Geopolitics in the ESC: Comparing Russia’s and Ukraine’s use of cultural diplomacy in the Eurovision Song Contest

Abstract

The Eurovision Song Contest has long served as a platform for cultural diplomacy among its participants. This paper examines how Russia and Ukraine have approached cultural diplomacy in and around the Eurovision Song Contest in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Following an outline of pertinent events from 2014 to 2022, including the Song Contest and the respective countries’ selected entries as well as the public discourse surrounding them, two distinct types of cultural diplomacy—culturalist versus neo-propagandist—are employed in a congruence analysis. The findings show that Russia employed a largely neo-propagandist approach to cultural diplomacy characterized by their projected image of peacefulness, innocence, and strength to alter their situational image. Ukraine has employed a mostly culturalist approach mainly focused on mutual recognition and the representation of national culture. The conscious instrumentalization of the platform to counter misconstrued perceptions of Ukraine shaped by the Kremlin’s rhetoric also adds neo-propagandist elements.

Introduction

The Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) has often been portrayed as merely a kitschy, shrill spectacle in Western European media. While that is certainly the appeal for large parts of its audience, this narrow view disregards the possibilities a music competition of this size offers in terms of cultural diplomacy. Because of its political potential, the contest has been the subject of academic research, mostly in the fields of cultural studies and international relations. Scholars have referred to the Song Contest as a “cultural seismograph” (Yair, 2018: 10) and shown that it “reflects the issues of the day [… and] has the capacity to illuminate debates surrounding national identity, polity and protest” (Jordan, 2009: 40). The former director of Eurovision, Jørgen Franck, argued that to him, the song contest was a battlefield and that “if we didn’t have that battlefield, we might have more battles” (Fricker and Gluhovic, 2013: 99). However, since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 began the Russo-Ukrainian war, there has been an actual battle in Europe. Both countries have participated in the ESC since then until Russia was banned from the contest in response to their invasion of Ukraine. The aim of this paper is to analyze how Russia and Ukraine have approached cultural diplomacy in and around the ESC in the wake of the war.

Several case studies have investigated the contest and single entries employing theories related to cultural diplomacy, nation branding, public diplomacy, and soft power. The employed concepts, however, often remain blurry and are not differentiated clearly. Moreover, there is a lack of comprehensive studies that investigate strategic patterns in the two nations’ approaches to cultural diplomacy for the period between 2014 and 2022. To address this gap in the literature, I present an analysis of the two countries’ approaches based on a comprehensive review of events and a conceptualization of cultural diplomacy by Zamorano (2016). Zamorano distinguishes between a culturalist approach, more closely related to cultural relations, and a neo-propagandist approach that entails an instrumentalization aimed at power or persuasion. While the supposedly “non-political” ESC was intended as a platform for culturalist cultural diplomacy, it has frequently been portrayed as highly politicized. Because Zamorano’s distinction covers both ends of this spectrum, I apply his categories in a congruence analysis.

The application of Zamorano’s theory shows that while the framework provided by the ESC is designed for culturalist approaches based on the reciprocal communication pattern inherent to the event, it leaves some room for instrumentalization. Russia’s approach can be categorized as neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy due to the strong control of the message and the attempts at persuasion and power demonstration. Especially with female representatives, there was a strong focus on projecting an image of peacefulness and innocence. Ukraine has employed a mixed approach, largely based on cultural exchange and the representation of Ukrainian culture and heritage. Its entries have often provided counterarguments to Putin’s claims about Ukraine – most notably, Crimean Tatar singer Jamala, who won the contest in 2016 with a song highlighting the historical patterns of Russian aggression and Kalush Orchestra, who provided an anti-war anthem with their winning entry “Stefania” in 2022. However, because the Ukrainian broadcaster has at times intervened in the selection process to ensure that their representatives at Eurovision share their stance on the Russian invasion, Ukraine also exhibits neo-propagandist elements regarding instrumentalization and control of the message.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The next section presents a review of the ESC, the theoretical framework, and relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the pertinent events in a chronological order from 2014 to 2022. Section 4 puts forward the congruence analysis to determine which category of cultural diplomacy best explains both Ukraine’s and Russia’s approach. Section 5 discusses results and limitations. Section 6 concludes the analysis.

Background and theoretical considerations

The Eurovision Song Contest

The ESC is an international music competition that has existed since 1956 and was originally conceived as a project to bring European countries together through a shared cultural event after the Second World War. Since then, it has taken place annually ¹ and has in recent years attracted over 200 million viewers. It is organized by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) which consists of public broadcasters from Europe and West Asia. Since 2015, Australia has also been taking part in the contest. Each broadcaster selects an entry to represent their country and compete against the other countries. Since 2010, each edition of the contest has had its own logo and slogan, usually messages reflecting the spirit of Eurovision like “Building Bridges” or “Come together”.

Traditionally, the country that wins the contest becomes the host country the following year. The Big Five (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) ² and the host country are set to be in the final. All other countries must qualify in semi-finals. The vote is split between national expert juries and a public televote, each making up 50%. Each competing nation gets the same number of points to give out - regardless of their size, population or economic prowess.

While the first contest only included seven countries, it has expanded over the decades. After the cold war, former Soviet states have joined the competition. Russia made their debut in 1994 and was generally very successful, winning in 2008 and finishing in the top five 10 times. Ukraine joined the contest in 2003 and is the only country that has never failed to qualify for the final. It won the contest three times in 2004, 2016, and 2022 and managed eight top five finishes.

The official rules of the ESC explicitly define it as a “non-political event” (EBU: 7), stating that all participating broadcasters need to ensure that the contest “shall in no case be politicized and/or instrumentalized” (ibid.). This rule has been enforced numerous times: In 2009, Georgia chose to send a song titled “We don’t wanna Put In” containing obvious references to the Russian president shortly after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and was therefore asked to change the lyrics which it declined and therefore did not participate that year. In 2015, Armenia called for recognition of the Armenian genocide with a song titled “Don’t Deny”. Since this was deemed too political by the EBU, it had to change the title to “Face the shadow” and went on to participate, lyrics unchanged. When the Icelandic band Hatari waved Palestinian flags during the final of the contest in Israel, the Icelandic broadcaster was fined. When Portuguese contestant Salvador Sobral wore a sweatshirt saying SOS Refugees, the EBU asked him to stop wearing it due to the supposedly political messaging. These are just some examples of actions that the EBU deemed political to a degree that required intervention.

In its statutes, the EBU declares that one of its main purposes is to contribute to “safeguarding and improving freedom of expression and information, which is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society” (EBU, 2020: 1). However, broadcasters from countries with authoritarian governments and severely limited freedom of expression like Belarus, Azerbaijan, or Russia have also long been part of Eurovision. Thus, the EBU has been giving states whose policies do not align with their statutes a platform to present themselves in a favorable light in front of a large audience. Membership in the EBU, and thus participation in the ESC, only ever hinged on technical requirements, never political ones (cf. Vuletic, 2018: 215f).

There have been some shifts from this lately: In 2021, the Belarussian broadcaster BTRC was suspended due to the suppression of media freedom in Belarus. This was the first time a broadcaster was suspended from the EBU. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the country was banned from competing in the ESC that year, marking the first instance of a nation being excluded because of geopolitical aggression. In response, Russian broadcasters left the EBU.

