The Blue Pacific in Search of a Collective Identity: Towards Success in Regional Security amid US–China Rivalry

Abstract

The Pacific Islands region has emerged as one of the central areas where the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China is playing out. Thus, to safeguard their own interests, the Pacific Island countries have attempted to manage the competing policies of these external partners. This study focuses the recent adoption of the ‘Blue Pacific concept’ to examine how Pacific Island countries attempt to influence the engagement of their external partners in the region. The formation of the ‘Blue Pacific’ identity must be understood as a mutual process between the Pacific Islands countries and their external partners because they are seeking cooperation with these partners to address the security concerns. We find that the ‘Blue Pacific’ identity formation aligns with region-building, which allows the Pacific Islands countries to stress their own security issues. This study highlights the challenges and opportunities of constructing a collective identity in this context. Finally, the effectiveness of the Blue Pacific strategy remains debatable, although it has yielded success in gaining recognition and support from the external partners.

Introduction

The Pacific region has emerged as one of the central areas where the geopolitical rivalry between Western powers, especially the United States and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, China) has sparked. Being embroiled in strategic competition, the Pacific Island countries (PICs) have sought to deftly manage the competing policies of these external powers to safeguard and advance their own interests. In this respect, PICs show a clear willingness to prioritise their own security needs, even though the extent to which they can assert their own interests in shaping a regional security architecture remains unclear. Some scholars emphasise that PICs play a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of foreign aid programmes (Dornan & Brant, 2014), while others highlight the concerns of the Pacific leaders that regional interests may be disregarded and subsumed under the broader Indo-Pacific framing (Wallis & Batley, 2020). Indeed, it has been repeatedly acknowledged that there is a divergence in security understandings between external powers and PICs (Morgan, 2020; Tarte, 2022; Wallis et al., 2023).

Recently, the ‘Blue Pacific’ concept, endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2017, has garnered scholarly attention. Through the concept, PICs assert their interests and emphasise the strategic autonomy of the Pacific region (Kabutaulaka, 2021; Morgan, 2020; Wallis et al., 2023). However, the extent to which external partners embrace and engage in this process is unknown. For instance, Morgan (2020) noted that ‘most Pacific Rim powers are doing little to tackle the Pacific’s key security threat’ (p. 61). Furthermore, Wesley-Smith and Smith (2021) also argued that ‘it seems unlikely that PICs governments could easily resist, manage, or leverage competing pressures’ from external powers, despite ‘the powerful symbolism of the Blue Pacific narrative’ (p. 25). Wallis and her colleagues (2023) stated that it is unclear how external powers fit within the Blue Pacific narrative (pp. 276–277). Although Kabutaulaka (2021) assessed the role of the Blue Pacific concept favourably as a narrative and strategy for charting alternative futures in a changing regional order, he does not explicitly state whether external powers genuinely embrace this concept. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the political significance of this concept in advocating for the security priorities of the Pacific region and the extent to which external partners embrace the interests of PICs.

This study re-examined the current trend of PICs across the region, who intend to assert their own interests through the adoption of the Blue Pacific concept. We focus on exploring the implications of a shared identity formation in the Pacific region—which has been shaped by the ongoing geopolitical rivalries and consequently employed diplomatically. Subsequently, we focus on how this shared identity influences the policies of external partners. We hypothesise that the assertiveness of the Pacific identity influences how external partners engage with the Pacific. To navigate the current geostrategic competition effectively, PICs are now seeking to construct a collective identity that can be embraced by their external partners. Thus, the ability of PICs to effectively address their security challenges depends on their ability to successfully consolidate a collective identity.

It should be noted that some scholars have challenged the term ‘Pacific security’, arguing that its use as a generalised concept could result in overlooking the local realities and neglecting diverse interpretations of security among PICs (Ratuva, 2019). Additionally, with the rise of sub-regionalism in the region, we cannot simply assume a consensus among PICs regarding security understandings (Lawson, 2016; Tarte, 2014). These factors, however, do not diminish the enthusiasm of PICs for a shared identity. Fry (2019) argues that framing the Pacific Islands as a bounded entity, as well as the concept of Pacific regionalism, serves a political purpose in navigating the global political situation. As the Pacific Island states are linked by strands of security policies, the regional security serves as the site for negotiation between national sovereign security interests and collective regional and global security interests (Ratuva, 2019, p. 78). Thus, sub- regionalism may pose challenges to Pacific regionalism, but it does not undermine the significance of the PIF. According to the PIF (2013), none of the leaders perceive these sub-regional groups as a threat to the larger Forum grouping (p. 95). The study also discusses this feature of regional processes in the Pacific Islands.

The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section, we examine recent geopolitical dynamics in the Pacific region. Thereafter, we present the conflicting views of security between PICs and their external partners, which has resulted in PICs to construct a collective identity. The following sections discuss the efforts of PICs to re-assert their strategic autonomy in recent history as well as the creation of a collective identity through region-building as a diplomatic means. Then we delve into the Blue Pacific narrative by examining how relevant external powers have incorporated the Blue Pacific identity into their foreign policies towards the region. Finally, we conclude that while the formation of the collective identity of PICs has resulted in the consideration of Pacific views in the policies of external powers to the region, more tangible actions need to be seen to claim its effectiveness.

