Navigating “Promising Victimhood:” Discretionary Practices of UNHCR Caseworkers in Rwanda’s Refugee Resettlement Process

Abstract

Executive Summary

As the global refugee population continues to expand, resettlement opportunities remain scarce, accessible only to a select few. Scholarly literature has increasingly drawn attention to the opaque bureaucratic processes, often referred to as “black boxes,” that govern resettlement selection, revealing that the decision-making practices determining which refugees are chosen for resettlement are still not well understood. This study addresses a critical gap concerning the implementation of selection criteria within UNHCR’s operations in the Global South, with a specific focus on caseworkers in Rwanda. It examines how these criteria are applied in practice, providing new empirical insights into the concept of “promising victimhood” — the contradictory demands placed on refugees to simultaneously demonstrate both vulnerability and integration potential to qualify for asylum or resettlement. The study explores how caseworkers navigate their roles amidst the complex and often conflicting demands imposed on refugees during the selection process. The analysis is grounded in interviews with sixteen caseworkers involved in resettlement selection, employing street-level bureaucracy theory alongside the concepts of refugee deservingness and promising victimhood. As key actors in the selection process, caseworkers exercise bottom-up power as policy implementers, while simultaneously adhering to the top-down directives established by resettlement states. The findings reveal that caseworkers employ a range of discretionary practices to reconcile the demands of resettlement states’ admission criteria with their advocacy for refugees deemed most vulnerable by the UNHCR. This research enhances our understanding of UNHCR’s operations at the street level, shedding light on how the practices of caseworkers influence perceptions of refugee eligibility and ultimately influence who is granted resettlement.

Keywords

refugee resettlement promising victimhood street-level bureaucracy Rwanda refugee program international migration

Introduction

The global rise in the number of refugees has intensified the demand for durable solutions, such as resettlement. The UNHCR estimated that 2.4 million individuals worldwide would require resettlement in 2024, with global needs expected to increase by 20 percent the following year, reaching over 2.9 million refugees in 2025 (UNHCR 2024). However, despite these growing numbers, only a small fraction of the world’s refugees is granted resettlement; in 2023, 96,311¹ refugees were resettled (UNHCR 2024). This significant gap between the number of refugees requiring resettlement and the limited quotas available has led scholars and practitioners to scrutinize the selection processes and criteria for this highly sought-after opportunity. Unlike asylum, there is no binding international law compelling states to participate in refugee resettlement programs. National governments maintain the autonomy to determine their level of engagement in such programs, including decisions regarding the countries of origin, selection criteria, and the extent to which they adhere to or diverge from UNHCR recommendations (Garnier, Jubilut, and Sandvik 2018, 10). Consequently, resettlement is not a guaranteed right but is contingent on the goodwill and discretion of the resettlement states. Perceived vulnerabilities often serve as screening criteria for both UNHCR and resettlement states. Additionally, many resettlement states implement criteria based on their assessment of refugees’ potential for integration (de Boer and Zieck 2020; Brekke et al. 2021), despite the UNHCR’s encouragement to avoid selecting refugees based on integration prospects (UNHCR 2011, 245).

UNHCR caseworkers involved in selecting cases for submission to resettlement states serve as crucial intermediaries, navigating the intersection between UNHCR guidelines and the preferences of resettlement states (de Boer and Zieck 2020; Bækkevold 2023). This paper examines the role of caseworkers in Rwanda, focusing on their discretionary power in day-to-day operations and assessing their impact on the selection process through the lens of street-level bureaucracy theory. By analyzing how caseworkers make decisions within the complex interplay of conflicting selection criteria — particularly those related to vulnerabilities and integration — and negotiating processes between UNHCR and resettlement states, this research seeks to deepen our understanding of how resettlement selection criteria are implemented by UNHCR caseworkers in Rwanda. In doing so, it also aims to elucidate the bottom-up influences on resettlement policy outcomes. This study is particularly relevant given Rwanda’s growing role in international refugee governance, exemplified by initiatives such as the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), which facilitates the transfer of refugees from countries like Eritrea and Sudan, who initially arrived in Libya, to Rwanda for processing in a safer environment. Additionally, the United Kingdom’s controversial asylum deal with Rwanda further highlights the country’s significance in this context. Although this deal was terminated following the UK general elections in July 2024, it sparked substantial debate and highlighted Rwanda’s evolving role in global refugee policy (Thompson 2024).

This research contributes to the academic discourse by shedding light on the “black boxes” of bureaucracy within the resettlement process, as described by Thomson (2012). Specifically, the paper offers new empirical insights into the concept of “promising victimhood,” exploring how caseworkers navigate their roles amidst the often-contradictory demands placed on refugees during the selection process. The research particularly focuses on the role of UNHCR in transit countries in the Global South, with a specific emphasis on Rwanda. Given the scarcity of studies on refugee resettlement practices and policies in Rwanda, this research represents a valuable addition to the existing academic literature.

The empirical investigation for this study was grounded in expert interviews which were conducted with caseworkers in Rwanda during March and April 2023, with additional follow-up by interviews conducted online in April and May 2024. The study employed a combination of snowball and convenience sampling techniques to recruit participants (Atkinson and Flint 2001; Sedgwick 2013). The snowball sampling method began with initial contacts within the UNHCR, who subsequently referred other potential participants, thereby expanding the sample through established professional networks. This approach proved effective in accessing a specialized and dispersed population, which might have been challenging to reach otherwise. Convenience sampling was employed to engage participants who were readily accessible and willing to contribute, which was particularly beneficial given the time-sensitive nature of the research and the logistical challenges of coordinating interviews across different geographical locations.

Of the sixteen conducted interviews, eight were with caseworkers from UNHCR Rwanda who were directly involved in the resettlement selection process. The remaining interviews included caseworkers from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, the Regional Bureau in Nairobi, and representatives from Norwegian government services, providing a broader perspective on the resettlement selection process. In selecting the methodology to investigate bureaucratic decision-making, scholars have highlighted the limitations of qualitative interviews, particularly the potential disconnect between bureaucratic discourse and actual practice (Hahonou and Martin 2019). Despite these limitations, the data collected enabled an in-depth analysis of various street-level bureaucracy processes, offering insights into the resettlement practices and decision-making mechanisms. While acknowledging the inherent constraints of qualitative methodologies, the approach employed in this study facilitated a rigorous analysis that contributes to our understanding of the systematic nature of resettlement procedures and practices. To analyze the data, thematic analysis was conducted following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) framework, with the coding process supported by NVivo software.