Cultural diplomacy, soft power, and nation branding

There is currently no universally agreed upon definition of cultural diplomacy. Scholars have offered varying descriptions and while there is generally a consensus that it entails the use of culture for political, economic, or otherwise diplomatic purposes, one point of contention is the question of who conducts cultural diplomacy. While especially in historical contexts, cultural diplomacy is sometimes narrowly defined as “intervention by the state” (Faucher, 2016: 375), the definition that is most commonly referred to nowadays is a broader one by Cummings who states that “cultural diplomacy is the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their people in order to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2009: 1). This opens the door to the inclusion of non-governmental actors who, as in the case of the ESC may be artists or musicians. Kaefer argues that the inclusion of non-governmental actors adds credibility since “citizens are the best sources and producers of authentic stories about the country” (Kaefer, 2020: 133). It has therefore been contended that cultural diplomacy has a greater effect when it is not directly associated with a state’s government (cf. Goff, 2020: 31).

Cultural diplomacy may involve exhibitions, exchange programs, the export of art, music and film, literature, educational programs or other aspects of culture. Lenczowski points out that the “universal language” of art and music can lead people to discover “aesthetic commonality [which] can, in turn, inspire respect and trust” (2011: 179).

While the terms nation branding and cultural diplomacy are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature and have both been used in reference to Eurovision, their main difference lies in their respective objectives: the focus of cultural diplomacy generally lies in geopolitical aims, nation branding is mainly targeted at economic purposes. Kaefer’s concept of nation brands as “values-based platforms” (2020: 130) entails a meaningful search for a country’s national identity. However, he indicates that, while in Europe, nation brands are expected to strongly align with reality, in Asia, branding tends to be more aspirational and a degree of dishonesty is thus more accepted (cf. ibid.: 132).

Cultural diplomacy and nation branding are commonly understood as means to achieving soft power – a term coined by Joseph Nye to describe “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2008: 94) which distinguishes it clearly from the military and economic factors that are at the core of hard power. Nye’s conception of soft power hinges on the values, culture, and policies associated with the respective country as resources that are promoted through means of public diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is therefore often defined as a subcategory of public diplomacy. These resources only contribute positively when they are viewed as authentic, appealing, and legitimate.

Nye’s development of the concept of soft power allowed scholars to view it in its multifaceted nature instead of the previously prevalent association with propaganda (cf. Faucher, 2016: 374). However, lines between the concepts remain blurry and Melissen argues that public diplomacy and propaganda “often go hand in hand” (2006: 7). He identifies the pattern of communication as the main difference between public diplomacy and propaganda, writing that “public diplomacy is similar to propaganda in that it tries to persuade people what to think, but it is fundamentally different from it in the sense that public diplomacy also listens to what people have to say” (2005: 18). As Grix and Brannagan have pointed out, Nye’s conceptualization of Soft Power, important as it is, remains rather opaque and therefore does not easily lend itself to research application (cf. 2016: 251).

To supply the discourse with a clearer differentiation, Zamorano (2016) distinguishes two ideal types based on different scholars’ conceptualizations of cultural diplomacy: culturalist and neo-propagandist. Culturalist (or reflexive) cultural diplomacy focuses on the representation of territorial culture through artistic or educational means. It is intended for long-term effects and seeks mutual recognition through dialogue and an in-depth exploration of identity. This model centers on “the multilateral promotion of pluralism and intercultural dialogue in the international system” (ibid.: 179) and highlights the cultural significance of identities, arts, and heritage instead of their instrumentalization, so there should not be much government involvement in the process. In the case of neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy, culture is instrumentalized as a tool for political or economic gains. The main goal is to create a positive image abroad. It is thus often employed to transform “a situational image, [manage] ‘difficult’ problems, or [manipulate] international geopolitical scenarios” (ibid.). This entails more government involvement and a shorter effect.

The Eurovision Song Contest as an arena for cultural diplomacy and nation branding

The ESC has been subject to a number of academic inquiries, often focused on voting patterns (e.g. Yair, 1995; Garcia and Tanase, 2013) to identify voting blocks and explain cultural relations and shifting dynamics within Europe. Yair coined the contest a “seismograph for exposing national traumas and cultural conflicts” (2018: 11) and Bohlman suggests that “minority and majority politics compete for and on the main stage” (2007: 66).

Eurovision has been described by multiple authors as an arena for cultural diplomacy and nation branding, because it offers nations a platform to win over people’s hearts and minds on a large, international scale through the use of music as a cultural product. Carniel argues that therefore, “each country’s performance can be understood as a covert form of nation branding” (2019: 159), but shows that this branding for foreign audiences does not always correspond to authentic self-representation.

Even though participants in the ESC are not official representatives of their states’ governments, they are often understood as such: There is a lot of diplomatic language around Eurovision – the teams from each state are consistently called “delegations”, artists often referenced as ambassadors and the entry and artists are often treated as being synonymous with the state they represent, each performance being broadcast with the name and flag of the state and points usually being awarded to the country as well (as in “10 points to Italy”). In fact, the country is the only thing listed on the Eurovision scoreboard.

Nation branding is a way to further a state’s chances in the omnipresent, indirect competition between nations for investment, talent, or tourism. In the ESC, this implicit competition is embedded in an actual, explicit competition between different countries in which they get 3 minutes to present their nation. While the EBU provides a set of rules regarding both lyrics and performance, broadcasters can choose how they want to see their country represented on stage rather freely. This differentiates the Eurovision Song Context from other big international events like the Olympics or the FIFA world cup in which participants, due to the less creative nature of the events, cannot send out messages quite as freely and individualized. The different elements of Eurovision performances however – the artist, the song, its lyrics, melody, singing style and instrumentation, the staging, and the costumes – offer a multitude of ways to represent what a nation is about. Presenting a nation’s values and culture to an international audience can be a key factor in building a “reputation as a reliable partner” (Jordan, 2014: 22) and especially smaller countries need to “punch above their weight” (ibid., 24) regarding “culture, image and branding” (ibid.) to achieve this. Jordan (2011, 2014) and Ismayilov (2012) have published extensive studies on nation branding and nation building in Estonia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, showing how the nations employed participating in, winning, and hosting the contest to improve their images and forge closer ties with Europe.

Yair states that the ESC is inherently “predicated on two contradictory agendas” (2018: 5), emphasizing European unity and brotherhood on the one hand while on the other highlighting each nation’s individual identity. Depending on the current political situation and who the broadcaster seeks to appeal to, it might be more useful for a nation to accentuate their progressive European values and Western orientation rather than their national traditions or vice versa.

Appealing to Western Europe has been especially important for former Soviet states that started joining the EBU and participating in the ESC after the Cold War. Jordan argues that this can be viewed as a “manifestation of the return to Europe within the sphere of popular culture” (2011: 12) and thus contributes to dissolving divisions and getting to know countries in a new light. Participating nations have often demonstrated their “Europeanness” by sending Europop-Songs in line with Western pop music trends and performing them in English rather than their native language to make them more accessible to the international audience. In light of the contest’s core values of inclusivity and diversity and its large LGBTQ fandom, allusions to queer culture are common and present a way to demonstrate progressive values and policies. Cassiday (2014) and Zhonga (2022) show that even Russia with its focus on “traditional values” and harsh anti-LGBTQ policies has used the contest to stage queer-coded performances by faux-lesbian duo t.A.T.u. and Dima Bilan to reach progressive European audiences. Finally, some delegations bring in extra props or special effects teams for their performance which can serve to demonstrate modernity, wealth, and innovation through technological prowess.

Vuletic points out that, when entries are selected through public voting, the ESC represents a “rare example of cultural diplomacy that is the direct result of a national, democratic process” (2019: 307f). However, he also shows that authoritarian leaders have frequently criticized the contest’s voting system to claim a bias by Western states (cf. ibid.: 310).

