“The new force in our country”: The emergence of post-truth feminism in the Russian media environment

Abstract

This article analyzes the complex interplay between the Putin regime and feminist activism within the realm of media practices. Through the case study of “photoshop activism,” the paper argues that in the context of “informational autocracies,” opposition actors can replicate the ideological frameworks and practical attitudes of the dominant regime in their own media practices. This adoption of authoritarian media tactics leads to the emergence of post-truth feminism, which combines both progressive and reactionary elements. By examining the intersections of authoritarian and progressive tendencies in feminist activism, the article warns that such practices can undermine public trust in activists, thereby hindering the formulation of a positive agenda and the achievement of structural changes. In conclusion, the paper calls for greater attention to the influence of “informational autocracies” on the development of media strategies by opposition actors.

In “The History of Sexuality,” Foucault (1990: 95) made his famous observation that “resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” On the contrary, power and resistance are intertwined in a complex network of relationships through which there is a constant exchange of discourses, technologies, and practices. Moreover, both ruling groups and opposition actors, despite their antagonistic views, can draw on the same cultural horizons and social attitudes. For example, analyzing the mass protests in Russia in 2011–2012, Gabowitsch (2016: 111) insightfully noted that although these protests were anti-Putin, they were at the same time “profoundly shaped” by Putin’s policies. As an illustration of his thesis, Gabowitsch points out that by focusing almost exclusively on the figure of Putin himself, these protests reproduced the centralization and personalization of power characteristic of the Putin regime. Similarly, many anti-democratic and anti-war movements today “can reproduce typical authoritarian practices” simply because the participants in such movements “were socialized in an anti-democratic environment” (Kronov, 2024: 12). This is not surprising, as political practices and imagination are always shaped by the broader cultural and historical context (Gomes, 2023). If this context is authoritarian, then, as Gabowitsch and Kronov show, there is a high probability that certain elements of authoritarian thinking or practices will be reproduced—intentionally or unconsciously—even in movements challenging authoritarianism.

Following this insight, the present paper investigates how the context of “information autocracy” (Guriev and Treisman, 2019) in contemporary Russia influences the media practices of protest movements, particularly feminism. The analysis of media practices is especially relevant, as media play an increasingly significant role in modern activism worldwide (Cammaerts, 2012; Chadwick et al., 2016; Clark-Parsons, 2022). In Russia, against the backdrop of restricted political rights and freedoms, digital media have become the primary infrastructure for opposition movements (Austausch, 2022; Glazunova, 2022), including feminism (Ratilainen and Zhaivoronok, 2024).

Simultaneously, the global media landscape is increasingly dominated by various practices of information manipulation, such as post-truth. Experts note that the spread of post-truth threatens contemporary democratic values as “it threatens to no longer recognize or effectively take down established democratic institutions…, while replacing them with populist or authoritarian leadership” (Koekoek and Zakin, 2023). Other scholars warn that under the hegemony of post-truth, neither fair and free elections nor “the protection of minority rights, and therefore fundamental human rights” can be guaranteed (Adler and Drieschova, 2021: 362). This is particularly evident in the Russian media environment, where practices of information manipulation play a key role in legitimizing the ruling authoritarian and conservative regime (Alyukov and Zavadskaya, 2024; Guriev and Treisman, 2019; Litvinenko, 2022).

To analyze the relationship between the media practices of ruling groups and the opposition, this paper proposes a case study of a prominent feminist protest in Red Square in 2017, where a group of feminist activists effectively employed post-truth media practices to garner surplus public attention (Костюченко, 2017a). Both Russian and international media (Meduza, Novaya Gazeta, Deutsche Welle, BBC, BuzzFeed) reported extensively on this case, which was often referred to as “photoshop activism.” The focus of the analysis will be on two manifestos or Statements by the organizers of this protest action, which were published on the Novaya Gazeta website (Костюченко, 2017a, 2017b). Additionally, the discussion of this case among feminist and opposition activists on the Facebook platform will be analyzed. This article aims to provide a detailed analysis of the case of “photoshop activism” in Russia to address three questions: How do feminists perceive and describe the Russian media system? What are the political and ideological foundations and effects of post-truth feminism? What critique of post-truth feminism can feminists committed to the politics of truth (Shomali, 2010) offer?

Based on the analysis of activist Statements, this paper argues that the feminists who organized this protest reproduce the modus operandi of media controlled by the Putin regime in their media practices. Specifically, they do not view the media as a watchdog responsible for providing objective information and educating society. Instead, they perceive the primary function of the media as manipulating or even creating reality, and they act accordingly. Moreover, these feminists also reject the normative value of concepts such as “truth” and “objectivity,” which are replaced by the notion of effective communication and a cynical sensibility. Thus, the paper confirms the thesis that opposition movements, including feminism, can reproduce practices and attitudes characteristic of authoritarian regimes. In the case of “information autocracies,” opposition actors may use reactionary media practices as a legitimate and even commonsensical part of their repertoire of action. However, such an appeal to reactionary media practices can undermine the democratic, feminist, and other progressive ideas that these opposition movements seek to convey. In conclusion, the paper calls on researchers to pay critical attention to the circulation of ideas and practices between reactionary and progressive movements, especially in the realm of modern media technologies and practices.

