Biological weapons can take many forms and have been designed for a variety of purposes, including—but not limited to—attacks on human populations. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention has played a key role in the comprehensive prohibition and prevention of such weapons over the past 50 years. To sustain this prohibition into the future, states parties to the treaty must carefully monitor advances in science and technology, while also remaining vigilant against the risks posed by older, outdated forms of biological weapons.
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