There are multiple case studies exploring both Russia’s and Ukraine’s representation on stage. Meerzon and Priven (2013) show how Russian entries in the 2000s were used to signal the nation’s desire to re-establish itself as a global superpower. Johnson (2014) illustrates how Russia’s 2009 entry, a Ukrainian singer singing in both Ukrainian and Russian, was used to evoke the Soviet rhetoric of the friendship of peoples and could therefore be read as a “veiled threat” of a renewed expansion of the Russian empire. Furthermore, she demonstrates how the circumstances surrounding the singer’s selection were framed in Russian media to differentiate their own welcoming culture from the purported “cultural authoritarianism” in Ukraine – a precursor to Putin’s later arguments for the invasion. Kazakov and Hutchings (2020) show how the discourse around Russia’s 2017 ESC representative Juliya Samoylova was used in a similar manner.

Pavlyshyn uses three cases to demonstrate how Ukraine represents itself in the ESC. The examples include Jamala’s “1944” which won in 2016, Ruslana’s “Wild Dances” which brought the country its first win in 2004 and displayed a distinct Ukrainian identity grounded in ancient traditions, and Verka Serduchka, a drag artist who reached second place in 2007. While Serduchka’s campy performance may have seemed nonsensical at first glance, it was “widely decoded as a proclamation of severance from Russia” (Pavlyshyn, 2019: 132) and Johnson describes it as a mockery of a “failed Russian utopia” (2014). Cashman (2017) studies Ukraine’s win in 2016 against the 2014 invasion and shows voting patterns in the contest correlate with states’ political responses to the invasion.

While there are some case studies into recent entries, both from Ukraine and Russia, there have not been any comprehensive studies contrasting the countries’ use of cultural diplomacy over the period from the Crimean annexation in 2014 to the full-scale invasion in 2022. Furthermore, the concepts of cultural diplomacy, nation branding, public diplomacy, and soft power often remain blurry and fall short in addressing political ambiguities on display in the ESC. Given its focus on cultural exchange and rules against politicization, it seems the ESC was designed to be a platform for what Zamorano (2016) calls culturalist cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, the ESC has often been accused of being highly politicized, in recent years especially regarding Russia and Ukraine. Such politization points to Zamorano’s concept of neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy.

To contribute an adequate analysis of recent events and address the apparent ambiguity surrounding the concept of cultural diplomacy on display in the ESC, I apply a more distinct conceptualization of cultural diplomacy. Based on a review of Ukraine’s and Russia’s actions in and around the ESC between 2014 and 2022, I distinguish culturalist and neo-propagandist elements employed by the countries in the wake of the war. Subjects considered in the analysis include the artists, songs, and genres, lyrics and instrumentation, the staging and images projected, as well as the national selection process, the political context of the time, statements in interviews or press conferences, and the media discourse.

Russia and Ukraine in the ESC 2014-2022

ESC 2014

After Russia had invaded and annexed Crimea in February and March 2014, both Russia and Ukraine went on to participate in the contest in May as planned. While Mariya Yaremchuk and her upbeat pop song “TickTock” had been selected to represent Ukraine in a public pre-selection in December, Russian broadcaster Russia-1 cancelled previous plans to host a public pre-selection and instead announced in March that it had opted to internally select the Tolmachevy Sisters to represent the country singing “Shine” (cf. Omelyanchuk, 2014).

The 17-year-old twins performed in flowy golden dresses and long blonde ponytails on a stage lit up in bright white and golden lights, smiling sweetly throughout their performance and were described as looking “cute, young and innocent” (Pop, 2014). Lines like “Sending out a message […] Telling all the world to show some love” combined with the innocence projected through staging, outfits and the performers’ demeanor clearly mark a stark contrast to the international perception of Russia as a geopolitical aggressor at the time.

While the Ukrainian act came in seventh, the Tolmachevy Sisters, despite ending up in eighth place and thus being seemingly positively received, were heavily booed in the arena both when qualifying for the final and whenever receiving high scores from another country in the final itself, which the international press attributed mainly to the crisis in Ukraine, but also to recent restrictions of LGBTQ rights in Russia (cf. Gibson, 2014). This led the EBU to implement “anti-booing technology” the following year so that such politically motivated reactions could not be heard in the broadcast. Executive producer Jon Ola Sand recalled an encounter with the Tolmachevy sisters after the show and expressed great sympathy, stressing how young and upset they were. He underscored that the ESC could not be politicized to such a degree that it would turn into “a political battlefield” (ESCKAZ, 2015).

Meanwhile, 2014s win of drag artist Conchita Wurst for Austria was widely interpreted as a statement for tolerance and against Putin’s homophobic policies. It caused outrage among Russian conservatives who framed it as symptomatic of Europe’s “moral decay” (Zhonga, 2022). Deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin tweeted that the result “showed supporters of European integration their European future: a bearded girl” (Davies, 2014).

ESC 2015

In 2015, Ukrainian broadcaster NTU announced Ukraine would not participate in the contest that year, citing an unstable financial and political situation, military aggression from the east and the annexation of Ukrainian territories (cf. Zurab, 2014). The event was still broadcast in Ukraine.

Russian broadcaster Channel One internally selected pop singer Polina Gagarina who, Kazakov and Hutchings argue, embodied a “retrograde femininity” (2020: 139) that lined up well with the Kremlin’s push for “traditional values”. Her song “A Million Voices” was “written by a truly international team” (Brey, 2015) as the promotion stressed. With lines like “We are the world’s people/Different yet we’re the same/We believe in a dream/Praying for peace and healing”, the song called for people to come together in harmony and love. On stage, Gagarina wore a white gown that lit up in white lights, just like the stage. Surrounded by backing musicians all dressed entirely in white, she delivered an emotional, vocally strong performance. The white clothes and lights added to the peace imagery, the LED projection of a globe behind the performers and Gagarina desperately reaching out her arms throughout the performance further underlined the message of a global coming-together. Fricker argued all this made the song not only highly effective, but actually “manipulative” (Mulholland, 2015).

The song ended up reaching second place in the final. Still, whenever Russia received points, there was a lot of booing in the arena which indicates there was awareness and criticism of the political context among the contests’ international audience. Nevertheless, people across Europe were swayed to vote for the entry. The absence of Ukraine from the contest possibly contributed to a greater perceived authenticity – the audience believing in Russia’s display of peace and harmony without an active reminder of the ongoing crisis. While journalists expressed sympathy for Gagarina who had shed tears over being booed in the Green Room and pointed out that the singer did not represent Russia’s policies (cf. BBC, 2015), it is worth mentioning that she went on to perform at Putin’s Moscow Rallye 2022, celebrating the invasion of Ukraine and has since been included in a list by the Kremlin, recommending artists of a “patriotic orientation” (Meduza, 2022). Her later actions clearly show conscious political representation.

ESC 2016

In 2016, Ukraine returned to the competition, having publicly selected Crimean Tatar singer Jamala and her song “1944”. The title alludes to the year of Stalin’s deportation of Crimean Tartars, the song telling the story of Jamala’s great-grandmother who was among those deported. The opening lines “When strangers are coming/They come to your house/They kill you all and say we’re not guilty” immediately paint a dark, brutal image of war and violence in relatively simple English that make them accessible to the international audience. The lines “Where’s your mind?/Humanity cries/You think you are gods/But everyone dies” address the oppressors directly and appeal to their humanity. The chorus is sung in Crimean Tatar, the lines “Yaşlığıma toyalmadım/Men bu yerde yaşalmadım” are taken from the Crimean folk song “Ey, güzel Qırım” (Oh beautiful Crimea) and roughly translate to “I could not enjoy my youth/I could not live in this place”. At the time, Crimean Tatars were experiencing renewed repression under Russian rule with multiple activists in detainment and the suppression of Tatar media (cf. Rainsford, 2015).