This article is structured as follows. First, I contextualize post-truth feminism by briefly reviewing the main features of the hybrid media system in Russia (Chadwick, 2017) and the intra-actions (Barad, 2003) between feminist activism and media in the country. Then, I outline my methodology, data, and positionality. Next, I offer an in-depth and detailed analysis of “photoshop activism” and the ensuing debates within the Russian feminist community. In the final section, I offer my reflections on the political implications of post-truth feminism for the feminist movement and other oppositional actors.

Hybrid media system in Russia

While post-truth is a global media regime, it has its own idiosyncrasies and peculiarities in different national contexts. Unfortunately, there is no space here for an extensive discussion of the genealogy of the Russian hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017). Suffice it to point out that the dominant media regime in the country emerged from certain historical conjuncture within which heterogeneous practices and structures—Soviet media regime, shock transition to neoliberal economic model in the 1990th, power struggle between regional elites and federal center, emergence and rapid spread of Internet throughout the country, growing authoritarianism, global media trends and the like—interpenetrated and intermingled with each other, creating distinct post-truth media-environment (Gatov et al., 2017; Glazunova, 2022; Golosov, 2011; Litvinenko, 2022; Roudakova, 2017; Yablokov and Schimpfössl, 2021).

Utilizing both Soviet era managerial techniques and up-to-date socio-technological innovations, such as bots and “troll factories” (Kiriya, 2021; Linvill and Warren, 2020), the Russian ruling political elite over the years was able to establish the regime which Guriev and Treisman (2019) characterize as an “informational autocracy.” This form of governance legitimizes its authority not only through overt coercion but via the nuanced control and manipulation of information, fostering an environment where public trust in media and political institutions is systematically eroded. Simultaneously, the media politics of Putin’s regime transcends the mere dissemination of a particular ideology. Instead, it aims to cultivate widespread distrust, engendering a societal condition where cynicism pervades the public perception of all media and political actors (Alyukov, 2023; Alyukov and Zavadskaya, 2024).

Researchers characterize the post-truth regime of hybrid media in Russia as cynical, eclectic, inconsistent, providing distorted and fictional narratives (Litvinenko, 2022; Pomerantsev, 2017; Tolz and Hutchings, 2023). Cultural critic Mark Lipovetsky identifies the following characteristics of the Russian pro-governmental media’s modus operandi: amoralism, the outright rejection of ethical standards, and a pervasive cynicism. Central to this modus, as Lipovetsky asserts, is the “rejection of the categories of ‘truth’, ‘reality’, and ‘fact’, which are replaced by the ‘hyper-reality of simulacra’ or performative acts that exploit reality as mere material for aesthetic fabrication” (Lipovetsky, 2018). In this ideological framework, reality does not objectively exist, but is rather seen as a projection of power games and thus can be manipulated or (de)constructed in any way to serve the interests of power elites (Adler and Drieschova, 2021; Kurennoy, 2016). Lipovetsky notes that the discourses legitimizing the post-truth regime often draw on concepts and metaphors from postmodernist thought. This reactionary appropriation of postmodernism involves the distortion of postmodernist ideas to justify and perpetuate authoritarian practices. Lipovetsky (2018) emphasizes the distinction between post-truth discourses and postmodernist constructions: the latter aims to undermine traditional notions of reality and power-knowledge nexus, while the former strives to construct a specific representation of reality that serves the interests of maintaining and reproducing existing power structures. As Schindler (2024: 103) argues, unlike postmodernism, “post-truth discourse is marked not only by the denial of objective truth, but also by the dogmatic belief in certain truth claims.” In other words, while postmodernism represented a critical epistemology, the post-truth regime represents a cynical ontology, legitimizing “the politics of bad governance” under Putin (Gel’man, 2022) and other authoritarian leaders (Cosentino and Alikasifoglu, 2019; Etl, 2018).

The same post-truth regime has been used in Russian propaganda since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Litvinenko, 2022; Tolz and Hutchings, 2023). But it’s vital to understand that the ruling elite in the country weaponized the post-truth media regime not only to achieve its aims in foreign politics. Equally important, that during past decades post-truth regime was used to undermine the legitimacy of political opposition within Russia, to distort the public discourse, discredit democratic institutions, and disengage citizens from being actively involved into political life of the country (Alyukov and Zavadskaya, 2024; Roudakova, 2017). Consequently, post-truth, as a dominant reactionary media practice, plays a central role in sustaining Putin’s regime. Despite efforts by liberal opposition media to counter the regime’s manipulations with “new sincerity” (Roudakova, 2017: 196–217) Lipovetsky (2018) cautions that the cynical post-truth attitude is not confined to the power elites alone but also permeates among “powerless outsiders”.

Media and feminism

The relationship between media and feminism occupies a paradoxical position in the research literature on contemporary feminism in Russia. While many scholars have highlighted the media’s central role in shaping feminist movement during last decades in the country (Perheentupa, 2022; Solovey, 2022; Sperling, 2015; Yangeldina, 2023), the specific nature of this impact remains underexplored. Thus, the assertion that media has been pivotal to the development of feminism in Russia over the past two decades warrants critical examination. This necessitates a shift in research strategies from merely acknowledging the media’s importance to closely investigating how the Russian media environment shapes feminist culture and politics. Central to this investigation is understanding how the post-truth media environment has influenced feminist discourses and activism in Russia in recent decades.