Rising Rivalries: The Competition for Influence in the Region

The security dynamics of the Pacific region have recently undergone a noteworthy transformation, which can be partly attributed to China’s growing economic and diplomatic presence in the region. Since the first China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 2006, China has provided developmental aid programs and investment to PICs, thereby amplifying its presence in the region. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has implemented over 100 aid projects and delivered more than 200 batches of in-kind assistance, primarily in infrastructure development. According to the Chinese government, China’s direct investment in PICs that have diplomatic relations with China reached $2.72 billion by the end of 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022a). Since October 2021, China has held two China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers meetings. Such meetings clearly show China’s intention to deepen its relations with PICs beyond economic dimensions (Song, 2021). During the second meeting in May 2022, China sought to establish cooperation that would encompass both traditional and non-traditional security with 10 PICs with which it had diplomatic ties (Needham, 2022). China underscores the enhancing of its partnership with PICs in its position paper (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022b). Moreover, in February 2023, China appointed Qian Bo, the Chinese ambassador to Fiji, as the first special envoy of the Chinese government for PICs Affairs. These commitments were motivated by China’s two primary interests in the region. First, for economic benefits, China has focused on promoting its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, the sea route that is part of the BRI, and searching for natural resources and raw materials. Second, for strategic benefits, China has sought to establish itself as a great maritime power, which requires breaking through the United States-controlled island chains that currently restrict its access to the sea. As some PICs are part of the second island chain, breaking them has long been the goal of the senior leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Yu, 2016; Zhang, 2021).

The US has expressed concerns regarding China’s increasing influence through economic and military aid, particularly in relation to China’s assertive diplomatic actions towards PICs. The US perspective on the Pacific region is grounded in the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy, introduced in 2017, which aims to ‘advance a free and open Indo-Pacific that is more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient’, by strengthening the US role and building collective capacity with its partners (White House, 2022a, p. 10). To counteract China’s influence, the US government has shown its intention to increase its presence in the region. In May 2019, former US President Donald Trump met with leaders from the Pacific Freely Associated States (FAS), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. During the meeting, he pledged to increase the US presence in the region through the ‘Pacific Pledge’ of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. In October 2020, President Joe Biden strengthened partnerships with PICs with new funding exceeding $200 million as part of the Pacific Pledge (USDoS, 2020). This renewed engagement was further exemplified by the declaration of the US–Pacific Partnership after the first meeting with PICs in Washington, D.C. in September 2022. Furthermore, the US government announced in February 2022 that it would reopen its embassy in the Solomon Islands (USDoS, 2022). This was followed by the announcement to open embassies in Kiribati and Tonga in July 2022 (White House, 2022c). Later, in March 2023, the United States declared its intent to open an embassy in Vanuatu (USDoS, 2023a). These continuous efforts show a growing strategic interest in the Pacific region.

The Pacific region is thus becoming a tug-of-war site, where the external powers are vying for greater influence to gain significant economic and strategic benefits. Consequently, other traditional partners besides the United States have been forced to reconfigure their approaches to the region, thereby establishing stronger ties with PICs. The traditional partners of the Pacific, including Australia, France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, have demonstrated a renewed interest in the region. In 2016, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull launched the ‘Pacific step-up’ to enhance its engagement in the region with greater intensity and ambition, which was followed by a ‘further step-up’ by Prime Minister Scott Morrison in 2019 (DFAT, 2019). In 2018, New Zealand launched the ‘Pacific Reset’, and then ‘Pacific Resilience’ in 2021 to revitalise its approach to the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand), 2021). Similarly, the United Kingdom launched the ‘Pacific Uplift’ initiative in 2019, recognising its diminished presence in the region since the beginning of the twenty-first century (United Kingdom Government, 2019). France has also strengthened strategic cooperation in the region, positioning itself as a sovereign power with its overseas territories across the region. This was exemplified by the publication of the Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018 and President Emmanuel Macron’s visits to Australia and New Caledonia in 2018 and French Polynesia in 2021. Japan, traditionally not considered to be a major player in the Pacific, has recently demonstrated a significant strategic interest in the region. Japan has been engaging in the region through initiatives such as its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023).

Some scholars argue that broader regional militarisation due to geopolitical competition may spill over into the Pacific region (Wesley-Smith, 2021; Zhang, 2021). Indeed, Western powers have heightened their presence in the region through security cooperation—as exemplified by the Quad and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) triad. Although these initiatives aim to encompass the broader Indo-Pacific, they are attributed to the rise of China’s military presence in the region, alongside its economic assistance to PICs. For instance, it has been reported that China is allegedly searching for a military base in Vanuatu (Wroe, 2018). Although the Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Charlot Salwai, has denied China’s military base construction, these affairs have elicited strong reactions from Western allies. In this context, the recent announcement of a new security pact between China and the Solomon Islands in April 2022 raised concerns about the former potentially increasing its military presence in the region. Regarding the security pact, both Australia and the United States dispatched envoys to discourage the Solomon Islands from entering into the agreement. In response to these challenges, President Biden pledged to expand the federal budget and increase funding for US diplomatic presence throughout the Indo-Pacific, ‘with a particular focus on the Pacific Islands’ (White House, 2023, p. 40). This is part of the ‘Out-Compete China’ strategy, providing $7.1 billion in economic assistance to the FAS over the next 20 years, reportedly in exchange for basing rights on these islands (VoA, 2023). Furthermore, in May 2023, the US government signed a new bilateral defence agreement with Papua New Guinea (PNG), potentially granting US military access to naval bases in PNG for 15 years (USDoS, 2023b).