The obvious parallels to the recent annexation of Crimea under Putin’s Russia and ongoing conflict quickly led to discussions about whether this breeched Eurovision’s “no politics” rule and Russian State Duma deputies called on the EBU to ban the Ukrainian entry. However, based on the argument that it was not about current politics, but Jamala’s personal family history, the EBU allowed the song to compete (cf. Katzenberger, 2016).

Ukraine took up its own fight to bend Eurovision’s “no-politics” rule in their favor after the EBU accidentally released a list of flags that are banned from the contest. Generally, only flags of UN-recognized states are allowed at Eurovision, LGBTQ- or EU-flags are accepted, but disputed regions’ flags are explicitly forbidden to prevent political disputes. Among those banned was the Crimean flag which people would therefore not be able to wave in support of Jamala. This led the Ukrainian vice-president to tweet that this suggested Eurovision accepted the annexation and was becoming “Russiavision” (Atazhanova, 2016). The EBU announced they were relaxing their flag policy the following week but implored the audience not to make political statements.

In Stockholm, Jamala’s staging was kept simple, dark colors and lighting reflected the sinister topic and mood of the song up until the last seconds of the song when the singer releases a wailing cry and a golden LED tree sprouts from projected roots beneath her feet. The performer stated that this imagery represents “where we came from, that we should know about our roots” (Wiwibloggs, 2016). The song is composed in the Mugham tradition and includes traditional instruments like strings, drums and the duduk (cf. Hindrichs, 2016). All these elements stem from ethnically Turkic communities and are therefore prevalent in Crimean Tatar culture, tying the song to her roots as well and differentiating it from traditional Slavic music styles prevalent in both Russian and Ukrainian culture. The mix between modern and folkloristic musical elements bridged the gap between history and presence, further underlining the parallels to the recent annexation. Overall, the entry had a much more serious tone than is common at Eurovision.

Russia, on the other hand, internally selected pop star Sergej Lazarev with a techno pop ballad titled “You are the only one”. Before the contest, he was the bookmakers’ favorite to win. The performance stood out for its advanced use of technology since the delegation had brought in an additional LED screen Lazarev could interact with and climb on, allowing him to show off his physical strength as well. Russia narrowly won the televote ahead of Ukraine, but combined with the Jury scores, Ukraine won the contest overall.

While Lazarev congratulated Jamala, he speculated that some of the juries, with whom he had placed fifth, were boycotting Russia ³ (cf. Bidder, 2016). Russian media reported that the juries of Western countries had gone against the people’s choice, implying that Russia had won the televote by a wide margin and juries had overwhelmingly backed Ukraine. However, Russia had received 361 points from the televote, Ukraine 323, while Australia won the jury vote in a landslide ahead of Ukraine. Cashman shows that voting patterns indeed followed states’ political reactions to the annexation in 2014 with juries from countries like Belarus or Azerbaijan that had remained sympathetic to Russia, awarding them top scores and juries from countries strongly opposed to the annexation ranking them lower (cf. Cashman, 2017). ⁴

There was immediate backlash among Russian politicians, one Duma deputy calling Ukraine’s win “a consequence of the propaganda war of information that is being waged against Russia” (Walker, 2016) and numerous politicians calling for a boycott of the contest in Ukraine the following year. Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov, a member of Putin’s United Russia party, said in his pledge for a withdrawal “The reality is that we will be unwelcome guests in a country seized by fanatics, who dream of destroying all the good between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples” (Rosenberg, 2017).

ESC 2017

Kyiv was chosen as the host city and the EBU and Ukrainian broadcaster UA:PBC jointly revealed 2017s logo and motto for the contest in Ukraine. The logo showed a Ukrainian necklace called Namysto which is traditionally worn as an amulet of protection, thus including an element of national cultural heritage in the branding and subtly alluding to the country’s need for protection. Each bead of the necklace has a different pattern, a reference to the chosen motto “Celebrate Diversity”. The slogan was identified by international media as an attempt to contrast Ukraine as an open-minded, European nation against Russia’s repressive LGBTQ policies.

There were speculations whether Russia would even participate given the tense political situation. However, Channel One internally selected Juliya Samoylova, a singer who had travelled to and performed in Crimea after the Russian annexation. ⁵ When Ukraine therefore predictably declined to issue the singer a visa, the fact that Samoylova uses a wheelchair was instrumentalized heavily by Russian media to criticize Ukraine for not living up to the “Celebrate Diversity” slogan, thus not embracing European values and the spirit of Eurovision. This criticism was picked up by international media outlets and supported by the EBU who publicly expressed disappointment in the Ukrainian decision. Samoylova’s disability was put front and center of Russian media coverage, consistently framing her as a poor, frail, disabled girl whose only wish was to go to Eurovision (cf. Kazakov and Hutchings, 2020). It also made her a perfect ambassador for diversity without taking a stance on LGBTQ issues.

An EBU executive stated in an interview that even before Ukraine’s visa refusal, the Russian delegation had not participated in any preliminary meetings or reserved accommodations in Kyiv, suggesting they had never actually planned to participate. The EBU suggested having Samoylova perform via video link which both broadcasters opted against (cf. Huber, 2017) and Russia consequently withdrew from the competition. The show was not broadcast in Russia that year. Despite the abundance of indicators that Russia’s actions had been solely based on political tactics, the Ukrainian broadcaster was fined by the EBU for their handling of the situation while Russia did not face any formal consequences.

The contest itself did not include any heavily politicized elements after Russia dropped out, but mainly allowed Ukraine to prove it was a nation capable of hosting high-quality, major events even in times of crisis. The host city Kyiv had made headlines in recent years for the political unrest around the Euromaidan, so hosting the contest was a chance to show Kyiv in a different light. It was decorated according to the diversity theme, the people’s friendship arch – a symbol of Russo-Ukrainian friendship crowning over the city – being painted as a rainbow and renamed the Arch of Diversity.

The event was considered a success as they organized a professional and high-quality show without any major issues. This demonstrated Ukraine's reliability as a partner, even in times of crisis. However, it was noted that the event had a presenting team consisting of three straight, white men, which marked a departure from Eurovision's history of having diversity among presenters. Having a more diverse set of hosts would have conveyed the motto and Ukraine’s belief in it more convincingly. The postcards would have been a chance to show different sides of the country and its culture, which resulted in massive increases in tourism for countries like Azerbaijan and Estonia (cf. Jordan, 2014; Ismayilov, 2012). Instead, UA:PBC opted to show the artists preparing for the contest in their home countries. On the other hand, giving guests the stage can also “create an image of the nation as a generous host unconcerned with their own image” (Carniel, 2019: 162) and demonstrate an “ethos of cultural relations” (ibid.: 161). This was further underlined by the hosts greeting every single spokesperson in the voting sequence in their national language – a rare occurrence.

Ukraine’s entry in 2017 was “Time” by rock band O. Torvald which demonstrated a variety within the Ukrainian music in comparison to previous years and showed that Ukraine is willing to embrace subcultures and more alternative music styles as well. They placed 24th out of 26th – Ukraine’s lowest finish to date. Previous Ukrainian winners Ruslana and Jamala performed their new singles as interval acts and electro-folk group ONUKA performed with the traditional Naoni Orchestra, all presenting modern music with a folkloristic twist, showing a balance between tradition and progressiveness.

ESC 2018

In 2018, Russia returned to the contest held in Lisbon, having internally chosen Juliya Samoylova to represent them at last. It was important for Russia’s credibility to have her compete again after it had crafted such a heroic story around her the previous year and to prove it had not only nominated her to set a diplomatic trap for Ukraine. Her song “I won’t break” underscores Samoylova’s fighting spirit, possibly alludes to her comeback after being excluded from the previous contest, but more likely marks another instance of her disability being in the promotional focus. Compared to previous Russian entries, both the song and the staging clearly lagged in production value. As a result, Russia failed to qualify in the semi-final for the first time since their introduction.

