In this survey, we present recent developments in the literature on Network games. We briefly cover the literature on Communication situations and the corresponding allocation rules. This is followed by a review on the existing player- and link-based fixed and flexible allocation rules for networks. It is worth mentioning that all the allocation rules hitherto found in the literature are either player- or link-based which means that they give emphasis either on the players or on the links they form, but not both equally.
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