The emphasis on military approaches to counter China’s increasing influence has raised concerns regarding potential conflicts, thereby undermining regional stability. Some Chinese scholars specialising in Pacific studies have denied China’s military ambition in the Pacific region, pointing to the low importance of the Pacific in China’s broader diplomatic agenda and its limited ability to challenge US military predominance (Zhang, 2020, p. 85). According to Fangyin (2021), ‘China’s relations with the Pacific Islands have not changed dramatically’, and they have ‘a limited position in China’s overall foreign economic relations’ (pp. 244–245). However, as Zhang (2020) argues, the lack of transparency regarding China’s intentions, along with its state-led infrastructure projects using government- to-government approaches and limited collaboration with the United States and its allies, exacerbates concerns among the traditional partners. Thus, there is still a strong argument that the Pacific region is significant for China’s strategic goal and its desire to project naval force into the Pacific (Paskal, 2021).

Indeed, although the potential for military engagement exists, it has been noted that China’s involvement in the Pacific region is predominantly characterised by economic and diplomatic means (see Wesley-Smith & Smith, 2021). Hence, such military-centred approaches could make cooperation in security matters between the external partners and PICs difficult. One scholar has noted that Australia’s attempt to deny Chinese military involvement becomes an attempt to deny the interests of several PICs committing to loans from China, resulting in tensions between Australia and PICs (Fry, 2019, p. 269). The hard power-oriented approach to regional security by the external powers often conflicts with the security priorities of PICs. This aspect is discussed further below.

Conflicting Views of Security

China has strengthened its engagement with the Pacific region primarily through economic cooperation to establish itself as a maritime power and gain diplomatic support from PICs. Zhang (2021) delves into China’s official definitions of security and notes that PICs are relevant to China’s security interests, primarily concerning the Taiwanese issue, as it is directly related to China’s national security, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and reunification (p. 37). Tensions escalated after Tsai Ing-wen from the pro-independence party was elected in Taiwan in 2016. Therefore, gaining diplomatic support from PICs while reducing the international recognition of Taiwan is crucial for Beijing. In September 2019, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati decided to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing.

For the United States, China’s increasing influence has been perceived as diminishing the US longstanding economic, political and military influence in this region, thus posing a threat to its national security. According to an official report, ‘as Beijing increases its comprehensive engagement in the region, the United States and its allies and partners involved in the region … face increasing challenges in ensuring a free and open environment and preserving their interests’ (Meick et al., 2018, p. 17). In this context, Washington attaches importance to the compacts with the FAS, which guarantee military access and ‘the right of strategic denial’ (Paskal, 2021, p. 10). However, these hard power-oriented approaches have not been well received by PICs.

Perspective of PICs on China’s growing influence in their region differs from that of the United States and its allies. Whereas the United States and its allies express concerns regarding rising Chinese influence in the region, PICs do not necessarily have a negative view. According to Meg Taylor (2019a), former Secretary General of the PIF, the key word that resonates among all Forum members regarding China is ‘access’. This suggests that China’s presence is viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat. As PICs rely on the external assistance to improve their economic and social development capacities, China’s faster negotiation process and aid disbursement have provided them with an obvious advantage. ¹ In contrast to the traditional partners, who often emphasise conditionality and have a rigid approval and monitoring process, China’s approach allows PICs to access the aid more quickly (Zhang & Lawson, 2017, p. 203). The Solomon Islands government elevated the security deal with China signed in April 2022 to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ by July 2023. This enhances cooperation in law enforcement and security matters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023). Manasseh Sogavare, the prime minister of the Solomon Islands, thanked China and emphasised that his country had ‘a lot to learn from China’s experience’ (Reuters, 2023). Additionally, the relationship between Vanuatu and China has grown stronger, as exemplified by China’s contribution to emergency relief supplies in response to the hurricane disaster in March 2023. Ishmael Kalsakau, Prime Minister of Vanuatu, stated that China’s assistance reflects ‘the profound friendship between the two countries’ (CIDCA, 2023).

The primary security concern for PICs is climate change. These small islands are highly vulnerable to various climate-related challenges, including sea level rise, storms, floods and ocean acidification. These challenges directly endanger the livelihoods of local populations, their economies and, more seriously, their existence itself. Additionally, climate change exacerbates pre-existing challenges, such as food insecurity, water scarcity and infrastructure development requirements. In this respect, the Boe Declaration, issued by the leaders of the PIF in 2018, highlighted an expanded concept of security that encompassed both traditional and non-traditional concerns, such as human security, environmental and resource security, transnational crimes and cybersecurity. The declaration acknowledges that climate change is ‘the single greatest threat’ facing the region (PIF, 2018).

The Pacific leaders have expressed concerns about being caught amid the escalating competition between the United States and China. If embroiled in this strategic competition, there is a risk that the priorities of PICs could be disregarded or even undermined when hard power security issues take precedence. For instance, the announcement of the AUKUS partnership has provoked apprehension among the PIC. The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia has simultaneously raised worries in the Pacific region, where nuclear non-proliferation is a key concern. Some former prime ministers of PICs, Marshall Islands’ Hilda Heine, Palau’s Tommy Remengesau, Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoga and Kiribati’s Anote Tong, criticised the Australian payment of a ‘staggering $368 billion’ for new submarines as an affront to the region. They emphasised that combating climate change should be prioritised as the greatest security threat for the Pacific Islands (Brennan, 2023).