Ukraine held its annual public pre-selection in which X-Factor-winner Melovin emerged victorious with his pop rock song “Under the ladder”. His look and staging in Lisbon had a goth aesthetic, once again representing young Ukrainian subculture. He qualified for the final and proved popular with the public, reaching seventh place in the televote. However, juries placed him last, resulting in a 17th place finish overall.

ESC 2019

In 2019, multiple contestants of Ukrainian pre-selection Vidbir were questioned regarding their stance on Russia and Crimea by judges and host. Among them was the eventual winner, Ukrainian singer Maruv. Her electro-pop number “Siren Song” quickly created a buzz among fans and bookmakers, but days later, broadcaster UA: PBC announced they were not able to reach contractual agreements with Maruv and she would therefore not represent Ukraine at Eurovision. The singer had been criticized for her ties to Russia, continuing to tour there after 2014, with two upcoming concerts scheduled in 2019, and the rights to “Siren Song” belonging to Warner Music Russia. She was presented an amended contract including clauses that would not only require her to cancel the upcoming concerts in Russia and have the song’s rights transferred to the broadcaster, but also prevent her from improvising on stage or giving any interviews not authorized by the broadcaster, any breech resulting in a 2 million UAH (∼€66.000) fine, and only given 48 h to sign it – which she refused.

In an official statement, the broadcaster explained that “for the time of the contest the performer becomes a cultural ambassador of Ukraine and conveys not only their own music, but also becomes the spokesperson for the opinion of Ukrainian society in the world” (Vautrey, 2019) and that they did not agree on a vision for this ambassadorial mission. Maruv reacted, stating she was “a musician, not a bat in the political arena” (ibid.). The acts who had placed second and third in the national final were offered similar contracts, but declined, and Ukraine withdrew from the contest. The contest was still broadcast in Ukraine.

Russia-1 once again internally selected Sergej Lazarev to represent Russia with a pop ballad titled “Scream”. The song was presented in Tel Aviv with elaborate technologically advanced staging involving rain and multiple projections of Lazarev appearing on stage. It reached third place in the final, again scoring higher with the public than the juries.

ESC 2020

Following the controversy surrounding Maruv’s ties to Russia, the Ukrainian broadcaster published new rules for their national pre-selection Vidbir that included a stipulation that artists had neither performed nor participated in any events in Crimea or Russia since the annexation, would not do so at least until after Eurovision, and had not visited Crimea in violation of Ukrainian law (cf. NSTU). The competition was won by electro-folk band Go_A with their Ukrainian-language song “Solovey”. Channel One internally chose internationally successful Russian band Little Big to represent Russia with the alternative electropop song “Uno” which became a hit in multiple countries. However, the contest was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic and selected songs would not be eligible to compete the following year.

ESC 2021

Two weeks before the submission deadline for Eurovision entries in 2021, Channel One surprisingly announced they would hold a national final a week later without any information on the artists or songs. On March 8th, the first Russian national final since 2012 took place, including three contestants and deciding the winner solely through a public vote. Singer Manizha won with her song “Russian woman”, the first entry in 12 years to be sung in Russian. The song told a story of female empowerment, the historical and current challenges women face in Russian society, and combined elements of hip-hop, pop and Southern Russian folklore. Controversy quickly broke out among conservatives in Russia over Manizha’s ethnicity and her openly progressive political views. She was born in Tajikistan but grew up in Moscow after fleeing the civil war with her parents and had been an activist for victims of domestic violence as well as women’s and LGBTQ rights for some time. Several politicians like Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of the Federation Council, criticized the choice to send her to Eurovision. Many comments in both social and state media revealed sentiments of ethnic Russian nationalism, specifically pointing to her Tajik roots as the reason she should not represent Russia. Despite the xenophobia she faced domestically, Manizha stated that she wanted to show that Russia was a “big, multicultural and strong country that gave [her] shelter” (Vasilyeva, 2021) and that the team from Channel One had continuously supported her.

On stage in Rotterdam, the singer emerged from a huge dress made of traditional fabric patches women from over 40 different regions of Russia had sent in, in red overalls with traditional Tajik Chakan embroidery. Pictures by Russian artists Natalia Goncharova, Aleksandra Exter and Natalia Klimova depicting womanhood in Russia built the backdrop to Manizha and her four-person-choir’s performance who were eventually joined in the final chorus by 100 women appearing on screen, singing along. This collage showed a wide variety of what a “Russian woman” could look like, with multiple generations, ethnicities and styles being represented.

Ukrainian broadcaster UA:PBC internally selected Go_A, 2020's Vidbir winners, to represent Ukraine with their song “Shum” (Ukr. Шум). The techno-folklore song was the first song to be performed in Ukrainian on the Eurovision stage. It drew inspiration from traditional Ukrainian Vesnianka songs about the awakening of spring which reflects in the lyrics, the music, and the stage performance. Ukrainian folklore instruments like the Sopilka and lead singer Kateryna Pavlenko’s white voice singing are mixed with techno music. The according music video was filmed in the forests of Chernobyl, providing a new perspective on a region primarily known for the nuclear accident in 1986. The stage show in Rotterdam generally had a futuristic flair due to the LED background and the performers’ outfits but included elements of traditional Vesnianka dancing.

Russia placed ninth, receiving similar scores from the national juries and the public. While Ukraine only ranked ninth after the jury votes, it came in second in the televote, resulting in a fifth place overall. “Shum” went on to be the first Ukrainian language song to place in the global billboard 200.

ESC 2022

In 2022, while the threat of Russian invasion was becoming more imminent, the final of Ukraine’s public pre-selection took place on February 12th. Alina Pash won with the song “Shadows of forgotten ancestors” which combined modern and folkloristic elements as well as Ukrainian and English lyrics. It was about Ukraine’s long history of war and conflict and called for peace. However, shortly after the final, allegations emerged that Pash had traveled to Crimea from Russian territory in 2015, violating Ukrainian law, and had forged corresponding documents to be eligible for Vidbir participation. When this proved true, she stepped down from representing Ukraine and Kalush Orchestra, who had placed second with their song “Stefania” were offered the opportunity instead. They accepted and became the official Ukrainian representatives on February 22nd.

On February 21st, Putin announced that Russia would recognize the Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic as sovereign states and sent troops into the separatist regions. In reaction to this, UA:PBC requested Russia be excluded from Eurovision and banned from the EBU on February 23rd, writing that “the participation of Russia as an aggressor country and a violator of international law in this year’s Eurovision undermines the very idea of the contest” (NSTU, 2021).

Despite the launch of the full-scale invasion the next day, the EBU responded that while they would watch developments closely, Russia was still welcome at Eurovision since it was a non-political event. Broadcasters from multiple countries came out in solidarity with Ukraine, criticizing the EBU for this decision and threatening their own withdrawal if Russia was not excluded. On February 25th, the EBU announced that Russian participation this year “would bring the competition into disrepute” (EBU, 2022b) and thus, there would be no Russian entry at the ESC that year. Russia in turn left the EBU altogether, also closing the door to future participation and the cultural exchange involved. The ESC would also no longer be broadcast in Russia.

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky declared martial law on February 24th which prohibited men aged 18-60 from leaving the country. Since all members of Kalush Orchestra are men in that age range, it was unclear whether they could participate specifically, and whether Ukraine could generally take part considering the war. However, Ukraine opted to participate as planned and all members of Kalush Orchestra received exemptions to leave the country for Eurovision as well as a promotional tour beforehand, stating that they felt this was how they could be of most use for their country. They expressed that they wanted to “show the world community Ukrainian music, our spirit and how unbreakable we are” (Suspilne, 2022).

