This article draws its analytical approach from neoclassical realism (NCR). It focuses on empirical evidence that explains (a) India’s reluctance to adopt nuclear weapons as the basis of national defence; (b) the decision to drop its reluctance and officially make nuclear weapons the foundation of national security; (c) the adoption of a minimalist approach to deterrence as a starting point for national policy; (d) the subsequent partial shift away from minimalism; and (e) the neglect of the conventional-nuclear linkage thereafter. It expands the ambit of NCR by introducing a neglected normative dimension into the theory and bringing out the complexities involved in the theory’s subcategories. It shows how the initial reluctance to pursue a nuclear deterrence strategy was driven by a conscious normative choice, whereas the post-nuclearization process has been driven by both normative restraint and a largely unconscious choice of expanding capability as well as neglecting nuclear–conventional links relating to emergent technologies.
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