Research clearance was obtained from the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research, as well as Rwanda’s National Council for Science and Technology (NCST). All data handling adhered strictly to the data-protection laws of both countries, and necessary permissions were secured from relevant authorities. Given the sensitivity of the topic, careful attention was paid to ethical considerations throughout the research process. This study examines how caseworkers in Rwanda navigate individual-level selection processes for resettlement. Although the respondents, due to their expert status, were not classified as particularly vulnerable, their responsibility to protect vulnerable refugees necessitated a careful and respectful approach to data collection and interviews. Interviews were conducted with strict adherence to ethical guidelines, including obtaining voluntary, informed consent and taking measures to ensure participants faced no adverse effects from their involvement, in alignment with the “no harm” principle in research ethics. Anonymization was rigorously applied by omitting specific details such as camp locations, gender, and other identifying markers. To enhance the credibility of the findings, respondent validation was employed, with key participants reviewing the findings to ensure accuracy and to identify any sensitive information that should be excluded. A shredding key was used to connect transcripts to identities, ensuring the security of the data. This study intentionally excludes refugee narratives, a common limitation in research on the resettlement system. While the focus on caseworkers offers valuable insights into bureaucratic practices, the absence of refugee perspectives constrains our understanding of the direct impact on individuals. Future research should prioritize the inclusion of refugee voices for a more comprehensive analysis of the resettlement processes.

Theorizing Access: Selection Criteria and Refugee Deservingness

While scholarly literature on resettlement is expanding, it has received less attention compared to other facets of refugee management (Beirens et al. 2007; Ozkul and Jarrous 2021). Recent studies have highlighted the growing political significance of resettlement within the European Union and other regions, emphasizing the need for a more profound understanding of its implications and implementation (Phillimore et al. 2021; Bjørkhaug and Bækkevold 2024). In contrast, the U.S. resettlement system, which has resettled more refugees than any other country, has been thoroughly studied, revealing key bureaucratic processes and actors (Brown and Scribner 2014; Kerwin and Nicholson 2021). However, research has highlighted a lack of coordination and poor information sharing between international screening agencies and domestic resettlement organizations, creating inefficiencies and logistical issues upon refugees’ arrival in the US (Brown and Scribner 2014).

To date, much of the literature on the resettlement selection process has focused on how refugees navigate and perform their cases to align with access criteria (Jansen 2008; Sandvik 2009; Bjørkhaug 2017; Menetrier 2021; Clark, Haw, and Mackenzie 2024), as well as on the motivations and actions of resettlement bureaucrats across various contexts (Borrelli 2018; Vandevoordt 2018; Dörrenbächer 2019; Ioannidis, Dimou, and Dadusc 2021; Ekstedt 2023). A recent study by Watson (2023) offers a unique perspective by examining resettlement bureaucracies at the meso-level, exploring how administrative infrastructures and institutional pathways create self-reproducing bureaucratic pipelines that prioritize or deprioritize certain refugee populations in specific geographical areas. Research on selection criteria for refugee resettlement has consistently highlighted the dual roles of vulnerability and integration potential (Brekke et al. 2021; Phillimore et al. 2021; Welfens and Bekyol 2021; Welfens and Bonjour 2021). Martin (2005) discusses how certain aspects of the refugees selection for resettlement can be questioned on equity grounds, as individuals who have made their way to a processing site may be prioritized over those facing greater dangers elsewhere. However, he argues that this concern is often overstated and should not prevent action, as the inability to help everyone does not justify failing to help some. Martin also highlights the potential for distortion when resettlement categories, such as “women at risk,” are not well-defined, as families may exploit these criteria or women may alter their circumstances to qualify for resettlement.

Schneider (2021) discusses the challenges and concerns surrounding the selection criteria employed by resettlement countries, arguing that these criteria, although sometimes conflicting, significantly influence resettlement opportunities for specific refugee groups. Vulnerability often dictates the immediate need for protection, prioritizing those at the highest risk. On the other hand, integration potential relates to refugees’ long-term ability to adapt and thrive in new environments. Together, these criteria shape the complex landscape of the resettlement selection process, balancing urgent humanitarian needs with practical considerations for successful integration (Brekke et al. 2021). Both UNHCR and resettlement countries establish selection criteria; however, concerns have been raised about the criteria used by some countries for their resettlement programs. Issues such as lack of transparency, frequent changes, and perceived arbitrariness in the decision-making process have been noted (ibid).

The concept of vulnerability in the resettlement process functions as both a guiding and a constructed framework. It is influenced by political stakeholders and implemented by street-level bureaucrats, reflecting the complexity of its application (Lipsky 2010; Brun 2016). In the 2000s, UNHCR introduced “categories of vulnerability,” focused on characteristics such as gender, age, and disability, within its guidelines to standardize refugee selection and reduce political influence in resettlement decisions (Garnier, Jubilut, and Sandvik 2018). In response to criticism that it was not adequately protecting female and LGBTQI+ refugees, UNHCR implemented guidelines recognizing the unique protection needs of these groups. However, critical scholars argue that an excessive focus on women and LGBTQI+ groups may overlook the challenges and vulnerabilities faced by heterosexual men. This ongoing debate highlights the complexities of establishing clear and equitable selection criteria, as different groups face distinct risks and obstacles that must be addressed within the resettlement framework (Turner 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Further research reveals how criteria related to vulnerabilities and integration potential can produce intersectional outcomes influenced by identity markers such as race, sexuality, gender, class, and age (see e.g., Mügge and van der Haar 2016; Seibel 2016; Roggeband and van der Haar 2017; Turner 2017; Bonjour and Duyvendak 2018; Sözer 2019; Turner 2019a, 2019b; Koçak 2020; Welfens and Bonjour 2021). For instance, while women and children are often categorized as vulnerable; young, able-bodied, single, heterosexual men are frequently perceived as less vulnerable (Turner 2019a; Turner 2019b; Palillo 2022).