Scholars argue that the new media environment profoundly transforms feminism, reshaping its political and practical contours (Clark-Parsons, 2022; Fotopoulou, 2016; Pruchniewska, 2018; Saraswati, 2021; Semenzin, 2022). Perheentupa, in her examination of Russian feminism, supports this view, noting that new media platforms lead to increased fragmentation and individualization of feminist activism (Perheentupa, 2022: 144). This suggests that media are not merely passive tools but actively shape feminist imagination and practice, influencing relationships between different feminist groups and their engagement with broader societal contexts. Building on this perspective, I undertake a nuanced study of the relationship between media and feminism in Russia. This study aims to elucidate the mediated dimension of feminist political thinking and practice and to understand the positionality of various feminist groups in relation to Putin’s propaganda.

Аnalyzing feminism in isolation from its intertwined dynamics with media risks missing a critical aspect of feminist politics, especially in the age of pervasive communicative technologies. Such a perspective is particularly missing from studies on Russian feminism, even though the different aspects of the Russian hybrid media system—such as censorship, propaganda, the digital divide, blogging, and media activism—have been well studied (Barash et al., 2020; Gladkova et al., 2020; Glazunova, 2022; Kiriya, 2021). This article aims to bridge this gap by integrating the complexities of Russia’s hybrid media system into research on contemporary feminism, underscoring the indispensable role of media in shaping the trajectory and nature of feminist movements. This study represents the first attempt at such an analysis, with the aim of unpacking and analyzing the media ideology of certain feminist groups in its intra-actions with the post-truth media environment of contemporary Russia.

Methodology

Case study

This research employs a case study methodology, defined as “an intensive study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon)” (Gerring, 2004: 341). It focuses on a specific feminist protest in Moscow, examining how the organizers framed the protest and the subsequent discussions within the feminist community. The study aims to uncover the activists’ rationale behind the protest, rather than its media representation. Therefore, it centers on the event itself and the reactions it elicited from the Russian-speaking feminist community on Facebook.

While case studies traditionally focus on a singular phenomenon, they also inherently suggest that the researcher examines the phenomenon in interaction with its broader context. As Yin puts it, the “case study researcher analyzes complex social interactions to uncover or construct ‘inseparable’ factors that are elements of the phenomena” (Yin, 2009). Therefore, this analysis intertwines the study of post-truth feminism as a distinct instance of feminist activism with the Russian media context within which it emerged.

Thus insights, provided by case study, go beyond the specifics of the examined situation or phenomenon (Ragin, 1994). Although the study of a particular case may not generate universally applicable findings for all types of feminisms across every context, it facilitates an in-depth exploration of specific trends that might recur in different scenarios (Donmoyer, 2009; Yin, 2009). The “photoshop activism” case, while distinctive, is situated within a political and media landscape that is not exclusive to it. Likewise, the perceptions of media and politics held by organizers of this protest are not solely characteristic of this group. Thus, in the article’s conclusion, I draw on this case study to discuss the broader implications of varying media ideologies and practices for the evolution of feminist activism and other oppositional actors in Russia.

To narrate and analyze this case, I employ a “storyline” as both a narrative and analytical framework. This approach allows for a concurrent description and analysis of the event. A “storyline” is conceptualized as “a set of sequences of actions and positions saturated with cultural meaning and therefore offering potential interpretations linked to characters and practices” (Søndergaard, 2002: 141). This results in an unconventional article structure that divides the analytical part into two phases, each corresponding to different stages of the event, and it includes a section on the social media debate sparked by the feminist protest. Thus, the article chronicles the unfolding of “photoshop activism” over time, merging the narration of events with a detailed, contextual analysis.

Data

Scholars have explored “photoshop activism”, but not to its full extent. In her insightful analysis, Perheentupa (2022: 141–145) relies on interviews with various feminist activists. However, a significant amount of data remains outside the scope of her study. For instance, Perheentupa does not mention the two manifestos or Statements published by the protest organizers (Kostyuchenko, 2017a, 2017b), in which they explicate aims and logic of their actions. Although Perheentupa mentions discussions of this case on social platforms, she does not provide a detailed analysis of these discussions. Furthermore, despite noting that “photoshop activism” “resonates with the populist tactics and post-truth era communications” (Perheentupa, 2022: 123), she ultimately approaches it as “modifying the truth” (Perheentupa, 2022: 141), thus eschewing an in-depth analysis of the imbrications between post-truth media practices dominant in Russia and feminist activism. Thus, her focus on this case highlights its centrality for understanding the feminism-media nexus in Russia, but further research is necessary.

I argue that public statements made by activists are vital to understanding this case. As I will demonstrate, the activists used both the form and content of these statements to highlight their perception of the media, while also explaining and legitimizing their actions. These statements help reconstruct the meaning of the protest as intended by the feminists and provide insight into the subsequent social media discussions. I undertake a close reading of the two statements published on the NG website on March 8 (Костюченко, 2017b) and March 10 (Костюченко, 2017a) 2017. Additionally, I utilize other sources, including comments by journalists who documented the feminist protest, and statements from the organizers and participants of the protest action, also published in NG.