The Pacific Island leaders have also expressed concerns over the Indo-Pacific framing, as it may lead to the potential marginalisation of their interests and priorities. Meg Taylor (2019a) rejects the terms of the dilemma, which presents the Pacific with a choice between a China alternative and their traditional partners. Similarly, Admiral Viliame Naupot, the head of Fiji’s military, stated at the Shangri-La conference that he believed there were three major powers in competition in the region, namely the United States, China and climate change. According to him, ‘climate change is winning, and climate change exerts the most influence on countries in our part of the world’ (cited in Morgan, 2022). Former Deputy Secretary General of the PIF, Cristelle Pratt argued that ‘the Blue Pacific cannot and will not become an aside in this new Indo-Pacific’ (cited in Wallis et al., 2023, p. 272).

For PICs, it is essential to forge their own path and assert their interests amid the growing geopolitical competition. In this regard, they called for a regional architecture for security cooperation. Taylor (2018b) advocated for robust and independent strategic autonomy to confront the challenging geopolitical landscape in the region. Similarly, during a visit to the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi (2018) criticised the external powers for expanding their interests in the contested strategic space, emphasising, ‘The big powers are doggedly pursuing strategies to widen and extend their reach and inculcating a far-reaching sense of insecurity.’ These statements highlight the perspective of the Pacific Islands as they strive to maintain their independence and strategic autonomy. The Pacific regional leaders have thus recognised the importance of defining security on their own terms, rather than having it dictated to them by external powers.

Path to Re-asserting Strategic Autonomy

The current geopolitical competition in the Pacific region is not a novel phenomenon, as historical antecedents demonstrate. After World War II and during the Cold War, PICs faced pressure to align with the Western bloc—colonial powers actively preventing them from falling under the influence of the Soviet Union. The establishment of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) under the Canberra Agreement of 1947, signed by Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, was a clear demonstration of this pressure. The SPC was set out in terms of the promotion of economic and social welfare, precluding political matters such as security or independence.

The process of decolonisation in the Pacific region, which began with the independence of Western Samoa in 1962 and accelerated in the 1970s, provided strong support for PICs in asserting their own security concerns, particularly regarding nuclear testing by colonial powers. During the Cold War era, the United States and its allies constructed military bases and conducted nuclear tests in the Pacific region, often without local consent. This situation led Pacific leaders to acknowledge that the major powers tend to view their region solely through the lens of their own national interests and disregard local security concerns. Local leaders responded by establishing a new regional organisation with a political mission that prioritised their own terms of security, which led to the formation of the South Pacific Forum in 1971, renamed the PIF in 1999. This new institution has played a significant role in asserting political autonomy in the region caught in the antagonistic grip of the Cold War, although the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand as members continues to cast a neocolonial shadow over the island states.

Simultaneously, in the 1970s, a political movement emerged in the Pacific region to establish a nuclear-free and independent zone in opposition to nuclear weapons testing and nuclear waste disposal in the region. The movement towards political autonomy and regional security reached its peak with the formation of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific in 1975 in Fiji. Based on the initiative of Fiji and New Zealand, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3477 (XXX) on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the same year. In 1985, the Treaty of Rarotonga was concluded with enthusiastic support from the Australian Labor government under Robert Hawke. The treaty created a nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, further cementing the region’s commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation (Power, 1986). These political efforts symbolise indigenous empowerment and resistance against colonialism and environmental degradation in the Pacific.

The end of the Cold War resulted in the loss of interest in the region by the United States and its allies and created a vacuum that China has since filled (Salem, 2020, p. 245). In the context of newly escalating tensions between China and the United States, it is pertinent to ask how PICs can assert their interests in ensuring their regional security. Therefore, we focus on the current trend among PICs, which intend to assert their own interests through the Blue Pacific identity. Taylor’s discourse emphasises the link between the construction of a collective identity and strategic autonomy, arguing that ‘exercising stronger strategic autonomy as one Blue Pacific Continent requires being clear on who we are as the Pacific’ and that ‘only once we clearly claim our collective geography, identity and resources will we be able to effectively secure the place and agency of the Pacific in the fast-changing global context’ (Taylor, 2018b). Thus, the establishment of a collective identity among PICs based on regional unity is a pivotal factor in realising the political autonomy of these states.

Creating Collective Identity Through Common Security

The political significance of the formation of a collective identity has been a subject of academic debate in the field of International Relations. Based on the constructivist perspective, we contend that: (1) collective identity formation among a group of states is closely related to region-building; (2) the establishment of a region with shared security interests serves as a unifying force among member states; and (3) despite the lack of institutional integration and the fragmented nature of the regional security architecture, a collective identity empowers the Pacific region to assert its own interests as a regional diplomatic bloc.

The process of forming a collective identity among a group of states is closely related to the construction of a region. Identity, which tells us who we are and what our interests entail, emerges through social processes rather than being predefined. Similarly, regions are social constructs and not merely material objects in the world (Katzenstein, 2000, p. 354). Region-building, therefore, requires social and political practices, including the formation of collective identities based on shared interests, cultures and history. This has been pointed out in the study of regionalism as ‘a set of cognitive practices shaped by language and political discourse, which through the creation of concepts, metaphors, analogies, determined how the region is defined’ (Jayasuriya, 1994, p. 412). These factors enable the emergence of regional entities and identities. Insofar as regionalism has been discussed with reference to ‘imagined community’ (Acharya, 2009; Neuman, 1994), a collective identity would emerge in the process of region-building.