Although a primary aim of resettlement is to prioritize the most vulnerable refugees, many resettlement countries also emphasize immigrant integration as a key objective of their resettlement programs. Several studies have explored the challenges refugees face during integration. One such report by Kerwin and Nicholson (2021), which analyzes the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), identifies several key obstacles. These include urging refugees to accept jobs that do not align with their skills, a lack of adequate integration support and financial assistance in the initial months after arrival, insufficient medical and childcare services, and delays in family reunification processes.

Research suggests that, to enhance prospects for successful integration upon arrival, many resettlement states also consider refugees’ integration potential during the selection process (Brekke et al. 2021).² Integration criteria may include factors such as perceived economic prospects in the host country and cultural compatibility. Some resettlement states explicitly outline their integration criteria, while others may employ implicit measures, indirectly evaluating integration potential during the selection process (ibid).

Although integration is not inherently opposed to humanitarianism and is intertwined with resettlement in many respects (Brekke et al. 2021, 107), the inclusion of integration criteria in the selection process influences how vulnerability-related criteria are interpreted and applied (Welfens 2023). When refugees are expected to meet both vulnerability and integration criteria, those facing the most severe circumstances may be excluded (Schiocchet 2019). Recent research highlights the conflicting expectations for refugees to demonstrate both vulnerability and integration potential³ to qualify for asylum or resettlement, a phenomenon referred to as “promising victimhood” (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2014; Bonjour and Chauvin 2018; Welfens 2023). An illustration of this complexity is the protection extended to skilled Afghan women following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021. While these women were deemed vulnerable due to their gender, their skills and resourcefulness were highly valued, forming the basis for their protection in resettlement countries under the imperative to “brain save” (Sandvik et al. 2022).

Resettlement selection criteria are deeply intertwined with perceptions of refugee deservingness. The literature on migrant and refugee deservingness explores how discourses, policies, and practices construct hierarchies that determine individuals’ access to aid, resettlement, and other limited resources based on the perceived worthiness of their unique identities and characteristics (see e.g., Massey 2007; Anderson 2013; Chauvin, Garcés-Mascareñas, and Kraler 2013; Holmes and Castañeda 2016; Mügge and van der Haar 2016; Turner 2017; Janmyr 2018; Turner 2019a, 2019b; Koçak 2020; Ravn et al. 2020; Ratzman and Sahraoui 2021). Perceptions of who is deserving of resettlement are shaped by the framing through which deservingness is perceived. From a human rights perspective, individuals are considered deserving if they meet specific legal criteria. Conversely, a humanitarian perspective categorizes refugees as deserving based on their vulnerabilities and suffering (Fassin 2012). An integration perspective deems refugees deserving of resettlement if they demonstrate cultural compatibility and the potential to contribute economically to the host society (Phillimore et al. 2021). From a security standpoint, refugees’ perceived deservingness may diminish if they are viewed as potential threats to public security, the economy, and cultural norms (Huysmans 2000; Fassin 2012: Welfens 2023). The concept of refugee deservingness is closely linked with the notion of “promising victimhood,” where considerations grounded in both humanitarian objectives and integration potential influence who is deemed deserving of resettlement.

A Street-level Bureaucracy Theory Perspective

The academic literature on resettlement underscores the discretionary and non-transparent decision-making processes employed in resettlement states, which frequently lack the obligation to justify their decisions (Sandvik 2009; Garnier, Jubilut, and Sandvik 2018; Menetrier 2021). This phenomenon is associated with the concept of the “black boxes” of bureaucracy where opaque processes and unclear criteria complicate the understanding of decision-making mechanisms (Thomson 2012). Studies have highlighted how refugees navigate these black boxes, often relying on rumors due to the absence of clear and detailed information about decision-making processes (Ozkul and Jarrous 2021). Recent literature has sought to illuminate the inner workings of migration and asylum bureaucracies by adopting street-level bureaucracy theory (SLBT), which emphasizes the central role of frontline bureaucrats and their practices (Lipsky 2010). SLBT is particularly relevant for studying migration bureaucracies because many employees in migration management can be characterized as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). These workers frequently operate with ambiguous and contradictory guidelines, allowing significant room for interpretation (Ekstedt 2023).

From a post-constructivist perspective on SLBT and the migration system, Dahlvik (2017) explores how bureaucrats and decision-makers within the migration regime continually reinvent and reproduce it. Dahlvik (2017, 382) argues that while the structures in the migration regime appear fixed, they are influenced by societal rules such as “laws, policies, and other institutional norms.” By making decisions on asylum claims within these structures, bureaucrats “not only reproduce but potentially also modify and transform them” (ibid, 382). Several studies have documented the discretionary practices of SLBs in asylum processing contexts (Alpes and Spire 2014; Vandevoordt 2018; Dörrenbächer 2019; Marshall and Béland 2019; Ioannidis, Dimou, and Dadusc 2021). However, contrasting findings suggest that SLBs may not always employ discretionary practices. For instance, Ekstedt (2023) notes that the compartmentalized institutional structure of the European Union Asylum Agency in Greece, coupled with short-term deployments and limited understanding of the long-term impact of decisions, constrained caseworkers’ use of discretion. Instead, caseworkers navigated ethical dilemmas through the exit-voice-loyalty model: resigning (exit), expressing concerns to management (voice), or aligning with institutional practices (loyalty). Although SLBT has been applied to analyze caseworkers in resettlement contexts, the literature remains less developed in this area compared to asylum contexts. Nevertheless, SLBT has been used to examine caseworkers involved in the integration and management of resettled refugees (Darrow 2015; Marshall and Béland 2019).