Beyond these materials, I explore statements made on Facebook by the organizers of the protest action, the participants of this protest, and the journalists involved, as well as the subsequent discussion that these statements initiated. In total, I analyze 15 Facebook posts published between March 8 and March 13, 2017, which collectively garnered over 1200 comments from approximately a hundred users, predominantly from the feminist, leftist, and journalistic communities (the author arrives at this conclusion based on personal familiarity with these communities). Of the 15 posts analyzed, six were critical of “photoshop activism,” while nine were supportive. However, each post sparked a discussion where the opinions of supporters and critics clashed. It is challenging to determine the exact number of critical and supportive comments, as some comments are difficult to categorize definitively. Generally, supportive posts attracted more supportive comments, and critical posts attracted more critical comments. Nonetheless, both positions were well-represented in the discussion. The posts and comments were analyzed using thematic analysis. My analysis primarily seeks to understand the expressed perceptions regarding the media’s functions, its role in political and social life, and which media practices are deemed effective and legitimate from the perspective of different feminist activists.

Positionality

Since 2013, I have been actively engaged in feminist and queer activism in Russia. My activist experience encompasses organizing and participating in street protests, conducting educational events, and facilitating reading groups. Additionally, I have managed various online blogs on feminist, queer, and leftist politics. As an activist, I possess substantial background knowledge (Nabudere, 2008) of the feminist scene, particularly in St. Petersburg, where I resided. Undoubtedly, my experience in feminist activism, along with years of observing the development of feminist media in Russia, informs my analysis. On the one hand, my experience allows me to better understand the context, dynamics, and significance of the case described. On the other hand, my perspective is inevitably shaped and constrained by my involvement in Russian-language feminist media activism. I am not a neutral observer; my stance is inherently political. Indeed, feminism is always a political stance, and feminist research cannot be value-neutral.

Research ethics

In March 2022, a Russian court designated Meta, the parent company of Facebook, as an extremist organization, resulting in the prohibition of its operations within the country (BBC, 2022). Although Russian authorities have stated that individual Facebook users will not be targeted due to this court ruling, the legislative and enforcement landscape in Russia remains subject to rapid and unpredictable changes. Furthermore, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian state has intensified its repressive actions against activists and independent journalists (OVD-Info, 2024). Given that any form of public exposure could potentially pose an indirect threat to the well-being and safety of activists involved in or discussing protests on the now-extremist platform Facebook, the author has chosen to omit names from this article, including those of public figures. Additionally, all Facebook comments cited are presented only in the author’s translation and in an anonymized and slightly altered format in accordance with ethical fabrication strategies (Markham, 2012). This approach ensures that the authors of the quotes cannot be identified.

Phase I: Feminist activism between truth and provocation

On March 8, 2017, a group of feminists took to central Moscow with a series of pickets. They displayed signs with such messages as “A woman should be the patriarch [of the Russian Orthodox Church],” “200 years of men in power—down with it,” “A woman should be the President,” and “Men, get out of the Kremlin.” They also put a banner reading “National Idea—Feminism” atop one of the Kremlin towers, capturing the attention of Russian and international media (Perheentupa, 2022: 141).

To document this event, the organizers engaged with independent media, including journalists from the Nobel Prize winning Novaya Gazeta (NG), an outlet recognized for its investigative reporting and critical stance on issues like the war in Chechnya and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine. The activists contacted journalists in advance, providing them with information about the time and place of the unauthorized protest. Following the protest, four activists and three NG journalists covering their actions were detained by police and later released after several hours of interrogation (BBC, 2017). Photo-documentation of the protest and the “Activists’ Statement” (AS), a manifesto created by the protest organizers, were published on the NG website (Костюченко, 2017b).

Securing a platform for the full publication of the AS in NG marked a significant achievement for the feminists, particularly within the Russian context where public discourse is predominantly conservative and freedom of expression is restricted (Glazunova, 2022; Sperling, 2015). Even in countries with more democratic and open media cultures, media outlets often heavily frame protest actions, frequently altering the activists’ narrative (Cammaerts, 2012). In contrast, this collaboration with NG provided the activists with an opportunity to convey their message directly, demonstrating NG’s substantial support for the feminist movement. How did activists utilize this unique media opportunity? What message did they communicate to a broader audience?

Stylistically the AS can be divided into two parts. In the first part of the text, the activists enumerate the various forms of discrimination and violence that women face in contemporary Russia. For instance, the AS states that “one in three women in Russia has experienced rape,” and “one in four women has faced physical violence.” Additionally, it highlights that women continue to bear the primary burden of domestic work, and points to the “glass ceiling” issue: “men are preferred for all high-status positions”.

However, the AS not only criticizes gender-based discrimination but also challenges the myth of gender equality in the country: “In Russia, equality between men and women is declared. However, in reality, this equality is a myth”. Elsewhere, the AS asserts: “Currently, the authorities are concerned with including women’s rights in the political agenda. But this is merely a trick before the upcoming elections, aimed at increasing the electorate”.

Thus, the AS portrays the rhetoric of the ruling regime about gender equality as a myth or an electoral trick designed to manipulate public opinion. The AS rhetorically contrasts this myth with the statistical, and thus objective, reality (“one in three,” “one in four”) of violence against women and their discrimination in various spheres. Clearly, in this context, both “myth” and “trick” are objects of feminists’ criticism, emphasizing the importance of telling the truth and revealing the actual state of affairs. It can even be argued that conveying the truth about gender inequality occupies a central place in the teleoaffective (Schatzki, 2005) structure of the AS.

