Japanese frustrations with the WTO system. Regarding the logic of structure, the election of President Donald Trump boosted protectionism and isolationism, and, as a consequence, the United States withdrew from the TPP, President Obama’s key trade policy in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to this, the EU and Japan have been highly concerned about China’s reactive response to the South China Sea issues and Beijing’s massive investment in some strategic sectors of the EU economy affecting both parties. With regard to the second shift, Angelescu (2018) identified that the EPA resulted from Japan’s frustrations with the WTO system’s limitations. The EPA is part of the country’s strategy to bypass the current WTO deadlock and the recent withdrawal of the United States from the TPP through alternative agreements that could help Japan set the new global trade standards. In other words, Japan is using a sort of hedging strategy or attempting not to put all its eggs in one basket (López i Vidal & Pelgrín, 2018). As part of its diversification and maximisation strategy, Japan is also negotiating an EPA with Turkey, Thailand and Colombia, free trade agreements with Korea, China and New Zealand, and what is known as the Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership with East Asian countries. Everything points to geoeconomics experimenting with a new phase of expansion.

Following the logic of interaction, the agreement has been negotiated and approved after the entry of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which made the European Parliament, along with the EC, key actors in the EU’s trade policy. This institutional change enabled the European Parliament to give its consent to any trade agreement, and to be constantly updated during its negotiation. In addition, to avoid a lack of transparency, lobbyists and in general civil society can take part in the process by opening any trade agreement to public debate. However, the EU–Japan EPA has been surprisingly ignored by the public, partly because it has been overshadowed by more controversial trade agreements such as the TTP, TTIP and the Trade Agreement with Canada. The low level of opposition to the agreement was only among some civil society groups and lobbyists (such as the Japan Business Council, or the European Round Table of Industrialists) and a few member states. As pointed out by Alvstam and Kettunen (2019, p. 4), in Japan, ‘public interest was drawn to the negotiations with the United States in the TPP constellation and the ambiguous economic relations with China, which meant that the EU–Japan talks were almost completely ignored’.

Finally, and following the logic of actors, the EU–Japan talks, as stated by Söderberg (2012), were boosted after the re-election of Abe Shinzō as Prime Minister in 2012, since the agreement aligned well with the objectives of Abenomics particularly its ‘third arrow’ or structural reform aimed at liberalising trade. Japan clearly wants to pursue improvements in economic efficiency through FTAs and by opening Japanese small and medium enterprises to the global market and digital economy (Yamamoto, 2019). In the same vein, to counter President Trump’s attempts to embrace protectionism, Abe has supported, along with the EU, the preservation of the liberal economic order. From the European perspective, considering the decrease in EU’s share in Japanese imports, the enactment of Brexit and the successful EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement, it made sense for Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker to seek negotiations with Japan and start a new era of partnership at a time when the global economy was being adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the EC, and Suga Yoshihide, Prime Minister of Japan, in a meeting via video conference on 27 May 2021 during the 27th EU–Japan Summit stated that the EU–Japan Economic Partnership was strengthening its ‘ability to bring tangible benefits to our citizens’. Today, the COVID-19 pandemic, the growing impact of climate change, and new security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and worldwide make EU–Japan cooperation more necessary than ever.

Conclusion

As we have suggested throughout this article, EU–Japan’s relationship can best be explained following a threefold logic of actors, structure and interaction. In view of this analytical method, we have examined how, after the actors’ post-war reconciliation, Japan and Europe concentrated their efforts mostly on economic relations and their political dialogue was rather limited. In 1984, both parties decided to institutionalise their political dialogue through ministerial conferences, which marked the start of a continuous, soft institutional dialogue. Following the end of the bipolar world, the period in which the focus had been on trade was replaced by a new era of cooperation, and Europe and Japan started to rethink their policies in line with their new international status. First The Hague Declaration (1991) and later the Action Plan (2001) revealed an increasing interest in collaborating to meet global challenges.

In this post–Cold War era, EU–Japan dialogue has broadened to other non-trade–related topics such as environmental issues, development aid, crisis management, terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, the promotion of peace and security or the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, we argue that the two not only share certain political goals and interests such as maintaining regional and global stability or multilateralism, but also their normative dimension and the values of democracy, a free market, freedom and human rights, or their support of the international liberal order.

Since 2001, they have strengthened their tools for dialogue and have worked together on issues of mutual interest. The EPA and SPA are the result of this new broader understanding of their cooperation and act as mechanisms of ‘institutional balance’ in which coalitions of regional actors act in response to an increasingly fragile-looking liberal world order. As for the EPA, the removal of both direct trade and non-tariff barriers aims to boost the trade of goods and services between both actors. The SPA, for its part, seeks to strengthen their relationship by promoting political and sectoral cooperation and joint actions in areas of common interest based on shared values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law or the promotion of multilateralism. As pointed out by Gilson (2020, p. 172), the institutionalisation of the dialogue has promoted ‘routine patterns of bilateral behaviour’. However, the signing of the EPA and the SPA can not only be explained by a matrix of economic benefit; it is also the result of the logic of structure (the rise of China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine ), the logic of actors (recent changes in their limited actorness), and the logic of the interaction (that is, the institutional context within which this relationship takes place).

As demonstrated in this article, recent events of the logic of the structure, such as the alignment between China and Russia, have involved condemning Moscow’s aggressive actions, supporting Ukraine and Taiwan, ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, advocating for a free and open cyberspace, enhancing Japan–NATO collaboration and strongly opposing North Korea’s nuclear missile testing. As expressed by Jean De Ruyt, former permanent representative of Belgium to the European Union, NATO and the UN, we are witnessing a growing ‘appetite for closer collaboration with Japan’ or, as the diplomat defines it, a ‘golden age for EU–Japan relations’ (Ruyt, 2023).

Throughout this article, we have assumed that the EU–Japan relationship is not an ordinary state-to-state forum. Rather, it is an interregional relationship whose function is primarily twofold: to foster institution-building in a multi-layered system of global governance and to act as rationalisers or clearing houses that enable both parties to reach pre-agreements on different issues (the so-called multilateral deference). Only if we apply an interregionalism approach to the study of the EU and Japan will we be able to grasp the meaning and functions of this bilateral relationship.

Finally, we subscribe to the idea commonly accepted among scholars that there is a serious lack of visibility or even seriousness regarding the EU–Japan political dialogue. Neither party has significant disputes and precisely because of that, there is a shared belief that the lack of problems may in fact create a problem. As Berkofsky noted, the problem with EU–Japan relations is that they do not ‘grab the headlines’ (Berkofsky, in Mykel, 2011, p. 124). In other words, even if there is an increasing amount of dialogue between them or joint activity on several issues, it appears to be invisible to the media.