Second, the emergence of a region based on a collective identity enables states to cultivate common security interests. Lawson (2016) provided a perceptive argument on identity formation that comprises relational, situational and instrumental characteristics. According to Lawson, identity formation is relational, as it requires an image of ‘Others’ against which self-identity can be constructed. The situational feature refers to the context in which such an identity is activated. The instrumental character indicates that identities can be deployed strategically in the pursuit of goals. Thus, constructing a collective identity among PICs allows them to foster common security interests among themselves, thereby pursuing strategic autonomy and their own security priorities in the region and beyond. This argument aligns with the assertion of Karl W. Deutsch and colleagues regarding the significance of shared identity, a sense of ‘we-feeling’ as a prerequisite for the establishment of ‘security communities’. Although a sense of collective identity has been invoked in the region, some scholars have acknowledged the limited applicability of the security community concept to the Pacific region owing to the presence of external powers (Batley, 2021, p. 31; Wallis et al., 2023, p. 266). We argue that this concept does not adequately explain the collective behaviour of PICs because the idea of a security community is inwardly focused, assuming the convergence of interests to avoid war within the community. Indeed, the Deutschian security community assumes a high level of integration among its members, providing ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 6). Acharya (2009) contended that it emphasises the existence of formal institutional structures or legal-rational modes of cooperation (pp. 23–25), a model primarily concerned with the Western world. However, the Pacific region does not see institutional integration in the process of regionalism; rather, it has developed multiple regional institutions or alternative governance systems depending on its purpose and necessity (Fry, 2019). Security cooperation in the Pacific takes the form of a ‘patchwork’, comprising agreements and arrangements across different levels, from bilateral to multilateral and from local to global (Wallis et al., 2021, 2023).

What are the distinctive features underlying the emergence of a collective identity in the Pacific region? We argue that this process of regional construction, facilitated by the development of a collective identity, assumes the role of a diplomatic bloc instrumental in asserting a region’s unique security interests. The concerted efforts of PICs to foster a sense of community based on shared identities, values and interests bear witness to this endeavour. The exercise of collective power by small states is often mediated by institutions, where ‘the combination of rules and negotiating strategies can help ameliorate the effects of asymmetry’ (Long, 2022, p. 64). Regional organisations can serve as facilitators, assisting small states in cultivating complementary advantages and diplomatic capacities. Fry and Tarte (2015) delineate the emergence of New Pacific Diplomacy since 2009, characterised by PICs’ pursuit of regional institutions under their own control. While these attempts may not be accompanied by institutional integration, as the PIF remains a central institution that includes Australia and New Zealand, the development of collective identity effectively unifies the voices of PICs as a diplomatic bloc and empowers them to assert their perspectives on international platforms. In this regard, the political meaning of regionalism is best understood ‘as a site of contest over how people in a region should live’, whose key aspects include purpose, identity and agency (Fry, 2019, p. 30).

‘Blue Pacific’ Identity

The emergence of regional identity in the Pacific region can be traced back to the concept of the ‘Pacific Way’ in the early 1970s, which embodies the aforementioned three characteristics: relational, situational and instrumental. Regional identity has evolved during the postcolonial era, resulting in the emergence of a pan-Pacific discourse that unites former colonial territories while also distinguishing them from the West as ‘Others’. On the one hand, this discourse has helped unite ‘Pacific voices’, particularly in relation to Australia and New Zealand. On the other hand, it did not resonate within some subregions of the Pacific, especially among Melanesian states, as the concept of the ‘Pacific Way’ has a more conservative Polynesian character. Moreover, to maintain consensus, the discourse has often avoided addressing internal political issues within PICs (Lawson, 2016, pp. 395–396).

In the 1990s, Hau’ofa (1993) argued that Pacific Islanders, in fact, perceived their world as a ‘sea of islands’ rather than as ‘islands in the sea’, thereby offering a critique of the discourse of ‘Pacific Way’. The term ‘sea of islands’ emphasises the ocean unity as a space of connection, in contrast to the ‘islands in the sea’ which stresses the smallness and remoteness of the islands. This assertion draws attention to the pan-oceanic identities based on postcolonial resonances shared by the ‘Oceanic peoples’, which stands in contrast to the perspective of the ‘continental men’—the Europeans—who have traditionally regarded the region as consisting of isolated islands in a vast ocean.

The actions taken by Forum leaders in parallel with Hau’ofa’s discourse have contributed to the shift towards regionalism in the Pacific region. In 2006, they endorsed the ‘Pacific Plan’ which aimed to promote regional integration and cooperation; this was followed by ‘Framework for Pacific Regionalism’ in 2014. Simultaneously, the Pacific Islands experienced a significant transformation in diplomatic ideas, institutions and practices known as New Pacific Diplomacy. This new agenda aimed at ensuring that the Pacific voice is heard and that regional institutions are controlled by PICs rather than ‘metropolitan powers’, such as Australia and New Zealand (Fry & Tarte, 2015). The establishment of the Pacific Islands Development Forum in 2013 by Fiji is a notable example of this shift towards regional control.

The adoption of the Blue Pacific identity by the PIF in 2017 further promoted the shift towards a collective identity, which can be attributed to the influence of Hau’ofa’s discourse. This Blue Pacific identity aims to unite the region and assert its collective potential and stewardship of the Pacific Ocean (PIF, 2017). Meg Taylor (2018b) emphasises Hau’ofa’s view of Oceania as a ‘sea of islands’ rather than ‘Pacific Islands’ which denotes small areas of land dotted within the vast Pacific Ocean. Consequently, the Blue Pacific represents the view that ‘as a region, we are large, connected and strategically important’. This narrative guides political conversations among PICs to ensure that they have ‘a strong and collective voice, a regional position, and action’ on issues vital to the development of the Blue Pacific Continent (Taylor, 2018a). Moreover, the Blue Pacific identity reflects the collective responsibility of the region for the Pacific Ocean as well as the need for Pacific peoples to assert control over its resources, ecosystems, and data and address climate change (Taylor, 2019b). Amid geopolitical tensions and the growing number of new foreign policy interests in the region, Taylor emphasised the importance of collaboration to ensure regional solidarity and address key priorities for the Blue Pacific. This is also endorsed by Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi (2018), Prime Minister of Samoa, who argues, ‘Under the flagship of our Blue Pacific identity, we are building a collective voice amidst the geopolitical din on the existential threat of climate change that looms for all of our Pacific family.’