They performed all their pre-contest concerts with a banner of a QR code which the audience could scan and directly donate money to the official state fund to preserve Ukrainian culture and used promotional interviews and press conferences to raise awareness and call for help for Ukraine.

Kalush Orchestra quickly became the bookmaker’s favorite to win and performed “Stefania” on stage in Turin. Front man Oleh Psiuk had written the song about his mother, however, in light of the war, the lyrics had taken on new meaning to many Ukrainians. Psiuk stated in an interview that to many, it referred to Ukraine as a mother or made them think about their mothers who they could not be with because of the war. Lines like “I’ll always find my way home, even if all roads are destroyed” (translation) would now be associated with the literal ongoing destruction of Ukraine and the singer asking his mother to sing him a lullaby in the chorus carries a sense of longing for safety and peacefulness. The song is the second Eurovision song in Ukrainian and combines contemporary hip-hop and fast-paced rap with folklore elements, underlined by the use of traditional instruments sopilka and telenka as well as folkloristic vocal harmonies. On stage, the band members wore outfits incorporating different aspects of Ukrainian culture from different time periods. After their performance, Psiuk shouted “I ask all of you, please help Ukraine, Mariupol, help Azovstal right now!”, drawing attention to the ongoing siege of Azovstal. While this could have been considered a forbidden political statement, the EBU deemed it “humanitarian rather than political” (Jones, 2022). This sentiment was also present in the show as the final opened with a performance of “Give peace a chance” by over 1000 musicians in Turin’s Piazza San Carlo and artists from Iceland and Germany ending their performances with messages of peace for Ukraine.

Ukraine won the contest, coming in fourth with the national juries and first in the televote, receiving a record-breaking 439 televote points. “Stefania” is the first Ukrainian language song to win the ESC. It entered the charts in multiple countries afterwards.

Kalush Orchestra auctioned off their winning trophy, the crystal microphone, for US$900.000 which went to military causes. They released a video to the song shortly after their win which followed female soldiers through the ruins of Bucha, Irpin, Borodianka and Hostomel – sites of some of the most brutal attacks by the Russian military.

Initially, the broadcaster and president Zelensky expressed the wish to host Eurovision in Ukraine the following year. However, the EBU decided that safe conditions could not be guaranteed in Ukraine at this time and so the hosting duties went to runner-up UK.

Congruence analysis

This section puts forward a congruence analysis to determine whether Russia’s and Ukraine’s approaches to Eurovision in the wake of the war can be explained through Zamorano’s (2016) conception of cultural diplomacy and whether their approaches can be classified as either culturalist or neo-propagandist.

Zamorano provides a list of variables by which the two types can be distinguished. The variables that will be applied are the pattern of communication, the projection term, the character of the audience, the social participation (of the general population in the selection), the aims, and the control of the message. Zamorano refers to the control of the message “by various processes of government management of external cultural representation” (Zamorano, 2016: 179). In the context of the ESC, this can be understood to refer mainly to control through the broadcaster. Depending on a broadcaster’s relationship with the state and the projected messages’ alignment with the government’s statements and policies, inferences regarding the political instrumentalization can be made. Furthermore, the analysis draws on entries’ genre, language, and incorporation of cultural heritage as typical markers of a culturalist approach.

The Eurovision framework

The ESC provides a certain framework within which cultural diplomacy can take place. As a result, several of Zamorano’s variables are identical for all participants:

Communication pattern

Zamorano sees two-way communication as an indicator of a culturalist approach. This distinguishes the category from the neo-propagandist type which consists of one-flow messages. The ESC shows a reciprocal communication pattern. Each country gets the same time to present their song and thus, their nation and message, and then watches and listens as other nations present their entry in a form of cultural exchange. However, this cultural exchange consists of multiple one-way messages. These messages are only limited by the ESC’s rules banning explicit political messaging. Voting and audience reaction in the arena are the only ways for immediate response.

Projection term

According to Zamorano, both forms of cultural diplomacy have long projection terms, while shorter projection terms are typical for propaganda or nation branding. In the ESC, there is a long-term effect that regular participation entails: Even one-time participation might raise a smaller state’s visibility, but over time, regular viewers gain familiarity with participating countries, their culture, their music, and their people (or at least what they have been projecting as such on stage). In some cases, single entries will be remembered long-term, and the artists maintain their role as cultural ambassadors of their respective country outside the ESC. There is also the obvious short-term projection of seeking to perform well in the live shows to garner votes which in turn could raise a country’s profile long-term as well. The Eurovision stage has also been used to counteract or underline narratives regarding current events which points more towards a short-term projection.

Character of the audience

Culturalist cultural diplomacy engages the audience actively, while in neo-propagandist approaches, the audience remains passive. In the ESC, the audience takes on a passive role during the performances but can participate actively by voting. Since the contest is broadcast internationally, it is possible to try to appeal to both the general public and certain target groups within the large, homogenous audience. There can also be signaling to domestic audiences.

This shows that the ESC was designed for non-political cultural exchange and allows for it, but also leaves room for instrumentalization within each single entry.

Russia

The Russian Eurovision entries between 2014 and 2019 show similar patterns that they do not share with 2021s entry which will therefore be handled separately. ⁶

Russia 2014-2019

Genre/language/cultural heritage

Representation of territorial culture is a typical marker for a culturalist approach according to Zamorano. In the ESC, this can be done through the inclusion of a native language, the visual or musical display of cultural heritage or the use of folklore elements. These are elements often found in culturalist approaches; however, their absence does not automatically imply a neo-propagandist approach. All the internally selected Russian songs were performed in English, belong to the pop genre, and include no evident references to national heritage or tradition.

Control of the message/Social participation

Zamorano stipulates that neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy features more state control of the message (cf. Section 4) and less social participation, meaning the general population can largely not influence how they are represented. A culturalist approach, however, entails less control of the message and more social participation, e.g. through a televote. From 2014 to 2019, all representatives were selected internally by alternating broadcasters Channel 1 and Russia-1. These internal selections without any audience involvement or transparency regarding why and how those decisions were made, gave the broadcasters full control of the message. Both broadcasters are state-controlled, have been categorized as propaganda channels (cf. RSF, 2022), and generally have shown their programming to be in line with Kremlin policies. They have contributed substantially to Putin’s hybrid warfare strategy by spreading misinformation, especially about Ukraine and the war. It can therefore be assumed that there is a general interest in representing an image of Russia that aligns with the Kremlin’s foreign and cultural policy goals.

Aims

According to Zamorano, culturalist cultural diplomacy is mainly focused on mutual understanding, while neo-propagandist approaches strive for power or persuasion. Among the Russian entries, it seems there are two different types of performances with slightly differing aims attached to them: First, the entries from 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2018 propagated images of Russia as a place of peace and benevolence. Interestingly, these are all entries by female performers. There is a recurring theme of femininity and fragility which can be seen in the discourse surrounding Juliya Samoylova’s disability as well as the tearful reactions to the booing in 2014 and 2015. Sending young women, in the case of 2014, teenagers, who sing songs about peace, love, and unity and thus apparently adhere closely to core Eurovision values, evoking a sense of sweetness and innocence, allows for a framing of negative reactions as “unfair”. This was supported by the repeated expressions of sympathy by both international media and EBU officials.

The case of Juliya Samoylova illustrates this further: The fact that the Russian delegation had not booked accommodations or participated in preliminary meetings shows they never had the intention to participate in a contest hosted in Ukraine. The subsequent framing of Ukraine’s visa refusal as an example of their lack of tolerance towards people with disabilities shows how Samoylova’s perceived fragility was instrumentalized to denigrate Ukraine and glorify Russia in contrast. This is highly reminiscent of the way Russia instrumentalized the ESC in 2009 to portray their ostensive welcoming culture in contrast to the “cultural authoritarianism” in Ukraine (cf. Johnson, 2014). Had Ukraine however granted Samoylova a visa as the EBU and international media soon requested, it would have had to abandon their stance on the status of Crimea and what constitutes illegal travel there. This strongly suggests that Samoylova’s participation constituted an intentionally created dilemma for Ukraine.