SLBT shifts the focus from policy formulation to policy implementation, arguing that policy only manifests through frontline workers who enact it in their daily activities. Essentially, SLBT investigates how SLBs practices and routines evolve into systematic procedures that shape policy implementation. Lipsky (2010, xvii) defines SLBs as public service workers who “interact with citizens in the course of the job and have discretion in exercising authority” noting that they cannot adhere to ideal practices due to the limitations of their work structures. These shared conditions often lead to common, implicit patterns of practice that influence their day-to-day actions. In the context of this study, the focus is on how the inherent ambiguities and constraints — stemming from divergent selection criteria related to vulnerabilities and integration potential set by both UNHCR and resettlement countries — affect the daily work of UNHCR caseworkers. These ambiguities and constraints require caseworkers to navigate complex and sometimes conflicting guidelines, which shape their practices and impact the resettlement outcomes for refugees.

A key aspect of SLBT is that SLBs possess both the potential and motivation to exercise discretionary practices. Discretion is defined as occurring “whenever the effective limits on [the public officer’s] power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction” (Davis 1969, cited in Gilson 2015, 4). SLBs operate under various pressures: chronic inadequacies in time, information, and resources; increasing service demands; vague or conflicting policy objectives; challenges in assessing their performance; and non-voluntary clients⁴ (Lipsky 2010). Furthermore, SLBs work in environments marked by significant uncertainty due to clients’ complex needs and the necessity for quick, frequent decision-making (ibid). Consequently, SLBs develop coping mechanisms through patterns of practice, which can influence work outcomes and agency services. These coping mechanisms involve navigating guidelines and regulations to make discretionary decisions, managing the inherent difficulties and ambiguities of their roles. Given their challenging work environment, SLBs may justify these coping mechanisms as pragmatic and reasonable (Gilson 2015). Lipsky (2010) underscores how SLBs navigate between policy directives and the individuals affected, negotiating policy implementation with its intended recipients. Understanding the practical dynamics of the resettlement selection process, SLBT provides insight into the latitude for discretionary decision-making within the daily tasks of caseworkers.

Notably, the discretionary practices of SLBs’ effectively “become the public policy they carry out” (Lipsky 2010, xiii). The significant discretion challenges the top-down view of public policy implementation, which assumes that policymakers wield all authority while overlooking the influence of lower-level actors (Gilson 2015). SLBT proves invaluable for understanding how UNHCR caseworkers can exert bottom-up influence on the resettlement system through their role as policy implementers. While discretion can have drawbacks, such as diverging from service ideals or manipulating agency services, Lipsky (2010) emphasizes the indispensable role of human judgment in policy implementation. He argues that managerial challenges lie in enhancing workers’ capacity to make impartial decisions. SLBT fundamentally examines organizational dynamics rather than critiquing individual workers, highlighting that challenges stem from specific work environments rather than individuals’ shortcomings (ibid). Unlike the conventional top-down approach where policies are strictly dictated from above, SLBT reveals that frontline workers possess considerable latitude in interpreting and implementing policies. This discretion allows caseworkers to adapt and interpret policies based on the immediate context and the unique needs of refugees. Consequently, policy implementation can significantly differ from its original design or intent, depending on how caseworkers apply it. This bottom-up influence empowers caseworkers to shape policy outcomes in significant ways (Brodkin 2012).

UNHCR Rwanda and the Resettlement Selection Process

As of late 2023, Rwanda hosted approximately 134,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and other displaced populations, primarily from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (59.86 percent) and Burundi (39.58 percent; UNHCR 2023a). Rwanda’s refugee response is managed through a collaborative effort involving the Ministry of Emergency Management (MINEMA), UNHCR, various UN agencies, and implementing partners such as Save the Children International, which oversees health initiatives in the camps. The country operates five refugee camps and the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in Gashora. In 2023, 7,826 refugees were resettled from Rwanda to ten countries: the United States, Norway, Canada, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand (UNHCR 2023b).

Resettlement states organize their selection processes through missions, dossier processing, or a combination of both. Selection missions involve officers from national immigration authorities conducting face-to-face interviews in host countries. Conversely, dossier cases are managed remotely, based on information gathered by third parties, typically UNHCR. Each resettlement country has its own admission criteria, specifying the regions or specific refugee populations they are willing to accept (UNHCR 2011). Some resettlement states include explicit integration criteria in their admission standards (Brekke et al. 2021). These criteria are communicated to UNHCR through a pre-mission questionnaire (PMQ; UNHCR 2023c). The criteria vary among resettlement countries; some may have numerous criteria, while others may have few or none. Resettlement states might also designate sub-quotas for specific categories, such as emergency cases, family reunification, or refugees with medical needs.

The resettlement process begins with the negotiation of quotas at a political level between the UNHCR headquarters (HQ) in Geneva and resettlement countries.⁵ Typically, the UNHCR country office in Kigali receives quotas and specific eligibility criteria from resettlement countries in December and January, with additional quotas allocated throughout the year as spots become available. The country office then disseminates this information to respective field offices, which initiate the resettlement process by systematically identifying eligible refugees. The Resettlement Registration Form (RRF) is a key component in the selection process (UNHCR 2023c). Resettlement applicants must demonstrate their eligibility for international protection as refugees, regardless of their vulnerabilities. Additionally, they must meet the resettlement country’s admissibility requirements, which include national security and other public interest criteria not outlined in the PMQ.

In Rwanda, UNHCR prioritizes refugees for resettlement based on vulnerability and date of arrival. To qualify for resettlement consideration, families must meet one or more submission categories outlined by UNHCR. The categories include: (1) Legal and/or physical protection needs, (2) Survivors of torture and/or violence, (3) Medical needs, (4) Women and girls at risk, (5) Restoring family unity, (6) Children and adolescents at risk, and (7) Lack of foreseeable alternative durable solutions (UNHCR 2023c).