Henri Puna, who succeeded Meg Taylor as Secretary General of the PIF also proclaimed the Blue Pacific identity. He emphasised the need to articulate, through this narrative, their collective priorities as a region for the benefit of all Pacific people. According to him, these priorities include, ‘climate change and oceans, economic development, technology and connectivity, and people-centred development’ (Pasifika Environews, 2022). In 2022, the PIF announced the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, which articulated the strategic interests and developmental priorities of the region (PIF, 2022b). At the Blue Pacific ministerial meeting, Puna (2022) reasserted that any partnership in the region must be founded on respect for the priorities, concerns and values of PICs.

To articulate the ‘Pacific security’, the PIF sought to expand the ambit of the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 to encompass a wider range of security threats. This endeavour culminated in the Biketawa Plus discussions, ultimately leading to the Boe Declaration in September 2018. The Boe Declaration recognises the importance of ‘an expanded concept of security inclusive of human security, humanitarian assistance, prioritising environmental security and regional cooperation in building resilience to disasters and climate change, including through regional cooperation and support’ (PIF, 2018). The assertion of shared security interests through the formation of a collective identity is a significant characteristic of this movement, as emphasised in the preamble. The preamble calls for them to ‘strengthen regional security cooperation and collective action through the assertion of Our Will and the voices of Our Pacific Peoples’. This marks an epoch: in contrast to the past, the formation of a collective identity for the Pacific is not accompanied by the contrasting image of the West or the Europeans as ‘Others’. Recently, a collective identity has been activated by internal affairs, which coincide with a shift in the conceptualisation of security, emphasising both traditional and non-traditional security perspectives. Consequently, this enabled the entire Pacific region, including its people, to unite as one ‘imagined’ cohesive regional entity, based on a human-centred approach.

Although the West is no longer explicitly designated as the ‘Other’, the construction of a sense of ‘we-feeling’ termed as ‘Our Pacific Peoples’, is, however, inherently associated with the presence of another ‘Other’: climate change. Pacific leaders have securitised climate-related issues as ‘the single greatest existential threat facing the Blue Pacific’, thereby acknowledging their vulnerability to climate change (PIF, 2022a). These leaders have stressed the need to limit the global average temperature rise to 1.5 °C and urged developed countries to take immediate actions to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. While external engagement is critical in mitigating the impact of climate change on the Pacific region, Puna (2019) emphasised the political independence of the Pacific, in which even Pacific Islanders must play an active role in addressing climate change and protecting their way of life. He called for a shift from a passive understanding of climate change as an existential threat to active engagement so that the Pacific Islanders could be empowered to develop strategies and policies to protect their communities with scientific and technical studies, data and interpretations of climate change. Again, Puna underscored the significance of collaboration among PICs, who should address shared challenges by drawing on their common history in the region.

As stated above, the focus on climate change in the Pacific articulates the existential threat and enables PICs to assert their autonomy by emphasising their collective identity. This was achieved through the Blue Pacific narrative, which underscores the interconnectedness of the Pacific Islands. This strategy allows the Pacific Islands to claim their cultural and environmental resources, designating them as entities to be safeguarded based on their shared culture and history. This human-centred approach requires a shift away from a state-centric approach; the former considers the unique cultural and environmental characteristics of the region shared among the Pacific peoples. Simultaneously, a collective identity marked by concerns about non-traditional security issues enabled PICs to exert more substantial influence than they could individually. This is explicitly exemplified by the role of Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) at the UN, effectively voicing the Pacific’s stance on climate change mitigation on a global stage. In this sense, the Blue Pacific narrative, based on a shared identity, empowers PICs to assert their own interests as a regional diplomatic bloc, even though they have not experienced formal institutional integration.

The absence of formal institutional integration sometimes leads to tension among PICs, as each PIC still has autonomy to make decisions regarding its security. For instance, any decisions made by each PIC regarding traditional security issues can be met with criticism, as seen in the case of the China–Solomon Islands security pact. In response, Puna organised a ‘Tok Stori’ session, fostering direct dialogue among Forum members to comprehend the perspectives of the Solomon Islands. During this session, forum members reaffirmed respect for state sovereignty and highlighted their own national security concerns while sharing a vision of the region. Puna emphasised the value of dialogue in resolving differences in views among PIF members (PIF, 2022c). In this manner, the PIF exhibits an approach of collaboratively resolving concerns without establishing institutional or supranational decision-making bodies, thereby maintaining the sovereignty of each member state. As discussed in the previous section, collective identity plays a pivotal role in establishing a diplomatic bloc that asserts regional priorities, while maintaining each state’s sovereignty.