The aim of these four entries was subsequently to convey Russia’s good will and peacefulness – which directly contradicts its geopolitical actions. They are thus examples of neo-propagandist strategies aimed at transforming their situational image and whitewashing the aggression towards Ukraine. The images created are in line with the Kremlin’s narrative of Russia as a liberator rather than an oppressor.

In 2016 and 2019, when Russia was represented by a male artist, the focus was rather on demonstrating their technological prowess and strength. Meerzon and Priven point out that Russia has tended to use the contest to display their ability to produce performances that are up to international standards and establish themselves “as a competitive, progressive, and wealthy Euro-Asian nation” (2013: 112), seeking to reaffirm their previous global superpower status. Lazarev’s performances, which stood out for their advanced use of stage technology, clearly fall into that category. They were thus aimed at a demonstration of power Zamorano describes as an element of neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy.

Russia 2021

Russia’s entry in 2021 differs in many ways from the apparent strategies of previous years.

Genre/language/cultural heritage

Firstly, it is set apart by its use of the Russian language and the inclusion of musical folklore elements, both representations of distinct national culture. The representation of Russian women’s art – both through the background paintings and the artisanal traditions displayed in the dress, the lyrics, and the collage of different Russian women all constitute an exploration of identity suggesting a culturalist approach.

Control of the message/Social participation

Secondly, this is the only entry in the observed time frame that was selected by the public. While in most other national pre-selections and in the ESC itself, a combination of jury and televoting is employed, the Russian national final was purportedly decided only via televote. While this speaks to more social participation in the selection and less control of the message, it should be taken with caution given that there was only a choice of three songs an internal committee had selected, secrecy and concerns around the event, and keeping in mind Russia’s and Channel One’s history of vote rigging.

Aims

Therefore, it becomes more relevant to consider the messaging and its possible benefits for Russia in terms of soft power. Even though Manizha’s case exposed ethnic Russian nationalism domestically, her performance on stage projected an image of Russia as a multi-ethnic, inclusive society. This is in line with the ideas put forth by Putin in his 2012 article “Russia – a national question” in which he describes Russia as a society of interethnic harmony and peace, with different peoples uniting under the Russian culture. Putin utilizes a reconstruction of the Soviet “friendship of peoples” motif which is represented here on stage, thus alluding to Soviet times and a larger Russian empire.

The fact that Manizha is an activist for women’s, minority and LGBTQ rights gives her more credibility and authenticity. However, this also means that she is indeed critical of many Kremlin policies and her song criticizes patriarchal structures, making her an unlikely candidate given the previously established pattern.

Overall, Russia’s 2021 entry contains elements of a culturalist approach because of its incorporation of tradition and folklore and its exploration of individual and national identity. However, the alignment between the projected friendship of peoples motif and the Kremlin’s rhetoric shows a clear avenue for instrumentalization which speaks to a neo-propagandist approach.

Overall, the Russian entries since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war have all shown characteristics of neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy. However, 2021s act raises some questions and shows certain inconsistencies.

Ukraine

Control of the message/social participation

From 2014 to 2022, Ukraine has selected their representatives through a pre-selection show. ⁷ Up to 24 contestants are selected by the broadcaster to compete for the spot at Eurovision, usually in semi-finals and a final. Their model in which the vote is split between a jury and a televote is rather common for national finals. The fact that the public can vote and have a range of artists and songs to decide between speaks to a high degree of social participation and little control of the message on the broadcaster’s side. However, the examples of Maruv und Alina Pash clearly show that UA: PBC will go against the public selection if they see any indication that an artists’ representation of Ukraine is not in line with the desired public perception.

In the past years, Vidbir has been highly politicized by discussing participants’ stance on the Russian aggression during the show, and through the implementation of the new rules for Vidbir participation in 2019. The international reactions to Maruv’s initial selection suggested she had good chances of achieving a great result for Ukraine. Therefore, her case in particular demonstrates that UA:PBC values the ambassadorial, political role of their selected entries above their potential success. While this led to criticism of Ukraine’s politicization of the contest, it is worth noting that this has been communicated openly rather than moving the entire selection process behind closed doors as other countries do.

Thus, while the broadcaster will intervene to control the message in cases they deem harmful to the fight against Russian aggression, there is generally more social participation and less control of the message in the Ukrainian selection.

Genre/language/cultural heritage

The entries from 2014, 2017, and 2018 were all performed entirely in English. While 2014s entry was a standard Eurovision pop song, 2017 and 2018 demonstrated the popularity of alternative genres in Ukraine. The song in 2016 had passages in Crimean Tatar (2021) and 2022s entries were performed in Ukrainian. Those 3 years also saw the inclusion of folkloristic elements – While Go_A and Kalush Orchestra employed Polesian and Hutsul folkloristic traditions from mainland Ukraine, Jamala’s “1944” was rooted in the musical traditions of Crimean Tatars, yet they all combined these folkloristic influences with contemporary elements, positioning them as a modern, progressive partner for Europe. They had a clear focus on cultural heritage and identity.

Aims

While 2014, 2017 and 2018 generally contributed to Ukraine presenting a variety of musical styles in the contest and showed Ukrainian subculture, the other three entries appear to have more far-reaching aims.

The choice to have a Crimean Tatar singer display Crimean Tatar culture, history, and language on an international stage in 2016, officially representing Ukraine, fulfilled several functions. Firstly, it sent the clear message that Ukraine still considered Crimea and its people part of the country, and that it was willing to embrace their cultural heritage. Secondly, it shone a light on historical patterns of Russian aggression, and Jamala’s performance raised international awareness for the fate of Crimean Tatars. Thirdly, the story of her song provided a counterargument to Putin’s claim that Crimea had always belonged to Russia.

The incorporation of the Ukrainian language and folklore in 2021 and 2022, combined with the artists’ statements in interviews, can be read as a direct disproval of the Kremlin’s suggestion that Ukraine has no individual national identity and culture. By combining the folkloristic elements with the contemporary elements of electronic dance music and hip-hop, it simultaneously demonstrates modernity. Additionally, Kalush Orchestra’s aim was to raise both awareness and funds for the war that had taken over their country shortly before their appearance in the ESC. They used their newfound platform after their win to show sites of some of the most brutal attacks on Ukraine in the music video to “Stefania”, displaying the country’s destruction in a further effort to garner support.

These aims align directly with Ukraine’s foreign policy goals focused on “securing unwavering international support for Ukraine on the restoration of her sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine, 2020) and “strengthening the international credibility of Ukraine, improving the country’s profile and attractiveness on the world stage and overcoming distorted and outdated stereotypes through the means of public and cultural diplomacy” (ibid.). The fact that Ukraine’s foreign ministry explicitly acknowledges cultural diplomacy as a key resource underlines that these demonstrations of Ukrainian culture were seen as a way to explain the country’s identity and struggles and thus gain trust and support.

This also resonates in the broadcaster’s mission statement which does not only include an intended focus on Ukrainian traditions and cultural heritage, but furthermore calls the country’s Soviet history an “obstacle [that is] substantially slowing down the path to a stable democracy” (Suspilne, 2020: 1), showing a clear intention to distance themselves from Russia and their Soviet past and instead emphasize Ukraine’s individual identity and culture.