It is worth noting that this ethos of “truth telling” aligns feminists with the discourse of “new sincerity” within the Russian opposition, where critical truth is contrasted with the corrupt and deceitful Putin’s regime (see Roudakova, 2017). Thus, the first part of the AS takes a critical stance towards the authorities and their manipulation of public opinion and information. Additionally, the discussion of various forms of violence and discrimination that women face functions as a “feminist killjoy” (Ahmed, 2010), unsettling the public by drawing attention to the often-invisible suffering of women in the private sphere.

The first part concludes with a discussion on the critical role of women’s representation in political institutions, asserting:

Global practices show that when women in power constitute less than 30%, they tend to acquiesce to the male majority. It’s only upon reaching or surpassing the 30% threshold that they begin to enact decisions benefiting women (Костюченко, 2017b).

Given this premise, one might anticipate a demand to elevate women’s participation in power institutions to a minimum of 30% or higher. Contrarily, in the second part of the AS, the narrative diverges significantly from such “global practices,” advocating instead for the complete substitution of men in positions of power by women—proposing a new era of female rule in Russian governance for the next 220 years: “Since 1796, the country has been continuously governed by men… It is time for women to take over for the next 220 years” (Костюченко, 2017b).

This last proposition could be interpreted as inspired by the radical feminist ideology that enjoys popularity in modern Russia (Kirey-Sitnikova, 2016; Yangeldina, 2023). At the same time, the call for female rule over the next 220 years can also be seen as an expression of the carnivalesque and provocative performativity characteristic of certain strands of feminist activism in Russia (Perheentupa, 2022: 140–141). As Perheentupa points out, such a carnivalesque approach to activism often results in protests whose purposes are not immediately clear, shifting away from a direct articulation of a feminist agenda or the laying out of explicit political demands. Such tactics prioritize capturing media attention, sometimes at the expense of rendering feminism into a form of spectacle. Thus, at the level of goal-setting, the transition from the first part of the AS to the second can be seen as a shift from formulating a specific problem to creating a provocation. Accordingly, the implicit understanding of the role of media also changes. While the first part is aimed at truth-telling, the second part focuses on attracting attention, refusing to make any concrete demands other than “men must go”.

On another critical note, it is worth mentioning that the call for exclusively female rule for 220 years, even if it is a joke or “styob” (Yurchak, 2006: 249), also sounds undemocratic, as it excludes not only men but also non-binary and transgender individuals from power. This is especially concerning as the AS did not clarify the nature of the envisioned female political regime—whether democratic, authoritarian, or otherwise. The only implicit reference to a model of female rule pointed to is the absolutist reign of Empress Catherine the Great (Madariagade, 2002), the last instance of a woman leading the Russian state/empire. The reign of Catherine the Great, which ended in 1796 with the empress’s death, was a period of colonial expansion of the Russian Empire, including the annexation of Crimea. In the context of current Russian authoritarianism and imperialism, and especially considering the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, such a reference is more ominous than promising.

Summarizing the analysis of the AS, it can be said that the main media practice in the first part of the text is truth-telling and the debunking of myths and ideological tricks produced by the dominant regime. This approach aligns the AS with progressive media practices that seek to expose and challenge systemic misinformation (Glazunova, 2022; Roudakova, 2017). By highlighting the harsh realities of gender-based violence and discrimination, the AS aims to dismantle the facade of gender equality promoted by the authorities. However, the second part of the AS functions more as a provocation designed to generate additional attention. This shift from a straightforward critique to a more provocative stance can be seen as a strategic move to capture media interest and public discourse. This provocation however eschews the formulation of clear political demands, instead shifting the text into a carnivalesque register.

Phase II: The emergence of post-truth feminism

By the evening of March 8, multiple photojournalists had revealed that the Kremlin tower photo, published in NG and showing activists with a “National Idea—Feminism” banner, was a fake. The organizers of feminist protest initially stated they were unaware of the fabrication, indicating they too were misled. They claimed that a subgroup of activists, participating independently and without personal ties to the main organizers, had submitted the fake image (Костюченко, 2017a). The NG journalists contacted this “subgroup.” Responding to the journalist’s inquiry, the “subgroup” sent a manifesto outlining their position, which NG then published as “Statement of Photoshop Activists” (SPA) (Костюченко, 2017a). But this was not the end of the story either.

On March 10, NG journalists continued their investigation and revealed that no “subgroup” existed; the initiative to produce and circulate the fake photo had originated from the protest’s main organizers. Confronted with these findings, the organizers admitted to producing both the fake photo and the SPA (Wonderzine, 2017). They also apologized to the deceived journalists, but the NG journalists refused to accept the apology. They stated that “the real victims in this story are our readers” (Meduza, 2017), indicating that the scandal with the fake photo could negatively impact readers’ trust in NG. The news that feminists had faked the Kremlin photo went viral and was discussed by international media (Lytvynenko, 2017; Times, 2017). BBC Russia included “photoshop feminism” in its list of the top 10 most significant fakes of 2017 (BBC Russia, 2017).