Shared identity is a powerful instrument for projecting collective interests and wielding diplomatic influence, particularly for small states facing material constraints. Therefore, the question is whether the effort to construct a regional identity would indeed be effective in asserting security interests externally. While the concept of collective identity entails a sense of ‘we-feeling’, it is simultaneously relying on its validation by others. This aspect warrants further examination, especially in terms of how external partners embrace and engage with a collective identity. As we explore below, the effectiveness of this collective identity is continuously influenced by the willingness of external partners to align with these Blue Pacific priorities in their foreign policies. The acknowledgement by external partners strengthens the political legitimacy of their collective identity, thereby enhancing the agency of the Pacific region within global geopolitical contexts. The legitimacy of identity is directly linked to the legitimacy of regionalism, determining whether it can serve as ‘a site of contest over how people in a region should live’.

Incorporation of the Blue Pacific Identity

The Pacific Islands’ commitment to addressing the challenges they face is evident in their security discourses. By highlighting the security issues as a whole region rather than on a state-by-state basis, PICs aim to construct a collective identity and assert a collective voice for their interests. This attempt illustrates the instrumental nature of identity, as articulated by Lawson, in deploying collective identity to pursue their own security. However, considering their reliance on foreign assistance, the effectiveness of this collective identity is contingent upon whether the external partners accurately represent and prioritise the security concerns of PICs in their foreign policies.

The recent establishment of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States in 2022 represents a positive response by the external partners to the Blue Pacific identity. PBP seeks to support the Pacific’s goals of prosperity, resilience and security through partnerships with Pacific governments. The three principles of PBP clearly support Pacific priorities: enhancing these the efforts of the aforementioned five countries in line with the PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, forging closer connections with the Pacific and elevating Pacific regionalism under the PIF and facilitating engagement with other partners that share the values of the Pacific. PBP will thus ‘be led and guided by the Pacific Islands’ (White House, 2022b). This partnership is open to other partners, as demonstrated by the inclusion of representatives from Canada, France, Germany, India and the Republic of Korea in the foreign ministers’ meeting in September 2022. Below, we examine how each partner state (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Japan) engages with the Pacific Islands and integrates Pacific interests through bilateral or multilateral means.

Even before the establishment of the PBP, the United States partially embraced the Blue Pacific identity. In 2021, during a hearing at the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Judith B. Cefkin, a retired US ambassador to the region, referred to the countries of Oceania as ‘the Blue continent’ and highlighted that non-traditional challenges were the greatest security threat to the region. Cefkin (2021) proposed that any increase in US military resources to the region should be matched by a corresponding increase in soft power resources, including an expansion of US Agency for International Development (USAID) programming and joint infrastructure projects with other donors.

In response to the PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, the US government announced a budget increase aimed at reinforcing the US–Pacific Islands Partnership in September 2022. USAID (2022b) also announced the expansion of its presence by re-establishing the regional mission for the Pacific in Fiji. In the 2022–2027 Pacific Strategic Framework, USAID (2022a) acknowledges the priorities of the Blue Pacific, specifically climate change, thereby asserting that its strategic framework closely corresponds to the priorities of the Pacific Islands. Following the declaration of the US–Pacific Partnership, the US government announced the allocation of over $810 million towards expanded programs aimed at improving the lives and well-being of Pacific peoples (White House, 2022d). In 2023, USAID (2023) announced additional funding of $5.5 million in nine new grants to support PICs in bolstering their resilience to climate change and protecting the livelihoods and well- being of their communities.

Besides increased cooperation, closer diplomatic ties can also be observed. In 2022, the United States named an envoy to the PIF for the first time (White House, 2022d). Furthermore, the bill presented in the US Senate in 2023 to establish the position of Special Envoy to the PIF states that said envoy should have a direct line of communication with the President and Secretary of State ‘regarding the unique and particular needs of Pacific partner nations’ (US and PIF Partnership Act, 2023).

Efforts are being made by other partner countries to address the concerns of the Blue Pacific. Australia, the largest donor to PICs, has made significant efforts not only in strategic defence but also in the issues aligned with the priorities of the Blue Pacific. For instance, following the Boe Declaration, Australia announced a new project to examine the impacts of the sea-level rise on maritime zones and developed Pacific-led solutions with a budget of A$3.5 million between 2019 and 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Australia), 2019). Furthermore, Australia announced that it would double its climate finance commitment to A$2 billion over the period of 2020–2025, with at least A$700 million of this amount allocated to Pacific climate and disaster finance in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Australia), 2021). Moreover, Australia increased its official development assistance to the region by A$900 million over four years from 2022, which included support for climate change and resilience (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Australia), 2022). The newly appointed Foreign Minister of the Australian Labor Party, Penny Wong (2022a), announced the start of a ‘new era’ for Australian involvement in the Pacific, highlighting ‘our Pacific family and the Pacific priorities’, and stated that past governments had ignored Australia’s responsibility to address climate change. In a subsequent speech later that year, she pledged to increase the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific from A$3.5 billion to A$4 billion to support grant and loan packages, as well as the investment in climate-related infrastructure through the Pacific Climate Infrastructure Financing Partnership (Wong, 2022b).

Another regional partner, New Zealand’s engagement with PICs is driven by New Zealand’s strong Pacific identity, which has been carefully cultivated to avoid being perceived as having a colonialist approach (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Parliamentary Committee, 2020, p. 9; Powles, 2021). This identity is linked to New Zealand’s national interest because the stability and prosperity of the Pacific directly affect the country. The Pacific Reset, introduced in 2018, seeks to move towards genuine partnerships and focuses on non-military areas such as climate change, effective governance and youth empowerment. The Advancing Pacific Partnerships strategy of 2019 from the Ministry of Defense also emphasises New Zealand’s identity as a Pacific nation, which underscores its endorsement of the Blue Pacific identity as ‘one oceanic continent’ (Ministry of Defence, 2019, p. 4). Interviews conducted with individuals from Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu revealed that Pacific Islanders perceive New Zealand as more effectively engaging in a ‘Pacific-mode’ than Australia, its PIF counterpart (Peacifica et al., 2020, p. 33). This is a testament to the successful cultivation of New Zealand’s Pacific identity. Its approach has been accepted by the Pacific islanders, and it is clear that New Zealand’s efforts are being positively received.