Two primary methodologies are used for processing resettlement cases: group processing and individual processing. Group processing, designed for Congolese refugees, streamlines the procedures for resettlement to the United States based on specific origin and arrival dates. Initially, UNHCR conducts a simplified interview, among other standard procedures including counseling refugees for the prevention of fraud, explaining personal data protection and privacy in the resettlement context, best procedures for children where required, collection and verification of personal documents, and biometric identity verification. This is followed by further interviews by US officials and US Government-contracted partners.⁶ Individual processing is used for submissions to other countries and for those to the United States who do not qualify for group processing. Resettlement officers use a master list derived from the UNHCR ProGres⁷ data system, prioritizing refugees by their date of arrival. UNHCR’s methodology involves a systematic approach to identifying and processing refugees for resettlement, which can vary based on the operational context. For individual processing, UNHCR conducts a detailed interview to verify background information and ensure accuracy. Following this, cases undergo two levels of review, and a recommendation is made regarding the appropriate resettlement country. Each case is assigned a priority level: emergency, urgent, or normal. Emergency and urgent cases are prioritized with shorter processing deadlines. Country offices submit resettlement cases directly to the US, for individual or group processing. Cases recommended for submission to other resettlement countries are referred to the regional Bureau in Nairobi to submit on behalf of the country office. It is uncommon for the Nairobi regional Bureau to alter the country assignments recommended by the field office. Consequently, caseworkers effectively hold the power to decide which individuals UNHCR submits for resettlement and who is excluded from consideration. However, their authority is constrained by the need to adhere to various guidelines and meet the requirements set by resettlement countries, which have the final say and can reject any submitted case.

Caseworkers’ Use of Discretionary Practices to Advocate for Refugees

This section examines the various ways caseworkers navigate the use of discretion in their work. By exploring these practices, we gain insights into how caseworkers manage the complexities of proposing refugees who are both vulnerable and eligible candidates for resettlement.

Navigating Flexibility in Resettlement Criteria

Many resettlement states impose restrictions based on family size, significantly impacting the resettlement process for refugees. These restrictions often reflect cultural perceptions of what constitutes an ideal or manageable family size in the resettlement country. However, differences in terms of culture and legal requirements between the resettlement states and the refugees’ countries of origin can lead to mismatched expectations and challenges (Welfens and Bonjour 2021). As one caseworker described: “In an African context, a 20-year-old can be a child; they are still really dependent on the family. But some resettlement countries say that as soon as you are 18, we [UNHCR] should consider it [and submit it] as a separate case.” Another caseworker shared a similar account:

It’s mind-boggling for them [the refugees] because they’ll say ‘these three kids can share the room and these ones can share the room’. And you [the UNHCR caseworker] say ‘no, you can maybe have two beds in that room’. And they [resettlement states] are going to look at the genders of the kids and the age they are and maybe say ‘sorry, they’re too old’.

Additionally, refugee families may include more distant relatives, contrasting with the Western understanding of the nuclear family (Welfens and Bonjour 2021). When families do not conform to Western standards, they may be perceived as having weaker integration potential by resettlement states. In some cases, limitations on family size may arise from practical considerations within the resettlement country. For instance, Norway cites a shortage of spacious housing as a reason for imposing family-size criteria (Brekke et al. 2021).

Regarding cases where the number of members in refugee families exceeds the family size criterion, caseworkers have developed a practice to address this challenge. They may overcome the resettlement state’s criterion by proposing to split larger families into two separate (but linked) cases⁸, suggesting that family members can live as neighbors or in close proximity:

We act according to family criteria from resettlement countries. We can try to negotiate with the resettlement countries. We can suggest that the small children can live with their parents, and these three adult children over 20 [years] can live in the neighboring house.

This practice of submitting families as two units provides an opportunity to reconcile the demands of the resettlement state with the needs of the refugee family. Before proposing this solution to a resettlement state, UNHCR always consults the refugee family in question. If the family members agree to reside as neighbors, this practice enables families considered too large under certain resettlement countries’ criteria to circumvent those restrictions. Caseworkers operate within the criteria set by resettlement countries while still managing to submit large refugee families for resettlement. This adaptation demonstrates how the actual implementation of policy can vary significantly from its original design, depending on how caseworkers apply it. This bottom-up influence allows caseworkers to shape policy outcomes (Evans and Harris 2004). By splitting families into two linked units, caseworkers navigate the constraints of resettlement policies with discretionary adaptations, mediating solutions that balance policy requirements with the practical needs of refugees.

Application of Implicit Admission Criteria

Caseworkers in the field offices play a crucial role in recommending eligible refugees for resettlement to the UNHCR regional Bureau in Nairobi. This includes determining which resettlement country should receive a particular case. The decision on which country to recommend hinges on several factors, including resettlement countries’ admission criteria, available quotas, deadlines, potential family ties, and the expressed preferences of refugees.

The 2011 version of the Resettlement Handbook emphasizes that UNHCR’s resettlement decisions on who to promote for resettlement should not be influenced by the resettlement countries’ criteria (UNHCR 2011, 216, 245). Similarly, the 2023 version of the handbook underlines that “Considerations that are not protection-related, such as integration potential and educational level, are not relevant to identification and selection processes for resettlement carried out by UNHCR” (UNHCR 2023c). In practice, caseworkers coordinate cases and carefully assess specific eligibility criteria of each resettlement country, highlighting the necessity for a pragmatic approach in resettlement practices, balancing UNHCR’s humanitarian mandate with the practical realities imposed by resettlement countries. One caseworker reflects on this process: “. . . we look at the vulnerabilities and also the country-specific criteria. We try to match and find who [which refugee] to submit to which country.” If a case does not align with the admission criteria of the resettlement country initially considered, caseworkers try to identify another country where the case meets the requirements. As a caseworker explained: “If we are planning to submit a case to a certain country and there is a requirement for something [a criteria that the refugee does not satisfy], we can reach out to the refugee and we return the case to the caseworker [to change the country recommendation].” This dynamic interpretation and application of resettlement criteria by caseworkers ensures that as many cases as possible are directed to countries where they are most likely to meet acceptance criteria.

Resettlement countries are not obligated to accept submitted cases and can reject them without providing a reason. Caseworkers recounted experiences of refugees being repeatedly rejected by specific resettlement countries due to implicit criteria, such as attributes related to certain cultures or religions, even when these cases met the explicit admission criteria. One caseworker described how these implicit criteria become apparent through repeated rejections and how caseworkers address such situations:

We have cases where refugees might not be accepted by a resettlement country due to their religion or cultural background. The resettlement countries don’t say this directly, but we can infer it. We understand it later, when talking to the refugee. We know that the refugee is eligible, but they were rejected. We never get reasons from the resettlement countries for why a refugee is rejected. But we understand it although it was never said explicitly. Then we can try to avoid giving this type of cases to that [resettlement] country, to avoid rejections.

