This article examines the variety of roles enacted by Asia-Pacific middle powers in response to the rise of China. This article identifies two factors determining such variety, especially in the security realm: alignment pattern and geopolitical constraints. We argue that the differences in level of alignment with the United States and the risk of geopolitical tension with China affect the role conception taken by the middle powers. We assert that the combination of a high-level of alignment and high geopolitical risk tends to cause them to take a bridging role, a low-level of alignment and low geopolitical risk drive them to take the role of regional leader, a high-level of alignment and low geopolitical risk allow them to become faithful allies, and a low-level of alignment and high geopolitical risk enable them to take an active independent role. We illustrate this framework through the comparative analysis of Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Vietnam.
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