The SPA opens with a paradoxical admission: the activists acknowledge creating a digitally altered image, yet they challenge the notion of it being fake. They assert, “Yes! It was us who produced the fake picture with the Kremlin tower… More precisely, we didn’t just photo-edit it—we actually created it.” The activists further elaborate on the process, detailing how they purchased materials like fabric and acrylic paints, crafted the banner, photographed it, and then used Photoshop to modify the visuals. Since all the practices involved in creating the fake image actually took place, the activists conclude that the image itself was real, or as one of the organizers of “photoshop activism” would say in 2020, it “was not entirely fake” (see Гарина, 2020).

The photograph is indeed real in an ontological sense, as the fake image exists. As we know from social sciences, myths are generally quite real in the sense that they exist and have a tangible impact on social life. However, in an epistemological sense, neither myths nor fake photographs are real, as they depict things that do not exist in reality—such as mermaids or feminists climbing the Kremlin tower. The SPA, however, blurs the boundary between ontology and epistemology—a move characteristic of the cynical post-truth regime of Russian media (Lipovetsky, 2018; Litvinenko, 2022). The text implies that if the fake photo is real in an ontological sense, then it is also real from an epistemological perspective, and therefore, the use of fake images is entirely normal and legitimate.

Indeed, the idea that reality is constructed through the interconnected flows of information and power is a leitmotif of the SPA. The text proclaims that the media construct reality through “vbros” (вброс): “You live in an information field, where billions, pumped from the state budget, are invested into production of vbros’es” and “Modern society consists of vbros’es” (Костюченко, 2017a). But what exactly is a “vbros”?

The “vbros” (вброс) can be seen as a form of “flooding” or “spin” (see Adler and Drieschova, 2021) where the goal is to flood the information space with misleading or sensational content to distract or confuse the audience. It also aligns with the concepts like “black PR” and “kompromat,” both of which gained traction in Russian journalism and PR in the 1990s. Alena Ledeneva (2014) in her seminal study characterizes kompromat and black PR as practices of disseminating information that discredits political opponents or business competitors. Information used in black PR or kompromat may range from partially accurate to entirely fabricated. As elucidated by Ledeneva (2014), the factual correctness of kompromat holds little significance compared to its ability to impact its target’s public image. The paramount concern in such media practices is the resultant media effect, not accuracy.

The National Corpus of the Russian Language (NCRL, n.d.) defines “vbros” as the dissemination of information aimed at discrediting certain politicians or businessmen. However, the term “vbros” extends beyond this, to the release of any information designed to captivate an audience through its novelty or sensationalism. Hence, a “vbros”, unlike kompromat, does not inherently serve to defame. Its primary function lies in capturing public attention by any means. The accuracy of the information provided is secondary to its capacity to evoke public engagement. Therefore, practices such as “vbros,” alongside kompromat and black PR, constitute the key tools of information manipulation within the ambit of Kremlin media strategies (Roudakova, 2017).

By declaring that “modern society consists of vbros’es,” the SPA paradoxically ontologizes and legitimizes the modus operandi of the authoritarian media environment under Putin’s regime, rather than critiquing it (as was the case in the AS). It also taps into a global cynical sensibility that takes for granted the “belief that all public discourse is fake, that words do not match actions, and specifically that self-interest is behind all claims to… objectivity” (Schindler, 2024: 103). In other words, in the practical understanding (Schatzki, 2005) of the photoshop activists, creating fake information or a vbros is a common-sense and thus completely legitimate political practice, which should be embraced for its effectiveness, rather than rejected for its dubious ethics and association with Putin’s media regime. This confirms Lipovetsky’s (2018) observation that in modern Russia, cynicism and amorality in handling information, characteristic of post-truth practices, are elevated to commonsensical practical understandings shared by both the ruling elites and disenfranchised groups.

The SPA also explains not only the logic behind using the fake photograph but also the specific function of this action in the overall concept of the protest: “we gave additional promotion (раскрутка) to the protest.” Thus, the use of the fake photograph is portrayed in the SPA as a deliberate technique, an “additional promotion,” that helped attract extra attention to the protest. The authors of the SPA refer to this technique as “раскрутка” (“raskrutka”). “Раскрутка” is a slang term with several meanings, including a marketing promotion of a product, or an attempt to deceive a customer (NCRL, n.d.). Notably, in the thesaurus, the first synonym for “раскрутка” is “deception” (Словарь Синонимов, n.d.). This indicates that “раскрутка” clearly carries the same connotations of “manipulation” and “unscrupulousness” in handling information and public opinion as “vbros.” However, in the SPA, both terms are stripped of their negative connotations and are used in a neutral or even positive sense.

Indeed, the activists take pride in the fact that their fake photo sparked a strong public outcry:

“We did a great job! Whether the context is positive or negative doesn't matter—the word 'feminists' is now on everyone's lips. Bold feminists who scaled the tower! Nasty feminists who fooled everyone. Disgusting feminists, emerging as a new force in our country!” (Костюченко, 2017b).

This statement reveals that for the self-proclaimed “disgusting feminists,” the substance of their message is irrelevant; the primary objective is to capture public attention. Thus, the activists perceive the media as a mere tool in a struggle for power, where the ultimate manifestation of power is seen, conditioned by post-truth’s hegemony, as an ability to “bullshit” (гнать пургу) the audience. The SPA poses a rhetorical question: “Did you think that only the authorities can bullshit you?” (Вы думали, что гнать пургу может только власть?). This question associates power with the capacity to “bullshit,” while simultaneously asserting that feminists possess this ability as well. Consequently, it could be argued that, within this context, the ability to “bullshit” emerges as a form of feminist empowerment in the post-truth environment. By leveraging “vbros” to draw widespread public attention, the SPA positions feminists as “a new force in our country,” capable of bullshitting on par with Putin’s regime.