By observing a pattern of systematic rejection of refugees with certain attributes, caseworkers inferred and implemented the resettlement country’s implicit criteria. This understanding allowed them to reduce further rejections by submitting cases that met both the explicit and implicit criteria of the resettlement country. Another caseworker provided a similar example of how implicit criteria communicated by resettlement states may manifest in practice. One resettlement country explicitly stated they sought to fill a quota spot with any woman at risk. However, whenever caseworkers submitted a case involving a woman with male relatives, the case was rejected:

There was a country looking for a ‘woman at risk’ with no male relatives. If they had a brother they had never met, they would be rejected. There are implicit criteria. This was something that was never written down, but we understood it due to rejections. Sometimes, resettlement countries don’t give us the reason for the rejection, so we cannot know exactly. Then we stop sending these people. If we know a country will reject them, then what’s the point?

Caseworkers discern patterns and expectations from the resettlement states, and learn what is desired and what is not, even when these preferences are not explicitly stated in the PMQ. Another caseworker highlighted how they navigate and interpret implicit criteria through their extensive experience with working with various resettlement countries.

So, I would say [we] have done this for several years [. . .], we’ve managed the quota which gives us some perspective on what most States desire, what they do not like. Some things aren’t said in these PMQs. Some things you just need to know from headquarters [and] engagement with certain states. [. . .] They tell you random bits of information. [. . .] And so, Norway is, of course, a part of that and we can see some of the things they like and some of the things they don’t like. But what this does is; it gives [us] a bit of perspective to decide what is going to be in the best interest of that case. Where is it most likely going to succeed? And that is based on that experience and based on our analysis.

Aligning a case’s attributes with the implicit admission criteria of a resettlement country significantly increases the likelihood of acceptance because it avoids countries where the case might be rejected due to mismatched criteria. Failing to align cases with implicit criteria could lead to increased rejection rates and potentially hinder refugee resettlement opportunities. Therefore, this discretionary approach plays a crucial role in ensuring that each refugee is directed to the country where they have the highest likelihood of being accepted. Through this strategic approach, caseworkers effectively satisfy both the specific implicit criteria of resettlement countries as well as UNHCR’s imperative to resettle as many vulnerable refugees as possible by minimizing rejection rates. By employing this strategy, caseworkers actively make decisions that go beyond mere procedural adherence. They must leverage their expertise and professional experience to interpret and apply the implicit criteria, a process that requires a significant degree of judgment and flexibility, highlighting the discretionary power inherent to the caseworkers’ roles.

Submission Strategies Based on Resettlement Country Processing Times

Caseworkers appear to be aware of the standard processing times of various resettlement countries. In some instances, they may intentionally avoid submitting urgent cases to countries known for prolonged processing durations. As one caseworker explained: “. . . if it is urgent, we don’t want to refer a refugee to a country that spends a long time for processing the resettlement.” In another case, a caseworker described how UNHCR opted for a parallel submission to Norway because the original destination country was too slow in processing the case:

The biggest problem are certain countries, who I won’t name, who hold on to [cases submitted by UNHCR] for months and months and months and don’t give us answers. We’ve had a case like that recently and we’ve actually done a parallel submission to Norway because we know we’re going to get an answer from [Norway] and we can’t wait for this country [to which the case was initially submitted] to make a decision.

These examples illustrate how discretionary decisions are made to ensure that urgent cases are directed to countries with shorter processing times. Such practices highlight the role of caseworkers as advocates for refugees they consider to be deserving of expedited resettlement.

Negotiating With Resettlement Countries During Selection Missions

Some resettlement countries conduct selection missions to Rwanda where they interview refugees as part of the resettlement process. These missions not only involve final interviews with refugees eligible for resettlement but also serve as opportunities for dialogue between UNHCR staff and civil servants from the resettlement countries. This platform enables the promotion of UNHCR’s priorities and the advocacy for individual cases (UNHCR 2023c). During these debriefings, UNHCR caseworkers may engage in negotiations with representatives of resettlement countries, advocating for cases that do not fully meet admission criteria, in the hope that an exception might be made. As one caseworker noted:

We [. . .] debrief and negotiate with resettlement countries, sometimes, when they visit [Rwanda] on commission trips to do interviews. ‘This case is not meeting your requirements, is there any possibility that you can make an exception?’

These negotiations provide caseworkers with an opportunity to enhance refugees’ access to resettlement. Successful negotiations can result in the resettlement of refugees who initially did not meet the receiving state’s admission criteria. Without the intervention of caseworkers, these refugees would likely be excluded based on the resettlement country’s formal policies. Therefore, by choosing to negotiate and advocate for refugees who might not strictly meet predefined criteria, caseworkers ensure that vulnerable individuals are not overlooked due to rigid standards. This advocacy can lead to exceptions, allowing refugees who would otherwise be excluded to gain access to resettlement opportunities. This bottom-up influence highlights the role of caseworkers as active agents in the policy implementation process, rather than mere executors of predefined rules. Their discretionary actions can foster more flexible interpretations of resettlement criteria, ultimately contributing to more equitable and effective resettlement practices. By leveraging their discretion, caseworkers address the nuances of individual refugee cases and advocate for outcomes that better align with the humanitarian goals of the UNHCR. This not only enhances the resettlement process but also ensures that the policies are more responsive to the real-world complexities and needs of refugees.

Channeling Criticism, Feedback, and Guidance Through UNHCR’s HQ

When caseworkers perceive the admission criteria of a resettlement State as overly complex or restrictive, they may engage in advocacy efforts to modify or relax these criteria. One caseworker explained:

If there are some quotas that we were unable to fill because they [the criteria] were too restrictive – maybe it would take very much time to identify this quota – we have a role to play in advocacy; making [resettlement] countries aware of our needs.

Caseworkers report such issues to the UNHCR HQ, aiming to initiate discussions with the resettlement State at the political level. This process involves several steps of communication. It begins with field caseworkers conveying their concerns to the Regional Bureau for escalation to UNHCR’s HQ in Geneva through the country office in Kigali. The Regional Bureau and/or HQ and UNHCR country offices in the resettlement State can engage with the resettlement state government counterparts at a higher level to address the issue, potentially influencing the resettlement State’s admission criteria for the following year’s quota.