The Blue Pacific concept has been embraced to some extent even by states that have not traditionally been considered major partners of PICs. For instance, Japan’s engagement with the Pacific Islands has been viewed as ‘slow and steady’, with a largely development-oriented character (Envall, 2020). This trend is still active, as the ninth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM9) adopted the Pacific Bond (KIZUNA) policy to ensure Japan’s cooperation with the PIF is in line with the region’s priorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021a). Japan and PICs discussed five priority areas for the next three years from 2021, including COVID-19 response and recovery, sustainable oceans based on the rule of law, climate change and disaster prevention, strengthening foundations for sustainable and resilient economic development, and human exchanges and capacity building (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021b). Japan has spent $1.5 billion on the Green Climate Fund in 2015–2018, with an additional commitment of up to $1.5 billion in 2020–2023. It is the second largest donor of the fund, following the United Kingdom (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021c). The following year, Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi pledged to reinforce cooperation on climate change issues and endorsed the PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. Furthermore, discussions were held in 2023 on the discharge of wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and Japan has since made efforts to engage in dialogue and address PICs’ concerns. ² Therefore, Japan continues to provide aid for climate change and environmental issues in the Pacific.

The UK government also recognises the importance of the PBP and the need to align its approach with the priorities of PICs. The UK government announced a new initiative of the Indo-Pacific strategy that included £2.9 million, with £1.8 million specifically allocated to nine South Pacific countries. The strategy also includes the creation of nine new diplomatic posts, including in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. It focused on building stronger economic ties, addressing climate change and working together on science partnerships. Additionally, in 2021, the UK government signed an agreement with the Pacific Community for £263,000 to help Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Tonga secure their ocean spaces (United Kingdom Government, 2021a). The UK government also pledged £274 million for a new ‘Climate Action for a Resilient Asia’ program and £40 million to help Small Island Developing States become more resilient (United Kingdom Government, 2021b, 2021c). However, despite UK Aid’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, most has been spent on Asia (37.3% of the total of region- specific bilateral official development assistance in 2022, the second largest receiving region following Africa, 44.1%), the Pacific region received only £9 million. This represents 0.4% of the total and, therefore, makes it the smallest receiving region (FCDO, 2023, p. 15). It must be noted that the Pacific region is not a top priority for the United Kingdom, and its approach towards the region is limited.

Generally, the Blue Pacific identity has been embraced by external partners, despite variations in policies and aid amounts. The engagement of these external partners with the Pacific islands illustrates that the Blue Pacific identity has successfully incorporated the traditional ‘Other’, encouraging their involvement in Pacific security priorities. This has been made possible by establishing another ‘Other’: climate change, identified as the single greatest threat, and addressing it collectively through the voice of the Blue Pacific continent, representing a unified entity of Pacific islands. Pacific leaders strategically navigate the geopolitical landscape, asserting their voices as a collective identity that serves as an instrument to pursue their own agenda.

Conclusion

In recent years, the security landscape in the Pacific region has undergone a significant transformation. In this context, we examined the current trend in the Pacific region and how PICs are navigating this situation to assert their own security priorities through collective identity. In addition, we assessed the extent to which external partners are embracing PICs’ security interests in their foreign policies. While traditional hard security issues remain relevant, growing recognition is given to the importance of human-centred security issues, including climate change. PICs are seeking to avoid being caught up in the strategic competition among the external powers. Instead, they are keen to enhance regional security primarily through a human-centred security viewpoint, by strengthening partnerships with both traditional and new external partners. Thereby, the divergent understandings of security between the Pacific Islands and the external partners have led PICs to construct a collective identity: the Blue Pacific, as a means of asserting their interests and prioritising their security issues. This identity formation aims to make their voices more audible to the external powers in the midst of intensifying geostrategic competition in the region.

The Blue Pacific identity emerged as a response to non-traditional security challenges. Subsequently, it became closely intertwined with the diplomatic means of asserting the interests of PICs. To assert their political autonomy and interests, Pacific leaders have emphasised the interconnectedness of the Pacific region through the use of ‘sea-of-islands’ metaphors during identity construction. Yet, in this context, the Pacific region’s identity formation remains relational. Instead of relying on the traditional contrast with the West as the ‘Other’, climate change now takes on the role of another ‘Other’, enabling Pacific islanders to shape their collective identity. This approach has yielded success in gaining recognition and support from the external partners to some extent, including the West, the traditional ‘Other’, as evidenced in the PBP and climate-related assistance. External partners are beginning to acknowledge that the Pacific Islands’ underdevelopment and vulnerability to climate change are factors that China can leverage to expand its influence in the region.

However, the effectiveness of constructing a collective Blue Pacific identity remains a topic of debate. Although the PIF’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, which outlines several proposals to address PICs’ own security issues, has been embraced by the United States and its allies, uncertainty remains regarding how effectively it can translate into concrete policy actions and outcomes. Implementing those proposals in practice and collaborating with these partners pose significant challenges. Despite some positive reactions from the external partners, as mentioned above, tangible actions are needed to achieve the desired outcomes.