The SPA concludes with the following passage:

“Women are killed by the thousands at home, left in poverty and loneliness to raise children imposed on them. They are raped… Every day. Oh, how ashamed we are of the fake! Okay, we were wrong, let's leave everything as it is. Until the next vbros. Until the next lie” (Костюченко, 2017a)

The enumeration of various forms of violence and discrimination experienced by women in this passage clearly correlates with the enumeration of forms of gender-based discrimination in the AS. However, in the AS, this articulation of gender discrimination was presented as an act of truth-telling, opposed to the manipulative tricks of the ruling regime. In the SPA, however, the manipulative media practices of Putin’s regime are not only not condemned but normalized and considered as a model to emulate. Thus, in the SPA, violence against women is mentioned in the context of legitimizing post-truth practices. This raises the question of the epistemological status of the description of violence against women in the SPA. Is the description of gender violence just another vbros? An affirmative answer would confirm the anti-gender movements’ attempts to present data on gender discrimination as manipulation and therefore not worth attention (see Budgeon, 2021). A negative answer calls into question the central idea of the SPA that “modern society consists of vbros’es,” and thus undermines the legitimacy of feminist post-truth media practices. However, the SPA does not resolve this emerging contradiction.

Moreover, like the AS, the SPA does not formulate any specific demands or proposals for improving the situation of women. The activists themselves do not claim any other achievements besides the fact that their actions had a viral effect and thus became publicly visible, “regardless of the context.” Perheentupa rightly notes that during the period in question, the struggle for public visibility was a priority in the strategies of Russian feminists. Indeed, achieving public and media visibility is important for various political actors in different contexts, as such visibility allows them to convey their demands and/or proposals to a wide audience (Cammaerts, 2012, 2021; Chadwick et al., 2016). However, as Natalie Fenton (2016) points out, while public visibility is crucial for political actors, visibility alone is not inherently political. It becomes politicized when embedded into actual political campaigns and struggles, otherwise media activism transforms into a form of spectacle. The “photoshop activists” captured public attention, but what follows once visibility is attained remains an open question. This absence of a clear agenda or set of demands highlights a significant aspect of their strategy: the focus on visibility over substance.

Moreover, as was noted by critics (see next paragraph), the non-contradictory combination of any positive political program with the explicit justification of post-truth practices is hardly possible in principle. This is because post-truth practices inherently involve the manipulation of information and the blurring of the lines between truth and falsehood, while achieving any political goals and demands requires public support based on trust (Adler and Drieschova, 2021). In this respect, the teleoaffective structure of the media practices of the “photoshop activists” coincides with the “anti-hope structure of feeling” characteristic of reactionary feminists described by Kay (2024: 9). The “anti-hope structure of feeling” suggests that it is pointless to try to change the male-dominated gender order, so women should abandon the idea of getting rid of patriarchy and instead start profiting from it. Similarly, the use of manipulative media practices implies that it is pointless to change the post-truth regime, so one should use its logic and extract visibility by playing by its rules. This approach is evident in the SPA’s embrace of “vbros” and “raskrutka” as legitimate tactics.

Thus, both post-truth media practices and the “anti-hope structure of feeling” are based on the disavowal of “any utopian desires for large-scale social and political transformation” (Kay, 2024: 9). Instead, they propose accepting the rules that dominate the field of gender relations and media and trying to maneuver within these rules to achieve their own goals. This strategy of maneuvering within the existing power structures rather than seeking to fundamentally change them limits the potential for transformative feminist politics. Feminist post-truth media practices reflect a pragmatic approach that prioritizes short-term visibility and impact over long-term structural change. While such practices may yield immediate results in terms of media attention, they ultimately reinforce the very systems of power and oppression that maintain and legitimize gender hierarchies and inequalities in the first place.

Online discussion of “photoshop activism”

The case of post-truth feminism triggered lively debates among Russian-speaking feminists on Facebook. A segment of the feminist community criticized the actions of the photoshop activists, while another segment welcomed them. The voices of both critics and supporters were rather equally represented in the discussion. This indicates that despite photoshop feminism being a one-off event, a significant portion of the Russian feminist community shared its organizers’ post-truth media ethos. Therefore, the results of the analysis of photoshop feminism could be extrapolated beyond this specific case, offering insights into the media ideologies among some segments of Russian feminists.

In what follows, I focus on voices critical of post-truth feminism for two reasons. Firstly, I intend to clarify that not all Russian feminists support post-truth. Secondly, I believe that activists can offer a more precise and reasoned critique of post-truth feminism, as their arguments are grounded in direct political experience. Thirdly, the arguments of post-truth feminism supporters largely align with those of the organizers, and thus, analyzing their position would not contribute new insights.

Feminist critics of photoshop feminism

Feminists critical of “photoshop activism” argued that feminist protest should not mimic the dominant media ideology in the country. One user put it thus:

[Justifying post-truth feminism] is like saying “I totally support President Putin.” Our country’s primary ideology for the last 20 years has been postmodernism; what's the point of reproducing this ideology? (Facebook)

Hence, feminists critical of “photoshop activism” understand that Russia’s dominant media ideology is a cynical post-truth (Lipovetsky, 2018; Litvinenko, 2022) that disregards the value of objectivity and truth. Unlike the protest organizers, these critics believe feminism, like other opposition movements, should not reproduce it. Instead, according to their views, feminism should adhere to the politics of truth.