Reflecting on instances where resettlement States established admission criteria that were challenging to meet within the refugee population prioritized by the UNHCR, a caseworker noted:

If we, as UNHCR, feel that the eligibility criteria are too strict, this is discussed at the HQ level. We can be given a quota where we may not even find a single person that fits. If there is an amendment, that has to be done at the HQ level. The HQ has all the information of the country operation; they know the profiles of refugees in Rwanda. If there are issues at our level, we give feedback to regional Bureau and the HQ.

Similarly, another caseworker pointed out that “if a [resettlement] country has discriminatory criteria, then this will be reported and discussed at the HQ level. They sit down with the resettlement countries and come to an agreement, and sometimes the criteria are relaxed.” In these ways, caseworkers advocate for policy changes by raising issues with the HQ, expecting it to negotiate with resettlement countries to adjust admission criteria. If these criteria are ultimately relaxed, caseworkers can operate within the revised guidelines, facilitating the resettlement of the most vulnerable refugees, including those who previously did not meet the criteria. Furthermore, reporting challenging admission criteria to the UNHCR HQ can influence not only the current quota’s criteria but also the composition of future quotas. This demonstrates that caseworkers, beyond merely implementing policy, can instigate bottom-up changes in written policy.

Avoiding Case Rejections

As mentioned earlier, although UNHCR submits cases to resettlement States, it does not have the decisive power over who will be accepted. The acceptance of a case hinges on the resettlement country’s willingness to host the refugee, and is subject to its laws, regulations, and procedures. Caseworkers recognize the potential adverse consequences for refugees if their case is rejected. When asked why they strive to avoid rejections, a caseworker explained that a rejection might create difficulties for the refugee if their case is re-submitted to another resettlement country in the future:

We try to avoid rejections. If they are outside the criteria, we [caseworkers] won’t submit the refugee to that country. We don’t want to put the refugees in an awkward situation. If a refugee’s case is rejected, we are obliged to mention that in the refugee’s file due to transparency reasons. Then, the next country [which the case is submitted to] might be suspicious when considering their case.

Therefore, caseworkers refrain from submitting cases that do not align with the explicit or implicit admission criteria of resettlement countries, as these are likely to face rejection. While caseworkers exercise the discretionary power inherent in their role to advocate (or refrain from advocating) for cases, they strategically act to minimize rejection rates. For instance, a caseworker described a situation where a resettlement state implicitly excluded refugees with a particular cultural or religious background by consistently rejecting such cases. Upon realizing this implicit criterion, caseworkers stopped submitting refugees who did not align with the preferences of that state. As a caseworker stated: “We don’t want to set refugees up for rejection, so we don’t send the refugees there.” In an effort to reduce rejection rates, caseworkers may refrain from promoting particular cases for submission, even if these cases meet UNHCR’s selection criteria, because they do not meet the specific admission criteria of a resettlement country. In such situations, the caseworker will seek an alternative country where the case aligns with the criteria. While previous findings have demonstrated how caseworkers advocate for refugees where there is potential for acceptance, the practice of avoiding rejections highlights how caseworkers must navigate between advocating for refugees and recognizing situations where success is unlikely due to the criteria imposed by resettlement countries.

The practice of avoiding rejections is significant because it effectively shifts the exclusion of refugees who do not align with the preferences of resettlement states to an earlier stage in the selection process, before the cases are even considered by the resettlement state. In theory, this practice could hinder vulnerable refugees from accessing resettlement, reinforcing the dynamic of “promising victimhood” at the hands of caseworkers: some vulnerable refugees may not initially be advocated for submission if they fail to meet the resettlement countries integration criteria. However, in practice, a caseworker’s decision not to submit a case does not necessarily affect refugees’ access to resettlement because the likelihood of acceptance by the resettlement country is inherently low when a case fails to meet admission criteria. Moreover, as mentioned above, previous rejections must be disclosed when promoting a case to a new resettlement country, which could make it more difficult for the refugee to obtain resettlement in the future. In this context, refraining from submitting a case to a resettlement country where it is likely to be rejected may improve the refugee’s chances of acceptance when eventually submitted elsewhere.

The practice of avoiding rejections can be seen as an adaptive strategy in response to the challenging work environment faced by caseworkers, characterized by a high number of refugees needing resettlement and limited quota spots. Gilson (2015) notes that street-level bureaucrats often rationalize their adaptive strategies as pragmatic and reasonable within their work settings. This rationalization is evident in a statement by a caseworker:

We make sure we don’t submit refugees that do not fit the criteria. There is always that implicit consideration. We are advocating on behalf of refugees when we submit their cases. You can only advocate where there is a possibility for being accepted.

This perception that advocacy is effective only where there is potential for acceptance reflects a pragmatic mindset among caseworkers.

Influences on Resettlement Selection Outcomes

Having reviewed the empirical findings, we now examine the interplay between top-down directives and bottom-up practices in shaping resettlement outcomes. This section explores how policies and caseworker discretion converge to influence the resettlement process, revealing the intricate dynamics at play.

As the selection process becomes a balancing act between UNHCR’s criteria related to vulnerabilities and the admission criteria of resettlement states, caseworkers utilize discretionary practices to navigate the task of promoting the “appropriate” refugees based on contrasting rationales of refugee deservingness. This supports Lipsky’s (2010) argument that SLBs employ discretionary practices to manage challenging work settings and conflicting mandates. The findings contribute to the existing literature on migration bureaucracies, highlighting how SLBs use various discretionary practices to address the day-to-day challenges in their roles (Darrow 2015; Borrelli 2018; Vandevoordt 2018; Dörrenbächer 2019; Marshall and Béland 2019; Ioannidis et al. 2021). Furthermore, the findings align with Lipsky’s (2010) assertion that caseworkers strive to negotiate policies on behalf of their clients. Through their routine bureaucratic practices, caseworkers optimize their available resources and organize their work to find solutions within constraints.