Overall, there is clear alignment between Ukraine’s state policies, the broadcaster’s mission statement and actions in the selection process, and the messages projected by at least three of the six observed entries. Even though they contain reflections on Ukrainian history and heritage as well as contemporary identity which speaks to a culturalist approach, these are clear indications of political instrumentalization. The Ukrainian entries thus also show characteristics of a neo-propagandist approach. However, due to their aims being mostly based in principles of cooperation and mutual recognition, Ukraine’s efforts have to overall be categorized mixed, containing mostly culturalist, but some neo-propagandist elements.

Discussion

While conceptualizations of soft power and cultural diplomacy have often remained blurry because of the multitude and broadness of definitions, Zamorano’s (2016) compilation of different scholars’ work into the categories of culturalist and neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy made clearer distinctions. Furthermore, since the two categories reflect both what the ESC is intended as and what it is often accused of, it seems highly applicable to Eurovision. However, while multiple contrasts between the two nations did indeed come to light, there are four clear limitations to this analysis.

First of all, political or otherwise diplomatic considerations are generally not the only factors – and officially no factors at all – in choosing an act for Eurovision. Johnson (2014) pointed out that commercial interests and the desire to win often play a larger role in selecting an entry than authentic self-representation or “grand statements” (ibid. 30). Still, all acts, no matter how and why they were selected, project a certain image of the state they represent. In the past years, the Ukrainian broadcaster has clearly demonstrated that they understand representation at Eurovision as a diplomatic mission. ⁸ The exclusion of Maruv and Alina Pash despite international popularity and for similar reasons shows that for Ukraine, commercial interests rank below the ambassadorial, political function of their representation.

In Russia, on the other hand, there is a lack of transparency that makes similar conclusions more difficult. Past analyses by Meerzon and Priven (2013), Jordan (2009) or Johnson (2014) illustrate the importance of the ESC for the country. The estimated financial efforts around both of Lazarev’s performances in particular and the political attention to the contest within Russia suggest this did not changed in recent years.

Still, the Russian selection in 2021 shows a divergence from previously established patterns and raises questions that could not be fully explored within the scope of this research. Manizha’s selection through 100% televote because Channel One “wanted viewers to have the final say” (Veen, 2021) caused surprise after years of internal selections. This, combined with the fact that the broadcaster stood by the artist through immense backlash reads as a contrast against the exclusion of the Ukrainian public’s choice Maruv in 2019 which was covered and criticized in Russian media (cf. RT, 2019). Given Russia’s history of framing themselves as more democratic, tolerant and inclusive than Ukraine, not only, but also in connection to Eurovision, this would be an interesting topic of further research and require a more thorough analysis of the pertinent discourse in Russian media.

Secondly, in light of the war of aggression Russia has been waging against Ukraine since 2022, many events in and around Eurovision can be viewed as precursors to the escalation. While in the past, there were numerous complaints, both from journalists and fan communities, that Ukraine was politicizing Eurovision, recent events have given legitimacy to their course of action. Ukraine has obviously realized the potential of cultural diplomacy within the ESC and has employed it consciously to raise awareness and provide a counterargument to Russian rhetoric. At the same time, the broadcaster interfered whenever they saw that these aims might be corrupted through a seemingly friendly association with Russia or acceptance of illegal travel to Crimea.

Zamorano (2016) bases his categorization on a historical and theoretical review of cultural diplomacy and propaganda. He builds the distinction between propaganda and cultural diplomacy on Melissen’s (2005) argument that the communication pattern is the main differentiating factor. However, the above presented results suggest that the congruence and authenticity of actions deserve much stronger consideration. This could account for the inauthenticity of the framing of a strong, peaceful, benevolent nation in Russia’s entries on the one hand, and the validity of Ukraine’s fight to prove and maintain their own national identity in the face of aggression on the other. In fact, the only reason entries like Polina Gagarina’s “A Million Voices” cannot be classified as outright propaganda in this analysis is the Eurovision framework which provides a reciprocal model of cultural exchange. However, whenever Ukraine did not participate in the ESC, the contest was still broadcast there. When Russia did not participate, it chose not to broadcast the contest. This suggests there is more willingness to participate in this cultural exchange, to “listen” even when a message of their own cannot be sent out, in Ukraine.

Thirdly, it is worth noting that Zamorano’s (2016) theoretical framework does not account for the imbalance of power between Ukraine and Russia which would – in different contexts – be another interesting dimension to include in the analysis. However, because Eurovision provides an opportunity for smaller, lesser known or less powerful states in giving every nation, irrespective of their size, wealth, or population the same amount of time and votes, the power imbalance plays a more limited role in this context.

Lastly, this analysis does not consider the long-term impact of the competition on a state’s soft power more closely. However, a study by the Ukrainian Institute into the perception and knowledge of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture from 2021 found that, e.g., in the UK and Hungary, while many interviewees associated Ukraine mainly with Russia, its Soviet past or Chernobyl, Eurovision was one of only a few sources of positive associations with the country. Especially Jamala’s win and even the specific story she told about the Crimean Tatars resonated and were remembered (cf. Shelest and Gerasymchuk, 2021: 22). This suggests that Ukrainian entries in the ESC have managed to fulfill their aims of raising awareness and improving the country’s profile. However, conclusively determining the soft power effects would be difficult generally and not possible in the scope of this paper.

Conclusion

Since Russia first invaded parts of Ukraine in 2014, both countries have used the ESC as a platform for cultural diplomacy. The contest itself is designed for what Zamorano (2016) defines as a culturalist approach but leaves room for neo-propagandist tendencies. Political instrumentalization of the entries is limited only by the contest’s rules against explicit political messaging. Implicit messaging is still possible and has been used by both nations.

The analysis showed that Russia used an approach mainly centered on ameliorating the state’s image and presenting a front of peacefulness, innocence, and tolerance, underlining their “traditional values” by employing themes of female fragility and masculine strength. Since lyrics have often focused on peace and love, they did not break any Eurovision rules. Besides the evident lack of authenticity of the image presented in the ESC, aimed at persuading Europe that Russia’s role is that of a liberator rather than an oppressor, there is a high degree of state control through the Kremlin-aligned broadcasters. Russia accordingly engaged in neo-propagandist cultural diplomacy in the ESC before being banned for their invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine employed an approach largely centered on mutual recognition and representation of Ukrainian culture and heritage. It won the contest twice in the observed time frame, once in 2016 with Crimean Tatar singer Jamala and her song “1944” which highlighted historical patterns of Russian aggression against Ukraine and Crimean Tatars and brought renewed attention to the invasion, and once in 2022 with Kalush Orchestra’s “Stefania” which became synonymous with a Ukrainian longing for peace and safety and raised awareness and funds for the fight against the invasion. The Ukrainian broadcaster has demonstrated repeatedly how highly they value the ambassadorial role of their representatives in the ESC, taking a clear stance against any association with Russia. This has caused them to intervene in two selections and control the message at Eurovision more strongly. Overall, Ukraine has thus mainly employed a culturalist approach in the ESC which, due to the broadcaster’s control and the alignment with state policies, contains neo-propagandist elements.

This study also shows future avenues for research – Positioning the selection of Russian representative Manizha in 2021 against Ukrainian selection processes and comparing the media discourse around them may shed more light on the decision-making processes involved and help outline the Russian broadcaster’s aim more clearly. Moreover, Manizha is an interesting case study to reflect on the contradictory concepts of Russia as a multi-ethnic nation and ethnic Russian nationalism within Putin’s nation building strategy which has previously been outlined based on other cases (cf. Hutchings and Tolz, 2012). Furthermore, it would be interesting to study the impact of the ESC and see how cultural diplomacy efforts inside the ESC relate to those outside. Lastly, to improve the theoretical framework for case studies like the one presented in this paper, future conceptualizations of cultural diplomacy could explore questions of legitimacy and the balance of power between nations more closely.