In the rhetoric of critics, truth is valued as: (1) a moral virtue in itself, (2) a symbolic element of political antagonism distinguishing the “opposition” from the “regime,” and (3) a normative attitude necessary for societal trust. One critic emphasized truth’s role as a moral value within the logic of political antagonism: “What distinguishes grassroots politics from official politics is exactly the truth. Truth is the essence of grassroots activism, as it stands against manipulations and fights for the trust of people tired of political machinations.” This comment reflects the logic identified by Rudakova (2017) and Zhuravlev (2014). in the Russian opposition: for a protest movement, “truth” forms a crucial part of collective identity, distinguishing protesters from the “corrupt” and “deceitful” regime.

Beyond the symbolic aspect of truth, which helps maintain the boundaries of collective identity, its pragmatic aspect is also crucial. For instance, the above comment mentions that protest movements must fight for the trust of people tired of manipulations. According to this logic, the use of fakes undermines public trust. This stance is exemplified in a comment: “This Photoshop story makes it more difficult to make other people relate to feminism, as they will remember this lie.” Hence, to attract new supporters, feminists need to earn public trust. Using fakes not only fails to generate support but actively undermines public trust. Therefore, despite achieving visibility, post-truth feminism weakens feminism’s legitimacy instead of bolstering it.

Others noted that truth and objectivity are vital elements of feminist activism per se. If truth and fake are indistinguishable, then, for example, defending victims of sexualized violence becomes impossible. As one user wrote, in a post-truth world, “any claim from the victim’s side could be easily dismissed as a made-up story”. Consequently, proving the reality of sexual or any other violence becomes epistemologically impossible (see Budgeon, 2021). From this perspective, post-truth feminism ultimately undermines the foundation from which women can articulate their grievances and defend their rights.

Thus, while some Russian feminists interpret media through the post-truth lens, others align with the “new sincerity” prevalent in the broader Russian opposition (Roudakova, 2017). These differing perspectives influence how various feminist groups engage with the media. Proponents of post-truth feminism perceive politics as a media-driven spectacle, prioritizing visibility and media influence as the ultimate feminist political objectives.

Other feminist groups are more critical of post-truth as a politico-epistemological regime. They view the current trend of politics’ spectacularization in Russia as a strategy that benefits the Kremlin. Their critique extends beyond recognizing that post-truth feminism mirrors Putin’s media ideology; they condemn its effects: fostering public mistrust toward activists; eroding the credibility of the feminist cause; violating feminist ethics; and undermining ties between independent journalists and activists. These critics challenge post-truth feminism by reaffirming the importance of truth and objectivity in feminist and oppositional activism. They argue that media visibility is crucial only insofar as it facilitates the articulation of positive agendas and the development of public trust, both essential for mobilization and building opposition to the regime. In other words, while media is important for feminist politics, it should not be reduced to the pursuit of visibility nor comply with the hegemonic media order.

Conclusion

The central thesis of this paper is that feminism, like other protest movements, can reproduce the discourses and practices of the conservative and authoritarian regimes they oppose. In the context of informational autocracies, feminists may follow the same logic and employ the same techniques as media controlled by the Putin regime. As the analysis of the “photoshop activism” case demonstrates, the same activists can criticize certain aspects of the ruling regime (such as gender discrimination) while simultaneously legitimizing and normalizing other aspects (such as the instrumental and cynical use of media). This observation underscores the numerous connections and intersections between power and resistance, which researchers should not overlook but rather analyze in detail.

However, the problem is not only that feminists or other progressive groups may use certain ideas and practices from the arsenal of authoritarian regimes. The issue lies in the consequences of such use for these opposition actors. As the analysis of “photoshop activism” shows, the use of post-truth practices ultimately undermines the progressive message that feminists intended to convey through their protest. Moreover, information manipulation practices in general erode public trust in both activists and the media, thereby hindering the possibility of structural changes in the future. For a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of various information manipulation technologies on oppositional actors employing them, further research is needed. Besides “photoshop activism,” one could also consider the use of bots and fake accounts by the Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Free Russia Foundation (see Литаврин and Полозняков, 2023). Studies aimed at understanding how different audiences respond to such techniques would be particularly valuable. This research could illuminate the broader implications of these practices for the credibility and effectiveness of opposition movements.

Thus, the conclusion from examining “photoshop activism” is that within informational societies, especially under informational autocracies, researchers studying feminism or other forms of political activism should, if not prioritize, then at least consider activists’ media practices. Other researchers (Glazunova, 2022) have highlighted that under repressive authoritarian regimes, media play a crucial role in activist projects, serving as both infrastructure and a focal point for civic initiatives. Consequently, media practices become integral to all political projects, aiming either to maintain the status quo or challenge it. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important for researchers to analyze not only the discourses produced by various actors but also to question the quality and political effects of the media practices they employ. For a comprehensive understanding of diverse political movements, including but not limited to feminism, it is imperative for researchers to integrate into their analysis the “practical understandings” of activists regarding the functioning, meaning, and social role of media that shape the political strategies of these movements.