Consistent with Welfens’ (2022) concept of “promising victimhood,” this study demonstrates that various actors within the resettlement system promote different rationales of deservingness, influenced by the power dynamics between them. It empirically shows how caseworkers navigate the sometimes divergent refugee-deservingness rationales of UNHCR and resettlement countries. Given the nature of their roles, caseworkers play a crucial part in negotiating the demands of promising victimhood on behalf of refugees. By mitigating or circumventing integration and other criteria imposed by resettlement countries which caseworkers perceive as excluding some of the most vulnerable refugees, their practices may moderate the impact of these demands in the resettlement selection process. In doing so, caseworkers act as advocates for the refugees identified by UNHCR as in utmost need, enhancing their access to resettlement opportunities, whenever feasible. These findings suggest that, from the perspective of vulnerable refugees who may not necessarily meet integration criteria, the exercise of discretion by caseworkers has a positive impact. This resonates with Lipsky’s (2010) assertion that the exercise of human judgment by SLBs in public institutions is not only important but also indispensable.

Caseworkers’ use of discretionary practices underscores, as argued by Dahlvik (2017), that frontline bureaucrats engaged in the resettlement selection process are not entirely confined by the structure of the resettlement regime. Caseworkers wield a measure of agency by adjusting their practices within the confines of the established policy framework and guidelines. As demonstrated, the practices of caseworkers ultimately shape policy outcomes and have the potential to influence whether specific cases are nominated for resettlement (and subsequently approved). This highlights how the seemingly everyday and mundane practices (Adler and Pouliot 2011) of caseworkers can influence the outcome of the selection process.

Caseworkers often find themselves in a dual role: advocating for refugees by leveraging their bottom-up power while also adhering to the preferences of the resettlement countries, reflecting the influence of top-down power. Although caseworkers possess a degree of bottom-up power, they are bound by the need to adhere to various guidelines and meet the requirements of the resettlement countries, which ultimately hold authority over the acceptance or rejection of cases proposed by UNHCR. When identifying a refugee with potential for resettlement, caseworkers may advocate on their behalf but exercise caution to avoid actions that could lead to case rejection. Through discretionary practices, caseworkers can, to some extent, influence resettlement outcomes by striving to balance the integration criteria of resettlement states with the needs of the refugees whenever possible.

The findings illuminate the dynamic interplay between the top-down power of resettlement countries, which may exclude some vulnerable refugees through selection criteria, and the bottom-up power of caseworkers, who strive to align their actions with UNHCR’s objective of resettling those in utmost need. This challenges the traditional top-down perspective of policy implementation within the resettlement regime, which assumes that policymakers in resettlement states hold predominant power, often overlooking the influence and agency at lower levels. Recognizing caseworkers’ ability to exert bottom-up influence through their practices adds a nuanced dimension to our understanding of the resettlement framework. Furthermore, the study illustrates that these practices carry significance not only as enacted policy but also as potential catalysts for adjustments in written policy. This empirical analysis reveals the selection process as a complex set of practices, demonstrating how policies are actively interpreted, negotiated, and at times altered by caseworkers on the ground.

Summary and Policy Recommendations

Resettlement is a critical tool aimed at promoting human security and ensuring safety from harm for a selected group of vulnerable individuals. This approach requires the coordinated efforts of various actors to effectively navigate and mitigate potential frictions. Caseworkers face the complex challenge of selecting suitable refugees for resettlement, striving to balance the UNHCR’s goal of prioritizing those in greatest need with the diverse preferences of resettlement states. The objective of this study was to address knowledge gaps concerning the resettlement system by examining the implementation of selection criteria, specifically within the operations of UNHCR Rwanda, and provide a new empirical analysis of the concept of “promising victimhood.”

The findings illuminate the intricate situations caseworkers encounter as they manage the expectations placed on refugees and highlight the use of discretionary power by caseworkers in handling these challenges. In their decision-making process, UNHCR caseworkers consider both the explicit and implicit admission criteria of the resettlement states, including the integration criteria outlined by several resettlement countries. The study reveals various ways in which caseworkers exercise discretion to meet selection criteria for resettlement, identifying the following practices: navigating flexibility in resettlement criteria; applying implicit admission criteria; adopting submission strategies based on resettlement country processing times; negotiating with resettlement countries during selection missions; channeling criticism, feedback, and guidance through UNHCR’s HQ; and avoiding case rejections. The analysis aligns with the assumptions of SLBT, which anticipates that caseworkers will employ discretionary practices to navigate ambiguous or conflicting guidelines. The findings indicate that frontline workers in Rwanda use a variety of strategies to meet the selection criteria for resettlement while advocating for refugees whom UNHCR considers eligible based on vulnerabilities.

The study contributes to the field by enhancing our understanding of the complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up forces within the resettlement selection process, highlighting caseworkers’ active role in shaping resettlement outcomes. These insights provide policymakers with insights about how policies established by resettlement states may influence the practices of caseworkers and, conversely, how bottom-up dynamics may influence policy outcomes.

For future research, it is recommended to address the limited scope of this study through observational studies. Such research, ideally conducted over longer periods, would provide a more comprehensive understanding of practices within the resettlement system and better assess the systematic nature of these practices. Further research could also explore how these findings applies to NGO-led resettlement submissions, such as those by RefugePoint, HIAS, IRAP, and other organizations, as well as Italy’s humanitarian corridors program, where actors like Caritas and Sant’Egidio are involved in refugee identification. Additionally, examining these findings in the context of complementary pathways, such as labor mobility programs in the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK, and Italy, where non-UNHCR actors identify candidates, could provide further insights.

Moreover, further exploration of the intersection between bureaucratic practices and humanitarian aims is essential for enhancing our comprehension of the broader dynamics influencing resettlement outcomes. This is crucial for ensuring that resettlement remains a fair mechanism for providing refugees with a pathway to long-term security. Given that resettlement continues to be a critical tool in addressing refugee situations, it is imperative to refine our understanding and methodologies in this field. This approach is not only academically valuable but also critical for developing policies that more effectively address the challenges faced by refugees seeking lasting solutions.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The Research Council of Norway funded the research of this study in Rwanda.

ORCID iDs

Kine Marie Bækkevold

Ingunn Bjørkhaug

Jerome Irankunda

Shai André Divon

Notes

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